
Class _-LjB_M£i 
Book 




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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF LEARNING 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
LEARNING 

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
ECONOMY AND TECHNIQUE OF MEMORY 

BY 

E. MEUMANN 

n _ 
Professor of Philosophy in Hamburg 



Translated jrovi the Third Edition of "The Economy 
and Technique of Learning" 

BY 
JOHN WALLACE BAIRD 

Professor of Experimental Psychology, Clark University 




D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 
NEW YORK LONDON 



V* 






Copyright, 1913. 
By D. Appleton and Company 



/^ 



d-« 



>CI,A35407o 



PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION 

I have gladly consented to the publication of this transla- 
tion of my "Economy and Technique of Learning," because 
the monograph will be made accessible to a larger number 
of readers. 

Experimental psychology and the most important field 
where it finds practical application, — that is, experimental 
pedagogy, — are based upon the product of the combined 
efforts of students of psychology and pedagogy in the United 
States and in Germany; it may indeed be said that these 
sciences have been created by the two nations. So firmly am 
I convinced of this community of interest and of endeavor 
that in all of my writing I constantly keep the American 
reader in mind. Much wider in scope than the "exchange of 
professors" between these two countries have been this con- 
tinuous interchange of scientific ideas and this mutual inspi- 
ration which have been going on these many years. 

In both coimtries, too, there is a deep-rooted conviction 
that the most important problems of the science of educa- 
tion can be solved only by an appeal to experimental psychol- 
ogy, and by an application of the methods of psychology to 
tlie problems of pedagogy. 

The more then must one deplore the fact that until recently 
experimental psychology has devised no means by which the 
pupil's daily tasks of learning in all its various forms may be 
accomplished more readily. The efforts which had hitherto 
been made to facihtate the work of learning were limited 
either to the old, and harmful, custom of transforming the 
memorial material into verse and then memorizing the verse 



vi Preface to the American Edition 

mechanically, or to the employment of other mnemonic de- 
vices. But mnemonics admits of only a very limited application 
both in the affairs of daily life and in the work of the school- 
room; and since it burdens the memory with a mass of arti- 
ficial auxiliary ideas, it really increases instead of diminish- 
ing the work of memory. Moreover, the discovery and 
employment of mnemonic aids demands a degree of ingenuity 
which is not possessed by every child. 

The increased demands of the present age require children 
to master a much greater body of knowledge than was deemed 
necessary in former generations. This condition has given 
rise to the problem as to the best means of avoiding over- 
burdening the pupil, which is an inevitable result of his 
increased tasks. This difficult problem can not be solved by 
eliminating important subjects from the curriculum; it can 
be solved only by devising improvements in methods of 
learning and in methods of teaching which shall be psycho- 
logically sound. 

It is the aim of the present monograph to meet this urgent 
demand for methods of learning which shall be psychologically 
most appropriate, and which shall embrace all of the different 
kinds of learning. It begins with methodical observation as 
the basis of all memorial work. It seeks to develop rules for 
systematic observation. It discusses the most favorable sub- 
jective and objective conditions for mechanical memoriza- 
tion; and it endeavors to establish at least a few of the car- 
dinal points for the retention of logical associations, — a 
process whose nature is still imperfectly known. Our present 
knowledge of the economy and technique of learning is still 
in need of being supplemented by practical instructions as 
to how best to master the various concrete tasks with which 
the pupil is daily concerned. 

Such directions dealing with the retention of concrete 



Preface to the American Edition vii 

material, with the learning of foreign vocabularies, of names 
and dates, of poems and prose selections, I hope to pubHsh 
in the near future; and it may be that that may also be 
made accessible to American readers. 

I desire here to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Baird for 
undertaking the work of translating this monograph. 

E. Meumann. 



PREFACE TO THE THIRD GERMAN 
EDITION 

The experimental investigation of memory has made sub- 
stantial progress since the second edition of this book was 
published. The pioneer work of Ebbinghaus has been sup- 
plemented by several psychologists, who have hoped by this 
means to extend our knowledge of the general basis of me- 
morial function and to discover its laws. Psychiatrists and 
pathologists have made an accurate study of pathological 
disturbances of memory, which furnish a new insight into the 
functioning of normal memory. Semon, Rignano and others 
have thrown a wholly new Hght upon the bodily correlates of 
memorial processes; and certain of the more recent sum- 
maries which cover the whole field of memory, such as those 
of Offner and Schoeneberger, have also contributed to the 
solution of our problems. 

A new edition of this book must, therefore, consist in a 
complete working over and an extensive supplementation of 
the text of the first and second editions. 

Important changes have been made in the first three 
chapters. The chief purpose which I have had in view in 
introducing the supplementations in the present edition was 
to meet the demands of a wider circle of readers. My readers 
have repeatedly expressed the desire that I should incorpo- 
rate a brief summary of the fundamentals of the general 
psychology of memory. Accordingly, I have presented in 
the opening chapters an epitome of the essential features of 
the present psychology of memory; and lest the introductory 
chapters of the book should become too extended, the dis- 



X Preface to the Third German Edition 

cussion of the researches in psychiatry, which was presented 
in detail in the second edition, has been condensed. As a 
result of this the book now approximates a psychology of 
memory; but, in order that the original purpose of the book 
should not be abandoned, the results of psychological experi- 
ments have, so far as possible, been considered throughout 
from the point of view of their significance for practical life 
and for the work of the school. 

The fact that the first and second editions were exhausted 
within a few years shows that educators are recognizing, 
more and more, the importance of experimental psychology 
and pedagogy for the work of the schools. Numerous com- 
munications, inquiries, suggestions, and expressions of ap- 
proval of the discussions of the first and second editions have 
come to me from teachers; and they have been so numerous 
that I could not, unfortunately, always reply as I should 
wish. 

May the new edition win new friends for experimental psy- 
chology and pedagogy! 

E. Meumann. 

Hamburg, February, 191 2. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 



Introduction: The Meaning of the Economy and 

Technique of Learning xiii 

I. A Survey of the Modern Psychology of Memory i 

II. The Functions of Memory 34 

III. Observational Learning: The Technique of Observing 

and Learning 

1. Analysis of Observational Noting 49 

IV. Observational Learning (Continued) 

2. The Experimental Investigation of Observa- 

tional Noting 78 

V. Associative Learning: The Technique and Economy 

of Learning 139 

1 . Memory Types, Learning Types, and Ideational 

Types 169 

2. More Detailed Description of Ideational Types 

and Memory Types, and their Fundamental 

Characteristics 187 

VI. Associative Learning (Continued) 

3. Economical Learning 231 

4. The Conditions and the Technique of Mechan- 

ical Learning 255 

VII. Associative Learning (Continued) 

5. The Learning of Significant Materials 290 

6. Experimental Investigation of the Effect of 

Learning; Stages of Learning; Retention and 
Forgetting 313 

7. The Education of Memory in the Schools 335 

8. The Actual Memorial Efficiency of School 

Children Compared with the Results of Ex- 
perimental In\estigations 347 

xi 



xii Contents 

PAGE 

Appendix I. The Construction of Series of Nonsense 

Syllables 365 

Appendix II. The Meaning of Economy of Time and 

Energy in Learning 368 

Appendix III. Addenda from the ]\Iost Recent Literature 374 

Bibliography 378 

Index of Authors 385 

Index of Subjects 389 



INTRODUCTION 

THE MEANING OF THE ECONOMY AND TECHNIQUE 
OF LEARNING 

The experimental treatment of the problems of psychology 
and pedagogy has furnished the modern student with a 
wealth of information which remained unknown during the 
non-experimental stages of these sciences. And this knowl- * 
edge proves to be of profound practical significance in direct- 
ing the efiforts of both the teacher and the pupil. Psycho- 
logical and pedagogical experimentation has given us an 
insight into the complex conditions of mental activity; and 
we are beginning to lay a secure foundation for the technique 
and economy of mental work. The mental processes which 
constitute the basis of the school-work of pupils are opened 
up to exact analysis; a great part of the mental work of 
children which was formerly left to accidental success and 
to the instincts of the child can now be directed in a manner 
which is psychologically most appropriate. All of these are 
problems of which the older pedagogy had scarcely an ink- 
ling; and the pedagogy of the future will be enriched by a 
new sub-division of "method" because, in addition to 
methods of teaching, methods of learning must also be con- 
sidered. Many of the investigations which are now being 
devoted to an analysis of the mental life of the child have 
not yet extended beyond the four walls of the psychological 
laboratory. Indeed, the subject-matter of the present volume 
is drawn from investigations in experimental pedagogy which 
are still far from being completed in all of their details; and 



xiv Introduction 

this circumstance may explain why many of our inferences 
bearing upon the work of the school-room are still hypothet- 
ical in character. The reader will find, however, that we have 
drawn a distinction throughout between statement of estab- 
lished fact and statement of mere conjecture. 

The questions which will be discussed in this volume are 
concerned, in the first place, with the general principles of 
our modern doctrine of memory, and with the technique and 
economy of "mental noting," — by which is meant the imprint- 
ing upon memory of any sort of material as a result of atten- 
tive perception and observation where no special effort to 
learn is present; next in order come the technique and econ- 
omy of verbatim learning; then the economy of memory in 
general in school-children; the fundamental differences of 
memory- types among individuals; and, finally, a number of 
interesting miscellaneous results which have been obtained 
as a by-product of the experimental investigation of memory. 

In the traditional pedagogy we read a great deal about 
methods of teaching; but, in most cases, the pedagogical 
text-books can tell us nothing about methods of learning. 
And yet we find ourselves confronted by the very serious 
question as to whether the efficiency of school-room manage- 
ment may not be increased by systematically improving the 
pupil's procedure in the act of learning in such a fashion that 
his learning may be perfected in its technical aspects and 
accomplished more economically. This question becomes the 
more pressing in modern times because our courses of study, 
in their attempt to comply with the increasing requirements 
of practical life, are becoming more and more exacting in the 
demands which they make upon the memory tasks of school- 
children. 

In order to make this clear to the reader, we must first 
of all develop the meaning of the economy and technique of 



Introduction xv 

learning. Ignoring for the present the fact that we may 
speak of learning or imprinting upon memory in very different 
senses, we find that in every kind of memorial acquisition of 
every sort of material, in practical Hfe or in the school-room, 
the learner must always fulfil the following conditions: 

1. In the act of learning, he must endeavor to proceed in 
the most suitable manner and in accordance with psycholog- 
ical conditions of learning, i.e., he must fulfil those conditions 
of learning under which the particular, present purpose of 
his learning can best be attained. For instance, if the aim 
of his learning be, in one case, a literal memorization of a 
poem, in a second case, a permanent retention of a concrete 
material, and in yet a third case, the association of foreign 
words with their equivalents or synonyms in his own language, 
this diversity of purpose brings with it a diversity in the con- 
ditions of learning under which his goal can best be attained. 
We must attempt to investigate these conditions and to make 
the learner familiar with them/ 

2. All the varieties of memorial acquisition have, however, 
certain characteristics in common because they are all me- 
morial work in the broadest sense of that term ; and all memorial 
work, in turn, is subject to certain general conditions and 
laws, which must be fulfilled if anything is to be imprinted 
permanently upon memory. These general conditions of all 
learning must also be investigated; and the learner must 
become familiar with them if he is to be able to fulfil them 
in his act of learning. 

3. Every learner has his own peculiar individuality, and 

* It is really self-evident but since other views of the matter are 
held it must be mentioned that upon the point of view of the purpose 
which the learner seeks to attain depend all other points of view con- 
cerning the economy of learning, even that of economy of time and 
of energy. 



xvi Introduction 

his own individual endowment; and in consequence of these 
the general conditions of learning and the means of attaining 
a special goal in learning are often modified to a considerable 
degree. From this it follows that individual variations in 
memorial work must be investigated; and each individual 
must be trained to employ his own procedure correctly. 

4. Besides these general conditions of learning, and these 
individual conditions, and these conditions which depend 
upon the purpose which the learner has in view, we must 
consider certain artifices or artificial devices which may 
facihtate the act of learning. Every technique involves 
certain artifices or tricks of skill, certain artificial aids and 
modes of procedure by means of which an end may more 
readily be attained; and the technique of mental work is no 
exception to this general rule. It is a well-known fact that 
mnemonic devices are alleged to furnish an aid to memory. 
Hence it devolves upon a technique of learning to inquire 
into the psychological justification and the practical utility 
of artificial aids to memory; and rules which are at once 
psychologically sound and justified by the purpose in view 
must be formulated for the employment of such devices as 
aids to memorial work. 

5. All of the foregoing refers to the technique of learning. 
But in addition to this we aspire to an economy of learning. 
It is the purpose of an economy of learning to enable the 
learner to secure a maximum result at a minimum cost of 
time and of energy, and consequently to enable him to accom- 
plish his task with a minimum degree of fatigue and with a 
minimum danger of over-fatigue. 

It may be said, in summary, that an economy and tech- 
nique of learning endeavors to investigate not only the gen- 
eral mental conditions of learning but also those special 
mental conditions which depend upon the specific purpose 



Introduction xvii 

for which a particular act of learning may have been under- 
taken; it also endeavors to make these various conditions 
subject to the will of the learner. It attempts to specify the 
particular conditions which depend upon the peculiar mental 
constitution of the individual learner; it investigates the 
possibihty of taking advantage of technical aids and artifices 
in learning, and of finding a psychological and a practical 
justification for employing them; it aims to give the learner 
instructions as to the best means of saving time and energy, 
and of attaining the highest degree of efiiciency in remem- 
bering and reproducing what he has learned/ Our problem 
then may be said to deal with the question: What methods 
or modes of procedure in learning are based upon a sound 
psychological, technical and economical foundation? 

There is always a parallel between the subjective aspect, — 
the economy and technique of the work of the pupil, — and 
the objective aspect, — the teacher's presentation of the ma- 
terial to be learned, — in so far as the pupil's procedure is de- 
termined by the teacher's mode of presentation. For instance, 
if at one time the pupil acquires a given material in a visual 
fashion, from seeing it, and at another time in an auditory 
fashion, from hearing it, his mode of acquisition has varied 
with the mode of presentation; it took its start from the 
written or printed text, in the former case, from the oral 
statement of the teacher, in the latter case. Hence in so 
far as these different external starting-points of the pupil's 
activity in learning constitute subjective conditions of his 
activity, we may also speak of an economy of presenting 
material to be learned. 

It is evident that this way of looking at the matter consists 
simply in regarding the subjective conditions of learning from 

^ For a discussion of the various meanings of economy of learning 
the reader is referred to Appendix II. 
2 



xviii Introduction 

the objective point of view, the mode of presentation. Yet 
there are certain practical reasons wliich justify^ a separate 
discussion of the influence of presentation upon learning. 

It may also be noted that the experiments which deal with 
the presentation of material contain the first beginnings of a 
new branch of pedagogy, which may be called the economy 
and technique of teaching. And it may be that the psychol- 
ogy of memory will furnish the means of taking the first step 
toward an accurate experimental determination of rules and 
norms of teaching. In the discussions which are to follow, 
this possibiHty will frequently be indicated. 

These general statements may be illustrated in detail by 
an observation of the memorial work of pupils. Even at an 
early age the pupil is called upon to accomphsh a great variety 
of mental tasks; and we require of him a work of memory 
to wliich he brings but Httle, if any, experience. Now, mental 
work may be done by wholly different methods; the pupil's 
procedure may be exceedingly wasteful of time and energy, or 
it may consist in the formation of such associations as shall 
employ his mental energies in the most advantageous manner. 
For example, in memorizing a poem he may go through a slow 
and laborious process of adapting his attention to the subject- 
matter in question; or he may concentrate his attention 
intensively from the outset. His repetitions of the poem 
may be mechanical and barren of result; or he may make 
every repetition contribute its quota to the memorization of 
the material. He may make much or little use of the factor 
of rhythm; he may make much or little use of the meaning 
of the poem; he may pronounce the words audibly, semi- 
audibly or inaudibly; he may employ a rapid rate of pro- 
nunciation or a slow and emphatic pronunciation; he may 
divide the poem into small sections and memorize each sec- 
tion independently, or he may read the whole poem through 



Introduction 



XIX 



each time from beginning to end and memorize it as a unitary 
whole; he may learn it at a single sitting, or he may devote 
several sittings to the task, distributing the work over a 
longer period of time and introducing pauses between the 
several sittings; his learning may be of a purely successive 
sort, or he may employ in part successive and in part simul- 
taneous and regressive associations. 

Which of these methods of learning leads most readily and 
most rapidly to the goal, — to fluent and errorless reproduc- 
tion? Which method secures the most permanent and the 
most accurate retention? Questions such as these arise in 
connection with every sort of memorial imprinting, — even 
with the imprinting of concrete sensory material, whether 
presented but once or presented repeatedly. Here again the 
learner may proceed in an unsystematic fashion with an 
extravagant expenditure of time and energy; or he may ful- 
fil all of the conditions which are necessary for a systematic 
and effective imprinting of the material upon his conscious- 
ness. Thus in every department of memorial function we 
may speak of a technique and economy of memory; and 
that is the topic which we propose to evolve, in its essential 
features, in this volume. If we are to attain this end we 
must first discuss the foundation of the modern psychology 
of memory in order that, from this vantage ground, we may 
be able to throw light upon the various functions of memory, 
and upon the various sorts and cases of memorial activity for 
which we are to formulate specific, technical rules. Then we 
shall attempt to give the reader an insight into the experi- 
mental investigations which have, in recent times, established 
the conditions of the various sorts of memorial activity; and 
finally we shall discuss the more important results of these 
investigations, and indicate their significance for the work 
of the teacher. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING 

CHAPTER I 

A SURVEY OF THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGY OF MEMORY 

In every-day speech, memory is understood to mean the 
capacity to imprint and to retain perceptions and ideas and, 
as it were, to incorporate them into consciousness as a tempo- 
rary or permanent possession. That such an imprinting or 
incorporation has taken place, however, is revealed to us only 
by the fact that we can subsequently recall our experiences; 
but when the same impressions recur to consciousness we 
detect certain changes in our attitude and behavior, — a 
feeling of familiarity, a greater facility in re-learning, and the 
like. Strictly speaking then, we have an immediate knowledge 
only of the process of imprinting, on the one hand, and of 
the subsequent reproduction and the changed attitude on the 
other; everything that lies between these two termini com- 
pletely escapes our direct knowledge. In so far then as we 
are limited to empirical observation, the sole manifestations 
of memory consist either in a reproduction or in a changed 
re-experiencing or in a modified re-learning of what has 
previously been experienced or learned. 

Now since reproduction must necessarily depend, in some 
sense, upon a retention of impressions, and since our modified 
acquisition must be due to an after-effect of former contents 
of consciousness, memory may be briefly defined, for the 
present, as the capacity to retain perceptions or ideas and 
subsequently to revive them, or at least to experience after- 



2 The Psychology of Learning 

effects of their former presence in consciousness. And since 
it seems probable that an "after-effect" is only a species of 
reproduction, the present consequences of former memorial 
activity may all be referred to briefly as reproduction. 

Educational psychology regards memory as a definite func- 
tion and capacity which serves certain educative purposes. 
General or theoretical psychology, on the contrary, concerns 
itself, as a rule, not with mental capacities or functions but 
only with mental processes. The mental processes which 
are fundamental to memory are, on the one hand, the im- 
printing of impressions and the forming of associations among 
ideas, and on the other hand, the reproduction or revival or 
reappearance of ideas in consciousness; between these two 
processes lies the hidden intermediate member, the after- 
effect of former impressions or ideas, which is to be conceived 
as a latent survival of the dispositions and associations which 
were established by the original imprinting. It is important 
that association be distinguished from reproduction. Asso- 
ciation is the initial formation of a connection between ideas 
which are present in consciousness simultaneously or in im- 
mediate succession, or which occur at least as links in a chain 
of ideas which constitutes some sort of a unitary whole for us. 
Reproduction, on the other hand, is the appearance of ideas 
in consciousness, or the entrance of ideas into consciousness, — 
a phenomenon which is rendered possible in most cases by a 
previously established association between these ideas and 
other ideas. In order to account for the imprinting and the 
subsequent reappearing of the idea, psychologists usually 
assume that every perception or idea which comes to con- 
sciousness, even if only once, leaves behind it a trace or 
after-effect. And since this residuum has to do with subse- 
quent revival it is called a disposition to revival. The term 
disposition has a dual significance here. It indicates that the 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 3 

idea tends to recur to consciousness through the aid of other 
ideas, or even in consequence of its own energy; but it also 
indicates that every revival of an idea is facilitated by impres- 
sions and by other ideas. 

The doctrine of memory and of its origin in the association 
and reproduction of ideas has undergone a considerable change 
in modern psychology. The significance of memory has been 
essentially broadened and extended; and attempts have been 
made to distinguish memory more accurately from cognate 
mental processes. 

The extension of the meaning of memory takes its origin 
from an endeavor, in itself perfectly justified, to bring the 
phenomenon as manifested by man, into relation with a group 
of related phenomena which occur elsewhere in nature. It 
has been hoped by this means to bring memory more nearly 
within the range of our comprehension, and especially to 
demonstrate the organic basis of memory dispositions. Thus 
the physiologists Hering, in i860, and Hensen, in 1877, 
attempted to show that *' memory is a universal property of 
organic matter." This view was extended by Haeckel, Forel 
and Mach, and more recently in a comprehensive volume by 
Richard Semon.^ Semon calls the memory processes in general 
"mnemic" processes; and organic memory he calls mneme, 
— from the Greek \i.<zr\\rr\, memory. This extension of the 
meaning of memory receives its support from the fact that 
every process or activity which has once occurred in organ- 
ized matter, — in nerve, in muscle, or even in simple cell or 
in groups of cells, — leaves behind it a disposition or after- 
effect as a result of which the same activity, on being repeated, 
is accomplished more easily and with a lesser expenditure of 
energy, and also in somewhat modified form. This survival 
of the dispositional after-effects of every activity is also the 
^ See Bibliography at the end of this volume. 



4 The Psychology of Learning 

basis of all of the effects which result from practice; and thus 
memory is brought into relation with all of the phenomena 
of practice. Now, it seems probable that the basis of all 
memory processes, in human as well as in animal conscious- 
ness, is to be sought in the physical phenomenon that former 
impressions and ideas,— or more strictly speaking, the physi- 
cal parallels of these mental processes, — do leave behind them 
such a disposition to a more ready recurrence. There is no 
doubt that in this respect the human function of memory 
suggests characteristics which are common to all organic 
matter. But it is only to this rudimentary and general basis 
of memory in parallel bodily processes that we can apply 
this extended meaning of memory; and such a procedure 
does not help us in the slightest degree to understand the 
origin or nature of memory as a mental process. We must 
not lose sight of the fact that the survival of these enduring 
dispositions of impressions becomes comprehensible to us only 
when we assume that material modifications, of a temporary 
or permanent sort, take place in a substance which itself 
persists throughout; and that these modifications subse- 
quently facilitate the recurrence of the activity to which 
they owe their existence. 

Dispositions, in this sense of a permanent modification of 
an organ, do not exist in the domain of consciousness; nor 
can we speak, in any such sense, of mental or psychical dispo- 
sitions. When a muscle or a group of muscles has made a 
particular movement a great many times, there ensues a 
muscular change which is continuously present as a persistent 
modification of the muscle-substance — a modification of its 
mass, of its structure, or of its chemical or molecular consti- 
tution. And these modifications constitute the basis of the 
muscle's subsequent capacity to accomplish the same activity 
in a more easy fashion. A somewhat analogous state of affairs 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 5 

must be assumed for nerve-substance, and especially for the 
nerve-cells of the cerebral cortex, to which we ascribe those 
neural processes which run parallel with the processes of con- 
sciousness. But we find nothing in the domain of conscious- 
ness which is in any way a counter-part of this permanent 
modification of nerve-substance. So far as the phenomena 
of consciousness are concerned, we see only the results or the 
efifects of the repetition of an activity or an impression, — for 
instance, we see simply the reproduction or the facilitated 
acquisition of the impression. We do not find any permanent 
modification of consciousness itself which can serve as a 
basis for this resultant of former activity. From this it fol- 
lows, firstly, that we cannot speak of psychical dispositions 
in the same sense in which we speak of physical dispositions. 
Psychical dispositions must consist solely in the fact that 
mental processes run their course differently as a result of 
repeated recurrence. A second consequence is that, in so 
far as their bodily aspect is concerned, it becomes possible 
to explain the phenomena of practice, — and the processes of 
memory are phenomena of practice, — by referring them back 
to a more general physiological principle. So far as their 
mental aspect is concerned, on the contrary, such a tracing 
back of the processes of practice and memory to more general 
phenomena is impossible. They are rather to be regarded as 
ultimate facts; and we can only establish them as facts. 

A second extension of the concept of memory is concerned 
with the mental aspect of memorial phenomena. This exten- 
sion owes its origin to pathology and psychiatry (the inves- 
tigation of the pathological conditions of mental life); it is 
interesting to note, however, that it was anticipated by the 
French philosopher Malebranche. It has been observed that 
all memory training has a twofold effect: a general or func- 
tional effect, which is to be regarded as essentially a phe- 



6 The Psychology of Learning 

nomenon of practice; and a special effect, which has to do 
with the content or material which is remembered. Kraepelin 
refers to this as a distinction between general memory and 
special memory.^ Whenever we train the memory with any 
sort of material we bring about a twofold result: i. The 
material or content is imprinted upon our consciousness, and 
is thereby rendered capable of being subsequently repro- 
duced; or in other words, by means of the activity of memory 
we acquire knowledge, a stock of particular ideas whose per- 
manence of retention is proportionate to the thoroughness of 
their imprinting. 2. But we also train the memory itself, i. e., 
our general retentive and reproductive capacity is strength- 
ened and improved by every act of memory. In this regard, 
also, the whole activity of memory appears as a phenomenon 
of practice, as it does in regard to memorial traces or dispo- 
sitions. But our general capacity to retain and to reproduce 
also depends, in turn, upon the development of other func- 
tions of consciousness, especially upon the concentration and 
persistence of attention, the effort of will, the emotional con- 
dition and the Hke.^ 

Thus in training the memory we always develop all of these 
other formal capacities of mind as well; and hence in exer- 
cising the memory we derive an advantage not only in the 
direction of an acquisition of knowledge but also in the direc- 
tion of an improvement of all of the general functions which 
are active in the work of memory and which make memory 
possible. It was this twofold function of memory which led 
to a distinction between general and special memory. This 

^ E. Kraepelin, Der psychologische Versuch in der Psychiatric, 
Psychologische Arbeit en, I., 1894, 48. 

^Cf. Ebert und Meumann, Ueber einige Grundfragcn der Psychol- 
ogic der Ucbungsphanomene im Bereiche des Gedachtnisses, Archiv 
f. d. gesamle Psychol. IV., 1904, 2oSfI. 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 7 

distinction, however, is by no means free from objection 
because the concept of a general memory is a sheer logical 
abstraction. As a matter of fact, we have no general memory, 
but only a number of special memories; and the term "gen- 
eral memory" has had its origin a. in the fact that every 
exercise of memory has this formal and general effect, that we 
develop it in all of its formal aspects, not only its capacity 
to acquire practice-dispositions in the domain of intellect, but 
also its capacity to set attention and will to work in the service 
of memory, h. But another fact has given rise to the con- 
cept of a general memory, — the fact that the training of each 
special memory is not confined to the special memory which 
is trained, but that all the other memories which are qualita- 
tively similar or related to this special memory are trained as 
a result of its training. 

The fact that related functions of memory are influenced 
by each other's training in proportion to the intimacy of their 
relation is our chief justification for speaking of phenomena 
of general practice in the domain of memory. The overlapping 
of training to related functions, however, is not a sufficient 
justification for assuming the existence of a general memory. 
In short, the concept of a general memory must, in my opin- 
ion, give place to the twofold concept i. that all memory 
training, besides its acquisition of content, also brings with 
it the cultivation of certain general functions which co-operate 
in all memorial acquisition; and 2, that each member of a 
group of special memories which are related to one another 
shares in the profits which are derived from the training of 
any member of the group.^ Of more importance than this 
extension of the meaning of memory are the attempts which 
have been made to define more accurately the nature of me- 

^ This latter phenomenon was pointed out by Ebert and Meumann, 
Op. cit. 200. 



8 The Psychology of Lcar^iing 

morial processes themselves . Modern psychology has modified 
the old view that memory consists in a retention and revival 
of ideas. It is not true that memory is simply a revival of 
old ideas, and that imagination differs from memory in that 
the former transforms ideas and re-combines them in novel and 
original forms. Every-day experience, no less than psycho- 
logical investigation, shows us that memory also transforms 
ideas. 

In the first place, our recollection of former experiences is 
invariably and necessarily of a more or less fragmentary 
character; and, in the second place, lacunae in our remem- 
brances are filled, in involuntary fashion, either by our cus- 
tomary associations rushing in and fusing with our fragmen- 
tary ideas, or by our function of judgment adding its quota 
to the remembered data. In this way, using parts of really 
remembered ideas, we build up a mosaic picture of the whole 
experience which we seem to remember. Rodenwaldt inves- 
tigated the memories of a number of adults, employing as 
his material a picture of an infant in a cradle. The majority 
of his observers "remembered" that the color of the cradle 
was brown although it really was a conspicuous blue in the 
picture. Such falsifications of memory are products of the 
fusion of habitual associations. Since the wooden cradles 
which we ordinarily see are brown and not blue, the idea of 
the brown color comes in to supplement our memory of the 
picture of the cradle, and fuses with it if we have forgotten 
the real color. The second sort of transformation of our 
remembrances, which is a product of judgment, occurs 
especially in those cases where our perception turns out to 
have been of a fragmentary sort. In such cases we always 
endeavor by means of the function of judgment to eke out 
a picture of the complete details of the experience, and to 
combine the various components to form such a complete 



The Modern Psychology of Memory g 

context as shall seem most probable. In combinations such 
as these it is extremely difficult to make a clear distinction 
between what is remembered and what is contributed by 
imagination and judgment because these parts blend together 
to form a unitary whole for consciousness. Striking illus- 
trations of this phenomenon are found in errors of testimony, 
which will be described in the fourth chapter. This process 
has not yet been sufficiently investigated by psychology. 
We may call it memorial assimilation; it is w^holly analogous 
with perceptual assimilation which is a much more familiar 
phenomenon. For even in perception we continually supple- 
ment the sensory impressions of the moment by customary 
ideas which the former arouse, and which seek to fuse with 
them. 

But memorial contents undergo other transformations. 
They enter into fusions with one another, especially in cases 
where two groups of ideas closely resemble each other. I 
have frequently observed that my memory-images of pictures 
by certain noted painters who deal with similar subjects, for 
instance paintings by Jordaens and Rubens, fuse so com- 
pletely with one another that I wholly fail to hold them apart 
in thought. And then my remembrance of a particular 
painting by Rubens sometimes becomes a composite of the 
memory-images of the picture in question and of a similar 
picture by Jordaens. Phenomena of this sort frequently 
occur in my experience. In general, it is remembrances of 
similar impressions which combine with one another in this 
fashion. Thus our mental images of cities, of mountain 
landscapes, of similar faces of acquaintances frequently fuse 
without our being aware of the blending until we find an 
opportunity to compare the remembrance with the original.' 

' These memorial fusions of similar impressions were revealed in 
striking fashion in Ranschburg's investigation of the immediate reten- 



10 The Psychology of Learning 

This mutability of memory-images is inherent in the very 
nature of memorial processes themselves. Only in very excep- 
tional cases arc our memory-images mere revivals of single 
perceptions. They are, as a rule, revivals of a multitude of 
perceptions which may have been widely different from one 
another. Hence our idea of any given object must have come 
about by a fusion of various perceptions with their several 
memory-images. Even when I have an idea of a particular 
thing, — of a personal acquaintance, for instance, — this idea 
is the revival of numerous particular perceptions in which 
my acquaintance was seen from different points of view, under 
different conditions of illumination, in different dress, with 
different facial expressions, with different movements, with 
different vocal expressions, etc. Indeed, even in those cases 
where I have seen a man or a landscape but once, the percep- 
tion consists of a great variety of details of perception whose 
contents differ. Out of these the micmory-image is built up 
by a process of fusion. And it is for this reason that memory- 
images can never be simple copies of things; their contents 
must be the product of a certain transformation or free com- 
bination of several particular remembrances or perceptions. 
Even those things which have been committed to memory are 
always acquired as the result of a number of acts of learning; 
and in each act of learning the idea of the thing undergoes a 
change. Hence here, too, the idea is the product of a fusion 
of various impressions. 

Finally, our interpretations of phenomena and their emo- 
tional values contribute to the formation of memory-images, 
in that they select certain of the perceived and the remem- 
bered elements. This selective activity not only differs from 



tion of numbers. P. Ranschburg, Ueber die Bcdeutung der Aehnlich- 
keit beim Erlernen, Behalten und bei der Rcproduktion, Journal f. 
Psychol, u. Neurol. V., 1905, 93-127, 



The Modern Psychology of Memory ii 

individual to individual, but even in the same individual it 
varies with the progress of his development and of his knowl- 
edge. Thus it comes about that an idea depicts not merely 
a thing but also my reflection about the thing. Our inter- 
pretation of objects, our practical or theoretical evaluations 
of objects play a part in the formation of our complex ideas 
without our making any intentional contribution. Finally, 
many ideas are not mere copies of particular objects; they 
relate to whole groups or classes of objects which are repre- 
sented or symbolized by them in consciousness. In such cases 
many objects, which may be of wholly different sorts, are rep- 
resented by a single particular idea or by the parts of a partic- 
ular idea; and by this means the idea acquires "representa- 
tive universaHty." 

This view of the nature of the idea, which we owe to experi- 
mental investigation, is wholly different from the naive view 
of the older psychology which regarded ideas simply as copies 
of particular things. It follows that an idea is not a simple 
revival of a definitely perceived thing but is always the 
product of many perceptions and of their subjective elabor- 
ation by the perceiver. Hence every memory-image repre- 
sents a greater or lesser degree of subjective transformation and 
free combination of impressions derived from perception. 
Applied to memory this means that memorial activity does 
not consist in a simple revival of ideas of a former object; but 
that in every reproduction of an idea, memory is always influ- 
enced by numerous former perceptions, by other remem- 
brances, and by a subjective elaboration of former impressions. 

From this it may be inferred that particular memory-ideas 
cannot be traced back to particular dispositions in any such 
fashion as to make each memorially imprinted idea correspond 
to a single, definite disposition; on the contrary, numerous 
traces or after-effects or dispositions of former impressions, 



12 The Psychology of Learning 

ideas, and the like co-operate in every reproduction of an 
idea. Of course, this nature of the memory-idea renders 
untenable the naive view of certain psychologists, according 
to whom particular ideas have their seat in particular nerve- 
cells of the cerebral cortex. Such a complex functional process 
as the physiological correlate or correlates of an idea cannot 
take place in a single nerve-element. 

It is evident that our envisagement of the idea itself has 
been profoundly modified by modern psychology. Thus we 
know that any illustration such as V, V, V^, etc., which 
represents the successive appearances of an idea in conscious- 
ness by means of a series of mathematical symbols is a purely 
schematic representation, because ideas are by no means such 
clear-cut and sharply defined structures as these symbols 
might lead one to suppose.^ 

We know too that in their successive recurrences to con- 
sciousness ideas appear in changed form. Every idea is com- 
posed of a greater or lesser number of partial ideas ; and now 
one, now another of the components stands out more prom- 
inently in consciousness, as a result of the context in which 
it appears, or of the direction in which the attention is turned, 
or of the emotion which dominates us at the moment.^ Hence 
the manner in which the same idea comes to consciousness 
varies from time to time. The pattern of these changes is 
not to be envisaged in the form of clear-cut units arranged as 
a series of discrete terms, such as is represented by the schema 
V, V, V% etc.; ideas are of a fluid character, and we fre- 
quently find that there is a constant transition from one into 
another. It is only when the course of thought changes 
abruptly, or when new impressions force their way into 

' The whole Herbartian doctrine of association and reproduction is 
based upon schematic seriations of cleady demarcated ideas; no such 
ideas are ever found in the realm of reality. 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 13 

consciousness, or when something "occurs" to us that ideas 
or groups of ideas possess tliis characteristic of sharp demar- 
cation from the other ideas which dominated us at the mo- 
ment of interruption. But that does not happen in ordinary 
cases of recollecting and imagining; here the stream of ideas 
continually pass over into one another, as we shall see in 
greater detail later. 

Even more complete than the transformation in our mean- 
ing of the idea has been the transformation which modern 
psychology has made in the meaning of laws of association 
and reproduction, — that is, the laws which govern the appear- 
ing, the combining, and the recalling of ideas, — which were 
regarded as the essential basis of memory. Attempts have 
been made to reduce the number of the laws of association 
by tracing them all back to a single fundamental law; and 
the meaning of the term has itself been modified in that the 
laws no longer refer to inter-connections between discrete and 
sharply demarcated ideas, but to the phenomena which 
constitute the fundamental basis of these inter-connections, 
that is, to the establishment of dispositions to revival. The 
older psychology assumed that memorial activity is to be 
explained by means of laws of association. These laws have 
prevailed in psychology for upwards of two thousand years; 
but experimental investigation has shown, in recent years, 
that but slight importance attaches to them. The laws were 
formulated by Aristotle; and they were retained intact by 
the mediseval philosophers. At the beginning of modern 
philosophy we j&nd them again in the systems of Hobbes and 
of Locke. They were developed in detail by Hume, and they 
constituted a dogma of the English School of Association 
Psychologists. Since Hume these laws have usually been 
formulated as follows: Ideas enter into association with one 

another i. when they are contiguous in space or in time, 
3 



14 The Psychology of Learning 

(law of spatial or temporal contiguity); 2. when they 
resemble one another, (law of similarity); j, when they are 
in contrast with one another, (law of contrast) ; and 4. when 
they stand in the relation of cause and effect, (law of cause 
and effect). The law of cause and effect is now regarded as 
superfluous; and the law of contrast is held to be but a special 
case of the law of similarity because similar ideas are always, 
in some degree, different or in contrast. The law of similarity 
is usually reduced to the law of contiguity because when 
similar ideas are similar by reason of the presence of common 
components in each, an apparent reproduction by similarity 
may be due to the fact that the common components of the 
two ideas constitute a bridge by means of which conscious- 
ness passes over from one to the other. But these common 
components are associated, by contiguity, with the other 
components of each idea. Hence, as a matter of fact, we 
have reproduction by similarity only in so far as result is 
concerned; from the point of view of process, it is a repro- 
duction by contiguity. 

Of all these laws of association only that of contiguity is 
admitted by most modern psychologists; but it is easy to 
show that this law too is wholly inadequate. The law states 
that ideas enter into association as a result of their having 
been in consciousness simultaneously or in immediate suc- 
cession. Now it may readily be shown that all ideas which 
were present in consciousness simultaneously or in immedi- 
ate succession, do not, by any means, become associated and 
do not subsequently reproduce one another. After seeing a 
painting or a landscape I am far from being able to reproduce 
their complete details, although all of these details were pic- 
tured upon my retina and were present simultaneously in 
my consciousness. This simple illustration shows that the 
law of contiguity is inadequate. It is e\ddent that other 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 1 5 

causes must co-operate in order to make simultaneity in 
consciousness effective in bringing about an association of 
ideas. Instead of the old laws of association, experimental 
psychology demonstrates the special conditions under which 
the association and reproduction of ideas take place. In our 
investigations of memory we discover the exact conditions 
of association; and in the reproductions to which we have 
recourse as a test of retention we discover the exact conditions 
of reproduction. These experiments enable us to formulate 
new laws of association and reproduction which specify these 
conditions. 

A statement of these conditions and laws must include 
three factors: 

I. The conditions of imprinting and associating the con- 
tents of consciousness, or the estabhshment of dispositions. 
These are the conditions of association in the narrower sense. 
Both of these phenomena, — the formation of dispositions to 
a subsequent revival of ideas, and the connecting of an idea 
with other contents of consciousness, — may be designated by 
a single term: the combining capacity or the associative 
valence of the contents of consciousness. 

II. The conditions of revival of mental processes, or the 
coming into operation of the dispositions. These are the 
conditions of reproduction in the narrower sense. 

III. The conditions of forgetting, or the gradual fading of 
ideas and the breaking down of associations and the cessation 
of operation of dispositions. 

The first and the second of these conditions may be brack- 
eted together as conditions of retention; and they may be 
set over against the third, which concerns the conditions of 
forgetting. 

I. The fundamental conditions of association in the narrow 
sense are to be found /. in the temporal factors which come 



1 6 The Psychology of Learning 

into operation in association; it was chiefly these which the 
old law of contiguity attempted to specify. The temporal 
factors of association are reducible to three: a. Every men- 
tal process must have a certain minimal duration in conscious- 
ness, if it is to establish a disposition to revival or an asso- 
ciation with other contents of consciousness. We sometimes 
fail to retain fleeting impressions in memory because of their 
momentary character, b. Every mental process must recur to 
consciousness a certain number of times if security of retention 
is to be attained. Impressions which have been present to 
consciousness but once are, in many cases, wholly forgotten 
unless they made a strong appeal to the attention or to the 
feelings, c. The rhythmic recurrence of impressions and 
ideas tends to reinforce their retention. When words or 
tones are repeated in rhythm they are much more durably 
imprinted upon consciousness. These three conditions of 
association also constitute three fundamental conditions for 
increasing the permanence of associations and the valence or 
strength of dispositions because the longer a mental process 
is present in consciousness, and the more frequently and the 
more rhythmically it returns to consciousness, the more 
intensive is its effect upon memory. 

2. A second group of conditions of association is the 
product of the part played by attention in the processes of 
consciousness. The direction of our attention to any content 
of consciousness endows that content with a greater associa- 
tive capacity or valence. The well-known fact that attention 
is a significant factor in associative learning is due chiefly to 
this phenomenon. 

J. A third group of conditions of association is due to the 
influence of the feelings; here too is to be included the influ- 
ence of the organic sensations which originate in the internal 
organs of the body and which are intimately connected with 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 17 

the feelings. Every experience which was attended by more 
or less intensive feeHng or emotion becomes ipso facto endowed 
with greater associative power. It is a familiar fact that occur- 
rences which were intensively tinged with emotion are remem- 
bered more readily and in more complete detail; a single 
component idea, — for instance, some person who was con- 
cerned in such an occurrence, — may suffice to recall the 
whole occurrence to consciousness. In the domain of intel- 
lect, however, our feehngs manifest themselves chiefly in the 
form of our "interest" in certain matters; and interest is 
one of the most fundamental conditions of impression and 
association. The extraordinary significance which attaches to 
interest in the imprinting of impressions and ideas upon the 
mind of the child has always been a matter of prime importance 
in pedagogy. Nagy has recently called attention to the sig- 
nificance of interest in the memorial work of children.^ 

The second and the third conditions are also significant 
for increasing and reinforcing associations. The associative 
power or valence of a content of consciousness increases with 
increase of attention devoted to it, and with increase of 
emotion or interest aroused by it. There are, however, certain 
extreme conditions of internal excitation which constitute an 
exception to this rule. When the concentration of attention 
and the intensity of emotion exceed a certain Hmit they may 
bring about a decrease of associative capacity; indeed they 
may give rise to a complete inhibition of association. It 
seems probable that in such cases the extraordinary degree of 
internal excitation consumes an excess of psycho-physical en- 
ergy, which is withdrawn from the intellectual processes. In 
mental pathology those groups of ideas which are accompanied 
by intensive emotions and are, at the same time, consolidated 

* Ladislaus Nagy, Die Entwickcliing des Interesses der Kinder. 
Leipzig, Otto Nemnich, 191 2. 



1 8 The Psychology of Learning 

into groups by the attendant emotion have come to be called 
emotionally toned complexes of ideas, or more briefly ''com- 
plexes." (Jung, RickHn, Bleuler, Freud and others.) That 
is, the component ideas of any experience which aroused our 
emotion intensively are consolidated by the emotion into a 
single idea-complex which now may itself acquire a special 
significance for consciousness. Occurrences wliich are accom- 
panied by intensive emotions of unpleasantness are especially 
prone to form such indissoluble complexes. Our remembrance 
of a place where we had an especially unpleasant experience, 
or of a person with whom we had a particularly unpleasant 
altercation may constitute such a complex. As soon as any 
fleeting thought of this place or of this person comes to con- 
sciousness the whole unpleasant memory-complex tends to 
force itself into consciousness. And under certain circum- 
stances the unpleasantness which attaches to such an event 
may become so intensive as to be intolerable. Pathological 
"suppressions" may then ensue, — that is, we suppress our 
remembrance of the event which may now disappear so 
completely from consciousness that we can no longer remem- 
ber the complex. The doctrine of the "suppression" of un- 
pleasant memory-complexes constitutes an exceedingly impor- 
tant phase of modern pathology, especially in hysteria. This 
doctrine assumes that suppression gives rise to various sorts 
of pathological symptoms; it seems as though the emotion, 
when forcibly suppressed, were seeking to discharge itself in 
some other fashion.^ 

The topics which we have discussed from these last three 

' An excellent summary of the much disputed Freudian theories 
appears in A. Kronfeld's monograph " Ueher die psychologischen The- 
orien Freuds und vcrwandte Anschauungen," Leipzig, 191 2. This mon- 
ograph may be found in the Archiv fur die gesanite Psychologic, XXII., 
1912, 130-248. 



The Modem Psychology of Memory 19 

points of view constitute groups of memorial conditions 
because temporal relations, attention, emotion and interest 
are themselves complex phenomena; and they may exercise 
their influence upon association in very different ways. But 
a detailed discussion of this topic would carry us too far 
afield into the general psychology of memory and its special 
problems. 

All of these conditions of association may function for one 
another, either wholly or in part, in a vicarious or surrogate 
fashion; and this is exceedingly important for the economy 
and technique of memory. For instance, the fleeting and 
momentary character of an impression may be compensated, 
in part, by increased concentration of attention; frequency 
of repetition, intensity of emotional accompaniment and con- 
centration of attention are, to some extent, mutually equiv- 
alent and interchangeable factors. 

II. The special conditions of reproduction in the narrower 
sense may also be sub-divided into two chief groups: 

I. Subsequent reproductions or revivals of contents of 
consciousness depend, of course, upon all of the factors 
which contributed to the formation of associations. Hence 
all three of the conditions of association which we have 
described are also conditions of reproduction. Every former 
association into which an idea has entered endows the idea 
with a tendency to reproduction. These tendencies are of 
two sorts: a. Wlien an idea enters into associative connection 
with other ideas its own tendency to reproduction is increased 
because each of its associates may now recall it to conscious- 
ness. This we may call a passive reproduction tendency. 
b. In forming associations with other ideas an idea acquires a 
tendency to recall its associates to consciousness. This may 
be called an, active reproduction tendency. No explanation 
of the appearance of an idea in consciousness in any partic- 



20 The Psychology of Learnifig 

ular case can be adequate unless both sorts of reproduction 
tendency are taken into consideration. 

Every idea may enter into numerous associations with 
other ideas; and these associations may differ in strength 
and stability. Hence in explaining any particular case of 
reproduction we must consider both the sum of reproduction 
tendencies possessed by an idea, and the manner in which 
these tendencies co-operate with one another. The com- 
bined action of reproduction tendencies depends, in part, upon 
their content, and in part upon their intensity or strength. 
For instance, my idea of Schiller has entered into numerous 
associative connections with other ideas. On hearing the 
name Schiller I may think of his youthful adventures, of the 
storm and stress period, of classicism in poetry, of the roman- 
tic school of poets, of Schiller's relations with Goethe; I may 
think of Schiller's idealistic philosophy, of his views on aesthet- 
ics, and the Hke; I may think of such places as Weimar and 
Jena. Each of these associations constitutes a reproduction 
tendency which attaches to the name of Schiller; and accord- 
ing to the context in which the idea of Schiller comes to my 
consciousness one or other of these reproduction tendencies 
may become effective, either singly or in co-operation with 
other tendencies. Which of these tendencies shall become 
effective in a given case depends upon the totaUty of possible 
conditions of reproduction, and upon the content and the 
strength of the reproduction tendencies which attach to the 
name Schiller. Hence it may even happen that when I hear 
the name Schiller apart from any definite context, as is 
ordinarily the case in association experiments, so many repro- 
duction tendencies of this word may crowd into consciousness 
together that they may inhibit one another; and I may be 
unable, for a moment, to give expression to an appropriate 
idea for the very reason that the name possesses such a 



The Modern Psychology of Alemory 21 

wealth of associations. This phenomenon of mutual inhi- 
bition of reproduction tendencies which come into operation 
simultaneously is frequently observed in psychological exper- 
iments. Matters are facihtated if we give the observer a 
particular point of view from which he is to respond by repro- 
ducing a word when he hears the stimulus-word. For instance, 
we may ask: Where was Schiller born? Where did he meet 
Goethe? 

The several reproduction tendencies of an idea may rein- 
force one another; they may inhibit one another; or their 
effect upon one another may be in part reinforcing, and in 
part inhibitory. In the latter case opposing tendencies may 
appear, giving rise to "slips of the tongue," "slips of the pen," 
and the Hke. In an association experiment I once responded 
to the stimulus- word "picture," with the apparently mean- 
ingless reaction- word "Rumens." This phenomenon was due 
to the presence of an idea-complex which possessed two 
reproduction tendencies. A short time before I had been 
engaged in a dispute with an acquaintance regarding the 
frame {Rahmen) of a painting by Rubens, — which was to me 
unpleasing. The remembrance of this incident made itself 
felt in two reproduction tendencies, — a tendency to repro- 
duce the word Rahmen and the word Rubens, and this mixed 
tendency gave rise to the reproduction of the word "Rumens." 

2. A second group of conditions of reproduction includes 
two classes, both of which are characterized by the fact that 
they are not due to the operation of former associations. A 
chief error of the older psychology of memory consisted in 
supposing that ideas can return to consciousness only in 
consequence of their associations. It is now known that this 
view is untenable because, on the one hand, the reproduction 
of a particular idea in a particular case is due not to pre- 
viously acquired associations but quite as much to factors 



22 The Psychology of Learning 

which have to do with the present state of consciousness; 
and, on the other hand, we may in certain instances observe 
the operation of a wholly different set of conditions of repro- 
duction which render possible the appearance in conscious- 
ness of "detached" or freistcigcnde ideas. The former class 
of conditions may be referred to as conditions which have to 
do with constellations and with the state of consciousness. 
Here are to be included those conditions of reproduction 
which are due to the momentary state of the individual and 
to the momentary constellation or composition of conscious- 
ness. The latter class of conditions may be designated as 
inducing or actualizing conditions in order to distinguish 
them from previous associations. The modern psychology 
of memory contains numerous references to these non-asso- 
ciative conditions of reproduction, but their nature is still 
obscure. 

a. What particular idea shall appear in consciousness in 
any particular case is a matter which is not determined solely 
by the associative connections possessed by the ideas which 
are present at the moment; quite as much influence is exerted 
by the general condition of the individual, his freshness or 
fatigue, the fact that he is well-disposed or ill-disposed, the 
total group of impressions and ideas which are clearly or 
obscurely present to his consciousness, his feelings, and every- 
thing else that may be designated as his conscious constella- 
tion. Hence the constellation conditions of reproduction 
include, as the term indicates, the combined action of all of 
the non-associative factors which may acquire an influence 
upon reproduction at the moment when reproduction takes 
place; this embraces all the feelings, efforts, ideas, impres- 
sions, and the Kke, which make themselves felt at the moment, 
and to these must be added the general condition of the indi- 
vidual. The detailed investigation of these conditions of 



The Modern Psychology of Meinory 23 

reproduction is one of the future problems of psychology. At 
present we are in possession of relatively few experimental 
observations which can give us an insight into these exceed- 
ingly complicated conditions of reproduction. 

b. The apparently "free" emergence into consciousness of 
a (detached) idea is a phenomenon which is equally incapable 
of being explained from former associations. And this phe- 
nomenon also has not yet been sufhciently investigated; its 
existence, however, can not be doubted. Ideas come into 
consciousness through the medium of their former associa- 
tions, without being aroused by the dominant ideas of the 
moment; on the contrary, they break in upon the prevaihng 
train of ideas. The only point concerning which there can 
be any doubt is the question as to whether they are not to be 
explained from a complicated co-operation of manifold factors 
of association. Meanwhile it is important to describe these 
phenomena, making a clear distinction between the specific 
nature of this phenomenon of alleged "free" ideas and the 
question as to whether they can be explained. These two 
problems are not always distinguished with sufficient clear- 
ness in psychology. For instance, although G. E. Miiller has 
established the existence of phenomena like perseverations as 
facts, this does not prove that they constitute a special cause 
of reproduction. These considerations will be more readily 
understood if we cite the four cases in which an apparently 
free emergence of ideas can be established: perseveration, per- 
sistence, iteration and automatic reproduction (or reproduc- 
tion as a result of automatization). 

G. E. Miiller employs the term perseveration to designate 
the following phenomenon: An idea upon which we have 
concentrated our attention acquires the capacity to re-enter 
consciousness immediately thereafter and even to break in 
upon the course of ideas to which we have meanwhile directed 



24 The Psychology of Learning 

our attention, although it seems to derive no associative sup- 
port from the ideas which dominate us at the time of its re- 
entrance. For instance, words or syllables which we have 
learned in a memory experiment may subsequently force 
their way into consciousness while we are applying ourselves 
to the learning or the reciting of a wholly new group of syl- 
lables or words. Phenomena like the following are more 
familiar: After reading an unpleasant letter and returning 
to our work we frequently find that the remembrance of the 
letter interrupts our work; and the interruption may recur 
again and again with irresistible force. Such a remembrance 
has acquired perseverative power; it persists in consciousness 
with its reproductive tendency, and it breaks in upon our 
prevailing ideas although it is not supported by any associ- 
ative connections with them. In such cases the entrance of 
the unwelcome idea seems to be a "free emergence," because 
it seems to break in upon us instead of being introduced in 
an associative manner. 

I cannot here discuss the difficult problem as to whether 
such phenomena as perseveration are really incapable of 
being explained from the general laws of association. I can 
only point out that in the most of the phenomena of this 
sort which have been described it is not difficult to find an 
explanation from the general laws of association. The remem- 
brances of the unpleasant letter may have acquired their 
reproductive tendencies from the fact that the emotion and 
the mood produced by the letter, and the concomitant organic 
sensations continued to persist after I returned to my work; 
and the memory-ideas were reproduced from this lower 
stratum of consciousness which had become intimately asso- 
ciated with the ideas of the letter. This mode of reproduc- 
tion would be possible so long as the mood persisted. The 
intrusion of syllables and words in memory experiments may 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 25 

be explained from the fact that the general situation has re- 
mained tmchanged in the two experiments, and that the new 
syllables and words contain numerous points of similarity 
with the old. But however that may be, we do not wish to 
discuss the causes of "free" ideas here; we can only describe 
the various cases of "free emergence" as such. And in doing 
so, it is important to define more clearly the meaning of per- 
severation or persistence of ideas because the term has been 
employed to include wholly different phenomena. 

7. By perseveration I mean only that emergence of ideas 
which consists in the fact that shortly after an idea has dis- 
appeared from consciousness it possesses the capacity to force 
its way into consciousness again, and to interrupt the pre- 
vaiHng course of ideas. The essential conditions for this are 
that we have concentrated our attention long and intensely 
upon the idea, that the idea has excited our feelings inten- 
sively, and that the circumstances which formerly brought 
about the reproduction are still, at least partially, present. 

2. By persistence I mean a wholly different phenomenon. It 
designates the fact that under certain circumstances, — for 
instance, when we are fatigued or otherwise unfavorably 
disposed in body or in mind, — our ideas and our activities 
tend to become repetitive and persistent because we no 
longer possess sufficient energy to apprehend differences or 
to react in a discriminating fashion. In experiments dealing 
with the reproduction of ideas, a fatigued observer tends to 
acquire a persistent form of verbal apprehension, — m.ere 
successions of auditory ideas without meaning, — or a stereo- 
typed form of verbal response, — rhymes or transpositions. 

3. The phenomenon of iteration is different from both of 
the foregoing. It designates the fact that ideas force their 
way into consciousness and tend to break in upon the pre- 
vailing course of ideas, which is then characterized by a 



26 The Psychology of Learning 

frequent repetition of the same ideas. It ordinarily appears 
in the form of a repeated intrusion of melodies, of rhymes, 
or even phrases or single words wliich persist in "running 
through one's mind." 

4. A fourth phenomenon of this group is the free emergence 
of ideas as the result of an automatization and mechanization 
of psychical and psycho-physical functions. It manifests it- 
self most frequently in the motor domain, where the role 
of the automatized and mechanized functions is especially 
noticeable. At times its effects seem to be identical with 
those of iteration; but it seems to be due to a wholly different 
complex of causes. Its origin is invariably to be found in the 
frequent execution of activities which thereby become com- 
pletely automatized. For instance, certain manipulations of 
apparatus have to be repeated over and over again in an 
experiment. When a second experiment is undertaken we 
involuntarily repeat the manipulations of the former experi- 
ment. Similar phenomena may be observed after shifting 
from any activity in which facility may be acquired ; if after 
conversing in French we begin a conversation in German, we 
soon find that we have involuntarily dropped back into the 
use of French. 

It is to be borne in mind, however, that all of the laws of 
association and reproduction, as well as of the conditions of 
memory in general, are probably quite as valid for motor 
as for intellectual processes; and hence we may speak of 
motor memory and of motor reproduction. A famihar illus- 
tration is to be found in the case of the practised pianist. 
His fingers are able correctly and automatically to hit upon 
the most appropriate fingering even for the different scales. 

The terminology which is customarily employed in the 
psychology of memory is not wholly free from objection. The 
term reproduction of ideas is misleading in that the reproduc- 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 27 

tion of an idea is not always the mere revival of a former 
idea. Unfortunately we also employ the term reproduction 
to designate the free activity of combination which is char- 
acteristic of productive imagination and thinking, and which 
is essentially a matter of new combinations of ideas. And 
even the purely memorial reproductions of former ideas are 
genuine reproductions only in very rare instances; here, too, 
as a rule, the impressions and ideas derived from our former 
experience have been re-shaped and re-cast. It is incorrect 
to employ but a single term to designate all of these varieties 
of emergence phenomena. Moreover, our extension of the 
meaning of the term makes it impossible for us to designate 
specifically the genuine recurrence of any idea where it is 
our intention and purpose to re-experience the idea in un- 
changed form. I shall, therefore, apply the term reproduction 
only to those cases of appearance of ideas where a genuine 
revival of former ideas actually occurs, and where the inten- 
tion to revive and not to re-combine is present. My general 
expression for the entrance of ideas into consciousness will 
therefore not be the word reproduction. But when I want to 
emphasize the movement aspect of ideas I shall employ the 
terms "emergence" or "entrance" (or actualization) of ideas 
into consciousness; and when I have in mind any sort of 
spontaneous activity on the part of the individual I shall 
employ the term "evoking" (calKng up) of ideas. 

The meaning of laws of association has undergone a second 
change. If the nature of memory is conceived to consist not 
in some sort of a storing of ideas, but in the forming of dispo- 
sitions to their more ready revival, — or expressed more gen- 
erally and more correctly, in the forming of dispositions to a 
more ready revival of everything that has ever been present 
to consciousness, — it follows from this fundamental view that 
the laws of association and reproduction are to be regarded 



28 The Psychology of Learning 

as laws which have to do with the formation and the oper- 
ation of memorial dispositions. The actual fixative and re- 
tentive function of memory must then be regarded as con- 
sisting in the establishing and reinforcing of these dispositions; 
and the effect of memorial activity, — that is, the reappearance 
of former ideas in consciousness, or the more ready revival of 
former impressions or actions, — is then to be conceived as a 
realization or actualization of dispositions which have been 
formed at some previous time. 

Hence all causes, conditions and laws of memorial function 
are to be represented as causes, conditions and laws of the 
formation of dispositions and of the actualization or coming 
into operation of dispositions. The whole psychology of 
memory may then be developed in the form of a doctrine of 
the laws of the estabhshment and the operation of memorial 
dispositions. 

But however logical and consistent may be our presenta- 
tion of a psychology of memory in terms of the formation and 
operation of dispositions, it suffers from one serious defect. 
It is, to a certain extent, a psychology of the future because 
the nature of these dispositions is but slightly known as yet. 
The introduction of such concepts as increase of mass, modi- 
fication of structure and change of molecular arrangement in 
tlie bodily organs concerned furnishes only a partial insight 
into their bodily substrates. From the psychical point of 
view, memorial dispositions consist in nothing more than 
effects of memorial functioning, — in changes which we see 
manifesting themselves in ideas and courses of ideas rather 
than in any "substrates" of ideas. 

Having attained this clearer conception of the nature of 
dispositions we must now describe the results of the memorial 
investigations of the past in terms of the establishment and 
the functioning of dispositions; and the same mode of envis- 



The Moderii Psychology of Memory 29 

agement must direct our efforts in the future investigation of 
memory. Whenever a new result is obtained we must inquire 
whether it can serve to define more definitely the nature of 
the physical and the psychical dispositions of memory. But 
the present state of our views concerning the nature of dis- 
positions does not justify us in presenting the whole psychol- 
ogy of memory as a theory of dispositions because we would 
either conceive the dispositions as physiological substrates 
of memorial function, — in which case our investigation would 
be transformed into a physiology of memory, — or we would 
have recourse to a vague and general conception of disposi- 
tions which would include both the physical and the psychical, 
— in which case our psychology of memory would amount 
to nothing more than a collection of statements concerning a 
vague and indefinite word. Or we might start from the con- 
cept of psychical dispositions, — the only legitimate concept 
for our purposes. From this starting-point the whole theory 
of dispositions becomes identical with a psychology of mem- 
ory conceived and developed as a theory of ideas, combina- 
tions of ideas, and revivals of ideas; and we can obtain a 
knowledge of the dispositions, in their psychical aspects, 
only when we have determined what are their effects by observ- 
ing ideas and the modified flow of ideas. 

In my opinion, then, a theory of memory, association and 
reproduction should always be brought into relation with 
the psychical effects of memorial functioning; and these 
latter may always be discovered by an introspective study of 
our ideas and their course. But meanwhile, in opposition to 
the older psychology, we must never lose sight of the fact 
that the nature of ideas and of their modifications is itself 
of a "dispositional character," — that is, that they are change- 
able mental processes which, under certain circumstances, 
may recur to consciousness in approximately similar or 



30 The Psychology of Learnmg 

identical form, and that from the psychological point of view, 
memorial activity here consists simply in certain relatively 
constant changes in the psychical conditions of this revival of 
ideas. 

For the psychologist who seeks to avoid superfluous hypoth- 
eses, therefore, the doctrine of memory dispositions is nothing 
more than a theory of persistent change in the conditions 
under which ideas may be reproduced or revived. 

It may be asked: Can we not discover the general nature of 
memory from the universal tendency of memory to form 
associations between ideas in consequence of dispositions to 
revival? Here again the only satisfactory answer must come 
from the facts of memory itself. We find that memorial 
activity tends to fuse into a unitary whole the elements, im- 
pressions or ideas which have hitherto not been united for 
consciousness. Hence memory ehminates the discrete and 
disconnected character of the particular processes of conscious- 
ness and blends them into one. The more perfectly the 
associative function does its work, the more nearly does the 
associated group of ideas become a completely unitary whole, 
and the more closely does the reproduction of such a group 
of ideas approximate a unitary state of consciousness. This 
manifests itself in the phenomenon that in a poem which has 
been thoroughly memorized we can pass directly from any 
part to any other part. The succession of elements and the 
successive character of the associations have been eliminated; 
we have attained as complete a mastery over such a perfectly 
memorized poem as over any manifold whose parts are all 
present to consciousness simultaneously. The poem has 
simply become a single unit for consciousness. And, in a 
series of nonsense-syllables which has been securely learned, 
we can pass over equally well from the first syllable to the 
second, from the first to the sixth, and from the first to the 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 3 1 

twelfth. The successive character of the syllables has been 
eliminated; the series of twelve has become a simultaneously 
present unit. 

And this constitutes the ultimate reason for the phenom- 
enon that impressions and ideas which were formerly discrete 
and isolated may now reproduce ''one another." When such 
elements as German words and their English equivalents, or 
the words of a poem, or the syllables of a series have been so 
thoroughly learned that they really form a unit, it is self- 
evident that when one part of these elements appears the other 
elements must also appear. The complete unitary content 
of consciousness into which these securely associated elements 
have been fused is revived. Hence the nature of memory 
consists in its being a formative activity which combines 
processes of consciousness, which formerly were isolated, into 
a unitary state of consciousness. Hoffding expressed a sim- 
ilar view when he designated the "fundamental law" of asso- 
ciation as a "law of totality."'^ 

If we carry this conception over to the dispositions we may 
say that the function of memorial dispositions is essentially 
synthetic in character; their nature would be designated 
more accurately if we called them unifying dispositions. We 
might also describe them as fusion dispositions because in 
the psychology of tones the production of a unitary content 
from a close combination of elements is designated a psychical 
fusion, where the elements constitute a new unitary state, it is 
true, but still they persist as relatively independent elements, 
— for instance, the tones in a chord. 

III. There is in a certain sense an opposition between the 

conditions and laws of forgetting and the conditions and laws 

of retention; the two are to be conceived somewhat as inverse 

or reciprocal processes. The laws of forgetting have been sub- 

^ H. Hoffding, Psychology (trans.), 1892, 159. 



32 The Psychology of Learning 

mitted to experimental investigation within recent years; 
special efforts have been made to deterinine and to reduce 
to definite laws the progress of forgetting with the lapse of 
time/ It has been found that immediately after the act of 
learning, the progress of forgetting is rapid, but thereafter it 
gradually becomes slower and slower. Short series of ideas 
are forgotten more rapidly than longer series; long stanzas of 
poetry are remembered better than short stanzas, all other 
conditions being equal. Efficiency of retention is improved 
by practice in learning and reproducing. 

The phenomena of forgetting may be brought into relation 
with the psychology of dispositions. It would be conceived 
that memorial dispositions gradually decrease in intensity or 
valence, losing their power to bring about reproductions and 
finally become "latent." Tins means that their effectiveness 
is finally to be conceived as being so sHght that one can no 
longer be sure that they still exist, — because we must never 
lose sight of the fact that they manifest their existence only 
by their capacity to revive ideas. Now since, theoretically, 
complete forgetting does not take place until an infinitely long 
interval of time has elapsed we must assume that a memory 
disposition, when once established, never wholly perishes but 
only becomes infinitely weak, — that is, its effectiveness finally 
exists only in latent form. 

But it must be admitted that a dispositional psychology of 
memory is exceedingly open to question. In the first place, it 
brings with it the danger of rehabihtating the old doctrine 
that the gradually fading dispositions are entities which exist 
in concrete and substantial form, and that they are to be 

'^ H. Ebbinghaus, Ueher das Gedachtnis, Leipzig, 1S85. P. Rados- 
sawljewitsch, Das Fortschreiten des Vergessens niit der Zeit, Gottingen, 
1907; this monograph was also published under the title Das Behalten 
und Vergessen bei Kindcrn und Erwachsencn, Leipzig, 1907. 



The Modern Psychology of Memory 33 

conceived as being somewhat analogous to physical bodies 
which wither and decay, or to chemical substances which 
volatilize and decrease in mass. Then, too, the advocate of 
such a theory tends to lose sight of the fact that all that we 
can ever know of the phenomena of forgetting is revealed 
through its psychical effects. These effects consist exclusively 
either in certain modifications which take place in the ideas 
themselves, — they become more indistinct, more fragmen- 
tary, less distinguishable from other ideas, — or in certain 
changes which take place in the conditions under which ideas 
make their appearance in consciousness, — their associations 
with other ideas become unstable and insecure, and in conse- 
quence of their weakened associations they possess a lesser 
tendency not only to return passively to consciousness, but 
also to participate actively in arousing other ideas. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FUNCTIONS OF MEMORY 

Since the general principles of memorial functioning have 
been discussed in the preceding chapter we may now raise the 
question as to whether it is possible to distinguish a variety 
of special functions within the general function of memory. 

The study of consciousness never reveals the existence of a 
memory as such; it can only reveal the existence of partic- 
ular modes of mental activity which possess memorial char- 
acteristics, — such as the remembering of concrete objects, the 
associative learning of verbal texts, and the Hke. These 
modes of activity are classified under the heading of memory 
because they all possess certain characteristics in common 
which differentiate them from all other mental functions. It 
is now our problem to discuss these various sorts of memory 
activity which we too may call memories, and then to answer 
the question: In what sense may one speak of a general 
memory as an actual fact of consciousness, apart from and in 
addition to these several special memories? 

In classifying memories, as in every other sort of classifi- 
cation, it is possible to proceed in various ways, and to employ 
different principles of classification. From the point of view 
of means employed in the memorial acquisition of data we 
may differentiate three chief classes of memorial function, 
which may be called i. the activity of noting impressions 
by means of observation alone, — or observational learning]^ 

^ This species of memorial acquisition {das beobachtende Merken) 
can scarcely be called learning in any strict sense of the term. We 
shall usually refer to it as observational noting. The phenomena of 
rational learning will be discussed under the heading of associative 
learning; see Chapter VI, especially pages 290-313. Tr. 

34 



The Functions of Memory 35 

2. the activity of learning impressions in consequence of the 
associations into which they have entered, — or associative 
learning; j. the activity of remembering experiences in conse- 
quence of our discovering their interrelations, — or rational 
learning. 

I. Observational noting. This function of memory comes 
into play when we imprint the contents of perception as such, 
— things, persons, the processes of nature, — by means of 
observation in order to incorporate them into our memory. 
Its chief significance in the school-room is found in the object- 
lesson, in nature study, in geography, — in short, wherever 
observation is the chief means by which the learner acquires 
the idea that he imprints upon his memory. Within the func- 
tion of observational noting we must recognize differentiations 
which are due to the employment of different sense-organs. 
For instance, one may observe by means of vision, hearing, 
smell, taste, or by means of the cutaneous and kinajsthetic 
senses. The "lower" senses need scarcely be taken into 
account in the work of the school-room, although under cer- 
tain circumstances it may be important to observe and to 
remember the taste and smell of objects if they are to be 
apprehended in complete detail. 

Our knowledge of observational noting, and of its signifi- 
cance in contributing to our remembrances is due cliiefly to 
investigations of sense-memory, of testimony, and of the 
apprehension and impression of temporal and spatial rela- 
tions; in recent years, however, the function of observational 
noting has itself been submitted to experimental investiga- 
tion. Light has been thrown upon this function by certain 
incidental experiments where the procedure consisted in ask- 
ing an individual to observe and to remember a number of 
objects; and information regarding this function has also 
been obtained from the experiences of every-day life and of 



36 The Psychology of Learning 

the school-room. It must be borne in mind that observational 
learning comes into play wherever one is concerned with the 
imprinting and remembering of any sensory material in its 
temporal and spatial relations. Hence not only are the 
various forms of object-teaching to be included under this 
type of memory work, but even such activities as the learning 
of a melody by hearing or singing it, the learning of the 
forms of objects and of geometrical figures by drawing them, 
and the like, are also to be included here because the act of 
observing is the chief means of memorial acquisition, and the 
learning of sensory material is the chief aim throughout. 

2. Associative learning is that activity of memory which 
might also be called verbatim memorization or learning in the 
narrower sense. The really effective factor in this sort of 
memorial imprinting is not sense-perception, single or re- 
peated, but the attentive repetition, in reproduced form, of a 
given series of ideas. This type of memorial imprinting 
occurs in all true learning, especially in memorizing the words 
of a text. In this type of learning in the narrower sense, the 
words which we perceive visually or orally or by both of 
these means serve to convey meanings to us. And it is these 
ideas of meaning and their logical connections which we wish 
to retain in memory; only in certain borderland cases, as in 
the learning of historical dates or foreign vocabularies and in 
the verbal memorization of formulas or poems, do we imprint 
the words themselves upon memory. But even in such cases 
as the learning of foreign vocabularies, we are not concerned 
with remembering the sense-impressions of the visual or 
auditory words, together with all the incidental circumstances 
under which they were presented to our senses; we have no 
desire to remember the peculiar character of the print or of the 
script, the form of the letters, or the quality and the cadence 
of the speaker's voice; those are matters of sense-perception 



The Functions of Memory 37 

and observational noting. The perception of the word now 
serves only to bring to consciousness the verbal idea and its 
meaning; hence the word as perceived by the senses is only 
a means to an end, an instrument for the arousal and imprint- 
ing of ideas. Here we never note the word itself merely as a 
sound or as a picture. In short, the sensory content is but a 
means which serves to arouse and to conjoin an idea content; 
and only the latter is imprinted upon memory, the sensory 
content being neither heeded nor imprinted. Thus in obser- 
vational noting the attention is directed to the details of the 
sensory content; while in associative learning we attend only 
to the idea of the v/ords and their meanings. Several different 
characteristics of associative learning show that the direction 
of attention is here wholly different from its direction in 
observational noting, and that the intent of the learning and 
the adjustment of attention have wholly different objective 
points in the two cases. In reading a text or in listening to 
words which we read, we fail to notice misprints and mis- 
pronunciations, — a proof that our attention is concentrated 
not upon words, but upon the ideas which they convey. In 
observational noting, on the other hand, the accurate appre- 
hension of the sensory impressions themselves is the aim and 
the goal of the act of learning. 

The chief means employed by memory is therefore different 
in the two cases. In observational noting the perception or 
observation itself is the essential means of imprinting; in 
associative learning, on the contrary, the essential means 
consists in an attentive apprehension, an understanding, and a 
repeated imprinting of the ideas. 

Every such variation in purpose and in means of learning 
brings with it a variation in the whole character of the mem- 
ory process and a variation in the conditions upon which it 
depends. In observational noting we are active chiefly in a 



38 The Psychology of Learning 

perceptual fashion; and attention comes into play to analyze 
and dismember the object perceived. When we learn by 
reading or by listening, we are active in an ideational fashion. 
And since our attention is no longer directed to the percep- 
tual content, this content is received in a cursory and indif- 
ferent manner; it is these ideas as such, and particularly 
ideas of meanings of words, which now dominate our con- 
sciousness. The detailed conditions of these two activities 
will be dealt with in a subsequent discussion of the technique 
of observational noting and of true learning. 

J. Memorial imprinting may be of a third sort; it may be 
characterized by an act of rational and reflective apprehen- 
sion, as when it deals with connected contexts of ideas or 
thoughts. This process of rational combining serves to im- 
print a connected train of thoughts. This third type of learn- 
ing comes into play when, without memorizing it word for 
word, we endeavor to remember the content of a description, 
an anecdote, a scientific treatise, a lecture, or the like. When 
material of this sort is learned verbatim, the associations 
between the words become the chief factor upon which mem- 
ory relies. It is characteristic of rational learning, however, 
that it abandons, in greater or lesser degree, its reliance upon 
verbal factors; an understanding of the concrete or logical 
relations among the ideas and thoughts now constitutes the 
essential means of remembering the material. The visual and 
auditory perception of the mere words plays a less important 
role in this sort of imprinting than in associative learning. 
The ideas of the words, indeed even the original order of 
presentation and the particular meanings which we attach 
to the words of the original text are a matter of indifference 
to us ; the only essential thing is to learn and subsequently to 
reproduce the thoughts or the context of ideas. That is, the 
exact form and the exact order in which the words and mean- 



The Functions of Memory 39 

ings of the original were arranged becomes a matter of no 
moment to us; all that is required of us is that we shall be 
able to reproduce in our own words a context of ideas whose 
meaning shall be similar to the meaning of the original text. 
In this sort of learning then, the attention is directed upon 
the concrete or coherent train of thought, not upon the medium 
or form of expression. 

This is the method of learning which is employed by the 
adult in dealing with by far the greater part of the material 
which he wishes to remember. In the retention of material 
presented to him through the medium of books, magazines 
and the conversations of his fellow-men, he makes no attempt 
to note accurately the words, the verbal order, or the diction; 
the sole purpose of his endeavor is directed toward the end 
that he shall subsequently be able to reproduce thoughts 
equivalent in value and in meaning to those expressed in the 
original book or article or conversation. This explains why 
the adult is able to remember great masses of material without 
repeated memorizations, while the child, who is much less 
able to rely upon his logical memory, is instructed to make at 
least a partial use of a more verbatim type of learning. As a 
rule the adult, in his scientific reading and in his reflection, 
assumes that if he once understands a train of thought, this 
will suffice for its permanent retention, and repeated imprinting 
is unnecessary. However, when a connected material has 
thus been learned by understanding it or by reflecting upon 
it, it is well to return to it occasionally and refresh the mem- 
ory by reviewing the material as accurately as possible; but, 
as a matter of fact, we remember much which has never been 
reviewed in this manner. This extraordinary capacity of 
logical memory in adults, which enables the scientist to retain 
almost the whole body of knowledge which belongs to his 
science, is to be explained chiefly from two circumstances: 



40 The Psychology of Learning 

a. The memorial material which we here acquire need not 
be learned or remembered in the original form in which it 
was presented. This saves the memory a great mass of 
detailed impressions, such as the particular words and the 
particular literal meanings of sentences, their sequence and 
their grammatical form. All of that we allow to drop out as 
useless lumber; we draw off a sort of extract which contains 
the essential points in the development of the thought. Tliis 
we imprint once more during the process of bringing it into 
relation with general points of view, which again serve as 
clues for a subsequent re-acquisition of the particular details. 
In this manner we note in a scientific work only the chief 
thoughts and these in as brief form as possible; with these 
as a starting-point we can readily reconstruct the content 
in detailed form. b. A second reason for the enormous 
capacity of memory is to be found in the fact that although 
no repetition or refreshing of the original content takes place, 
still the scientific thoughts which we have once mastered can 
always be revived and reproduced because they stand in 
relation with numerous other contexts of thought. For 
example, when I have learned the essential content of a work 
on logic or epistemology, certain thoughts contained in that 
work are recalled to mind whenever I read another work 
dealing with a similar topic; and by this means they are re- 
imprinted upon memory. Hence anything that has become 
assimilated into the context of our conceptional knowledge 
requires no verbal or other detailed renewal because it has 
entered into numerous logical relations with other conceptual 
contexts, and is reproducible through the medium of the 
latter at any subsequent time. 

From the second point of view, we distinguish between 
a. immediate, b. temporary, and c. permanent retention; or 
more strictly speaking, between a. the immediate reproduc- 



The Fu7ictions of Memory 41 

tion of impressions which have just been received, h. reten- 
tion for a short period of time, after which the material is 
forgotten, or retention for a single given interval, and c. per- 
manent incorporation in memory, which results from an 
intention to make a given content a lasting or imperishable 
possession of mind. Immediate retention should rather be 
called the restoration, without delay, of impressions which 
have not yet wholly disappeared from consciousness; and 
permanent retention might be called the delayed revival of 
impressions which had already disappeared from conscious- 
ness. The former represents immediate, the latter, delayed 
reproduction. 

These distinctions are based upon general considerations 
as well as upon experimental observations. They have been 
disputed, it is true, but, I believe, for insufficient reasons. 
Opponents of these distinctions usually maintain that these 
three functions of memory are not radically different, but 
that transitions may be found between immediate and per- 
manent retention. That is self-evident; but it does not 
constitute a valid objection to the distinction. In not a single 
instance where particular functions within the intellect are 
differentiated can we have to do with wholly incomparable 
functions which possess no characteristics in common, and 
which show no transitions or gradations from one into another. 
It is possible, for instance, to indicate a great many char- 
acteristics which are common to memory, to imagination and 
to thought; and we can find common elements and transi- 
tional stages in external and internal perception, in sensation 
and reproduction, etc. It is inherent in the very nature of 
psychological classifications that they cannot refer to rad- 
ically different sub-divisions of different functions because 
they are nothing more than logical epitomes of differentiations 
within a consciousness which is essentially unitary; and again 



42 The Psychology of Learning 

if we make distinctions within a given function they are, after"" 
all, nothing more than differentiations of the function itself. 
The objection in question might equally well be urged against 
every sort of psychological classification. Immediate and 
permanent retention are distinguished by such strikingly dif- 
ferent characteristics that no one who clearly understands 
what psychological classification means can doubt the validity 
of their differentiation. 

The distinction between immediate and permanent reten- 
tion is based upon the following reasons: /. It designates, in 
the first place, a difference in the intention with which we 
learn the material to be remembered. It may be our inten- 
tion to reproduce it immediately after the completion of the 
act of observing it. This is the case when we attempt to 
repeat letters or numbers which have been pronounced in 
our presence in order to test our capacity for immediate reten- 
tion; or when, on a question being asked us, we attempt to 
retain the question just long enough to answer it; or when we 
read the names on shop-windows, in order to get our bearings 
in the business section of the city, etc. In none of these cases 
could any useful purpose be served by a lasting retention; and 
in such cases we always make the observation for immediate 
use, and never retain it permanently, nor even for any con- 
siderable period of time. In experimental investigations, 
immediate retention is usually tested by pronouncing letters, 
syllables, or words, and having the observer speak or write 
them without delay. 

2. A second characteristic of immediate retention consists 
in the fact that it is, to some extent, a restoration of the 
original impression which has by this time partially faded. 
Immediate recall makes use of the dying away of the original 
impression itself, and hence it has in some degree the charac- 
ter of an after-image, as when a color stimulus after ceasing 



The Functions of Memory 43 

to act upon the retina is succeeded by an after-excitation in 
the visual organ and in the visual center, and tails off into an 
after-image which may last for several minutes. When we 
concentrate our attention upon such an after-image we are 
able to check its fading and lengthen its duration by this 
artificial means. In a similar manner, immediate retention, — 
for instance, the reproduction of words wliich have just been 
heard, — employs all the particular details of the original 
impression. I still seem to hear the sound of the speaker's 
voice, the tempo, the rhythm, and the accent; or if the 
words were presented visually, all the details of the incidental 
circumstances wliich attended the perception still remain in 
memory, and are all made use of by immediate retention. 
Indeed this persistence of the complete details of original 
impressions really constitutes the chief aid in this form of 
retention. All of these concomitant circumstances of the 
original impression fall away when the reproduction is delayed 
for several days, weeks or months. Watt has pointed out 
that lasting retention may also arrest these details and he 
urges this as an objection to the distinction which we have 
made. He overlooks the fact, however, that it is not a ques- 
tion of whether these details may be revived and renewed, but 
of whether immediate retention can make use of the fading-out 
of the primary impression itself. This is the essential point, 
3. And with this is connected a negative characteristic of 
immediate retention. It is the only form of revival of an 
impression which takes place without the original impression 
being crowded out of consciousness; all permanent retention 
takes place after the original impression has been effaced or 
has been forced out of consciousness by other ideas or per- 
ceptions. Immediate retention is, therefore, not a genuine 
reproduction, but only a re-inforcement or re-intensification of 
the fading primary impression. Against Watt's objection we 



44 The Psychology of Learning 

may also urge the fact that one finds it wholly impossible to 
retain permanently all the details and accidental circumstances 
which attended the original impression. It is a chief charac- 
teristic of forgetting that these non-essential details are repro- 
ducible only immediately after the disappearance of the 
original impression; they necessarily disappear from memory 
afterwards. Immediate retention, therefore, still possesses 
some of the freshness and detail and completeness of the 
original sense-impression itself, which are wholly lacking in 
the case of delayed reproduction. 

4. An intensive and uniform concentration of attention is 
the chief requisite for immediate retention. The essential 
condition of permanent retention, however, is a product of 
the temporal relations of the process of imprinting, but 
especially of an adequate duration and an adequate repetition 
of the impression. 

5. The effect of immediate retention is peculiar in that it 
lasts for only a brief period of time, and that it may readily 
be obhterated by distracting impressions. Tliis indicates that 
immediate retention is really nothing else than a re-inforce- 
ment of the fading impression. Thus, in experiments deahng 
with the compass of immediate retention we find that fifteen 
to twenty seconds after the stimulation has ceased the obser- 
ver is able to reproduce but little; and it sometimes happens 
that everything is forgotten a few seconds later, especially 
when the amount of material presented approaches the limit 
of immediate retention. If ten or twelve letters are pro- 
nounced in the presence of an observer, and if the reproduction 
is delayed a few seconds, the observer sometimes finds that 
he is no longer able to recall any of the letters. So, too, when 
disturbing stimuli or distractions of attention occur during 
the imprinting or immediately after the presentation of the 
letters, the whole series of imprinted letters may disappear 



The Functions of Memory 45 

immediately and completely from memory. These phenomena 
can be explained only on the assumption that no fixing of a 
genuine memory disposition had as yet taken place; and that 
all that occurred was a dying away and a revival of the 
primary impression. 

6. Our distinction is also justified by the circumstance 
that the capacity of immediate retention is a variable indi- 
vidual endowment. Certain persons possess a remarkable 
capacity of immediate retention but a very weak memory so 
far as permanence of retention is concerned, and vice versa. 
Finally, the two capacities differ even in children, at a time 
when the child's memory far excels the adult's in permanent 
retention, and his capacity of temporary retention is still much 
inferior to that of the adult. This again shows that perma- 
nent retention does not depend primarily upon the function of 
attention, because attention is much less highly developed in 
children than in adults. 

Temporary retention may be distinguished as a special 
function of memory only with regard to two characteristics: 
The learner does not here intend to retain permanently, but 
only for a limited time; and this intention exerts a definite 
influence upon the processes of imprinting, and upon reten- 
tion itself as well. This is the way in which we learn poems 
which are to be recited at a stated time, or prepare addresses 
which are to be delivered but once. Every public speaker 
must set about his work of memorizing with this intention 
in mind. In other respects the difference between temporary 
and permanent retention is not great. But we shall later 
discover several reasons for taking this difference into account. 
It shows how significant for retention is the sort of attitude and 
the sort of intention with which we learn. We need not consider 
permanent retention further at this time, because we shall de- 
scribe it more completely in all of our subsequent discussions. 



46 The Psychology of Learning 

In the third place, we may distinguish the functions of 
memory from the point of view of subject-matter retained or 
of content dealt with. Here it must be noted that the differ- 
ences of memorial function whose existence we are led to 
assume by differences in the content retained are also, as a 
matter of fact, to be regarded as functional differences in 
memory, — because there is no such thing as general memory 
but only a variety of special memories. When we attempt 
to sub-divide memorial functions in accordance with the 
subject-matter retained, numerous differentiations of me- 
morial activity may, of course, be assumed; and we must 
gather the objects (and the functions) of memory into groups 
if we are to avoid a too extended classification. From this 
point of view, we may first distinguish sensory-concrete 
memory. This includes : a. The sense-memories, which may 
again be sub-divided upon the basis of the different sense 
departments. Thus, we may distinguish tonal memory, 
memory for colors and brightness, memory for tastes, odors, 
pressures, temperatures and kinaesthetic sensations, b. Mem- 
ory for spatial and temporal impressions. Here we may dis- 
tinguish between memory for small, immediately perceptible 
extents of space and of time, — for instance, lines a few centi- 
meters long or temporal intervals extending over a few seconds, 
— and memory for complex spatial and temporal relations. 
c. Memory for concrete objects and processes as wholes, for 
things and events in the external world, as unitary groups of 
sensory qualities. From these must be distinguished d. mem- 
ory for abstract signs and symbols, for names, numbers and 
abstract verbal meanings; and e. memory of our own 
mental life and its processes. This latter may again be sub- 
divided into memory for products of our ideation and think- 
ing, and memory for emotions and volitions. These latter 
may also be called emotional and volitional memory. When 



The Functions of Memory 47 

volitional memory is ' concerned with external voluntary 
movements, motor associations contribute to its functioning/ 

If we employ the physiological point of view as the basis 
for differentiating the varieties of memory as regards con- 
tent, the special memories may be classified into two groups: 
I. The different varieties of sensory memory; and 2. the 
varieties and functions of motor memory. Everything which 
concerns memory of sensations, ideas and thoughts belongs 
to the class of sensorial memory function. Opposed to these 
stands memory of motor innervation of movements. It 
need not be mentioned that motor processes leave traces or 
dispositions in nerve and muscle just as do the sensory pro- 
cesses in the sensory nerves. In this sense we may, of course, 
speak of a motor memory. 

The former classification from the psychological point of 
view is, however, more appropriate because it is based upon 
psychical differences of memory functions, and hence it cor- 
responds more closely with the facts of the mental life. Thus, 
for instance, it is better to speak of a memory for volitional 
acts than of a memory for motor functions, because a memory 
for acts of will includes not only the remembrance of motives 
which comprise ideas and emotions; it also includes a memory 
of the movements corresponding to the acts of will. But if, 
on the other hand, we emphasize the motor aspect of memory, 
we dismember components which are necessary constituents 
in the act of will. 

Various objections may be urged against employing the 
sort of content remembered as a basis for a psychological 
classification of memories. In the first place it might be 
objected that, after all, we would then be dealing not with 
different sorts of memory but only with different sorts of 
remembered content. But there are no peculiar sorts of 

' Cf. p. 26. 



48 The Psychology of Learning 

remembered content to which special memorial functions do 
not correspond. Our memory for numbers is something 
different from our space memory or our tonal memory. It 
might be objected further that these differences of detail 
could be multiplied indefinitely. Thus one might also dis- 
tinguish between memories for different sorts of move- 
ments, such as writing movements, gymnastic movements 
and the Hke, or memory for sensation differences, etc. This, 
of course, can not be disputed; but in every classification it 
is necessary that groups of related processes be included 
under a single sub-division. And there are numerous other 
reasons which justify this di\dsion. In the first place, me- 
morial functions differ from individual to individual. There 
are individuals who possess an unusual and one-sided tonal 
memory; others, a remarkable memory for names, for num- 
bers, etc. Secondly, the several memories differ in their 
development in children, certain memories developing at an 
earlier age than others. Thus, in children, the memory for 
emotions and the memory for numbers and abstract concepts 
remain relatively undeveloped for a considerable time; while 
the memory for concrete objects precedes all others.^ Finally, 
the various memories may differ in characteristic ways in cases 
of pathological disturbances of memory function. It is found 
that the memory for certain particular objects may be dis- 
turbed or destroyed while the other memories remain intact. 

* This was shown by H. Netschajeff, Die Entwickelung des Gedacht- 
nisses bei ^chuYkind-QXTii, Zeitsckrijt f. Psychologic, 'XXIW ., 1900,321-351. 



CHAPTER III 

OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING: THE TECHNIQUE OF OBSERVING 

AND NOTING 

J. Analysis of Observational Noting 

Observational noting comes into play, as we have seen, 
when by an act of observation we imprint the contents of 
perception, — persons, things and processes, — with a view to 
remembering them. It may have to do with the imprinting 
of single sensations, — colors, pressures, temperatures, odors, 
tastes, sensations of movement; with groups and complexes 
of sensations, — combinations of colors, tonal chords, etc.; 
with sensation-differences which have been made a special 
object of the act of comparing; with spatial relations, such 
as the arrangement, position, distance and size of objects; 
with forms, or specifically with differences of spatial relation, 
such as the relative length of lines, the relative areas of sur- 
faces; with temporal relations such as the succession of par- 
ticular events; or with the combination of spatial or temporal 
relations and sensations. For example, when I note the size, 
the color and the tactual properties of an object, I apprehend 
a combination of spatial relations and sensational elements ; 
when I note a part of a melody by simply listening to it, my 
noting includes the tones, the tempo and the rhythm. 

It is to be borne in mind here that in those cases where we 
note not only the sensations or the temporal and spatial 
elements in themselves, but also note the total impressions, 
and where therefore, objects, events, successions of tones, 
etc., must be imprinted as wholes, we never remember merely 

49 



50 The Psychology of Learning 

the elements which constitute the whole but also the total 
impression. This total impression which is superadded to 
the elements as a special increment has appropriately been 
called the "form quality" {Gestaltsqualitat) in an attempt to 
express the fact that a composite stimulus, — for example, a 
variegated cube, — makes a characteristic impression as a 
whole, and to some extent has a special property or quality 
as a whole which is something more than the several attributes 
of the elements, — the color, the hardness, and the form of the 
surfaces of the cube. 

As we have already seen, observational noting plays an 
exceedingly important role in memory. It comprises the 
whole of sense perception in so far as the latter is concerned 
in the acquisition of information which we wish to incorporate 
in memory. 

To make clear the mechanism of observational or concrete 
noting, it would be necessary to discuss the whole psychology 
of perception and observation. By observation I understand 
a perception which is distinguished from unsystematic and 
purposeless sensing by the fact that the observation always 
has some definite goal in view, which guides the observation 
in a particular direction, and which, during the act of observ- 
ing, prescribes the point of view or points of view from which 
the observed object is regarded. And secondly, in conse- 
quence of this, the attention is directed toward a definite 
selection of sense-impressions, while those other impressions 
which do not fit in with the purpose of the observation remain 
unnoticed. Thirdly, the result of the observation is also 
subordinated to certain points of view and is systematically 
brought into relation with our previous knowledge. One 
may say briefly, then, that observation is a process of atten- 
tive and methodical sense-perception which is carried through 
systematically from definite points of view. 



Observational Lear?i{ng 51 

It would perhaps be well to describe the various parts or 
stages of such a methodical observation. Let us choose, as 
an illustration, the observant analysis of some art-product 
where we purpose to determine the period from which it 
dates, the style which characterizes its form, and perhaps, 
too, the master or artificer who designed it. Let us suppose 
it is an old and artistically constructed cabinet. The partic- 
ular stages in the observation may, of course, reach different 
degrees of completeness. We shall here specify those which 
are psychologically necessary if the purpose of the observa- 
tion is to be attained, i. We approach the observed object 
with a definite purpose or goal-idea, which plays the part of 
a guiding idea or of a dominant point of view in the observa- 
tion; thus in our illustration the purpose is to determine the 
style, etc., of the cabinet. The goal-idea may be definite or 
indefinite; it may assume the form of a general concept or of 
a wholly concrete particular idea. At the beginning of the 
observation we have the goal before us in a somewhat general 
fashion; but the farther the observation proceeds in dealing 
with the details of the cabinet, the more do we make use of 
definite, particular goals of observation. Hence, as a rule, 
we have a general, abstract goal-idea at the outset of our 
observation; but it gradually gives place, during the course 
of the observation, to a more and more definite and logically 
subordinate goal-idea. 2. The object acts upon the retina 
as a group of visual stimuli,— in this case the color and the 
form of the cabinet, — and gives us, at first, a total and but 
slightly analyzed impression of the object. Not all of these 
stimuli, however, have the same effect upon consciousness 
because our attitude of internal predisposition and attention 
toward all of them is not identical and uniform; on the con- 
trary, the stimulus which corresponds with our goal-idea comes 
most clearly to consciousness and is most especially noted. 



52 The Psychology of Learning 

J. In consequence of this, the goal-idea directs our atten- 
tion to particular parts of the object toward which we turn 
our regard. In our illustration, it is those parts in which 
the character of the style is most prominent which are selected, 
for example, it may be the ornamentation of the cabinet. 

4. Since our attention is concentrated upon particular par- 
tial impressions these are especially accentuated for conscious- 
ness, and, to some extent, isolated or raised into prominence 
from their surroundings, while at the same time such partial 
impressions as do not correspond with the view-point of 
observation are overlooked or remain unheeded. At the 
same time the will to imprint upon memory is directed upon 
those impressions which correspond with the goal-idea. Or 
more strictly speaking, the will to imprint was already present 
in the predisposition to observe as a will to note and imprint 
everything in the object which corresponds with the goal- 
idea ; and the impressions corresponding to the goal-idea now 
participate in this predisposing will. 

5. This brings it about that a certain selection is- made 
among the reproduced ideas which are aroused in conscious- 
ness by the sight of the object. Those impressions which are 
especially emphasized by attention arouse more definite ideas 
than those to which we do not attend. 

6. Among the ideas which are aroused by the sight of the 
object and the activity of attention, two sorts must be sharply 
distinguished from one another. The one serves exclusively 
for the cognition, recognition, interpretation and identifica- 
tion of what is given us in perception. These fuse immediately 
with the sense-impressions to form a unitary whole, and 
thereby give rise, now for the first time, to a unitary percep- 
tion of the external object, — the cabinet in our illustration. 
They are, therefore, the ideas by means of which the funda- 
mental forms in the cabinet are cognized, interpreted and 



Observational Learning 53 

identified. The other ideas do not fuse directly with the 
given impression, but they remain free and independently 
reproduced ideas of memory and imagination, and persist in 
consciousness side by side with the impression. They are, 
for instance, remembrances of my formerly having seen simi- 
lar cabinets, ideas of the price or value of the cabinet, and the 
Hke. 7. This introduces a two-fold process: a. an analytic 
sensing of the object, and h. an internal elaboration of the 
impressions received. The analytic sensing of the object 
comes about a. as a result of our several repetitions of the 
process described, — our eyes and our attention wander over 
the whole object, point by point, in the various stages of our 
observation, and again and again we analyze its parts and their 
properties from the prevailing points of view of observation; 
and (p. as a result of our clarifying and emphasizing now 
one part, now another part, by means of attention. Thus as 
our observation progresses, we gradually analyze the whole 
object from the prevailing points of view. 

The completeness and accuracy of the observation obviously 
depends, in great measure, upon the completeness and the 
persistence and the energy with which these repeated acts of 
analytic sensing are accomplished. Our internal elaboration 
of the impression begins with the independent ideas of memory 
and imagination, or with ideas which are aroused or repro- 
duced in us by the sight of the object. From these ideas our 
elaboration of the impression takes its start. On the one 
hand, we bring what we have just seen into relation with our 
previous knowledge of the various periods in the history of 
art; but, on the other hand, we also determine clearly what 
novel and characteristic features are present in the object 
before us, and bring them to consciousness as something which 
is new and characteristic. We find, for example, that not 
only are the familiar forms of the style of the Baroco period 



54 The Psychology of Learning 

represented in the cabinet, but also that the individuality 
of a particular city, — Danzig, for instance, — is stamped upon 
it. Of course, every result of our observation, not only the 
total result, but also the results of the various steps taken in 
analytic vision, may itself be raised in turn to become a new 
view-point of observation. 

8. As a rule, we combine more or less systematically and 
completely into a total picture, what we discover from our 
analysis of the object; and this composite picture can then 
express the result of observation in a synthetic judgment, 
(synthetic activity of observation). Thus in our illustration 
we synthesize the results of our observation into the final 
judgment: "The cabinet dates from a particular period of 
the Baroco era, and it was constructed in the city of Dan- 
zig, etc." 

It is important to note that mere persistent looking, listen- 
ing, etc., i.e., the persistence and the energy with which the 
purely sensory process of observing is accomplished, — in our 
case the purely visual fixation and the visual examination of 
the cabinet, — is of great significance for the success of obser- 
vation. The English aesthetician, Ruskin, and the German 
physicist, Lichtenberg, stated that it was chiefly to their 
training in persistent fixation that they owed the "analytic 
power" of their observation. 

In observational noting, then, one imprints upon memory 
the data which are acquired through observation, — not merely 
the total impression, but also the particular details which 
are determined during the process of observing. But it is 
clear that the work of memory depends, in great measure, 
upon the manner in which the act of observing has been done; 
we can, of course, remember only what we have observed. 
And, too, our method of observing may be favorable or unfav- 
orable for retention. There are two groups of conditions upon 



Observational Learning 55 

which success in observation depends : those conditions which 
have to do with the technique of observation itself; and those 
conditions which are especially significant for the remembering 
of impressions which have been acquired by means of observa- 
tion. 

Since observational noting depends upon the maimer in 
which the observing itself is done, a technique or an economy 
of observational noting must be, at the same time, a tech- 
nique or economy of observation, and a technique or economy 
of the retention of observed impressions. The development 
of an accurate method of observation ensures the survival 
in memory of reproducible traces of sense-impressions; and 
this is a preliminary condition which must be fulfilled if 
observational noting is to be successful. The second group 
of conditions concerns the specific factors of retention and 
reproduction. In a word, we must fulfil certain conditions of 
retention as well as of observation if we are to succeed in 
imprinting the contents of sense-perception adequately. These 
two groups of conditions must now be discussed more fully. 

Let us first consider all those conditions of observational 
noting which are concerned in the technique of observation 
itself. Here it must be borne in mind at the outset that an 
observation imposes wholly different conditions and demands 
upon the observer according to the variable external circum- 
stances under which it takes place. Three chief cases may 
be distinguished: i. The case where we observe a resting 
object which we are able to examine at leisure, and whose 
nature is such as to make it possible for us to bring the 
object under the most favorable conditions for observation, — 
for instance, the critical examination of a plant, or a physical 
or mechanical model. 2. A second case is that in which the 
observed object can be seen for only an instant, and where 
the observation must be brief and transient. This happens 



56 The Psychology of Lear^iing 

when we are called upon to observe rapidly moving objects 
which appear in the field of vision for only a short time; or 
when stimuli are present to observation for only an instant, as 
when we hear a momentary tone or noise, or see an instan- 
taneous flash of light. 3. A third case occurs when objects 
can not be brought under favorable internal or external con- 
ditions of observation. Illustrations of this case are furnished 
by those objects which we can examine only from such a 
great distance that the retinal image can not be made clear 
or intensive. From these three cases which we have dis- 
tinguished upon the basis of external conditions of observa- 
tion, there may be differentiated three other cases which are 
distinguished by differences in internal conditions of obser- 
vation. 

In the first place, we find it possible in certain cases to 
bring about a careful mental preparation and hence to enter 
upon our act of observing with definite expectations, or goal- 
ideas. We shall call this a case of inquiring observation. It 
is characterized by the fact that the whole process of obser- 
vation takes place under the influence of more or less definitely 
conscious goal-ideas or points of view of observation. At the 
same time, it is always a volimtary, and even an arbitrary 
observation; we set out to observe the object with a perfectly 
definite purpose in view. Secondly, the observation may be 
involuntary or forced. This is always the case when a stimulus 
makes its appearance suddenly and attracts our attention 
involuntarily without our having an opportunity for internal 
preparation. This sort of observation is characterized by the 
fact that its starting-point is not an expectation-idea or goal- 
idea which we have set up before us; it is always entered 
upon without such a preparation. Every involuntary obser- 
vation of this sort contains an element of surprise. When 
upon a forest-path a bird suddenly takes flight and attracts 



Observational Learning 57 

my attention, I am forced to an involuntary observation. 
The inherent difficulty of involuntary observation is due to 
the two characteristics which have been mentioned: a pre- 
disposing of consciousness by means of the setting-up of a 
goal-idea is lacking; and the observation is always attended 
by the emotion of surprise, which constitutes a disturbing 
factor. Thirdly, from these two cases must be distinguished 
a third possibility which has been too little heeded by psy- 
chologists. This I shall call passively expectant observation.^ 
In this type of observation we rid ourselves of definite view- 
points of observation, and have before us only the general 
indefinite purpose of observing whatever may happen. We 
find ourselves in this condition of passive observation when 
we travel in a foreign country. We do not know what sort 
of stimuli will fall upon our sense-organs; but we propose to 
make a careful observation of every interesting feature in our 
environment. In such a case as this, predisposition by means 
of definite goal-ideas is wholly impossible, and would be dis- 
advantageous because it would tend to cause us to observe 
certain phenomena in a one-sided and partisan fashion, while 
other phenomena would be overlooked. The only goal-idea 
which we have before us in this case is our intent to assume 
the general attitude of an observer. 

All three of these types of observation may be made more 
clear by referring to the different attitudes or adjustments of 

^ This third type of observation is called ' abwartende Beobachltcng.* 
Here the observer does not know in advance what he is about to 
observe; he simply proposes to be on the alert, and to discover in 
good time what it will be. His attitude is one of disinterested curi- 
osity; he is passive, calm, non-partisan and attentive. This third 
type of observation differs from the first type in that the observer 
approaches the observation without any definite predisposition, and 
from the second type in that he may now take his time, indeed he 
awaits the observation. It is then a passive, leisurely observation. Tr. 



58 The Psychology of Learning 

attention which precede the act of observing in the several 
instances. In inquiring observation, the attitude of atten- 
tion is relatively definite, at least it prepares the observer 
for a particular sort of stimulus; and under certain circum- 
stances, it even predisposes him for a perfectly definite, par- 
ticular, concrete impression. In involuntary observation or 
observation which is taken by surprise, the attention is either 
not concentrated upon the in-coming stimulus at all, or is 
concentrated there only by sheer accident. In passively 
expectant observation, we adjust ourselves only for observa- 
tion in general, intentionally refraining from any special 
adjustment; while in inquiring observation we always adjust 
ourselves for observation as accurately and as definitely as 
we can. 

Now it is clear that the various sorts of internal and exter- 
nal conditions which we have employed as a basis for the 
differentiation of the various types of observation may com- 
bine in different manners. In most cases, inquiring or vol- 
untary observation can deal only with resting objects which 
we are able to place under most favorable conditions for 
observing; at least in this sort of observation we usually 
endeavor to bring about this state of affairs. Nevertheless, 
it is advantageous to distinguish these cases from one another, 
and to consider rules for the technique of observation from 
the point of view of external conditions, and from the point 
of view of the type of observation which these conditions 
bring about. 

There are, however, certain internal conditions and espe- 
cially certain external conditions which are common to all 
types of observation; and these play a part in every act of 
observation. These general or common conditions of all 
observation are in part, external or objective, in part, internal 
or subjective. 



i 



Ohservaiional Learning 59 

a. External Conditions of Observation 

1. Objects must be presented to our senses under favor- 
able conditions if our observation of them is to be accurate 
and complete; thus, visual objects must be well within the 
range of vision, and they must appear in favorable illumina- 
tion; tones and noises must be distinctly audible, etc. In 
controlling the external conditions of stimulation we must 
exclude all distractions which might impair the action of 
the stimuli; thus auditory observations should be made only 
in a quiet room, and with proper precautions as to the con- 
duction and reflection of sound, etc. The detailed discussion 
of these external conditions is, of course, not a matter for the 
psychologist to deal with, since they concern the physiological 
and physical aspects of observation. 

2. Precautions must be taken to adapt the sense-organs 
to the nature of the stimulus, if they are not already in an 
appropriate condition of adaptation. Thus in visual observa- 
tion we must see to it that the eye is properly accommodated 
to the visual object, and that it is completely adapted to the 
brightness of the environment; the auxiUary apparatus of 
attention and sense-perception must also be brought into 
an optimal condition. For example, the eye must be made 
capable of accurately fixating the object to be observed, and 
of maintaining the fixation, — a result which is not always 
easily attainable when moving objects are to be observed. 
The whole bodily posture of the observer must be as well 
adapted as possible to the circumstances of the observation. 

J. A further general condition of accurate observation has 
to do with the acuity of the sensory apparatus itself, or more 
strictly speaking, with the sensory acuity and the physio- 
logical sensitivity of the peripheral and central nervous 
mechanism. This has an extremely important bearing upon 
the result of observation. 



6o The Psychology of Learning 

4. There are certain other conditions of observation upon 
which depend its accuracy and its scientific value. Hence we 
may call these the conditions which have to do with methods 
of procedure in observing. Here belong, first and foremost, 
the facts that observations should be made repeatedly and 
under as nearly as possible identical conditions both internal 
and external; that observations should be controlled and 
confirmed by other observers; that the results should, so far 
as possible, be expressed in definite quantitative terms. The 
significance of these requirements, however, is logical and 
methodological rather than psychological. 
b. Internal or Subjective Conditions of Observation 

In a discussion of the subjective conditions of observation 
we must refer back to the three chief types of observation 
which have been differentiated: inquiring or voluntary, 
startled or involuntary, and passively expectant. Each of 
these types of observation has its own peculiar subjective 
conditions. Let us first take the case of voluntary or inquir- 
ing observation; and let us suppose that we are concerned 
with a resting object which we may observe at our leisure. 
It is in such cases as this that training in observing and not- 
ing can most readily be acquired. 

Observing here begins with an internal setting-up of expec- 
tation-ideas or goal-ideas or points of view, which conduct 
the observation along particular paths and prepare the way 
for the selection of that which is to be observed, although 
they by no means finally determine the selection. Hence as 
a first condition of this sort of observation it is to be demanded 
that the observer shall proceed with definite goal-ideas or 
points of view. Moreover, these must be adapted to the pur- 
pose of the observation, and to the particular stages in the 
progress of the observation. They may accordingly have 
more of the character of general concepts or they may have 



Observational Learning 6 1 

the character of concrete ideas. As points of view of obser- 
vation, general concepts are especially significant when the 
general goal of a whole series of observations is to be stated 
or internally set up. For instance, when the teacher makes use 
of concrete objects he prescribes the analysis of the objects as 
the goal of observation; and he presents this goal to his 
pupils in the form of a general concept (phanerogam, crypto- 
gam, etc.). But so soon as the observation is accompHshed, 
attention is directed more and more to detailed points which 
correspond to the observed goal; and now to the general 
concept of the goal may be added more definite and more 
concrete goal-ideas which the observation proceeds to follow 
in detail. But more concrete view-points of observation, 
which are ideated in as definite form as possible, have a sig- 
nificance even when a particular and wholly definite content 
of perception is to be found or distinguished by means of the 
observation; for instance, a particular color, brightness, form, 
etc. Meanwhile it may be seen that the significance of the 
goal-idea varies greatly with the sort of material observed. 
The guiding ideas increase in significance with increase in 
the complexity of the material to be observed, because when 
the material contains many details there is a greater possi- 
bility that the observation will fail to concentrate, and will, 
therefore, dissipate its energy. When, on the other hand, the 
observation is concerned simply with the quahty of a partic- 
ular color, the directing idea has much less significance. It 
points out the general direction which attention, and with it 
regard, is sure to follow; and its task is then accompHshed 
because of the simplicity of the visual object dealt with. 
Attention must now accentuate the observed content, and 
make it clear and distinct for consciousness. 

Much more important are the conditions of observation 

which have to do with the proper employment of the direct- 
6 



62 The Psychology of Learning 

ing idea. During observation, the attention must be fixed 
upon the goal idea or the view-point of observation; by this 
means a constant direction of attention is assured. When 
the attention is not thus fixated and held, the goal is readily 
lost sight of by the observer; the attention wanders to other 
objects, and there ensues a distracted or purposeless observa- 
tion, although a goal of observation may have been set up at 
the outset. It is essential, furthermore, that goal-ideas should 
enter into proper relations with the objects of observation. 
This was already demanded, in part, by a condition discussed 
in the foregoing which specified that goal-ideas should not 
be suppressed by incoming impressions; nor should the former 
stifle the latter. The observer is to be on his guard lest he 
interpolate subjective additions into his objectively presented 
data; and he should always be ready to modify and correct 
his expectation-ideas to conform with his objective findings. 
When he deals with simple and easily observable objects or 
with objects which possess conspicuous characteristics, his 
tendency toward subjective falsification is not so great; inves- 
tigations of the psychology of testimony show that this ten- 
dency is much less evident in observation than in memory. 
The danger of illusory observation is great in proportion 
as the object observed is complex, and in proportion as the 
impressions received from it are vague and indefinite, whether 
as a result of hasty observation, or in consequence of the 
character of the contents themselves, — as when we observe 
in faint illumination or from a great distance. 

The proper relation between the expectation-idea and the 
objective datum determines, in part, the objective and fac- 
simile character of observation; but only in part, as we shall 
see. The more we subordinate the expectation-idea to the 
external impression, the more objective and accurate is the 
observation. The less critical is our attitude in allowing this 



Observational Learning 63 

idea to fuse with the impression, the greater is the danger 
that expectation-ideas which do not correspond with sensory 
impressions will assimilate with the latter, and the more sub- 
jective and false may the observation become. 

A second condition of this type of observation is furnished 
by the circumstance that the goal-idea oftentimes determines 
the point of- view from which the data are subsequently 
arranged and classified. This is especially Hkely to occur in 
cases where the goal-ideas refer to a general abstract goal, and 
where the result of the observation conforms with the goal. 

But it may happen even in a simple concrete perception. 
Let us suppose that two colors are to be compared in order 
to determine their relative brightness. The goal-idea is the 
brightness difference of the two colors; the result of the 
observation consists in the perception of a greater brightness 
in one of the colors. Thus the goal-idea stands, in a certain 
sense, both at the beginning and at the end of the observa- 
tion. But if the observation reaches a result which is at 
variance with the expectation-idea we incorporate the result 
into a judgment that our finding belongs not to the goal-idea 
but to another category. 

From this it follows that the result of the observation must 
always relate in some way to the dominating point of view of 
the observation, either positively or negatively, either in a 
confirmative, corrective or supplementing fashion, if the obser- 
vation is to be made in a systematic fashion. 

Attention performs a four-fold function in the process of 
observation; and a systematic observation must, therefore, 
fulfil four conditions in so far as the behavior of attention is 
concerned, i. The attention fixes in consciousness the goal- 
idea or the view-point of observation; and by this means, 
not only does it determine the selection of what shall be ob- 
served and what shall not be observed, but it also causes 



64 The Psychology of Learning 

the whole observation to center, in a certain sense, about this 
one goal; and it sends us back to the goal again after each 
successive step in the observation. It is chiefly to this fixative 
influence of attention that observation owes its unitary char- 
acter. 2. Attention raises the observed datum in the im- 
pression to greater clearness and to a higher degree of aware- 
ness; and by this means it separates the observed content 
from its environment. The content is thereby isolated and 
accentuated for consciousness, and at the same time every- 
thing which is not to be heeded is inhibited. 5. By this 
means attention facilitates the reproduction of those ideas 
wliich are directly aroused by the impression itself, which 
have to do with the apprehension and the interpretation of the 
impression, and which fuse completely with it. 4. This 
function of attention brings it about that not only do the 
observed contents surge forward into consciousness, and not 
only do they arouse the idea which is assimilated with them, 
but they determine the selection of those independently 
reproduced ideas which can attach to the perception; and 
at the same time the formation of associations between them 
and the perception-content is facilitated, and the memorial 
noting of the perception-content is aided and reinforced. 

The success of every mental activity, including the act of 
observing, depends not only upon the accomplishment of the 
component activities, but chiefly upon the co-operation of 
will. Will determines how much energy and persistence shall 
be devoted to the act of observing; and upon these two fac- 
tors depends the most important result of the observation, 
namely, the complete and thorough analysis of the objective 
datum. But even the fulfilment of all of these conditions of 
observation does not constitute the really complete observa- 
tion of an object. The most essential thing of all is the num- 
ber of steps in observation, or the repetition and continuation 



Observatio7ial Learning 65 

of the act of observing until the object is completely and ex- 
haustively analyzed from the point of view which is, for the 
moment, dominant. Not until we have gone over the object, 
part by part, from the point of view which is momentarily 
dominant do we obtain a genuine analysis which renders us 
perfectly famihar with all of its attributes and character- 
istics which appertain to that point of view of observation. 
This completeness of observation is therefore a product of 
the persistence and tenacity of our will to observe; it is not a 
mere matter of concentration as such. From the testimony 
of persons who are distinguished by a supra-normal capacity 
of analytical observation we learn that they owe their success 
to this property of will, — to their persistence and tenacity 
in observation. Thus the physicist Lichtenberg reports that 
he has often forced himself to fix his eyes upon an object 
until he discovers some particular characteristic of interest; 
Ruskin relates that he had trained himself from his youth to 
analyze the most insignificant objects with extreme accuracy 
and persistence by means of long-continued gazing. Goethe's 
gift of observation consisted in a disposition to consider 
things thoroughly from the most diverse points of view. 
Here, then, a great significance attaches to the purely sensory 
acts of merely looking, listening, and the Hke. 

General psychological reflection can not show exhaustively 
what significance attaches to the view-point of observation. 
We must discover it from an appeal to experiments which 
deal with the results of observation. These show us that a 
systematic and methodical observation is attained chiefly by 
having a great number and variety of view-points or cate- 
gories of observation, and by knowing how to employ them 
in a systematic and methodical manner. This appears with 
especial clearness from psychological experiments which deal 
with the development of observation through the years of 



66 The Psychology of Learning 

childhood. From these we find that children in their earlier 
years, at the age of about seven or eight years, still fail to 
observe much that the adult sees, because appropriate points 
of view from which to observe are lacking in children. But 
we also find that certain adults although possessed of these 
points of view still fail to observe accurately because they 
do not make a systematic use of their view-points.^ A further 
question arises as to whether the distinctness and concrete- 
ness of the goal-idea exerts any considerable influence upon 
observation. It is to be expected that only those persons who 
understand their points of view correctly can employ them 
correctly in observation. Hence children are able to observe 
only from those view-points which are adapted to their stage 
of mental development. But apart from this, the distinctness 
of the goal-idea does not seem to be of great significance 
because the attention may be attracted in a particular direc- 
tion by indistinct goal-ideas, and indeed, often is so attracted 
by extremely vague expectations; and the more accurate 
discovery of the direction of attention is facihtated by the 
perception-content itself. If a person who has had no experi- 
ence in psychological observation is asked to determine the 
relative brightness of different colors, his attention will be 
guided by the sensory content itself to that which is to be 
observed. 

From all of these considerations we see that the conditions 
of a perfect inquiring observation are manifold. They may, 
however, be classified into three chief groups: i. The goal- 
idea and its proper employment; 2. The function of atten- 
tion; and 3. The participation of will in the attainment of 
the observed goal. We shall later deal with the effect of 
observation upon retention; and then we shall return to 
discuss the significance of these three groups. 
^ See Chapter II. 2 c. 



Observational Learning 67 

If now we pass on to the second case, in which inquiring 
observation is called upon to employ itself not with a resting 
object, but with an object which suddenly appears to view 
and as suddenly disappears, we find that here we are deahng 
with conditions of observation which differ radically from 
those already described. In this case, we must train ourselves 
to obtain in an exceedingly brief time as definite an idea as 
possible from a fleeting impression. Let us suppose that we 
wish to observe the particular movements and the successive 
postures of a horse which passes rapidly across the field of 
vision. The chief conditions which are here essential to suc- 
cess are: a. We must learn how to direct our sensory appa- 
ratus upon the moving object with rapidity and precision. 
If it is a question of apprehending an instantaneous stimulus, 
such as a momentary flash of light or a word or picture which 
is exposed for only a instant, we must learn to fixate some 
appropriate point rapidly and precisely and to hold our fixa- 
tion at the right instant, h. We must be able to make a 
rapid adjustment of attention to the stimulus, and, in passing, 
to sweep the attention over the stimulus for a brief time with 
a high degree of concentration, c. Of special importance 
here is the state of preparation with which we enter upon the 
act of observing. This must not only consist in our obtaining 
a clear idea of the view-point of observation, but we must 
endeavor, so far as possible, to form a definite idea of all the 
minute circumstances under which the object appears, and, 
if possible, of the object itself. This latter operation is par- 
ticularly important when the object to be observed appears 
only for an instant, and appears unexpectedly. 

It is of advantage if we can accurately predict the moment 
at which the object will make its appearance; and hence in 
psychological experimentation a more accurate observation is 
secured if the appearance of the stimulus is preceded by 



68 ^ The Psychology of Learning 

a signal to attention. Nor is the duration of this period 
of internal preparation a matter of indifference. If it lasts 
too long the concentration of attention flags; and if it is 
too brief the attention cannot rise to an optimal degree of 
concentration. The effect of anticipatory preparation is prob- 
ably a very complex matter; it is usually regarded as con- 
sisting in a reinforcement of the external stimulus which 
impinges upon the sense-organ, and of the nervous excitation 
which is thence transmitted to the cortex, — the reinforce- 
ment in turn consisting in a process of facilitation or clearing 
the way (attentional facilitation, according to Exner; centro- 
sensory reinforcement, according to G. E. Miiller). In cases 
of very brief stimulation, it is important that in the forma- 
tion of the idea we should utilize not only the primary impres- 
sion, which continues so long as the stimulus acts upon the 
sense-organ, but also its immediate after-effect in conscious- 
ness. Visual observations reveal the presence of a true after- 
image of the stimulus which may, under certain circumstances, 
be perceived distinctly with closed eyes, and which may be 
made use of in reconstructing the impression. But besides 
this unitary after-image, every impression is characterized by 
a gradual fading from consciousness; and this stage of fading, 
during which many of the concrete details of the impression 
disappear, we can learn to make use of systematically. An- 
other important condition consists in the fact that immediately 
after the observation is ended, and while the after-effect of 
the primary stimulation still persists in some degree, we are 
able to give a complete account of what we have observed, 
and indeed, we can sometimes depict the details in a graphic 
sketch. 

It may be mentioned here that all of these conditions of 
observation assume that the observer possesses certain capac- 
ities which may readily be developed and perfected by prac- 



Observational Learning 69 

tice. Thus, in the present type of observation, it is easy 
to devise exercises to proiide training in fixating stimuli 
which appear suddenly, in following moving objects by 
movements of the eye, in adjusting the attention to instan- 
taneous stimuli, and in describing what has been perceived. 
And these exercises also furnish an opportunity for us to 
train and develop all of the component functions which play 
a part in the observation of instantaneous impressions. 

The next type deals with surprised or involuntary obser- 
vation. This is characterized by the fact that the initial 
stage of the process of observation does not here consist in 
an expectation-idea or a goal-idea upon which our attention 
is directed, but that the action of the stimulus upon our 
sense-organs constitutes the initial step in the act of observ- 
ing. Consequently it is an observation in which internal 
preparation is lacking; and everything which, in the former 
case of inquiring observation, is accompHshed by means of 
subjective preparation must here be accompHshed during the 
process of observation itself if a definite result is to be obtained. 
In involuntary or startled observation, then, antecedent 
reinforcement is lacking ; and this lack accounts for the absence 
of arbitrariness because the arbitrary character of an obser- 
vation is due to our anticipating the purpose of the observa- 
tion, and to our bringing about the observation by an act of 
will in consequence of our goal-idea. Surprised observation 
has, therefore, a passive and involuntary character. We do 
not bring it about of our own initiative; it is initiated by 
external stimuli which force themselves upon our conscious- 
ness. Since surprise or even fright is present in most cases 
of involuntary observation, it is a difficult observation to 
make. The success of such an observation depends chiefly 
upon two circumstances, a subjective and an objective: 
a. The rapidity with which we succeed in fulfilUng all of 



70 The Psychology of Learning 

the subjective conditions of observation, — the adjustment of 
attention, the attainment of a definite point of view from 
which to observe, the adaptation and accommodation of the 
sense-organ to the object, h. It also depends upon whether 
the phenomenon which surprises us and attracts our atten- 
tion remains within the range of observation, or whether it 
soon disappears again. If during a walk, I am impelled to 
observe a bird by its suddenly appearing before me and 
attracting my attention, and if the bird soon vanishes from 
my field of vision, the success of the observation depends 
upon a fulfilment of the subjective conditions which have 
been described. But if the bird perches upon a near-by tree, 
my surprised, involuntary observation gives way to an obser- 
vation of the inquiring, voluntary type. 

It is conceivable that training in involuntary observation 
may be acquired; but practice is more difficult to obtain here 
than in inquiring observation. It is to be recommended that 
training of this sort be not attempted in the school-room; 
pupils may be taken out for walks where every opportunity 
which presents itself, as when moving objects suddenly come 
into view, should be utilized. Practice in involuntary observa- 
tion may be conceived to consist in making the transition to 
the voluntary type of observing as abruptly as possible. The 
more rapidly we overcome the surprise and fulfil all the con- 
ditions for inquiring observation, — rid ourselves of former 
thoughts, adapt our attention rapidly to the new impression, 
fix our eyes upon the object, and the like, — the more rapidly 
do we succeed in making the observation. 

It is clear that in involuntary observation the attention 
has another very special function to perform, namely, to 
disengage itself abruptly from the thoughts which occupied 
it up to that time; and we know from the psychology of 
attention that this disengagement from previous concerns is 



Observational Learning 71 

rendered difficult by the phenomenon which is commonly 
referred to as adjustment {Einstellung) . 

When we have been occupied for a time with any activity, 
our attention becomes adjusted to that activity, and we acquire 
a tendency to continue in the same direction ; — or, negatively 
expressed, it becomes difficult to turn from this activity and 
pass over to any other. Hence the abrupt transition to 
involuntary observation, in cases where stimuli come to us 
suddenly and surprise us, presupposes the capacity to make 
a rapid change in the adjustment of attention. That means, 
however, that the attention must be able not only to dis- 
engage itself abruptly from its former stimuli or from thoughts 
which are dominantly before it, but also to adapt itself to new 
stimuli. It is possible then, to prepare for this sort of observ- 
ing by acquiring practice in rapidly shifting the adjustment of 
attention, or by training in abrupt transition from one activity 
to another. 

The present type of involuntary observation manifests still 
another characteristic; and we find that this one is more 
difficult to turn to account pedagogically than those charac- 
teristics which have already been described. Since subjec- 
tive preparation is lacking in involuntary observation, the 
external stimulus itself not only arouses those apperceiving 
ideas which fuse with the impressions, but at the same time 
it furnishes the points of view from which the observation 
is made. The view-points come into being only during the 
act of observing itself, but in most cases, definite points of 
view are wholly lacking in involuntary observation; indeed, 
it undoubtedly happens in numerous instances that they are 
not constituted until later, when, after the event, we proceed 
to work over or to elaborate a fleeting impression which has 
come upon us unexpectedly. Consequently, what we shall 
observe and what we shall note in this type of observation 



72 The Psychology of Learnhig 

is largely a matter of chance. In such cases our habitual 
associations, — our habitual modes of interpreting sense- 
impressions in terms of familiar ideas, — must naturally pre- 
dominate; that is, those ideas which are usually associated 
with the impressions must assert themselves with special 
vigor. And it is therefore to be expected that in cases of 
involuntary observation we should be much more likely to 
confine ourselves to famihar views of things than to notice 
strange and novel features in the perceived object. 

We shall later learn, from experimental investigations, to 
what extent our sense-impressions are suppressed by our cus- 
tomary ideas. This cannot be determined by reflection alone. 
It might turn out, for example, that customary ideas will 
assert themselves less vigorously simply because the invol- 
untary observation of a momentary stimulus arouses the 
activity of attention more intensively than does the inquiring 
observation of resting objects which we may examine so long 
as we please. 

Less well-known and less heeded in psychology is the type 
of expectant observation; and yet it is probably of paramount 
importance for our mental life. Our attitude of subjective 
predisposition toward a phenomenon may be of such a sort 
that we intend to observe only in a general way, or to observe 
anything that may happen, without setting up a goal-idea. 
Indeed, we do not even need to think of any particular group 
of phenomena as the goal of our observation. This is an 
attitude which we frequently assume during our travels in 
foreign countries because we do not know in advance what 
novel or interesting experiences we shall encounter. In this 
case, no definite goal-idea or view-point is present; it is our 
intention only to be prepared for observation in general. The 
auxiliary apparatus of observation comes into action only in 
a very diffuse and general fashion; we allow the eyes to 



Observational Learning 73 

wander about, although we are accustomed to fixate them 
upon something. We Hsten, but we do not listen for sounds 
from any particular part of our environment, etc. This t3^e 
of expectant observing seems to be characteristic of certain 
individuals, while others cultivate the distinctive type of 
inquiring observation. It is said of Goethe, for instance, that 
he had developed his expectant observation in the highest 
degree. This sort of observation is especially well adapted 
to obviate all tension and excitation during the process of 
observing, while inquiring observation is never free from 
expectant tension and internal excitation. For this very 
reason, expectant observation is particularly capable of secur- 
ing objectively valid results; and this characteristic is inten- 
sified by the fact that the observer does not make use of any 
definite point of view or expectation-idea whose employment 
might falsify his objective impression. Expectant observa- 
tion is, therefore, particularly advantageous when we are in 
the presence of wholly novel and unfamiHar phenomena and 
do not yet know what they may present to us. The manner 
in which expectation-ideas and points of view become efi'ective 
in this type of observation brings it into intimate relation, in 
certain respects, with involuntary observation. In both cases, 
the particular point of view must be furnished during the act 
of observation itself, and must be a product exclusively of the 
external stimulus; while in inquiring observation the point of 
view is only partially developed during the act of observing. 
Passively expectant observation might also be perfected 
by practice. Its chief conditions are: a. The observer must 
hold himself free from definite expectation-ideas; but he 
must be in a receptive mood for external stimuli, and he must 
assume an energetic attitude toward the act of observing. 
h. He must be capable of obtaining the proper points of view 
from the objectively given data, during the act of observing; 



74 The Psychology of Learning 

and these points of view enable him to distinguish that which 
is novel and peculiar from that wliich is famiHar and cus- 
tomary. 

Now it is evident that each of the above conditions of accu- 
rate observing, in its various possible forms, is at the time an 
important pre-condition and pre-supposition of observational 
noting, because, of course, we are able to note only what we 
have observed clearly, and we retain impressions more readily 
in proportion as we have fulfilled the conditions of accurate, 
objective, complete and distinct observation. 

But our procedure in observing may be such that it fulfils 
certain conditions which are specifically concerned in the re- 
tention and subsequent reproduction of impressions. And 
these may be stated, in part, from a general consideration of 
memory for sensory data, but in part they must be derived 
from experiments in observational noting. The general con- 
ditions which are derived from the nature of noting itself 
may be formulated first, in order that we may explain them 
more fully later, in the light of experimental data. The most 
important and most general condition is that the observation 
must, as a matter of course, be carried on from the outset 
with the dehberate intention not of grasping the impressions 
merely for the moment, but of retaining them permanently. 
This directing influence of will and of subjective attitude 
during the act of observing determines, in general, the effect 
of observation upon memory. If we have the will to imprint 
the observed data upon memory in order that we might 
subsequently be able to reproduce them, we actually retain 
them more readily; and when the will to remember is lacking, 
the incorporation into memory fails to take place, or if it 
does occur, it is a matter of sheer accident. This is probably 
to be explained from the fact that, when the will to remember 
is present, we assume a somewhat different attitude toward 



Observational Learning 75 

the observation. In the first place, we dwell upon the impres- 
sions longer than is necessary for mere apprehension; and 
we can sometimes notice here that we observe the impressions 
individually and discretely. It is especially to be noted that 
we designate them by names, and we concentrate the atten- 
tion upon them more accurately. Secondly, we make a 
stronger e£fort to bring them into relation with one another, 
as when in imprinting a landscape upon memory we note 
carefully the relative sizes, distances and directions of its 
parts, and subsequently employ these spatial relations to 
reinforce memory. When it is our purpose to remember we 
search more for connections among all of the individual 
impressions in order by this means to secure more secondary 
aids for memory. It is probable, too, that the will to remem- 
ber reacts upon attention in that we endeavor to raise to 
greater clearness and definiteness the impressions which are 
to be retained. 

It seems probable then that the will to remember what is 
being observed brings with it a characteristic attitude; and 
that this attitude, in turn, is especially favorable for the 
operation of those factors which give rise to a formation of 
associations among ideas. We have already seen that the most 
fundamental condition of association is to be found in the 
temporal relations of the idea. We establish particularly 
secure and stable associations between those impressions 
which have longest been present in consciousness and which 
have most frequently been repeated; and those ideas are 
most readily reproduced which have entered into numerous 
associative relations with one another. All three of these 
conditions are a product of the will to imprint the data of 
observation, which leads us to dwell longer upon impressions, 
to focus the attention upon them repeatedly, and at the same 
time to associate all their subsidiary impressions with them 



76 The Psychology oj Learning 

memorially. And here again is seen the dual activity of 
memory: for the individual impression we create as lasting 
a disposition to revival as possible; and we also endeavor 
to connect or to associate the impressions with one another. 

In imprinting objects upon memory by bringing them into 
associative relations with one another we fulfil yet another 
important condition of noting and remembering. We not 
only estabUsh associative connections between objectively 
given data, but we also bring the data into relation with our 
current ideas and with our general body of knowledge. These 
relations are in part of a purely associative nature, — pure 
connections of ideas; they are, in part, of a logical sort, and 
consist in the ascription of relations to the impressions. These 
two activities furnish us with a unitary comprehension of the 
impressions. The more we understand objectively given 
data and comprehend their logical and objective relations, the 
more readily can we retain and reproduce them. Impressions 
which are something more than the elementary material of 
mere sensation can be retained and reproduced if they are 
understood in the sense described. Thus, for example, we 
remember the lines of a drawing, or the outline of an object 
only when we have understood the principles embodied in 
their construction. No one is able to remember an arabesque 
from the purely visual picture as such without getting clearly 
before his mind the plan of its design and the principle of its 
construction. 

This is true also of the temporal relations of impressions. 
They, too, are a chief aid to memory because they bring to 
consciousness the temporal arrangement of the impressions, 
indicating which of the events occurred earlier and which 
later, and showing in how far certain processes occurred 
simultaneously, and by how long intervals of time the impres- 
sions were separated from one another. 



I 



Observational Learning TJ 

The spatial and temporal relations of stimuli attain defin- 
iteness only when we note their quantitative relations, as 
spatial and temporal distances and intervals and proportions; 
we do not obtain a definite idea of them until we reduce 
them to numerical statement. The noting and estimating of 
quantitative relations in spatial and temporal impressions are 
also important aids to memory, — probably for the twofold 
reason that the ideas themselves are thereby made more 
definite, and that such a conceptual knowledge of the rela- 
tions of number and magnitude combines with the remem- 
brance and furnishes it with a secondary support. 

The completeness of the analysis which is m.ade during 
the process of observing is of paramount importance for the 
retention of impressions. It is important, in the first place, 
because it guards against lacunae in memory, and by this 
means it lessens the danger of gaps being filled, without our 
being aware of the substitution, by customary associations 
and by imaginative adjuncts; secondly, because a complete 
observation gives rise to many more associations of impres- 
sions with ideas and with one another. We know, too, that 
those impressions which are most intimately related to 
emotion and to interest are most readily observed and noted. 
But it is impossible, by means of reflection alone, to discover 
any definite principle concerning what part is played by 
emotion in observational noting. We shall see, however, that 
experimental investigations have yielded interesting results 
bearing upon this topic. 

All of these conditions of observation and of observational 
noting may be made clear, by general psychological consider- 
ations, from the nature of observation and of memory; but 
in addition to this, experimental investigation has revealed 
the intimate nature of observational noting from various 
points of view. 



CHAPTER IV 

OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING {Continued) 

2. The Experimental Investigation oj Observational Noting 

Most of the experiments upon which the following dis- 
cussions must be based were not undertaken for the purpose 
of investigating normal observational noting itself. They 
have dealt, in part, with a somewhat different group of 
psychological problems; in part, they have been undertaken 
by psychiatrists and psychopathologists who have been 
interested in pathological disturbances of memory. But the 
results of these investigations are available for our present 
purposes because they give us an insight into certain char- 
acteristics of observational noting. 

_Jt was not until recently that psychologists turned their 
attention to the experimental investigation of the factors 
which play a part in the act of observational noting. Their 
experiments are concerned either with the retention and 
reproduction of simple sensations, — especially colors and 
tones, and hence they may be referred to as experiments in 
sense-memory, — or they deal with the retention and repro- 
duction of spatial relations and temporal relations, — in which 
case they may be called experiments in the memory of space 
and time, or in spatial and temporal estimation. We have a 
relatively small number of investigations of the observational 
noting of complex impressions, such as the noting of combina- 
tions of forms and colors ; not until recently have psychologists 
imdertaken the investigation of the retention and reproduc- 
tion of complex objects. All of these experiments have yielded 

78 



Observational Learning , 79 

results which are instructive for the student of pedagogy. 
We shall present a brief survey of their essential features; and 
then we shall summarize the conclusions which may be drawn 
from them, in so far as they have a bearing upon the training 
and the technique of observational noting. 

a. Investigations of Sense-Memory 

Let us first describe the methods and results of the experi- 
ments which deal with sense-memory. In tests of sense- 
memory we may regard the retention of a single sensation as 
the simplest case ; then, in progressive order, the retention of a 
sensation-difference or a combination of sensations; then the 
retention of the spatial and temporal relations of sensations; 
and finally, the retention of complex spatial and temporal 
impressions. Two modes of procedure are possible in these 
investigations: i. A particular stimulus may be presented to 
the observer, — a tone of a certain pitch and intensity, a color 
of a certain saturation and brightness, — and the attempt may 
be made to determine whether the same stimulus can be 
recognized after temporal intervals of variable length. This 
is the method of Recognition. Here it is necessary, of course, 
to employ not only the original stimulus, but also to introduce 
others which differ from it. The first impression is usually 
called the standard impression, or if referred to its objective 
cause, the standard stimulus; and the second is called the 
comparative impression or the comparative stimulus. 2. A 
method of Production or Reproctuction may be employed. 
After a definite interval has elapsed the observer is here re- 
quired to reproduce the standard color or the standard tone 
by means of an apparatus adapted to the purpose. In either 
case, the observer's errors may be taken as a measure of the 
accuracy of recognition and discrimination in the former case, 
and of reproduction in the latter case. The error, together 



8o _ The Psychology of Learning 

with the length of interval elapsing between stimulus and 
reproduction, expresses the accuracy of sense-memory. Of 
course, if such experiments are to give us a really accurate 
measurement of memory function, various precautions must 
be observed in the conduct of the experiments; especially is 
it necessary to make numerous determinations under identical 
conditions, internal and external, and to preserve a constancy 
of attention throughout. The evaluation of the results in- 
troduces numerous mathematical complications ; but it seems 
unnecessary to discuss them here. We may in general, regard 
the fraction ^ as an approximate measure of the accuracy of 
memory, where c is the number of correct estimations and n 
the total number of estimations. By a yariation of time- 
interval (seconds, days, or weeks) we are able to extend the 
experiments to include both immediate and permanent 
retention. 

Using a method of .this sort, in the psychological laboratory 
at Leipzig in i8S6, Wolfe ^ performed a series of experiments 
upon memory for tones, and succeeded at that early date in 
determining the most important characteristics of sense- 
memory. Wolfe's chief result, — which has been confirmed by 
other investigators, although the numerical data obtained by 
the latter may have been somewhat different in consequence of 
differences in experimental conditions, — may be stated as 
follows: The accuracy of tonal reproduction depends, in two 
respects, upon the length of time which has elapsed between 
the standard and the comparative tones, i. The interval 
must not be too short, for if the comparative tone comes too 
soon, — within a fraction of a second after the standard tone, — 
it is found that consciousness has not yet finished working- 
over the standard tone, and comparison is thereby rendered 

' H. K. Wolfe, Untersuchungen iiber das Tongedachtnis, Philos. 
Shidicn, III., i8S6, 534ff. 



Observational Learning 8i 

difficult. It turns out that about two seconds is the time which 
must elapse if the observer is to make an accurate discrimina- 
tion between the two tones. It is evident that immediate re- 
tention is in operation throughout in these experiments, and 
the investigation is rather a test of sensory discrimination 
than of the temporal capacity of memory, — the first sensation 
being still present to consciousness in the form of an after- 
effect when the second appears (successive comparison). 
2. When the time interval exceeds two seconds, the earher 
impression fades and the accuracy of reproduction and 
recognition decreases, — rapidly at first, then more and more 
slowly. With an interval of one minute, the uncertainty 
becomes so great that the second tone is estimated correctly 
in only about one-half of the cases. It turns out, too, that 
favorable and unfavorable lengths of time-interval alternate 
with one another; forgetting, therefore, does not progress in a 
constant and uniform fashion, but shows a series of upward 
and downward fluctuations. Thus, it may come about that 
tonal estimation is less accurate after an interval of fifteen 
seconds than after twenty-five seconds. These phenomena 
demand explanation; and two possible explanations present 
themselves, a. One might be tempted to regard the whole 
process of remembering and forgetting as a product of atten- 
tion. Forgetting would then begin at the moment when the 
impression leaves the focus of consciousness ; and the various 
periods of recognition or reproduction which are characterized 
by greater accuracy could be explained by correlating them 
with fluctuations of attention. It is a well-known fact that 
attention itself can not function with a constant degree of 
concentration even for a very brief period of time, but nor- 
mally manifests fluctuations of intensity. If, now, the revival 
of the tone occurs at a period where favorable conditions of 
attention are present, the tone will be recognized or repro- 



82 The Psychology of Lear-ning 

duced more accurately than when the revival coincides with a 
subsiding of attention. Observers themselves report this 
continuous alternation of waxing and waning attention. It 
is even possible to distinguish shorter and longer fluctuations; 
and both of these may be of significance for the reproduction 
of impressions, h. We might assume that the decrease of 
retention and the increase of forgetting are due to the gradual 
obliteration of the memorial dispositions themselves; and 
that the dispositions or traces which remain after the stimulus 
is gone do not become the prey of the variable behavior of 
attention, but themselves are subject to a general law of 
gradual fading with the lapse of time. In that case, the 
fluctuation of attention would exert only a secondary influence 
upon the accuracy of reproduction. In my opinion, the second 
hypothesis is much more probable, chiefly for the reason that 
a relatively accurate reproduction is possible after attention 
has been diverted from the impression and the stimulus has 
ceased to act upon consciousness. We shall later make the 
acquaintance of various other facts concerning the repro- 
duction of ideas, which support this view. 

Numerous other investigations, similar in form to Wolfe's, 
have been undertaken more recently; but no results which 
are essentially new in principle have been discovered. Heiden- 
hain investigated memory for colors; Lewin, for colors and 
other visual stimuli; Radoslawow, memory for extents of 
visual space (Hues and distances between points); Baldwin, 
Shaw and Warren, and Binet and Henri investigated the 
retention of lines and simple linear figures for different inter- 
vals of time. Baldwin and Shaw had their observers draw 
geometrical forms from memory or select them from other 
figures {Recognition Method and Selection Method). Binet and 
Henri had their observers select and recognize lines and spatial 
forms. Numerous other psychologists have made analogous 



Observational Learning 83 

investigations in which temporal intervals of brief duration 
(one fifth of a second to five seconds, and even more) were 
employed as data to be remembered; in these experiments 
the remembered datum was either reproduced after the lapse 
of different periods of time, or it was compared with another 
interval. These experiments yielded the remarkable result 
that only very brief temporal intervals, — probably not more 
than two seconds, — are capable of being immediately per- 
ceived; that an interval of approximately half a second is 
most accurately retained and reproduced, — this is the average 
interval between steps in walking, and is for that reason an 
interval with whose reproduction we have most experience; 
and that in our reproductions we over-estimate intervals of 
less than one half-second, while we under-estimate intervals 
from one half-second to twenty-five seconds."^ 

The most important results in all of these experiments were 
that the progress of forgetting is rapid at the outset, and then 
more slow; and that, with every sort of stimulus employed, 
the tailing-off of the original impression is, in all probability, 
an irregular and fluctuating process. If we could discover 
the causes of these irregularities in the progress of forgetting, 
the nature of forgetting would no longer remain a mystery. 
As already mentioned, forgetting begins at the instant when 
the attention is turned away from the impression, for, at that 
instant, the impression begins to fall to a lower degree of 
awareness ; and since it is no longer made secure in conscious- 
ness by attention, it may now be suppressed or dislodged by 
other impressions or ideas. Forgetting does not, however, 
consist solely in a distraction of attention; it probably con- 
sists in I. a dislodging of the forgotten impression from con- 

' For a discussion of the striking similarity between these illusions 
of time and illusions of visual space see my paper in Wundt's Philos. 
Sludicn, IX., X., 1894. 



84 The Psychology of Learning 

sciousness by other impressions or ideas, and 2. in a conse- 
quent fading of its after-effect or disposition to revival be- 
cause the impression is no longer present to consciousness. 
This weakening of the after-effect of the primary impression 
or of the tendency toward revival probably constitutes 
genuine forgetting; and the revival of the after-effects by 
renewed reproduction, either through the agency of a repeated 
stimulation or of a simple reproduction of ideas, constitutes a 
genuine restoration of the disposition which in turn gives rise 
to a permanent retention of the impression. It is the waning of 
the disposition which proceeds more rapidly at first, more 
and more slowly later; and just for this reason, the renewal 
or restoration of a disposition is more successful the more 
immediately it follows the waning of the original impression. 
Experiments which have dealt with the influence of atten- 
tion upon the process of noting are closely related with those 
which have dealt with sense-memory. They show us that the 
predisposing function of attention which fixes and secures a 
goal-idea is also subject to just such normal fluctuations as 
are characteristic of sense-memory. When in reaction ex- 
periments,^ a signal is given to warn the observer that the 
stimulus is about to come, the length of the interval which 
elapses between the warning signal and the stimulus is a matter 
of considerable significance. It has been determined that the 
signal must precede the stimulus by about two seconds in 
order to secure an optimal condition of attention for the 
reception of the stimulus. Shorter intervals do not give 

' The simple reaction experiment is arranged as follows: The 
observer responds to a pre-arranged stimulus by making a pre-arranged 
movement, — depressing a telegraph key, or the like. The time which 
intervenes between the application of the stimulus and the beginning 
of the reagent's movement is measured, and designated his "reaction- 
time." 



Observational Learning 85 

sufficient time for concentrating and adjusting the attention; 
when the interval is longer, the concentration of attention 
begins to wane before the stimulus appears. We shall see 
that the state of preparation is of prime significance for obser- 
vation and observational noting. 

Even from this small group of experiments it is possible to 
deduce important rules for the technique of observational 
noting. I. We see that it is of advantage to recall the goal- 
idea to consciousness in accurate and definite form a short 
time before the observation begins; but care must be taken 
that this time is neither too long nor too short. This becomes 
important in cases of instantaneous stimuh, where we have but 
little time during the observation itself to bring the view- 
point of observation clearly to mind; for example, in our 
illustration of inquiring observation with abrupt and fleeting 
stimuli. 

2. We find that all sense-impressions pass through two 
stages of forgetting. The first phase is to some extent only a 
waning of the original impression; during this period the 
impression can most readily be revived in accurate form, and 
hence it can be re-established in memory most easily by re- 
newed observation. From this it follows that for the tech- 
nique of observational noting it is advantageous to imprint 
stimuli accurately during the observation itself, wherever 
that is possible, or, in any case, immediately afterward. And 
this is the procedure which we involuntarily adopt whenever 
we wish to secure a lasting memory of complex stimuli. We 
repeat the observation with the intention of noting the im- 
pression while the object is still before us; or we close the 
eyes for a moment and later return to the object after at- 
tempting to reproduce it independently. The second stage of 
forgetting is of longer duration. During this period the im- 
pression, which has already faded in some degree, slowly 



86 The Psychology of Learning 

and gradually becomes weaker and weaker. From observa- 
tions of my own learning and retention of very complex visual 
stimuli, such as a painting or the facade of a building, I have 
determined that the first period of forgetting also manifests 
the following characteristics: a. The memory-image has 
much more freshness, and is in every way qualitatively more 
Uke its original than it is subsequently; h. the memory-image 
is here very much richer in detail than during the second 
period of forgetting. Hence, whenever we are called upon to 
remember complex impressions, it is expedient to begin a 
reconstruction of the memory-image as soon as possible after 
the disappearance of the primary impression; and wherever 
possible, to write down a complete description of the details 
because these will subsequently be lost from memory. 

b. The Experimental Investigation of Observing and Noting 

A chief condition of accurate observing and observational 
noting consists in the proper behavior of attention during the 
act of observing, and especially in its capacity to be distracted 
or to resist distraction in the presence of disturbing stimuH. 
In the complex function to which the name "attention" has 
been appHed, modern psychology difTerentiates a variety of 
attributes. Individuals differ from one another in the relative 
prominence of particular attributes, and these variations may 
constitute thorough-going individual differences of attention 
and of total mental endowment. The attributes which are 
most important for our present purposes are intensity of con- 
centration, and inhibition of distractions. These constitute 
the basis of individual capacity to concentrate and its op- 
posite, — individual tendency to succumb to distraction. Ex- 
perimental psychology has endeavored to measure these 
capacities in the hope of discovering a means of measuring 
attention. One of the most reliable methods consists in 



Observational Learning 87 

having the individual perform rival mental acts simultaneously. 
In the simplest case, the attention is attracted in several 
directions at the same time by rival stimuli, and we endeavor 
to observe the change in sensory impression which results. A 
somewhat more complex case occurs when we endeavor to 
carry on several activities simultaneously. By this means, 
capacity to concentrate is measured directly, and tendency 
to suffer distraction is measured indirectly when we determine 
the amount of decrease of mental efficiency which results 
from the introduction of rival impressions or activities. 
Kraepelin holds that distractibility and capacity to resist 
distraction can themselves be measured by the introduction 
of temporary or permanent distractions while mental work is 
being done. 

Since the attention may become accustomed or adapted 
to distracting stimuli, KraepeHn believes that continuous dis- 
tractions enable us to measure the individual's adaptation 
capacity. A great many investigations dealing with this 
problem have been carried on in the Cornell laboratory under 
the direction of Professor E. B. Titchener. In these experi- 
ments, impressions of various sorts were subjected to dis- 
tracting influences, the object of the investigation being to 
determine what is the effect of the distractions. These ex- 
periments show that it is very difffcult to divert the attention 
by means of distracting stimuh. Three cases must be dis- 
tinguished: I. Unless an actual distraction takes place an 
external stimulus does not necessarily disturb the attention 
at all, either in the sense of diverting it from the activity upon 
which it is engaged or in the sense of impairing its functional 
activity. In this case, the tendency to distraction is overcome 
by an increased concentration of attention; and one may 
either completely conpensate the distracting influence or one 
may more than compensate it, i.e., the concentration of atten- 



88 The Psychology of Learning 

tion may increase to such an extent that not only is distraction 
avoided but the original efficiency of attention is actually 
increased. 2. The disturbing stimulus may not really dis- 
tract the attention but still may interfere with its function 
because the observer is obliged to concentrate too intensively 
if he is to maintain a uniform degree of attention in the 
presence of the distraction. Here the energy of attention is 
diminished, but the attention is not diverted from the work in 
hand. 3. The attention may really be distracted; it may 
turn and occupy itself with the disturbing stimulus, or it may 
turn to some other objective point, in which case an essential 
impairment of its function or indeed a complete interruption 
of its original activity may be expected to ensue. 

The Cornell experiments show that different individuals 
conduct themselves differently in the presence of a distraction 
of the attention. For example, certain observers pause in 
their adding when a distracting stimulus is introduced, and 
during the pause a definite awareness of the distracting 
stimulus comes abruptly to consciousness; others, on the 
contrary, can not be so interrupted. In the latter case, one 
finds that the observer is but dimly aware of the disturbing 
stimulus; in certain instances he is not aware of it at all. 

In these experiments, concentration is measured by the 
simultaneous performance of homogeneous activities. Other 
investigators have had recourse to the simultaneous per- 
formance of heterogeneous activities, and have measured 
concentration from the cessation of these activities (Binet 
and Henri, Paulhan, Sharp). For instance, one is asked to 
read and to write at the same time, or to read and to draw a 
continuous spiral, and the Hke.^ 

' E. B. Titchener, Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling 
and Attention, New York, 1908. A. Binet, La concurrence des etats 
psychiques. Rev. phil. XXIX., 1890. F. Paulhan, La simultaneite des 



Observational Learning 89 

Other experiments have investigated the influence exerted 
by distracting stimuli upon motor reactions or upon simple 
movements such as are made in beating time. Swift found 
that homogeneous stimuli have a greater distracting power 
than heterogeneous stimuli, — when visual stimuli are intro- 
duced they have a more pronounced effect upon reactions to 
visual than to auditory stimuli. 

Binet and Jastrow employed reading, adding, and other 
mental acti\ities in an effort to disturb tapping mo^'ements. 
The amount of distraction is found to vary with the com- 
plexity of the tempo. Simple time-marking soon becomes 
automatic, and the movements of beating time are disturbed 
but little, or not at all, by the simultaneous execution of mental 
operations; more difficult tempos are very much disturbed, 
however, probably because they do not so readily become 
automatic but make a greater demand upon attention through- 
out. 

These experiments bring to light two important points: 
the distracting influence of a secondary stimulus is probably 
greater in proportion as the two stimuli which are simul- 
taneously present are similar in character; and the effect of 
distraction is lessened in proportion as one of the activities 
in question can be mechanized. 

The most important experiments of this group we owe to 
the Kraepelin school at Heidelberg and at Munich. Vogt' 
investigated the distractibility of normal indi\aduals, because 
distractibility of attention and power to resist distraction 
seemed to him to be a characteristic symptom of certain 
mental disorders. From a comparison of normal and abnormal 

actes mentales. i?ei;. ^aew/?/. XXXIX., 1887. S.E.Sharp. Individual 
Psychology, Amcr. Jour, of Psychol. X., 1899. 

^ R. Vogt. Ueber Ablcnkbarkcit und Gewohnungsfahigkeit, Kracpe- 
lin's Psychol. Arbcitcn. III., 1899, 62-201. 



90 The Psychology of Learning 

individuals Vogt concludes that the efficiency of attention 
may be estimated in terms of the pertinacity with which the 
individual clings to "goal-ideas" or points of view in observing 
and in observational noting. Upon the capacity to hold 
definite goal-ideas resolutely before one, depends in great meas- 
ure one's capacity of concentration. "The greatest capacity 
of concentration is present when the more specific goals are 
subordinated to a more general goal." Yet Vogt is of the 
opinion that the power to hold fast to the goal-idea in ob- 
servational noting is, in large measure, dependent upon the 
emotional life of the individual. On the one hand, complete 
indifference and disinterestedness is an impediment to the 
setting up of goal-ideas; but, on the other hand, the emotional 
life must not be subject to great variations of intensity if 
this capacity to concentrate the attention is to be present. 
The efficacy of the goal-idea is recognized by Vogt to consist 
in a selecting or choosing of what shall come to consciousness 
during the act of observing. To it is due the fact "that only 
those external stimuli or those ideas which accord with the 
direction of the goal can come to clear consciousness." The 
significance of the goal-idea for observing and noting will be 
made clearer in what follows. 

Vogt also endeavored to mea'sure the distracting influence 
which other processes coming to consciousness during mental 
activity exert upon the result of the latter. The effect of dis- 
traction was investigated in motor reactions, and in experi- 
ments upon apprehension, upon the association of ideas and 
upon the function of memory. The distractions consisted in 
the apprenhension of stimuli, in reaction movements and in 
memorization. For example, the observer was asked to read 
nonsense-syllables or to add numbers while he was engaged 
in tapping in unison with the beats of a metronome; and his 
power to resist distraction was measured in terms of the effect 



Observational Learning 91 

which artificially introduced distractions exert upon his 
efficiency in the task upon which he is engaged. Distracti- 
bility is identical with susceptibility to disturbing influences; 
hence in measuring this susceptibility we obtain an indirect 
measurement of his power of concentration. Vogt believes 
that the simultaneous and really efficient accomphshment of 
two activities by means of the attention is impossible. As a 
matter of fact, attention never splits into two halves which 
then function in an identical fashion; but every simultaneous 
achievement of two activities is due either to one of them 
having become mechanized to such an extent that it demands 
little or no attention, or to our ability to alternate rapidly 
from one activity to another. Now, it would be a matter of 
importance if we could obtain a clearer insight into the mental 
procedure which takes place when we seem to do several 
things simultaneously because, as a matter of fact, the atten- 
tion is obhged to occupy itself with different impressions at 
approximately the same time, in many cases of observation 
and of observational noting, Vogt's experiments give us 
information concerning certain phases of this problem. 

These experiments 3deld numerous results which are similar 
to the data reported by the American and French investi- 
gators whose work has already been described. They show 
that the effect of the subsidiary activity varies with the nature 
of the chief activity which engages the attention of the ob- 
server. For instance, the execution of simple tapping or 
writing movements in unison with the beats of a metronome, 
or with the sound of a bell which is struck at every fourth 
beat of a metronome (beating nineteen times per minute) does 
not diminish one's power to apprehend nonsense syllables; 
nor is apprehension decreased by the act of reading certain 
specified letters {e, n, u, s,) from a printed page. But when 
the observer is required to mark these letters, a distinct dis- 



92 The Psychology of Learning 

traction results. The distraction is found to be but little in- 
creased when the secondary operation consists in adding pairs 
of numbers and recording their sum. It is considerably greater, 
however, when the observer is required to add continuous 
series of numbers, — an operation which, of course, demands a 
much greater concentration of attention because the various 
partial sums must be retained in memory. Finally the memo- 
rization of syllables and lists of numbers is impaired most of 
all by a subsidiary task. 

There is one point, especially, in these investigations which 
has a special interest in connection with our general problem. 
In both Titchener's and Vogt's experiments, it was found that 
the effect of distraction is least when one is engaged in the 
perception of sensory stimuli, — that is, observation and 
observational noting are much less disturbed by secondary 
activities and secondary stimuli than is any other sort of 
mental function. Vogt expressed it as follows: "Hence we 
see that the processes of perceptioji and apprehension, which 
are aroused by external stimuli, suffer much less from the 
effects of distraction than do the reaction movements which 
are based upon volitional processes, or less than tasks of 
reading and adding which are accompanied by associative and 
memory processes. The more demand an activity makes upon 
the combination of many shghtly practised associations of 
ideas, or the more it demands the arousal of remembrances, 
the more susceptible is it to distraction." 

It does not seem to be difficult to explain this phenomenon. 
During the act of observing, memory constantly receives aid 
from external stimuli; the turning of the eye or the ear toward 
the stimulus suffices for an immediate re-discovery of the 
point of contact with the previous activity. For this very 
reason we are more independent of distraction in perception 
than in other mental functions. This fact is of great peda- 



Observational Learning 93 

gogical significance because it shows that concentration of 
attention and the important property of resistance and non- 
distractibiHty can most readily be employed in observation 
and in the apprehension and noting of sense-impressions. 
Hence a simultaneous apprehension of several impressions, 
or a simultaneous accomplishment of subsidiary activities 
while we are engaged upon the observation of a stimulus 
serves as an appropriate means for a formal training in the 
concentration of attention and in the resisting of distractions. 

An additional step in the progress of our knowledge of 
observational noting came with the systematic investigation, 
by the pupils of Kraepelin, of the capacity to perceive and to 
note under different conditions. Finzi"^ investigated the 
dependence of observational noting and retention upon the 
sort and the amount of material presented. He also dealt 
with the influence of different aids to imprinting, and the 
influence of the time interval which elapses between the first 
imprinting and the reproduction ; and he turned his attention 
chiefly to the degree of subjective assurance with which differ- 
ent observers give their testimony. 

Finzi worked exclusively with visual stimuli, Philippe 
having already investigated the noting of tactual impres- 
sions.^ Philippe bhndfolded his observers and had them handle 
an object; then, after a definite number of hours or days, 
they drew pictures of the object. This method, however, is 
very unsatisfactory; from the results of the investigation 
we see only in general that the accuracy of memory-images 

' J. Finzi. Zur Untersuchung der AufTassungsfahigkeit und Merk- 
fahigkeit. Kraepdin's Psychol. Arhcitcn, III., 1900, 289-3S4. See 
also J. Finzi, Die Schwankungen dcr gcistigen Tatigkeit, Wiesbaden, 
1903. 

^ J. Philippe. Sur les transformations dcs nos images mcntales, 
Revue philos. XLIII., 1897, 48 1. 
8 



94 The Psychology of Lcanmig 

decreases with the lapse of time. Finzi employed letters, 
numbers and nonsense-syllables, written upon cards. These 
were presented by means of an apparatus devised for the 
purpose, the duration of | the exposure being only about one- 
fiftieth of a second. After the exposure, the observer was 
asked to state what he had observed; and this was usually 
done after a very brief interval, either immediately after, — 
in this case observation was tested rather as an act of noting, — 
or at the end of two, four, eight or fifteen seconds, and in one 
series after two to five minutes. This investigation therefore 
also dealt essentially with the immediate fading of the impres- 
sion. Finzi distinguished between experiments in appre- 
hending and in noting. In the former, the observer's report 
of what he had seen was made immediately after the presenta- 
tion of the numbers, letters or syllables; in the latter experi- 
ment, the reproduction was not made until after the lapse of 
one of the intervals just mentioned. The observers were 
instructed to obtain as clear an impression as possible of the 
object upon the card, to fixate the attention upon it, and not 
to allow it to escape from the focus of attention. In order to 
facihtate this, the observer sat silent and motionless during 
the interval between the presentation and the reproduction, 
directing his eyes throughout upon the point where the 
stimulus had appeared. This is a very important circum- 
stance in the determination of the process of forgetting be- 
cause a forgetting or a fading of the impression occurs even 
when the attention endeavors to hold fast to the remembrance 
of the impression. 

The following excerpt from Finzi's results is important for 
our purposes. In measuring what an observer has accom- 
pKshed, we must distinguish between the amount and the 
reliabihty of his performance. The amount of his performance 
is determined by the sum of all the statements which he 



Observational Learning 95 

furnishes regarding the impressions; the reliability is cal- 
culated from the number of correct statements or their ratio 
to the total number. One must be careful to avoid falling 
into the erorr of ascribing a highly accurate sense-memory 
to those individuals who make a great many statements re- 
garding what they have remembered. A much more im- 
portant result is the ratio which determines the fidelity or 
reUability of their statements. 

As regards the number of stimuli to be employed, Finzi 
reports that a large number is unfavorable to perception 
because the act of perceiving readily becomes difficult or con- 
fused in such cases; yet he finds that an increase in the 
number of presented data is not so disadvantageous to the 
function of memory Greater differences were found in the 
acquisition and retention of particular sorts of impressions. 
Numbers are apprehended more readily than letters but they 
are not retained so well. Letters are apprehended and noted 
more readily when they appear in nonsense syllables than 
when they appear as isolated letters. In the investigation of 
noting it was found that single observations have an influence 
upon one another,^a phenomenon which must be regarded 
as especially important in associative learning. For instance, 
it is not advantageous to present a great many similar objects 
in immediate succession to the same observer; the individual 
impressions have a tendency, in such cases, to become con- 
fused with one another and reproduction is impaired. Appre- 
hension or observation is less subject to this type of confusion 
than is memorial activity, such as reproduction. 

As regards the temporal interval, Finzi found the state of 
affairs for his complex material to be wholly similar to that 
reported by the earlier investigators who had employed simple 
impressions. There are certain very brief intervals, — eight 
to thirty seconds, — for which the reproduction of impressions 



96 The Psychology of Learning 

is easy and certain; but even these differ somewhat in amount 
and in rehability of reproduction. Here again, then, we see 
that the best reproduction does not take place immediately 
after the first fading of the impressions. This proves again 
that forgetting is not due solely to a diverting of attention 
but that it is a phenomenon sui gejzeris, probably identical 
with the fading out of the traces or dispositions left by the 
primary impressions. The amount of impression was greatest 
at the end of 6 to 30 seconds; the intensity of impression was 
greatest after 4 to 15 seconds. AppHed practically to per- 
ception, this means that about 10 to 15 seconds should elapse 
after the primary impression if we wish to obtain a report 
which is at once ready and reliable. In teaching, we should 
therefore always allow pupils a certain time in which to work 
over the perception-content in a purely memorial fashion, and 
not begin to question them immediately after the act of per- 
ception has ceased. This phenomenon is closely allied with 
reproduction itself. The readiest answer to a question and the 
first ideas which occur to one when one hears a remark are 
least likely to be correct.^ 

Importance also attaches to Finzi's statement regarding the 
different means of imprinting ; but these were, unfortunately, 
investigated without an accurate determination of the idea- 
tional types of his observers. When, as in Finzi's experiment, 
one is called upon to note numbers, letters or syllables, it is 
possible to proceed in three or four different ways. One may 
imprint upon memory the visual images, or the auditory and 
vocal-motor images, or the vocal-motor images alone. One 
observer endeavors to remember the visual images of the let- 
ters, another says them over to himself, another hears them in 
imagination, while others speak and hear them at the same 

^ E. Meumann. Vorlesungen zur Einfuhrung in die experimentellen 
P'ddagogik, Zweiter Aiijl., 1912, I., 516. 



Observational Learning 97 

time. In general, it was found in Finzi's experiments that 
retention by means of visual images gives the most reliable 
results. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that visual 
images were the memory material which conformed most 
closely with the stimulus, for his method of presentation was 
visual. But it is probable that the same rule holds for observa- 
tional noting as for retention in general. Every observer must, 
so far as possible, discover his own pecuhar mode of remember- 
ing and employ chiefly that means which corresponds with his 
own ideational type. But the nature of the stimulus is also 
important. Visual stimuli are retained better by means of 
visual images; auditory stimuli better by means of auditory- 
images, etc. It is probable, therefore, that the most advan- 
tageous retention is that in which the individual endeavors 
to reach a compromise between his own ideational type and 
the sort of stimulus presented to him. A visuahzer will 
naturally be obliged to rely upon visual imagery in deaHng 
with visual stimuli; an observer who images in auditory terms 
will, in such a case, endeavor to employ his feeble visual 
imagery so far as he can, but he will reinforce them wherever 
possible by means of auditory images. 

Do we remember better when we rely solely upon impres- 
sions and ideas which correspond to our ideational t}'pe? 
Or is it more advantageous to have recourse to as many sorts 
of imagery as possible? Two American psychologists, Muen- 
sterberg and Bigham, have attempted to show experimentally 
that it is more advantageous to employ as many sorts of images 
as we can. Results obtained by Segal and by myself show that 
it is more advantageous for the observer to depend upon his 
own ideational type and upon the images corresponding there- 
to, so far as he can, and to attempt to effect a compromise 
between these and the modality of the presented datum only 
when the latter does not coincide with his ideational t3^e. 



9^ The Psychology of Learning 

The former occurs when a person of the visual type has to 
deal with visual stimuH; and the latter when he deals with 
auditory stimuh. 

It may be added that Finzi also made a study of the dis- 
traction of attention during the act of observation which 
constituted the chief topic of his investigation. Attention may 
be distracted either while the observation is in progress 
(Wundt's diverting method), or after the observation has been 
completed (Wundt's obHteration method), — the aim being, 
in the latter case, to obliterate the primary impression before 
the act of reproduction begins. The former experiments were 
obviously concerned with the immediate retention of an ob- 
served datum and with the behavior of attention during the 
observation itself; the latter dealt with the delayed reproduc- 
tion or the recognition of an impression after it had been 
crowded out of consciousness. We have already seen that it 
is extremely difficult to distract the attention, and that dis- 
traction is least effective in the case of sense-impressions. 
Finzi found that the effect of distraction, and its subjective 
compensation by the observer depend upon the means by 
which not only the noting, but also the distracting itself is 
accomplished. The observer who is accustomed to work with 
visual images is most distracted by subsidiary activities which 
also make use of visual images. The individual whose cus- 
tomary procedure in the act of learning consists in pronounc- 
ing the letters or syllables is distracted most when his vocal 
apparatus is called into play by the distracting stimulus. In 
general, therefore, it turns out that those distracting stimuli 
have the most pronounced effect which most closely resemble 
the impressions to be noted or the means employed by the 
observer in noting them. 

It may be added that Finzi found that visual imagery is 
subject to relatively Httle falsification in reproduction; and 



Observational Learning 99 

when we remember that visual learning is also most advan- 
tageous for the recognition of letters, visual noting seems to 
excel in every respect. Since we have to do chiefly with visual 
material not only in practical life but also in the school-room, 
it follows that visual impressions are of greatest significance 
for our consciousness even during the observing itself; it 
follows also that children should be trained, so far as possible, 
to employ visual imagery in noting impressions. 

Concerning the subjective assurance with which individuals 
report their observations, it may be said in general that sub- 
jective assurance is greatest soon after the observation is 
completed, and that it decreases with the lapse of time. The 
decHne of assurance is attended by characteristic phenomena, 
— correct statements are made with a feehng of uncertainty, 
and erroneous statements with a feehng of certainty. Then, 
too, subjective certainty manifests an individual variation. 
In the case of one observer, Finzi found that as many as one- 
third of his false statements were made with a feeling of cer- 
tainty that they were correct. The feehng of certainty is 
therefore by no means a reHable index of the fidehty of 
memory, — an observation which has been confirmed by the 
investigations of testimony by Stern and others, and by 
observations in criminal psychology made by Gross and 
others. ^ " Even those parts of the memory-image which have 
been smuggled in subsequently may be accompanied by a 
feeling of absolute certainty." In these and numerous other 
experiments, it is shown that one is always inclined to supple- 
ment incomplete memory-images so that they may give the 
same general impression as the original phenomenon; and 
the addition which judgment or imagination makes to memory 

^ H. Gross. Criminal Psychology (trans.), Boston, 191 1; Mncmo- 
tcchnik im Unterbewusstsein, Archivf. Kriminalanthropulogie, XXIX., 
1907. 



100 The Psychology of Learniiig 

can not, in many cases, be distinguished from the genuine. 
It is unfortunate that we do not know how the feehng of cer- 
tainty originates in our remembrances. Finzi advances the 
hypothesis that the distinctness of the memory-image plays 
a leading role in giving rise to it, — the more distinct the image 
the more convinced are we of its fidelity. It is possible that 
certain sensations also play a part here, such as organic sen- 
sations which may produce the feehng in question. The feel- 
ing of assurance is probably most illusory "in cases where the 
perception itself was inaccurate, or the elapsed interval was 
long, and the opportunity for falsification by means of ideas, 
external influences and emotions was most abundant." 
(Finzi.) 

It is, of course, important that when we train children in 
observational noting, we should direct their attention to the 
illusory character of the feeling of certainty, in order that they 
may soon reach the conviction that the only rehable test which 
we have for the accuracy of our memory of sense-impressions 
is a return to the sense-impressions themselves, and a com- 
parison of the remembrance with the object of perception. 
In later experiments, Finzi reported a remarkable phenomenon 
which has been confirmed by others, namely, that when re- 
production takes place after a long interval, the subjective 
assurance is again increased although the objective correctness 
of the memory has now decreased. 

We may still inquire what phase of observational noting 
profits most from training, — the accuracy and reliabihty of 
perception and imprinting, or the number of imprinted data? 
Finzi is of the opinion that reliability is increased more by 
training than is the amoimt noted. Thus the formal and 
functional aspect of memory derives more profit from training 
than does the material aspect. 

A particularly important result of Finzi 's investigation is 



Observational Learning 1 01 

his discovery that the most diverse individual characteristics 
may exist in combination, in observational noting. Thus, 
for instance, an especially great distractibility of attention 
and a great capacity for training and habituation may be 
present in the same individual; and we may find a combina- 
tion of increased compass of memory with increased fidehty 
and trustworthiness, etc. We have, as yet, no definite knowl- 
edge as to the interdependence of these individual char- 
acteristics. It is probable, however, that they are relatively 
independent of one another, because in the same individual 
we may find a great distractibility of attention and yet not- 
withstanding this a great capacity for training in its formal 
and material aspects. 

Finzi's experiments have been extended in many direc- 
tions by later investigators. Schneider, Reinhold and Kraus 
employed Finzi's apparatus in a study of the sensory appre- 
hension of the insane. Kraus found that the diminished 
memorial capacity, in a mental disorder which is known by 
the name of Korsakoff's disturbance of memory, may be due 
chiefly to a retardation in the rate of the process of apprehen- 
sion. This shows us again how important it is that the primary 
duration of impressions in consciousness should be sufficiently 
long if they are subsequently to be reproducible. Wolfskehl 
investigated the gradual fading of the image of groups of 
letters in the case of mentally abnormal patients; Kramer 
investigated the same phenomenon in normal adults. Wolf- 
skehl believes that he was able to show that noting capacity 
decreases a short time after the presentation of the material, 
or more strictly speaking, that the memory-image fades at 
this time; on the contrary, Kramer found, as did Finzi, that 
irregularly periodic fluctuations in the fidehty of the memory- 
image appear at different intervals. A uniform initial decrease 
and a subsequent increase does not, however, occur; an 



102 The Psychology of Learning 

increase in the fidelity of the memory-image is found to be 
present shortly after the stimulation takes place. Kramer 
made a determination of the progressive course of reproduc- 
tion after noting, at intervals of five seconds, for a total 
period of ninety-five seconds. 

Kramer discovered that one's capacity for noting is im- 
proved by practice and that different types of noting may be 
shown to exist. The most diverse individual characteristics 
may be present in the noting of the same individual, as Finzi 
also had found. Kramer cites the following combinations: 
I. amount very great, rehabihty moderate; 2. amount very 
slight, reliability very slight; 3. amount moderately great, 
reliability moderate; 4. amount not very great, reliability 
great. ^ 

The determination of such combinations of individual char- 
acteristics may be of importance in teaching; they show the 
teacher what divergences are to be eliminated in his pupils. 
Ranschburg and Boldt^ found that capacity to apprehend and 
to note is present in increased degree in cases of abnormally 
agitated emotional life. 

Ranschburg has introduced important innovations in the 
testing of noting. His method of pairs of words is especially 
useful in combination with the method of correct associates 
{Trefermethode) . Pairs of significantly related words are 
presented to the observer in auditory or visual fashion; and 
he is subsequently asked to respond with the second member 
of the appropriate pair when he hears the first member of 
that pair. His correct associates are recorded, together with 

' All of these investigations were published in Kracpelin^s Psychol- 
ogischen Arhciten. 

2 P. Ranschburg, Das kranke Gedachtnis, Leipzig, 191 1. K. Boldt, 
Studien iiber Merkdefekte, Monatsschr.f. Psychiat. u. Neurol. XVII., 
1905. 



Ohserjational Learning 1 03 

his association-time which may be measured by means of a 
stop-watch. This method is capable of a variety of uses, in 
that syllables may be substituted for words in order to test 
mechanical retention, and the test may be extended to include 
delayed instead of immediate reproduction. Ranschburg has 
devised an ingenious apparatus for the visual presentation 
of words and syllables;^ he employed this apparatus in an 
investigation of the relative efficiency of verbal memory in 
normal and sub-normal pupils. He found that these two 
classes of pupils are sharply differentiated by the results of 
this method. Sub-normal pupils are characterized by a lesser 
number of correct associates, and by a slower reproduction; 
their reproductions contain many words which are not sig- 
nificantly related to the words which aroused the reproduc- 
tions. 

His investigation of abnormal memory, in paralysis, delir- 
ium, etc., shows that the process of apprehension and imprint- 
ing may be unimpaired in a patient whose other mental func- 
tions are seriously impaired; but delayed reproduction or 
genuine retention is always defective when apprehension and 
imprinting are defective. This proves again that imprinting 
and retention are psychically distinct processes. Since im- 
printing is usually measured in terms of immediate repro- 
duction, psychopathology warrants a differentiation between 
temporary and permanent retention. 

Investigations of the memory of mental defectives show 
that the pathology of memory may make important contribu- 
tions to the solution of the problems in which we are interested. 
It enables us to compare the observational noting of normal 
and abnormal individuals; and such a comparison is illumi- 
nating because it shows us the factors upon which the success- 
ful accomplishment of observant noting depends. Then, too, 
^ This apparatus is described on page loS of this volume. 



104 '^^^^ Psychology of Learning 

the study of the abnormal mind enables us to analyze the 
process of noting in a much more thorough-going fashion 
than is possible by means of introspection alone. Since, in 
certain cases, the impairment is found to include only a part 
of the group of component processes which are concerned in 
the act of noting, we are furnished with a means of isolating 
certain of the components from the group; and we discover 
that processes which seem to introspection to be simple and 
unanalysable are really composed of more elementary com- 
ponents. The experiments of Finzi, Ranschburg, Goldstein 
and Boldt yield two chief results, in so far as the composition 
of the process of observational noting is concerned, i. The 
essential factors which contribute to successful noting seem 
to be: concentration of attention; a rigid adherence to a 
goal of observation; a certain rapidity of imprinting; a keen 
interest in the object observed; an active attention; a rich 
store of ideas with which the observed content may be brought 
into relation; an easy mobihty and a ready command of 
these relation-ideas; and an integrity of memory itself. 
2. Noting is found to consist of a number of relatively inde- 
pendent component processes; and in cases of mental disease 
the impairment may be restricted to one or other of the 
components. The following components may be enumerated : 
capacity to concentrate the attention and to become a con- 
centrated individuality; the whole process of apprehending 
and imprinting; the vivid immediate "after-effect" of stim- 
ulation; the normal development of genuine processes of 
reproduction in which the definite and correct verbal desig- 
nation of the observed content plays a leading part; and the 
lasting retention, or the persistence and fidelity of the 
memorial dispositions which have been laid down by the 
process of noting. 

Now the technique of noting must aim to develop all of 



Observational Learni?ig I05 

these component processes of noting. Since experimentation 
can show us which of them are ill-developed in a given indi- 
\idual, we possess a means of remedying defects in the indi- 
vidual's endowment by prescribing training of a special sort. 
A comparison of immediate and delayed reproduction is 
especially illuminating in this regard. Errors in immediate 
reproduction indicate that imprinting is defective; and indi- 
viduals who are prone to such errors should be given a special 
training in observing. Errors in delayed reproduction, if they 
occur in combination with efficient immediate reproduction, 
indicate an unreHable memory; individuals in whom this 
defect is found should be given special exercises in memory 
training. 

Investigations which have dealt with the retention and the 
revival of complex sensory material show a wholly different 
state of affairs. In every-day hfe and in the school-room 
this sort of observational noting is much more frequently 
employed than is the imprinting of simple sensory material. 
But still we must not lose sight of the fact that the latter sort 
of imprinting contains the elements of the former, and that' 
in the noting of complex impressions we are always concerned 
with the noting of elements; yet in the apprehending and 
imprinting of complex impressions a wholly new feature is 
added, — the apprehending and imprinting of a total impres- 
sion of a complex sort, — and the elements are in most instances 
imprinted only as component parts of this total impression. 
Experiments deahng with complex stimuli have shown us the 
significance of another group of subjective conditions of obser- 
vational noting, particularly that of the view-points of 
observation, of the direction of the observer's interest, and of 
other individual characteristics of the observer. 



lo6 The Psychology of Learning 

c. The Investigation of Testimony and Noting 

Only within recent years has our experimental technique 
been extended to include the noting of this sort of material, 
the investigation of testimony, among other causes, furnish- 
ing the impetus. The investigation of testimony consists in 
presenting to the observer a picture, a concrete object, a 
process or an event, and in having him describe his experience 
after the objective stimulus has been removed. The observer 
is given a definite time during which the picture or object 
may be examined ; and the period of exposure is short, usually 
less than one minute, in order that attention may be keenly 
concentrated throughout. During the presentation the obser- 
ver must, in accordance with instructions given him in advance, 
imprint the object upon his consciousness as accurately as 
possible. Then it is withdrawn, and immediately afterwards 
a complete description of the object is recorded in writing. 
Here, in conformity with a suggestion by Stern, we must 
distinguish between a spontaneous and independent descrip- 
tion or report, and an interrogation or cross-examination. 
The report comprises the testimony offered by the observer 
in a voluntary and spontaneous manner, without aid of any 
sort. As a rule the interrogation follows the report, taking 
the form of a systematic questioning addressed by the experi- 
menter to the observer. The aid received from the experi- 
menter's questioning may be combined with an attempt to 
determine whether the observer is susceptible to suggested 
impressions which were not received during the presentation; 
in other words, the observer's suggestibility may be investi- 
gated. Both the report and the interrogation may come at 
different intervals after the material has been presented. 
If they come immediately after the presentation, we make a 
test of observation and its effect as manifested in the imme- 



Observational Learning 107 

diate retention of complex impressions. If they do not come 
until after a considerable time has elapsed, we deal with true 
memory; and from a comparison of the results obtained 
after the lapse of different intervals we may determine the 
progress of the forgetting of complex material. 

These investigations of testimony are also investigations 
of observational noting, for the observer has expHcit instruc- 
tions so to imprint the material that he may give the fullest 
possible testimony concerning it. For instance, in Stern's 
experiments the following instructions were given to the chil- 
dren who served as observers: "I should Hke to find out if 
you have a good memory. I am going to show you a picture; 
and you are to look at it carefully. I shall give you ample 
time to note everything which it contains. Afterwards you 
will describe all that you saw." If in the description which 
followed, the child came to a point where he hesitated he was 
told to "Think again; perhaps you will remember something 
else." When he could find no more to report he was asked, 
"Does nothing else occur to you?" When finally he rephed 
in the negative, his report was taken to be finished and the 
interrogation began. 

The picture which Stern employed was a colored print of a 
peasant's room, from a portfoho of pictures pubhshed by 
Schreiber in Esslingen. Other investigators have employed 
somewhat different pictures, in some cases more complex. 
Lobsien's picture represented a boy engaged in fishing. 
Oppenheim used two pictures from Schreiber's collection; 
one of them s>Tnbolized water, and the other showed peasants 
at work in a field. Experiments of this sort have been made 
by Stern, Wreschner, Lobsien, Marie Dlirr-Borst, Roden- 
waldt and others. ^ 

So far as our purposes are concerned, these investigations 
' See Bibliography at the end of this volume. 



io8 The Psychology of Learning 

of testimony have the disadvantage that the effect of obser- 
vation upon testimony itself has not been submitted to an 
adequate investigation. These experiments therefore yield 
little more than a statistics of testimony from which, of course, 
certain important conclusions bearing upon observing and 
noting may be drawn ; but they do not contribute directly to a 
solution of our problem. 

From the investigation of testimony there has developed 
a group of experiments which deal directly with the noting 
capacity of adults, normal and abnormal, and of school- 
children. Experiments of this latter sort were conducted by 
Bogdanoff, and by Bernstein and Bogdanoff;^ others were 
undertaken by Boldt, Netschajeff, Brodmann, Ranschburg, 
Goldstein, Lobsien, and by Schroebler and the author. Among 
these we must mention, first of all, the pioneer experiments 
of Ranschburg and Goldstein because these writers call atten- 
tion to a number of extremely important objective conditions 
of observing and of noting, and contribute to an accurate 
analysis of the processes employed in these two functions. 
Ranschburg improved the technique of experimentation in 
this field by introducing a very useful apparatus which he 
calls the mnemometer. This is a small box with an aperture 
in the lid, under which rotates a disc driven by a spring. 
Numbers, words, pictures, etc., pasted upon the disc can be 
made to appear and to disappear, in successive order behind 
the aperture, at any desired rate of speed. Ranschburg's 
results show, first of all, that the ease and accuracy of obser- 
vational noting depends in great measure upon the character 
of the objective stimuli, particularly upon whether the stimuli 
differ from one another or contain similar or identical elements. 
His experiments led to the formulation of the important 
law that impressions are apprehended more rapidly and more 
^ See Bibliography at the end of this vohime. 



I 



Observational Learning 109 

correctly in proportion as their stimuli are diverse; and they 
are apprehended less readily and less correctly in proportion 
as their stimuli are similar or identical. "^ This law may be 
demonstrated from the apprehension of series of numbers. 
Several groups containing from two-place to six-place num- 
bers were exposed for periods of one-third of a second in the 
mnemometer, some of the groups containing wholly differ- 
ent digits (210 864), and some containing similar or identi- 
cal digits (471 038) (929 968). It was found that groups 
containing similar or identical digits were erroneously per- 
ceived much more frequently than those containing wholly 
different digits. There were also certain remarkable subsid- 
iary results. For example, errors seldom occurred at the left 
side of the column; approximately ninety per cent, of the 
false readings occurred in the right half of the group of 
digits.^ The final digits of the numbers, however, were per- 
ceived correctly in almost every instance. 

In these erroneous perceptions certain fundamental types 
of error recur with great frequency. Similar digits tend to 
fuse with one another in reproduction; for instance, 3 is 
often confused with 8, 9 with 6, 2 and o with 9. "The dimly 
perceived digits either lose certain of their finer details or 
they appropriate other details." For example, 194 607 was 
read instead of 194 907; 491 238 instead of 491 938, etc. 
When two similar digits stood side-by-side and one of them 
was imperfectly perceived, the latter was transformed into 
the former, — a very frequent type of error. One digit was 
substituted for another which bore no resemblance to it, as 
4 for 9, 7 for 8, etc. Again when a digit was imperfectly per- 

^ P. Ranschburg, Ueber Hemmung gleichzeitiger Reizwirkungen, 
Zeitschr.f. Psychol., XXX., 1902, 39-86. 

^ This may possibly be due to the influence of our having learned 
to read from left to right. 



no The Psychology of Learning 

ceived, a digit which was similar to one of its neighbors was 
substituted for it, thus 8ii 824 was read 811 224; or the 
digit next in numerical sequence was substituted for the 
imperfectly perceived digit. Ranschburg refers to these as 
simple errors, employing the term complex error to indicate 
transpositions and the Hke. It was found that certain series 
were read on the whole correctly and others incorrectly; and 
in particular, it was found that when digits containing straight 
lines, — I, 4, 7, — stood in the third, fourth or fifth places, the 
reading was especially accurate. This also shows to what an 
extent ready and correct apprehension depends upon the 
objective character and the external arrangement of the 
stimuli. The almost invariable absence of error at the left 
of the column of digits is referred by Ranschburg to the 
habitual direction of the progress of attention, as in our 
reading from left to right. 

The results may then be summarized in this statement: 
"Illusions in the apprehension of complex stimuli are due to 
two causes: a. the composition of the series, — homogeneous 
elements increasing the illusion; and h. the behavior of 
attention, which seems to turn first to the beginning or left- 
hand side of a series of graphic signs. This behavior in turn 
is a product of habit and training, and seems to follow a 
regular law. "In a minimal period of time, the attention is 
able to grasp a greater number of sensations or ideas when 
they are aroused by heterogeneous stimuli than when they 
owe their origin to homogeneous stimuH," or "The thresh- 
old for the apprehension of simultaneous or immediately 
successive heterogeneous stimuli is lower than for homogeneous 
stimuli presented under identical conditions." Ranschburg 
refers to this as the law "in accordance with which appre- 
hension is rendered more difficult by the presence of identical 
elements." Many other investigations justify the conclusion 



Observational Learning 1 1 1 

that this law holds for simultaneously perceived as well as 
for successively perceived stimuli. Ranschburg seeks the 
cause of this phenomenon in the circumstance that similar 
or Hke elements inhibit one another in the process of appre- 
hension. They are unable to hold their own in the struggle 
with their heterogeneous rivals for possession of the narrow 
field of consciousness. This is expressed by Ranschburg in 
the significant statement that "intensity and affective tone 
being equal, the dissimilar members of a group of stimuli 
which act upon consciousness at exactly or approximately 
the same time are given the preference; while those which 
are similar or identical inhibit one another." This formula- 
tion is employed by Ranschburg to give special emphasis to 
the fact that the inhibition of homogeneous stimuli operates in 
utter independence of all the conditions of noting which owe 
their origin to the intensity and the emotional tone of stimuli. 

All of this has a distinct pedagogical significance. It shows 
us that material which is to be presented concretely must 
be selected carefully in so far as its objective difficulty is 
concerned; and that concrete material is perceived more 
readily and more significantly in proportion as it is composed 
of simple elements, — digits containing straight lines, — and of 
dissimilar elements. It is also of importance to pedagogy 
that the observer finds greater difficulty and requires more 
concentration in apprehending groups which are "encum- 
bered" with similar elements than in apprehending groups 
which are made up exclusively of heterogeneous elements. 

A number of important experiments by Goldstein ^ deahng 
with observational noting in the insane, are, in a sense, a 
supplement to those of Ranschburg. They are a continuation 
of previous investigations by Diehl and Bernstein, Ransch- 

^ K. Goldstein, Merkfahigkeit, Gedaichtnis und Assoziation, Zeitschr. 
f. Psychol., XLI., 1906, 3S-47; 1 17-144. 



112 The Psychology of Learning 

burg and Boldt, but they go much farther in the analysis of 
the processes employed in noting. In a first series of experi- 
ments, Goldstein presented to his (abnormal) subjects twenty- 
three stimuli or objects to be noted, in successive order, — 
three significant words, three famihar objects, three uncol- 
ored pictures, three colored pictures, three two-place numbers, 
two street addresses, three colors (skeins of yarn), and three 
coins. The observers were allowed to regard these objects 
until they felt that they had imprinted every detail clearly 
upon memory; then after intervals of one minute, five min- 
utes and twenty-four hours, Goldstein determined how much 
was remembered. In a second series of experiments, single 
objects were presented; and these were described after very 
brief intervals, — five, ten, twenty, forty, and sixty seconds. 
Here again two different sorts of stimuli were employed, — in 
one case, stimuli which gave least opportunity for associative 
connections; and in the other case, stimuli which were rich 
in associations. The former objects included two-place, odd 
numbers; and the latter, a colored picture whose content 
was familiar to the observer. In the case of the picture, 
retention was tested by the method of recognition; in the case 
of the numbers, a reproduction of the digits themselves was 
demanded. In a third series of experiments, the time which 
intervened between observation and reproduction was filled 
with distracting stimuli; similar stimuli being employed in 
half the e'kperiments, and dissimilar stimuli in the other half. 
The distraction took the form either of a naming of pictures 
(after numbers or pictures had been perceived), or of simple 
arithmetical calculations. 

These experiments aimed to make a test, in certain cases, 
chiefly of immediate retention and imprinting itself, and in 
other cases, chiefly of the true retention which had been 
accomplished by means of associative aids. The investiga- 



Observational Learning 113 

tion 3aelded the important result that the same observer 
may show a creditable capacity in "noting for only a short 
time," that is, in immediate retention, but a poor capacity in 
noting for a longer time; and that noting b}'' means of simple 
imprinting (when numbers are presented and associative 
ideas are lacking) may be poor in an observer whose noting 
by means of associative aids (pictures) is highly developed. 
It was found, further, that even when an individual possesses 
a good capacity for imprinting and associating, his acquisi- 
tion of concrete material may still be very imperfectly devel- 
oped; this is the case when he proves to be an individual 
who lacks interest in the experiment and does not will to 
acquire information. 

These results give us a clearer insight into the nature and 
the component processes of the act of noting. They show 
us I. that in the act of noting, the process of imprinting 
(called "simple imprinting" by Goldstein) possesses, to a 
certain extent, a significance which is independent of the 
formation of associations. We must, therefore, distinguish 
between the simple or direct imprinting of stimuli which is 
relatively independent of the formation of associations, and 
noting which is accomplished by means of the formation of 
associations. The former process gives rise to a direct recep- 
tion of impressions; the latter to a reception through the 
medium of familiar ideas. The two activities cooperate in 
every act of sense-perception; but now the one, now the 
other may predominate. Pure direct imprinting comes into 
operation especially when we are dealing with impressions 
which are relatively lacking in associations, and when the 
time for perceiving is very short. In cases of the opposite 
sort, associative noting predominates. 

These experimental findings furnish another confirmation 
for my distinction between immediate and lasting retention. 



114 The Psychology of Learning 

Immediate retention depends much more upon the process 
of imprinting than upon the formation of associations, because 
the latter is precluded by lack of time under the conditions of 
the experiment. Immediate retention may be strong in an 
individual whose lasting retention is weak, and "uice versa; 
and this non-correlated distribution of the two functions of 
memory is to be referred to the effect of imprinting and of 
associating. Immediate retention appears to be the special 
efifect of imprinting, while lasting retention is the special 
effect of association. Immediate retention and the effect of 
imprinting are correlates. Indeed, the associative function 
may be seriously impaired in the insane without immediate 
retention being sympathetically affected. And it is for this 
reason that capacity for imprinting and capacity for asso- 
ciative noting may show different degrees of training and 
development in the same individual. 

As regards the effect of distraction during the period which 
intervenes between presentation and reproduction, Gold- 
stein found that in all of his observers distraction gave rise 
to a more serious impairment in the retention of numbers 
than in the retention of pictures; and that distraction by 
means of a homogeneous stimulus, — i.e., when pictures were 
introduced after pictures had been observed, — is more effect- 
ive than distraction by means of a heterogeneous stimulus. 
He recognizes that this phenomenon is analogous with Ransch- 
burg's finding that homogeneous impressions and ideas inhibit 
one another more than heterogeneous. But at the same time, 
it shows that distraction has a more disturbing effect in imme- 
diate retention; and this accords with Goldstein's further 
observation that the "formation of associations actually has 
a disturbing effect upon noting capacity for shorter intervals." 
This shows the pure imprinting of impressions to be a special 
process wliich has its own pecuHar conditions and results. 



Observational Learning 115 

Goldstein's observations give us still more information 
concerning the component processes which constitute obser- 
vational noting. We see, namely, that this act consists in a 
cooperation of i. the concentration of attention; this prob- 
ably is of the nature of a general condition upon which depend 
not only the result of the imprinting and the formation of 
associations, but also and chiefly the imprinting itself; 2. the 
process of imprinting; j. the formation of supporting asso- 
ciations, which constitutes, for the most part, the incorpora- 
tion of the content of perception into our body of former 
ideas, and renders possible the establishment of associative 
connections; 4. the will to observe and to note. The will 
to observe is to be regarded as a different direction of the 
will from that which is present in noting. Its presence is 
seen in the individual's interest in the acquisition of the con- 
crete material; and its absence manifests itself in an indif- 
ference on the part of the learner. To these must be added 
as additional conditions of observational noting the objec- 
tive relations, homogeneous or heterogeneous, of the stimuli, 
which Ranschburg specified, and the significance of the 
intensity and emotional tone of stimuli, which have long been 
known to psychology. Hence we find a multitude of cooper- 
ative processes and conditions in noting. 

It is a matter of prime importance that each of these fac- 
tors appears to have its special influence upon the results of 
the whole process of noting. There are only two of the fac- 
tors, however, which are to be regarded as genuine functions 
of memory, namely, imprinting, and the forming of associa- 
tions. Imprinting clearly has the chief significance in the 
immediate reproduction of impressions; while the formation 
of associations is chiefly significant for permanent retention, 
(after the impressions have wholly disappeared from con- 
sciousness) or for the genuine function of memory. Yet 



ii6 The Psychology of Learni?ig 

investigations of the insane show that associative noting is, in 
its very nature, dependent upon the excellence of the associa- 
tion mechanism, or upon the quality of the individual's func- 
tion of association and reproduction. Imprinting and imme- 
diate retention, on the other hand, are independent of this; 
that is, they may function normally even when the associa- 
tive mechanism is pathologically impaired. 

Just as these experiments give us an insight into the process 
of noting, others, such as those of Bernstein and Bogdanoff, 
are especially illuminating regarding the effect of noting and, 
in particular, of the retention of complex impressions as a 
result of observational noting. They have an especial value 
in that the material which they employed is closely related 
to that with which children are concerned in the school-room. 
Bernstein did not employ ordinary pictures, but simple geo- 
metrical figures which had been drawn upon a screen. The 
screen was marked off into nine squares, arranged in three 
rows; and each square contained a figure. The figures were 
simple forms, as a square with one diagonal, a two-armed 
cross, two triangles with their apexes joined, etc. For ease 
of observation the screen was framed, and placed in the 
hands of the observer. The children who served as observers 
were allowed to examine the group of figures for a period of 
thirty seconds; the observational noting or the retention of 
the material was then tested by a method of recognition. 
There was now laid before the observer a sheet containing 
twenty-five simple geometric figures, among which appeared 
the nine original figures distributed in irregular order, together 
with nine others which resembled them somewhat, and seven 
wholly new figures. The procedure consisted in having the 
observer identify the figures which he had seen in the original 
series upon the screen. The method assumes "that those 
figures which were imprinted accurately upon memory will 



Observational Learning 117 

now be identified without error, and that therefore the num- 
ber of figures identified upon the second sheet will correspond 
with the number retained in memory." If this number is 
brought into relation with the total number of figures observed 
upon the original screen, then we shall have the ratio -§ as a 
measure of the observer's noting capacity. ''If the observer 
selects from the second group any figures which were not 
present in the original series, the number of false identifica- 
tions must be brought into relation with the proportion of 
correct identifications, |- — /, that is, the relative number of 
correct and of false statements constitutes what we may 
call the co-efficient of noting." (Bernstein.) Similar experi- 
ments had previously been made with abnormal subjects by 
Bogdanoff; he and Bernstein together continued the investi- 
gation with children, — twenty-eight observer.s between the 
ages of seven and fifteen years, — in one of the high schools of 
Moscow. 

Their results give us much valuable information relating to 
the psychology of observational noting, although being influ- 
enced by current investigations of testimony, the experimenters 
were unfortunately content to give an inadequate numerical 
statement of their data, and did not make a sufiiciently thor- 
ough investigation of the process of observing itself. 

From all of these experiments we see that, in general, the 
number of correct statements increases fairly regularly with 
increase in the age of the child. Bernstein extended his 
investigation to include a test of "passive attention"; that is, 
after each experiment he asked his observers whether they 
could state how many figures appeared upon the second sheet. 
Since the children had had no reason to expect that this 
question would be asked them, it may be assumed, in the 
majority of cases at least, that they did note this feature 
deliberately or intentionally. In any case, such a question 



ii8 



The Psychology of Learning 



must yield very uncertain results because, of course, the 
deliberate and intentional imprinting of the number of figures 
upon the second sheet might have taken place, and because 
it was not difficult for the children to calculate the number 
of figures from the general appearance of the sheet since it 
contained five rows and each row contained five figures. For 
these reasons the numerical data obtained from the answers 
to this question show that "passive attention" is very irreg- 
ular in its development. 

One is surprised to find that some of the observers made a 
great many erroneous identifications; indeed, certain of the 
eighteen-year-old observers marked upon the second sheet as 
many as six figures which bore no resemblance to the original 
figures. And even when the number of errors was not so 
great, it is surprising that certain figures which had not been 
seen in the original series were sometimes "identified." In 
general, however, it turns out that noting capacity improves 
with increase of age; it reaches its maximum in the fifteenth 
year, and subsequently declines. Additional experiments 
with thirty-five adults showed that, on the average, adults 
are more efficient, — their averages being 7.6 correct and .8 
erroneous identifications. But at the age of fifteen the aver- 
age number of correct statements is 8.2. The results are 
shown in the following table: 






t; 



8 

9 
10 
II 
12 



7-8 
8-3 



8 



6 

6.4 

6.6 

6.9 

7-1 



!S 



■^ .0 



2 

1.6 
1-4 

■9 
1.2 



Sms, 



a 



■JS ^i '^ rCi 



;.^ 



6/1 

Adults 



e;' 



^c3 



.^ 









8.5 
8.4 
8.8 

8.4 



7-5 
8 

8.2 
7.6 



.0 

•4 
.6 
.8 



Observational Learning 1 19 

The important feature consists in the fact that the correct 
identifications increase in proportion as the erroneous iden- 
tifications decrease. Tliis relation gives one the impression 
that correct and erroneous ideas suppress one another. It is 
remarkable, too, that younger children make relatively few 
correct statements and a very large number of false, a feature 
which is especially noteworthy since the number of impres- 
sions to be noted was only nine. This indicates that capacity 
to observe and to note is but shghtly developed in the earher 
years. 

Boldt's^ investigation is not so important, because only 
six objects were presented. This number is decidedly too 
small. Netschajeff 's method ^ consisted in displaying twelve 
colored pictures of large size, and as nearly as possible of 
similar coloring. Each picture was shown for five seconds; 
then the child was asked to pick it out from among a group 
of thirty-six pictures. Here, too, the accuracy of recognition 
was found to increase with age. 

The actual investigations of testimony are in some respects 
more instructive than the investigations of noting capacity 
which we have mentioned, because they have endeavored to 
make a more accurate evaluation of the psychological sta- 
tistics of testimony. There are three groups of these experi- 
ments which must especially be mentioned here: i. The 
pioneer investigations of Stern and Wreschner, the former 
dealing with children and youths, the latter with adults. 
2. Rodenwaldt's experiments with soldiers must be brought 
into comparison with this first group. Rodenwaldt investi- 
gated the testimony of adults of about the same age as 
Wreschner's, but of a lesser degree of intelhgence. 5. The 

* K. Boldt, Studien iiber Merkdefekte, Monatschr. f. Psychiat. u. 
Neurol., XVII., 1905, 97-114. 

*A. Netschajeflf, Ueber Auffassung, Berlin, 1904. 



1 20 The Psychology of Learning 

third group of experiments concerns the important question 
as to whether testimony and capacity to observe and to note 
can be trained and improved by practice. This question was 
investigated by Oppenheim, Borst, Baade, Lipmann, Ransch- 
burg, Schrobler, Meumann, and others.^ 

We have already described the method employed in Stern's 
experiments. His material consists exclusively of the colored 
picture of the peasant's room. This picture represents a 
simple peasant's hut, in which a man in shirt-sleeves and col- 
ored vest is sitting at a table. The family is beginning their 
meal. The husband has a plate before him, and in his right 
hand a spoon. He is looking toward his wife, who stands at 
his right and is in the act of setting a pitcher on the table. 
Opposite the wife and to the left of the husband, a small 
child is sitting upon a bench, with a plate before him; he is in 
the act of bringing a spoon to his mouth. Beside him and at 
his left is a dog. At the side of the table, which is turned 
toward the spectator, is the wife's chair, and upon the table, 
her plate and spoon. The supper-dishes are upon the central 
part of the table. To the left is a blue cradle containing a 
baby. A large bed stands in the background; and upon the 
wall are three pictures and a crucifix. The window has a 
partially lowered shade and a pair of rose-colored curtains; 
plants can be seen through the window. Upon the wall, to 
the right, is a Black Forest clock; the room has a timbered 
ceiling. 

Rodenwaldt has justly remarked that this picture is not 
altogether appropriate for experiments in testimony. The 
clothing of the family, the beard of the peasant, and partic- 
ularly the woman's dress are most unusual. Then, too, the 
perspective of the picture is exaggerated to such an extent 
that the floor must seem to children to be non-horizontal. 
^ See Bibliography at the end of this volume. 



Observational Learning 121 

It was Stern who furnished the chief points of view for the 
evaluation of experimental data, in which, for the most part, 
he has been followed by other investigators, although there 
have been certain essential variations in the computation of 
results. Distinctions have been made between the amount 
and the accuracy of testimony, and between free or spon- 
taneous testimony and that which is obtained when sponta- 
neous memory is aided by interrogation or cross-examination. 
It is important to note that spontaneous testimony is always 
much more Hmited in scope and content than total testi- 
mony, the latter term referring to the combined spontaneous 
and interrogatory product, or to the total amount reproduced. 
Thus, when an observer reports his experience spontaneously, 
his report by no means represents the complete content which 
was left in his memory by the original sensory impressions. 
There is, as Stern points out, a mass of mental content in 
addition to this spontaneous product which can be repro- 
duced only at the instigation of an external impulse. Indeed, 
in many instances, the spontaneous portion amounts to only 
one-half of the total remembrance. Spontaneity is meas- 
ured by a fraction which expresses the ratio between the 
amount of spontaneous content and of total content: ^, 
where cs indicates the number of correct spontaneous state- 
ments, and ct the total number of correct statements. 

For the purpose of the present discussion, we shall utilize 
only those results of the investigation of testimony which 
afford us an insight into the conditions of observational noting. 
These may be summarized as follows: In the first place. 
Stern's experiments show that a determining factor in the 
result of observation and of the report of what has been 
observed consists in the point of view from which the observa- 
tion was made; that is, it is important that the observer 
should possess and should properly utiHze all of the points of 



122 The Psychology of Learning 

view which contribute to a complete analysis of the observed 
object. This comes to light more clearly in Stern's experi- 
ments where he employed children of different ages. His 
results enable us to correlate the different points of view or 
categories of observation with the age of the observer, because 
certain categories of retention have not yet been acquired 
and mastered by the young child. Hence it is possible to 
differentiate various stages of development in observational 
noting according to the dominance or absence of particular 
points of view of observation. 

Accordingly Stern distinguishes several levels or stages in 
the development of observation. The first stage, which pre- 
vails at about the age of seven years, Stern designates as the 
substance stage; here the child enumerates persons and things 
without coherent connection. Next in order comes the action 
stage, which extends to about the tenth year; here the chief 
objects of attention are the activities of people. The third is 
the relation stage, where chiefly the relations of things, and 
particularly their spatial relations, attract attention; this 
stage makes its appearance at about the twelfth to the four- 
teenth year. Finally, from about the fourteenth year onward 
comes the quality stage, where the properties of things are 
observed and analyzed. The following description of the 
peasant's room by a seven-year-old girl illustrates the sub- 
stance stage: "A man, a woman, a cradle, a bed, a boy, a chair, 
a bench, a doll, three pictures, a cross, a window, a boot-jack, 
a table, a plate, a dish." The following report by a nineteen- 
year-old student illustrates the quality stage: "A room with 
ceiHng of wood, probably oak; upon one of the walls there 
hangs a picture, with gilded frame, of a small house and a 
tree. A window with a shade partly rolled up, and a picture 
upon it. In the foreground, a table with brown, turned legs, 
etc." The results of these investigations of testimony and 



Observational Learning 123 

numerous experiences from every-day life show that what we 
perceive in an object is determined chiefly by the points of 
view or categories or directing ideas from which we observe 
it. This is illustrated in the familiar experience that when a 
layman and a person who is trained in some particular art or 
trade or profession observe the same phenomena the profes- 
sional man always sees much more than the layman. The 
former has a great many special points of view from which he 
observes things; and these are relatively lacking in the case 
of the layman. We shall see, however, that the mere presence 
of points of view is relatively unimportant; much more 
depends upon their proper utilization, and upon the observer's 
efficiency and perseverence in the act of observing. For, by 
intensity, persistence and thoroughness of observation the 
observer may acquire view-points from the objective material 
itself. 

An important question arises here : What proportion of the 
observer's testimony belongs to each of the different cate- 
gories? An answer to this question would enable us to deter- 
mine what items are selected by observers of different ages, of 
different levels of mental development, of different degrees of 
education; and what items each observer would therefore 
imprint especially upon memory, for testimony is a product of 
observation and noting. In this respect, Rodenwaldt's ex- 
periments constitute an exceedingly important supplement to 
those of Stern. Let us, however, first consider Stern's results. 
This investigator's answer to our question is contained in his 
discussion of "spontaneity values," by which he means the 
ratio of the number of items included in the spontaneous 
description to the total number of items contained in the 
original picture. This conception is not wholly free from 
objection, however, because one can never be sure of just what 
is to be regarded as the actual content of the presented object. 



124 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

According to Stern the " spontaneity value " is "a measure of 
the selection made by the observer, and therefore an index of 
the independent and spontaneous interest which a given 
category of items is able to arouse in him." This may be ex- 
pressed otherwise as follows : Whenever any tiling is observed 
spontaneously, a selection is made among the observed data; 
and this selection may be taken as a measure of the dominant 
interests of the observer. Stern found three chief categories 
of items which are preferred above all others: i. Persons are 
much more spontaneously observed and noted than things. 
2. Things are much more spontaneously observed than the 
properties and relations of things, that is, substance is much 
more interesting than accident, j. Spatial arrangement is 
much more readily observed than color. Indeed, the latter is 
ignored to an extraordinary degree; children and young 
people generally agree in paying little heed to colors. 

Wreschner obtained similar results. He, too, found that 
the compass of memory is less for data of an objective than of a 
personal sort, and that colors are but slightly noticed. It is 
significant in this connection that many features in the picture 
of the peasant's room which made a striking appeal to the 
senses, for instance, vividly colored objects, did not attract 
attention. As Stern points out, it is not by any means the 
intrusiveness of the stimulus itself which attracts the attention. 
When left entirely to itself, observation directs the attention 
not to the intensity or the quality of the stimulus but primarily 
to those features which are of practical significance, that is, 
which have greatest interest as practical concerns of life. Stern 
adds that among our practical interests the personal are para- 
mount; hence he asserts that the selection of that which we 
observe voluntarily and spontaneously is made in accordance 
with a principle which may be designated a "practico-anthro- 
pocentric evaluation." 



Observational Learning 125 

This conception is essentially narrowed by Rodenwaldt's 
findings. It is to be noted, however, that Rodenwaldt ex- 
perimented exclusively with adults (soldiers). He, too, found 
that the practical point of view is dominant in observation; 
the features preferred are, however, not personal relations, 
but things throughout. One even finds that his observers 
begin their description of the picture with a detailed enumer- 
ation of objects a;nd their properties,— table, bed, ceiHng, 
floor, etc. ; and that not until later and quite incidentally do 
they speak of persons and their actions. This phenomenon 
is doubtless due to a difference in the age and in the mental 
development of the observers in the two cases. With increas- 
ing age one's interest in personal matters declines, and one's 
interest in things begins to preponderate. Nevertheless, 
Rodenwaldt found that things are more accurately and 
more fully observed than are the qualities and relations of 
things; and among things and qualities the practically sig- 
nificant preponderates, — for example, spatial relations pre- 
dominate over colors. 

In general, then, it must be said that in cases where atten- 
tion has not been specifically trained, it is not genuinely 
attracted by sensations and their attributes as such, but by 
objects of practical interest or of practical significance (Stern, 
Rodenwaldt) . 

We are to bear in mind, however, that this statement is 
true only of individuals who have not received systematic 
training in observation. The experiments of Stern and Roden- 
waldt deal only with the spontaneous or free and unconstrained 
type of observation. If we examine the observation of the 
scientist or the artist, we invariably find evidence of the in- 
fluence of training in that more heed is given to that which 
conforms to their scientific or artistic interests. 

These earlier investigations of testimony laid the founda- 
10 



126 The Psychology of Learning 

tion for an illuminating group of experiments which have 
since been undertaken. The later investigations aimed to deal 
chiefly with the following problems: a. Can the testimony of 
the child be so modified by training that he will begin at an 
early age to employ those points of view which Stern found 
to be present only at a later age? b. Experiments in testi- 
mony must be checked and controlled by experiments in 
observation. The child should be required to observe objects 
from particular categories or points of view while still in the 
presence of the objects. And these experiments should be 
of two sorts. In the first group the child must be left wholly 
to his own guidance; in the second group the points of view 
are to be Indicated to him. Not until we are able to compare 
and to contrast free and directed observation, together with 
the subsequent remembrance of the observed data in the two 
cases, shall we be able to determine whether and to what 
degree the cliild is capable, at a particular stage of his de- 
velopment, of employing a particular category or point of 
view of observation. This problem of observation was in- 
vestigated by Meumann and Schrobler, and the investi- 
gation was continued by Schrobler alone in an extensive 
series of experiments. The observers were boys and girls 
from six to fourteen years of age; and the materials consisted 
of pictures, stuffed animals and sculptured figures. It turned 
out that two forms of free observation must be employed. 
In one case, only the most general questions are to be asked; 
for instance: " Can you tell me what you saw? " In the other 
case, the experimenter is to resort to artifices in order to 
encourage the child to talk about the object, — for instance: 
"How would you describe to your mother what we have 
shown you today?" It is necessary to have recourse to such 
artifices because the descriptions furnished by many children 
in free observation are exceedingly meagre; older children 



Observational Learning 127 

describe even more briefly than younger children, the latter 
feeling less restraint in this experiment. Well-marked indi- 
vidual variations were present J^oth in free and in directed 
observation. In free observation the children reported but 
little, and after looking about in a groping fashion for 
some time they finally announced that they had finished; 
but so soon as we passed over to directed observation they 
seemed to feel pleased and relieved, and their reports became 
much more detailed and extensive. One can plainly see that 
these children can observe, but notwithstanding all of their 
object-teaching, they have acquired so little method of 
observation that they are helpless. They have no means of 
finding their way about amid the wealth of detail, nor of 
assuming any definite points of view. And even in directed 
observation it is evident that although points of view are 
furnished to them they simply fail to see certain things 
which never escape the notice of adults. 

This shows that pupils are in need of systematic guidance 
in observation; they must learn to observe methodically. 
Our present system of object-teaching emphasizes material 
content in a one-sided fashion; it furnishes the pupil with 
facts but with no training in observing. And not until 
he possesses the latter can he succeed in observing in an 
independent manner. Experiments which have dealt with the 
educability of perception give us an insight into our present 
problem. These experiments have been arranged in two dif- 
ferent ways: i. Children are actually guided in the proper 
and systematic use of particular points of view of observa- 
tion, and they are encouraged to work carefully, con- 
scientiously and with good will. 2. Experiments of similar 
character follow one another, errors being pointed out and 
corrected after each experiment. Obviously, the former 
method alone is educative in any genuine sense; the object 



128 The Psychology of Learning 

which the latter method seeks to attain is self-help, and for 
that reason this method is more appropriate for adults than 
for children. Experiments of the former sort have been under- 
taken by Oppenheim and Borst, of the latter sort by Breuk- 
ink, Baade, Lipmann, and others. Within a period of three 
months Oppenheim made three tests of a group of thirty 
girls from ten to twelve years of age, employing the picture 
method devised by Stern. After each test free reports and 
interrogatory reports were recorded; then the picture was 
again shown to the observer who was now asked to discover 
her own errors. Finally, the experimenter pointed out any 
errors that she had herself not been able to discover. The 
observer was then admonished to observe accurately in future 
and to make her report as complete and as correct as possible. 
This process of education resulted in an essential improve- 
ment in subsequent reports. The errors decreased from 
twenty-six per cent, in the first experiment to seventeen and 
one-half per cent, in the third experiment. But the improve- 
ment in quality was much less marked in the spontaneous 
descriptions than in the interrogatory reports. While the 
former increased progressively in amount but not in accuracy, 
the latter became errorless; and the observer's capacity to 
resist suggestion steadily increased. 

Oppenheim's method did not provide for any real education 
of observation and description, because mere indication of 
errors and admonition to improve do not constitute educa- 
tion; guidance as to mode of procedure in accurate observa- 
tion was wholly lacking. Education is possible only when 
observers are systematically instructed in the use of particular 
points of view in observation. 

Borst made the pioneer attempt to educate individuals in 
the acts of observing and describing. Her experiments were 
conducted in the public schools of Zurich; her observers were 



Observational Learning 129 

sixteen pupils, six and seven years of age. The pupils were 
instructed to employ definite categories in observing. These 
categories were first explained clearly to the children who 
were then given practice in using them. The describing 
capacity of the unpracticed child was determined at the 
outset; this preliminary test was followed by practice experi- 
ments with pictures, all as nearly equally difficult as possible. 
Then the eft'ect of practice was tested by showing new pic- 
tures and noting the dift'erences in these later descriptions by 
the pupil. Three methods of education were employed: 
I. Method of general guidance. This consisted in teaching the 
children to employ particular points of view of observation 
and to make a systematic observation, from one point in 
the picture, of all the details from the different points of 
view which came into consideration. 2. MetJiod of raising 
the apperceptive masses. Here the children were made familiar, 
after the first experiment, with the sensory material to be 
observed; they were given formal instruction concerning 
colors, forms, relations of magnitude, etc., and concerning the 
naming of these impressions. 5. Method of influencing the 
will. Here an appeal was made to the feelings and the will 
of the observers; their interest was aroused, a desire to im- 
prove was inculcated, and especially was the feehng of respon- 
sibility intensified. 

A very definite improvement in description resulted from 
the third method. The first method actually impaired the 
reports, — a negative result which is to be explained from the 
fact that mere admonition to observe systematically from 
different points of view makes a severe demand upon chil- 
dren of this age, and from the fact that the experiments were 
not sufficiently long-continued. 

Experiments of the second sort were made in great numbers 
by Breukink. His method consisted in a frequent repetition 



130 The Psychology of Learning 

of tests in testimony with a great number and variety of 
educated and uneducated individuals, — nurses, students, 
teachers and instructors of school and university rank, 
together with their wives; and his material consisted of 
pictures which were projected upon a screen by means of a 
lantern. The object was to determine whether the later 
descriptions showed an improvement. The reliabiUty of 
testimony became greater and greater with the progress of 
the experiments; and Breukink assumes that this finding 
establishes the educabiUty of testimony. As a matter of 
fact, the factor at work was not education but practice in 
observing and describing; yet it is interesting to discover 
that practice improves these two functions. His experiments 
do not show us, however, what would be accomplished by 
children under similar conditions. Borst had already per- 
formed almost identical experiments with adults, and had 
concluded that a certain improvement in testimony can be 
attained in adults. 

Baade and Lipmann have since undertaken an investiga- 
tion of educabihty. Their method consisted in presenting a 
class demonstration of physical phenomena, and their ob- 
servers were children; their results proved to be essentially 
different from those of their predecessors. A simple physical 
phenomenon was demonstrated twice; after the first demon- 
stration the errors in the pupils' descriptions were pointed 
out, and the demonstration was then repeated. This feature 
of their method is open to objection because a stimulus lacks 
novelty when repeated; and this factor has a great influence 
upon the process of apperception in children, for which reason 
the second observation must of necessity be less accurate. 
Nor did it turn out that the testimony of the observers was 
improved by this second demonstration. This shows that 
improvement due to practice does not depend merely upon 



Observational Learning 131 

repetition, but may confidently be expected to occur only 
when the will to make a systematic improvement is aroused, 
and when a certain guidance as to how to improve by practice 
has been furnished, or when the (adult) observer can himself 
furnish that guidance. 

The child's capacity to observe has recently been investi- 
gated by Netschajeff and van der Torren. But their experi- 
ments, although of interest for the theory of observation, 
make no contribution to the technique of learning. 

Investigations of the descriptive powers of normal as com- 
pared with abnormal children have been undertaken by 
Ranschburg, Romer, Dosai-Revesz and Moravcsik. Here 
again it was found that immediate retention may be ''sur- 
prisingly good" in mental defectives where permanent reten- 
tion is seriously impaired; and that improvement in noting 
with increase of age reaches its limit at fourteen years in 
mental defectives, often reverting soon after the age of fif- 
teen to the level of the child of eleven or twelve years. 

It would be a matter of prime importance if these investi- 
gations of testimony could show us which factors in the act of 
observation are especially significant for retention. The more 
important results of these investigations have been included 
in the foregoing summary; but certain inferences which 
follow from these and other experiments may now be men- 
tioned. 

I. Investigations by means of the tachistoscope have given 
us a certain insight into the significance of the temporal 
factor, especially the significance of rapidity and brevity of 
perception, as well as the importance of repeated observa- 
tion. In these experiments, letters, syllables, numbers, simple 
geometrical figures, combinations of colors, or even complex 
pictures are observed under conditions of exceedingly brief 
presentation. The application of this experimental procedure 



132 The Psychology of Learning 

to the analysis of the act of reading is especially important; 
here the method usually consists in having the reader make 
repeated observations of a word or nonsense syllable which 
is presented for only an instant (about four or five one- 
thousandths of a second). The results of these experiments 
show that an exact visual fixation and a subjective prepara- 
tion of attention are of paramount significance for accuracy 
of observation; and that the observer must guard against 
too definite anticipation-ideas and against an assimilation of 
anticipation-ideas with incoming sense-impressions. The more 
the observer is inchned to expect a particular group of sense- 
impressions, — that is, the more definite the points of view 
from which he enters upon the observation, and the less 
capable he is of critically testing and inhibiting the assimila- 
tion of view-point and sensation, — the more inaccurate and 
treacherous will be his observation, a. All of these experi- 
ments show that we tend to incorporate our expectation- 
ideas into our perception of objects, and that these two sorts 
of mental content are more readily fused into a unitary whole 
when our anticipation-ideas are definite, when our perceptions 
are fleeting and indefinite, and when we fail to assume a critical 
attitude and to differentiate beweeen the subjective and the 
objective components of perception. Or in other words, the 
attainment of an accurate and objectively vahd perception 
depends rather upon the proper utiHzation than upon the 
mere presence of view-points of observation. We even find 
that those observers who rid themselves completely of all 
ideas of expectation observe more during an instantaneous 
exposure than those who have definite view-points, h. This 
is also borne out by the fact that we find two types of observer, 
—a subjective and an objective. The former type is inclined 
to blend expectation-ideas with sense-impressions, and in the 
subsequent elaboration of the impression, to interpret it by 



Observational Learning 133 

a process of guessing and conjecture. Then the product of 
his interpretation completely supplants what was actually 
seen ; and he finds it difficult or even impossible to distinguish 
his (objective) perception from his (subjective) interpreta- 
tion. The objective type of observer, on the contrary, makes a 
sharp distinction between what he has objectively perceived 
and what he has subjectively added to this datum. He is 
able to give an account of each of these components inde- 
pendently, and is, therefore, more cautious and conservative 
in the blending and interpreting of his sense-impressions. 

When the brief exposure of a visual object is repeated 
several times, we find that the single perceptions supplement 
and reinforce one another in part, but only in part. Supple- 
mentation and reinforcement seem to occur more readily in 
proportion as the single perceptions were accurate, and in 
proportion as the observer is convinced of their accuracy. 
The single perceptions reinforce one another less, the more 
fleeting and inaccurate and difficult they were, and the less 
subjective assurance attaches to them. Very fleeting percep- 
tions of the same object, for instance, of a word read by 
instantaneous exposure, often appear in successive observa- 
tions to be wholly discrete individual data, each coming to 
the observer as a new and original perception. 

2. Stern believes that accuracy in observation and descrip- 
tion depends chiefly upon the objective-point toward which 
the observer's interest is directed. Interest attaches, in the 
main, to persons; and in consequence, the reliability of 
spontaneous testimony concerning persons is especially great. 
It is also true that in testimony obtained by cross-examination 
the reliability is especially high when persons are concerned. 
And not only are things attended to more spontaneously 
than properties and relations of things, but the former are 
retained better than the latter. Spatial relations are attended 



134 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

to more spontaneously than colors; statements regarding 
colors are much less reliable than statements concerning 
spatial relations. Numerical relations are but little heeded, 
and testimony regarding them is correspondingly unreliable. 
If this result were confirmed it would show that a. the 
selection of that which is to be observed and remembered is 
determined by the interest and by the dominant direction 
of will; and that this is just what is best imprinted upon 
memory and best retained. Interest then seems to be a 
fundamental condition not only of attention but of memory 
as well. h. It appears that every observer adopts a proced- 
ure of critical selection among the observed data during the 
act of observation itself; this selection is not by any means 
determined exclusively by the view-point of observation, but 
chiefly by the unconscious participation of his evaluation of 
these view-points. Even the individual whose point of view 
consists in a desire to observe colors pays more attention to 
spatial relations, notwithstanding his point of view, because 
he regards spatial relations as being more important; and they 
therefore imprint themselves indehbly upon him. In numer- 
ous experiments I have found that observers continually 
assume and employ such view-points of value; especially do 
they fail to observe what seems to them to be superfluous or 
valueless, and yet their view-points of value may never 
come clearly to their consciousness, c. This dimly conscious 
evaluating of view-points of observation extends its influence 
even to remembering, and in a two-fold manner: indirectly, 
because we observe in accordance with our evaluation; and 
directly, in that a similar selection of data takes place also in 
our remembering where that which seems to be least valuable 
remains relatively unheeded and is least likely to be recalled. 
This explains the phenomenon that, in consequence of the 
extension of our knowledge, a datum may sometimes become 



Observational Learning 135 

more valuable than it formerly was, and we now attempt 
with all our power to recall it accurately to memory and fix it 
there, d. Interest or the ascription of values which plays a 
leading role in observational memory and testimony exerts 
a two-fold influence: advantageous, in so far as observation 
and memory are promoted in the direction of interest; dis- 
advantageous, in so far as it produces an inclination to make 
too many statements from the chosen point of view. Apper- 
ception may then become so abundant as to stifle observation 
and remembrance. For this reason, spontaneous testimony 
usually errs in the direction of the prevailing interests. Stern 
refers to these as errors of interest; he distinguishes them 
from errors of indifference which occur in cross-examination, 
and insists that the two sorts of errors are due to different 
causes. In his opinion, errors of interest owe their origin to 
a too broad and many-sided interest which encroaches upon 
the domain of the actually observed data. On the other 
hand, the typical errors which occur during interrogation 
are errors of indifference because they originate in a too slight 
intensity of interest; they owe their origin to the fact that 
the observer fails to make a critical distinction between what 
he remembers and what he does not remember. From this 
we see how careful one must be in arousing children's interests 
in particular view-points of observation, because by means 
of these may be produced an increase in the amount of de- 
scription at the expense of its accuracy. Here again we find 
that the essential thing is not merely to inculcate a point of 
view of observation, and to arouse the child's interest in it; 
the chief desideratum consists in inculcating a proper method 
of utilizing the point of view. But this in turn depends 
chiefly upon two factors: the estabhshing of a point of view 
with adequate security, and holding to it persistently through- 
out the analysis of the observed datum. To these two factors 



136 The Psychology of Learning 

may be added a third : When the preferred point of view is 
chosen we must learn to make a critical discrimination be- 
tween the objective datum and our subjective contribution, 
between the component which we actually remember and the 
component which is a subjective supplement to the remem- 
brance. 

J. There is still a most important question to be consid- 
ered. In what manner do imagined components most readily 
come to preponderate over observed and remembered com- 
ponents? Rodenwaldt has justly remarked that, quite apart 
from the circumstance as to whether distinctively suggestive 
questions are asked, the mere interrogation itself constitutes 
a suggestion. Hence when observational noting is used in the 
school-room it is essential to bear in mind that even the form 
of the questions themselves may be very significant. Every 
question of the teacher exercises a certain suggestive influence 
upon the pupil, an influence which may be conveyed through 
vocal inflection, through the grammatical form of the ques- 
tion, etc. Stern fmds that the introduction of a ''not," — for 
example : "Was there not a stove in the picture? " — constitutes 
the essential form of suggestive questioning. We know also 
from the experiences of Stern, Binet and Henri, and others, 
that children show different types of suggestibiHty. An indi- 
vidual of one type is led by the suggestive question to correct 
his description, another hesitates in his description, another 
is inclined to modify his description in the direction of oppo- 
sition to the suggestion, and still another allows himself to 
be misled into giving a false description. All of this must 
be taken into account in teaching by means of observational 
noting. 

4. Interest in what is observed is by no means exclusively 
a practical interest; a very strong theoretical interest also 
makes itself felt. Regarding this point, my interpretation of 



Observational Learning 137 

Stern's results is somewhat different from that given by Stern 
himself. We find that those features which contribute to an 
understanding of the picture are especially observed in order 
that they may be elevated to view-points of observation and 
that they may be remembered better in consequence of this; 
while, on the other hand, that which is unessential for the 
understanding of the picture and the treatment of the situ- 
ation is readily overlooked. This explains the remarkable 
phenomenon that the dog is frequently omitted from the list 
of chief objects, although children have, as a general rule, an 
especially great interest in animals. The dog is not necessary 
for an understanding of the general situation, — the evening 
meal of the peasant family. In experiments where pictures 
were drawn from memory I have repeatedly found that that 
which is not necessary for an understanding of the situation 
is very frequently ignored. This shows that attention is not 
by any means controlled exclusively by practical but also by 
theoretical interests. We attend to that which makes things 
comprehensible to us, and to that which seems to be of value 
to us. 

5. In addition to these chief points, certain subordinate 
conclusions which have pedagogical significance may be drawn 
from these experiments. For instance, failure to note colors 
indicates that the color-sense is trained in an extremely defec- 
tive manner in modern teaching. Stern's results show that in 
spontaneous descriptions one-sixth of the statements regard- 
ing color are erroneous, while in interrogatory reports, one- 
half are erroneous. Observation of quantitative relations is 
equally in need of training; children must be drilled in quan- 
titative statement. Descriptions which involve number and 
quantity remain relatively imperfect even in the adult; and 
yet our observations of space and time attain definiteness 
only when subjected to quantitative statement. In the obser- 



138 The Psychology of Learning 

vation of the temporal relations of actions and movements it is 
particularly important to train the eye and the attention in 
the noting of brief and constantly changing processes. Lip- 
mann found that descriptions of conditions contained less 
than one per cent, of error, while descriptions of actions con- 
tained more than twenty-five per cent, of error. 

6. We shall quote only one of the results obtained by 
Stern in his investigation of the correlation between age and 
efficiency in observational noting. He found that spontaneous 
observation shows an extraordinary increase in volume with 
increasing age of the child. Spontaneous description more 
than doubles in amount between the ages of seven and four- 
teen, and it increases almost three-fold between seven and 
nineteen, while the total amount of description increases by 
fifty per cent, up to the fourteenth year, and in subsequent 
years does not increase at all. Hence, as Stern says, the in- 
crease of spontaneity in observing and noting is one of the 
most essential characteristics of mental development. More- 
over, it manifests itself also in increasing power to resist 
suggestion, — that is, the more his spontaneous observation 
increases in amount, the less is the observer open to suggestive 
influence. 

If now we bear in mind how significant for the child is his 
spontaneous, independent and active observation of what he 
sees for himself, we shall again realize that the attention may 
develop of itself in this direction. What it needs is not aid 
in the discovery of points of view, but rather guidance in the 
proper and systematic utilization of its point of view. 



CHAPTER V 

ASSOCIATIVE learning: the technique and economy of 

— LEARNING 

In observational noting we employ sense-perception as the 
primary and essential means of imprinting material upon 
consciousness; an acquisition of the content of perception is 
here the real goal of our endeavor. But in memorization or 
in learning in the narrower sense, our procedure is wholly 
different. It is true that the material to be learned is still 
presented in the form of sensory stimuli; and we may still 
speak of visual, auditory, motor and other forms of presenta- 
tion, a. But in learning, sense-perception is no longer the 
essential means employed in the mental acquisition of the 
material. It is only the external point of contact with the 
material; and the objects of perception, — the letters and 
words which we see and hear, — serve only as symbols which 
designate meanings. They are stimuli which arouse in us a 
mental reproduction of the meanings which have become 
associated with them. b. Sense-perception no longer serves 
for an acquisition of contents of perception but contents of 
ideas, for it is meaning-contents with which we are now con- 
cerned, c. In consequence of this, sense-perception now ful- 
fils the function not of painstaking observation but only of 
hasty impression; and we seek to apprehend its content with 
just sufficient accuracy to insure the arousal of the appro- 
priate ideas, d. For this reason, attention is directed not to 
the letters and words which constitute the contents of per- 
ception, but to the meanings which they convey, e. In the 
act of learning, the will is not directed upon the imprinting 

139 



140 The Psychology of Learning 

of the contents of perception, but upon an understanding 
and retention of the meanings of these contents. /. The 
memorial result, — the retention and reproduction of meanings, 
—is dependent not upon a perception of the letters and the 
words but upon wholly different factors, — upon the under- 
standing of the trains and contexts of ideas, and upon repeat- 
edly running through the series of ideas which the objective 
symbols arouse in us. 

All of this makes true learning a radically different sort of 
mental function from observational noting. Hence even in 
the school-room, observational noting is treated as a wholly 
different sort of task from learning; and in psychological 
experimentation, also, the investigation of learning is assigned 
to a special group of experiments to which the rather inappro- 
priate name of memory experiments is usually given. Fol- 
lowing the classification of memory functions which we 
have already made, we shall refer to them as experiments in 
learning. 

Between the observational noting of sensory impressions 
and the associative learning of coherent contexts of words 
and ideas there stands, as a transition stage, a function which 
comes into operation in teaching more fiequently than any 
other, — the immediate retention of trains of ideas in which, 
as a rule, words serve as bearers and vehicles of meanings. 
This function comes into operation in the dictating of words, 
numbers and sentences, in questions, in mental calculations, 
in every form of discourse and response. These materials 
must always be held in consciousness until such time has 
elapsed as is necessary for the apprehension of the context of 
ideas. As a matter of fact, the chief process involved here is 
the apprehension of the connected trains of ideas; but this 
is rendered possible only through the agency of immediate 
retention, which brings about a fixation of ideas by means of 



Associative Learning 141 

attention. This activity, in turn, differs from observational 
noting and from real repetitive learning. It differs from the 
former in that the attention is not directed upon sense- 
impressions which are here only a means to the apprehension 
of trains of ideas; and from the latter in that the intention 
here is not to produce a memorial result, — permanent reten- 
tion, — but only a perceptual result, — a mere grasping by 
apprehension. And whatever memorial result, — immediate 
retention, — is attained, serves only as a means to an end, — the 
end being the act of apprehension. 

The experimental investigations which have a bearing upon 
this mental function in pupils have dealt chiefly with the 
immediate retention of words, letters, syllables, words and 
numbers, words arranged in incoherent groups, sentences, 
stanzas and parts of stanzas of poetry, groups of names and 
dates, lists of words with their equivalents from another lan- 
guage, and the like. 

The most suitable method for the investigation of this 
function is the one which I have already referred to as the 
"method of immediate retention." It would be better to 
give it another name since immediate retention is itself the 
object of the investigation. English authors have spoken of 
it as "prehension"; and Pohlmann has translated this term 
"span of memory." I shall call it the method of single 
memory-span because I am accustomed to think of a span as 
a spatial extent and not as a process or activity. ^ When we 
determine how many letters can be retained after a single 

^ Ebbinghaus calls it the "method of remembered items," but this 
term is misleading, because it conveys the impression that the observer 
is always called upon to remember isolated items; and we shall see 
that he much more frequently endeavors to remember the total impres- 
sion and to retain the items only as component parts of the total 
impression. Cf. H. Ebbinghaus, Psychologic, I., 646. 
11 



142 The Psychology of Learning 

presentation, and carry the test through successively with 
gradually increasing numbers of letters until the Kmit of 
prehension is reached, we may be said to be stretching the 
memory as though it were a spring, and measuring its span 
or power of expansion. 

The appUcation of the method of single memory span has 
been developed in various directions. Binet and Henri pre- 
sented a uniform number of words (seven) to their observers 
and had them write all that were retained. I have preferred 
the successive method, presenting three, four, five items, 
successively and continuing until I reached the limit beyond 
which the observer could no longer reproduce without error, 
or until one-third, or one-half of the items were lacking in the 
reproduction. If it is desired to employ the method in full 
completeness, all possible methods of presentation must be 
employed, — auditory, visual, auditory-motor with vocaliza- 
tion by the observer, and visual auditory-motor with vocaliza- 
tion and visuaHzation by the observer, etc. ; and various sorts 
of material must be presented, — nonsense syllables, signifi- 
cant words, numbers, concrete objects, and words of variable 
meaning, — in order to test the influence of verbal meaning 
upon immediate retention. Different tests of reproduction 
must also be introduced, — recognition, comparison with new 
stimuli, selection, reconstruction of a presented series when 
the items are re-presented, oral and written reproduction.^ 

Several of the results of these experiments are of value for 
pedagogy and for an economy of memory. The sort of 
material presented is of great influence upon immediate 
retention. In my experiments, nonsense material, particularly 
nonsense syllables, was retained much less perfectly than 
material which has meaning; but nonsense syllables were 

^ For a summary of methods of testing memory see A. Pohlmann, 
Experimenklle Beitr'dge zur Lehre vom Ged'dchtnis, Berlin, 1906, 2ff. 



Associative Learning 143 

retained better than mere groups of letters. Children from 
seven to nine years of age usually have an immediate reten- 
tion of only two, at most, three nonsense syllables. In order 
to avoid repetition I shall here mention no other results of 
these investigations, and shall refer the reader to my later 
discussion of the efficiency of memory in children. Regard- 
ing the pedagogical bearing of these results the following 
statement may be made. An especially important question 
to be considered is: In how far is immediate retention aided 
by meaning, or by an understanding of the material? Binet 
and Henri found that the retention of words which had been 
noted as parts of a sentence is very much more perfect than 
the retention of isolated words. When a list of seven isolated 
words was presented, only five of them were correctly repro- 
duced, on the average; but of a sentence containing thirty- 
eight words, which readily fell into seventeen logically con- 
nected groups, fifteen groups were reproduced; and of a 
sentence whose seventy-four words fell into twenty-four 
groups, eighteen groups were reproduced. In Ebert and Meu- 
mann's experiments practiced observers succeeded in cor- 
rectly reproducing sentences of thirty-six words. In my own 
experiments with several hundred children in the public 
schools, I employed, in a first series, simple words of every- 
day use; and in a second series, unfamiliar abstract terms. 
The understanding of the meaning of the words proved to 
have a marked influence upon retention. Words whose 
meanings were readily understood were much better retained 
than difficult or unintelligible words. ^ 

The method of presenting the material is also of influence. 
One must be cautious, however, in drawing conclusions as to 
the effect of presentation in immediate retention, from experi- 

' E. Meumann, Intelligenzpriifungcn an Kindern der Volksschule, 
Zeitschr.J. exp. Padagogik, I., 1905, 35-101. 



144 The Psychology of Learning 

merits on lasting retention where real learning is concerned 
because the process of apprehension operates under wholly 
different conditions in the two cases. From comparative 
experiments I have found it impossible to state that any par- 
ticular method of presentation is, in all cases, the most favor- 
able for immediate reproduction. The advantages accruing 
to any particular method depend, in pa^t, upon the sort of 
material presented, in part, upon the ideational type of the 
observer, and in part, upon the mode of presentation itself. 
This may be illustrated from the experimental literature. 
Pohlmann ^ repeated the experiments of Binet and Henri and 
found that in the presentation of isolated words the tempo 
of speech is an important factor, especially with individuals 
of the visual type. We shall see presently that persons who 
make use of visual imagery in their thinking develop any 
given train of ideas less rapidly than individuals of the audi- 
tory type; and this is especially true when the former are 
obliged to transform the auditory images of the presented 
words into visual images. In conformity with this, Pohlmann 
found that an observer of the visual type is hampered in his 
visualizing by a rapid auditory presentation of the words. ^ 
The observer from whom this result was obtained reported 
the following introspection: ''During the auditory presenta- 
tion of the words I endeavor to apprehend them in visual 
form also. I do not succeed, however, with more than the 
first half of the series because they are read to me too rapidly; 
I usually succeed only with about the first three or four words. 
In the reproduction which immediately follows, I have more 
confidence in dealing with these first few words; and I repro- 
duce the latter part of the series solely by means of the rapidly 
fading auditory image." I have frequently obtained similar 
introspections from observers of the visual type. We see 
^ A. Pohlmann, Op. cit., yiff. ^ A. Pohlmann, Op. cit., 73. 



Associative Learning 145 

from this that in auditory presentation every tempo is not 
appropriate to every type of imagery. For persons of the 
auditory type a relatively rapid tempo is more advantageous. 
For visuaHzers a slow tempo is necessary if their visual images 
are to assume distinct and definite form; and only when this 
condition is fulfilled can their ideation be clear and definite. 

Pohlmann devoted a special investigation to the problem: 
Do individuals actually have accurate and distinct images of 
the concrete contents of words? He found that this is not 
invariably the case. ^ This result was to be expected from 
our knowledge of the psychology of thinldng by means of 
words; for even in ordinary speaking the concrete word- 
meanings come to us in extremely fleeting and transitory 
fashion. This question, however, is wholly different from the 
one mentioned above, namely: Is the retention of words 
aided by an understanding of their meaning? We may 
understand the meaning of the words without bringing their 
concrete idea-contents clearly to consciousness; indeed, in 
ordinary reading and speaking, and especially in rapid reading 
and speaking, we normally have the sense of the words dis- 
tinctly before us although the detailed idea-content is present 
only in vague and fleeting fashion. The possession of a clear 
understanding of the meaning of a word presupposes only 
that we have made the verbal meaning clear to consciousness 
at some former time; it subsequently comes up in more and 
more vague form. And what we have present to conscious- 
ness is only the logical and associative relations of one word 
to others. 

A further pedagogical significance attaches to a charac- 
teristic feature of immediate retention, which consists in the 
fact that all verbal and ideational material which has been 
heard but once soon disappears again from consciousness; 
' A. Pohlmann, Op. cit., 77 and 79. 



146 The Psychology of Learning 

and indeed under certain circumstances it is almost immedi- 
ately forgotten. If we dictate to an observer a series of words 
whose number is about the limit of his capacity of immediate 
retention, and if after the presentation there should occur a 
distraction, it frequently happens that the whole list of words 
is forgotten forthwith. 

The rapidity of this forgetting is increased by various fac- 
tors which occasionally cooperate. Words which have been 
presented orally disappear more rapidly from consciousness 
under the following circumstances: a. When they have not 
been clearly apprehended. Words which have not been 
heard distinctly or which are not accurately transformed by 
the observer into his own typical sort of imagery disappear 
most readily from consciousness, h. When the meaning of 
the word is not at once apparent to the observer. Thus it 
frequently happens that dull pupils cannot answer questions 
for the simple reason that they do not fully understand the 
words employed; and in consequence, their immediate reten- 
tion is unable to hold the question in consciousness. On 
account of this fading of their ideas from consciousness they 
find it impossible to reflect upon the question. This consti- 
tutes a reason for the frequent repetition of questions and for 
the asking of incidental and subordinate questions. Miiller 
and Pilzecker have shown that homogeneous reproduction- 
tendencies reinforce one another. This furnishes a psycho- 
logical justification for the repeating and the supplementing 
of questions by the teacher, because these two expedients re- 
inforce and strengthen the reproduction tendencies possessed 
by similar verbal material and similar idea groups, c. The 
effect of fatigue must also be mentioned here. The compass 
of immediate retention decreases rapidly when the observer 
is mentally fatigued, a phenomenon which is due to his un- 
favorable physiological disposition. I once had my own im- 



Associative Learning 147 

mediate retention tested at a time when I was very much 
fatigued, and was obliged to discontinue the test because the 
compass of my retention was so abnormally small. 

The amount of material which is presented for immediate 
retention is an influential factor in determining the individ- 
ual's capacity. The presentation of too many letters^ or 
words may confuse the pupil and give rise to an inhibition of 
attention, which in turn brings about a complete forgetting 
of the presented data. Hence it frequently happened that 
pupils who retained the complete list of seven words were 
able to reproduce only one or two words when the list was 
increased to eight. In such cases the attention follows the 
presentation only up to a certain point; then the observer 
suddenly becomes aware of the fact that he is unable to 
follow so many words. And the consciousness of this fact 
immediately has a debilitating effect upon his retention, and 
even drives out the words which he has already imprinted 
upon his memory. ' This is a phenomenon which has frequently 
been referred to as retroactive inhibition. 

A further question which is equally important for pedagogy 
and for psychology concerns the influence exerted upon 
immediate retention by the mode of presentation employed. 
The pedagogical importance of this question is due to the 
fact that the teacher has to deal at every turn with the influ- 
ence of different methods of presentation; and this influence 
may vary greatly with variation in the sort of material pre- 
sented, and in the age and endowment of the pupil. The 
question is important psychologically because it shows us in 
how far the internal attitude and subjective procedure of a 
person, particularly his operations with different memory 
elements, are influenced by the mode of presentation or by 

* E. Meumann, Intelligenzpriifungen an Kindern der Volksschule, 
Zeitschr. f. exp. P'ddagogik, I., 1905, 35-101. 



148 The Psychology of Learning 

the sort of stimuli employed. It cannot therefore surprise 
us when we learn that numerous authors have turned their 
attention to this problem. Various points of view must be 
taken into consideration in discussing the methods of present- 
ing material for immediate retention, as for example, the point 
of view as to whether it is better to question or to develop, 
as to the effects of description and narration, etc. These 
questions concerning the form of teaching have scarcely been 
approached as yet in pedagogic-psychological investigations. 
Experimenters have been concerned rather with another 
point of view, — that of "mode of sensory presentation," or 
more strictly speaking, with the question: What effect has 
the dominant sort of stimulus, by means of which the material 
is presented to the pupil, upon his capacity to reproduce imme- 
diately? Several possibilities come in for consideration here: 

1. The several parts of the material may be presented 
simultaneously or successively, but, since the auditory organ 
receives all of its stimuli successively, this distinction can be 
carried through only in the case of visual presentation, and, 
to some extent, with tactual presentation. 

2. The material may be presented to one or to several 
senses simultaneously. It may be perceived simply by means 
of the visual, or the auditory, or the tactual, or the kinass- 
thetic sense. Or it may be presented simultaneously to the 
eye and the ear by a method of exposing and pronouncing; 
simultaneously to the visual and motor senses, by having 
the observer make appropriate muscular movements of speak- 
ing, writing, etc., during the exposure; simultaneously to the 
auditory and motor senses, by a combination of pronouncing 
by the experimenter and by the observer; simultaneously to 
the visual, auditory and motor senses, by a combined exposure 
and dictating by the experimenter and pronouncing by the 
observer. 



Associative Learning 149 

J. We must not fail to bear in mind that the method of 
presentation does not by any means determine the method 
which will be adopted by the observer in his perception and 
apprehension of the material. This latter is a joint product 
of the mode of presentation and of the ideational type of the 
observer. If we present any material orally to a number of 
pupils, only those who belong to the pure auditory type will 
apprehend it in terms of auditory images; the visuaHzers will, 
so far as possible, transform it into visual images, and the 
observers who belong to the auditory-motor type will pro- 
nounce the words to themselves during the presentation. 

One of the chief obstacles to an accurate investigation of the 
effect of different modes of presentation is due to this circum- 
stance; and it is an obstacle which is exceedingly difficult 
to overcome in class-experiments in the schools. In such ex- 
periments, a variety of ideational types is always present; 
and hence we can never know to what extent the method of 
acquisition and of reproduction conforms with the method 
of presentation. The mode of acquisition and reproduction 
may perhaps always be regarded as a compromise between 
the ideational type and the mode of presentation. 

A second difficulty in these experiments is solely a matter 
of method. The experimenter always finds himself con- 
fronted by two alternatives in his choice of method. He may 
present his material exactly or approximately as is done in 
the ordinary work of the school-room; or he may arrange 
to restrict his observer to the use of but a single sense-depart- 
ment in the acquisition and retention of the material. In 
the former case, we find it impossible to isolate the mental 
effect of the various sorts of sensory presentation in any def- 
inite fashion, because when we dictate the list of words we 
leave the observer free to pronounce them to himself or not 
as he will; hence we have no guarantee that particular mental 



1 50 The Psychology of Learning 

processes are isolated by the pupil in any such fashion as 
the experiment demands. If the second alternative be 
chosen, the presentation shows a wide departure from the 
ordinary procedure of the school-room; but an insight is 
obtained into the manner in which particular sensory-motor 
processes operate in memory. The former method of con- 
ducting the investigation, if employed exclusively, has the 
advantage of being able to show us how the several modes 
of presentation really affect persons of different imaginal 
endowment; but it admits of no unequivocal interpretation 
of the experimental results. The second method assures an 
unequivocal interpretation, but it leaves us uncertain as to 
whether our findings may be applied to the practical work of 
the school-room. It seems to follow, then, that the only way 
to reach a definite solution of our problem is to employ a 
combination of the two modes of procedure. Segal ^ has 
recently attempted to make a complete separation between 
the various ''sense-memories" in different methods of pres- 
entation; but I cannot wholly accept his results for the 
reason that his observers were too few in number. More- 
over, I have myself employed Segal's method on numerous 
occasions, and shall speak of it elsewhere. Segal is the only 
author who has published any experimental data dealing 
with the behavior of the different ideational types when 
material is presented to them which may be reproduced in 
various ways. How, for example, does the visualizer proceed 
when he is asked to reproduce purely auditory material, such 
as simple tones? What is the procedure of an individual of 
the auditory type when he is called upon to reproduce colors? 
How do the two of them proceed when they are obliged to 
retain and to reproduce words which have been presented by 

^ J. Segal, Ueber den Reproduktionstypus und das Reproduzieren 
von Vorstellungen, Archiv. f. d. gesamte Psychol., XII., 1908, 124-236. 



Associative Learning 151 

various methods and which may be reproduced in various 
forms? These preHminary questions must be answered before 
we can reach a definite interpretation of the experimental 
findings which deal with the various methods of presenting 
memory material. 

All of the investigations which have been undertaken in 
this field suffer from either of the defects which we have 
mentioned; and numerous other objections may be urged 
against them. An insufficient number of observers has been 
employed; and the investigations have been limited, in a 
one-sided fashion, to collective (class-room) experiments. Only 
by combining the class experiment with the individual exper- 
iment can we ever attain to a satisfactory interpretation of 
results. 

The most extensive experimental attempt to answer our 
questions with school-children has been made by Pohlmann. 
This investigator employed familiar significant material, — 
two-syllable names of concrete objects, and concrete objects 
themselves. He made use of six methods of presentation: 
I. He presented the objects visually, — key, funnel, sugar, 
purse, mirror, candle, etc. 2. He presented the objects vis- 
ually and at the same time pronounced their names, j. He 
pronounced the names alone. 4. He presented the names 
visually. 5. He combined the visual and the auditory pres- 
entation of the names. 6. He combined the visual presen- 
tation of the names with pronunciation by the observer. 
Ten words and ten objects were employed. His observers 
were pupils from nine to fourteen years of age, ten of each 
age, making a total of sixty observers. The stimuli were 
presented but once; and they were reproduced immediately 
in writing. The experiments were, therefore, an investiga- 
tion of immediate retention. 

Pohlmann found that the retention of objects is much 



152 The Psychology of Learning 

more successful than that of words, — a phenomenon which 
has a direct bearing upon the use of demonstration material 
in teaching. The results with auditory presentation were, 
on the average, much better than with visual presentation; 
and auditory-visual-motor presentation gave the poorest 
results of all. Pohlmann adds: "Under the conditions of 
my experiments, the participation of the motor function 
influenced the results unfavorably, for the purely auditory- 
visual method of presentation was much more effective." 

Data obtained from such group investigations as these are 
of relatively slight significance because the much more impor- 
tant individual results are obscured by being incorporated 
into a total mass. These results show, however, that the 
superiority of auditory presentation holds only in the lower 
classes of the schools; beyond the intermediate classes visual 
presentation gradually gains the ascendency and in the upper 
classes the relations are reversed, visual presentation being 
more advantageous here. 

This state of affairs is undoubtedly a product of the pre- 
vailing methods of teaching, because instruction is addressed 
more to the ear in the case of younger pupils, while, in the 
case of older pupils, the visual sense is more concerned. Pohl- 
mann^ also investigated the comparative retention of words 
and of concrete objects, for intervals of twenty-four hours 
and three days. Here again it turns out that the best results 
are obtained with objects, words being forgotten much more 
readily. For the retention of words, the visual-auditory- 
motor is again the least effective mode of presentation, and 
the auditory- visual the most effective; the purely auditory 
method stands intermediate between these two extremes, 
with visual presentation but little superior to the auditory- 
visual-motor method. 

^ A. Pohlmann, Op. cit., 150-157. 



Associative Learning 153 

Pohlmann concludes from these results " that the weaken- 
ing effect of time is considerably greater in the case of verbal 
than of concrete presentation," an inference which is not 
only justified by his results, but which is also of practical 
significance to the teacher. 

When the same material was presented three times, instead 
of once, as in the experiments described above, the best reten- 
tion was found to follow from auditory-visual and purely 
auditory presentation. 

A wholly different state of affairs is revealed by the use of 
unfamiliar and non-significant material. Pohlmann investi- 
gated the immediate retention of nonsense syllables and found 
that visual presentation now has a decided advantage over 
all other methods, a result which my own experiments have 
confirmed. I beheve that the chief reason for this is to be 
found in the fact that in the purely auditory apprehension 
of unfamiliar words it is difficult to analyze the syllables into 
their phonetic elements. The sound elements of words are 
much more arbitrarily constituted than the visual elements; 
and moreover the phonetic analysis must here be carried over 
into the visual elements of the written words. Pohlmann 
believes that auditory presentation makes a stronger appeal 
to the attention; and that when articulation is clear and 
distinct, the auditory word is more "penetrating" than the 
visual. I have no faith in this doctrine of "penetrative 
power" of sense impressions, as formulated by G. E. Miiller* 
it has received no confirmation from the experimental inves- 
tigation of attention. 

In additional experiments, where numbers were employed 
as stimuli, Pohlmann again found visual presentation to be 
more advantageous than auditory. 

When he varied the rate of presentation it was found that 
an increased rapidity of pronunciation weakens the retention 



154 The Psychology of Learning 

considerably; but the relative effects of the several modes of 
presentation were here but little changed. 

Pohlmann obtained a remarkable result in his experiments 
in a girls' school, where visual presentation proved to be more 
advantageous even for familiar material. Does this indicate 
that girls (and women) are more dominantly visual than 
boys? Or is it due, as Pohlmann believes, to the fact that a 
more frequent appeal is made to the visual sense by teachers 
in girls' schools? 

This investigator's results throw light upon the differences 
which are due to successive and to simultaneous presentation 
of visual material. Muensterberg and Bigham had found 
that simultaneous presentation is more favorable to reproduc- 
tion; while Hawkins reports that "young pupils are not able 
to imprint so much material upon memory in simultaneous 
presentation as in successive." Pohlmann^ discovered in 
agreement with Hawkins, that "average results show suc- 
cessive presentation to be, on the whole, more advantageous 
for memory." This is probably to be explained from the 
fact that the function of attention was regulated better here 
than where several stimuli were present at the same time. 

Pohlmann's experiments are unquestionably of great ped- 
agogical value. Above all else, they show us the importance 
of methods of presentation for different sorts of material. They 
do not, however, furnish a final verdict concerning our prob- 
lem, because they fail to provide for a complete separation of 
the component processes which constitute apprehension. With 
regard to this matter, Pohlmann misinterprets his experimen- 
tal findings. Thus he maintains, for instance, in opposition 
to W. A. Lay, that an inhibition of vocalization by holding 

^ C. J. Hawkins, Experiments on Memory Types, Psychol. Review, 
IV., 1897, 292. A. Pohlmann, Experimentclle Bcitr'dge zur Lehre vom 
Ged'dchtnis, Berlin, 1906, 181. , 



Associative Learning 155 

the tongue pressed against the teeth is a distracting factor. 
I am convinced, as a result of numerous controlled experi- 
ments, that pupils become accustomed to this unusual con- 
dition after a few experiments; and with most pupils it does 
not constitute a distraction. The final verdict as to the value 
of different methods of presentation cannot be rendered until 
the conditions of experimentation, which I mentioned above, 
are fulfilled. Regarding Pohlmann's own pedagogical infer- 
ences it may be said that, in agreement with myself, he holds 
that in the treatment and evaluation of pupils their ideational 
types must be taken into account, but not in teaching itself, 
because every pupil should be trained to work with methods 
of presentation which are not the most convenient for him. 
And since visual presentation has been shown to be especially 
advantageous with unfamiliar words, Pohlmann correctly 
infers that visual presentation has great significance in the 
teaching of foreign languages; and that the purely auditory 
method or vocal method, which is now being recommended, 
is one-sided and unwarranted. 

Let us now consider real learning by means of repetition, 
or learning in the narrower sense, together with its conditions 
and its technique. 

The whole doctrine of the conditions and methods of learn- 
ing is based upon the experimental investigation of memory. 
These investigations have undertaken to make a quantitative 
determination of memorial function in order by tliis means to 
obtain a clear insight into the conditions which are favorable 
and unfavorable to memorial activity. There are two chief 
starting-points from which the function of memory may be 
investigated, i. We may investigate learning in the nar- 
rower sense of learning by rote, — or, to express it in psycho- 
logical terms, the formation of lasting associations between 
ideas, and chiefly between verbal ideas. In our attack upon 



156 The Psychology of Learning 

this problem, we determine what is the effect of association 
upon acquisition and retention; that is, the effect of learning 
is tested and determined quantitatively in various cases, — 
and we investigate the learning process itself, or the formation 
of associations in the process of learning. Only by means of 
such a quantitative determination can we compare the influ- 
ences exerted by the various factors and conditions of learn- 
ing; for so long as we are restricted to mere description, — 
and description in such indefinite terms as "better" or "not 
so good," — of the result of learning or the accuracy of reten- 
tion, an exact comparison of the results of the various con- 
ditions of learning is impossible. 

Not only is it possible to investigate the reproduction which 
is due to a process of learning, but the reproduction of 
those ideas which are not the product of a deliberate 
formation of associations, — the free flow of ideas, — has also 
been opened up to experimental investigation. The repro- 
duction of the free flow of ideas has been investigated 
by Galton, by Wundt and his pupils, by Ziehen, and more 
recently by the Wiirzburg group of psychologists and by the 
present writer. But it is to Ebbinghaus that we owe the 
first development of the methods by means of which learn- 
ing, — the real function of memory,— is investigated experi- 
mentally. Notwithstanding many improvements which have 
been added to the methods of Ebbinghaus, especially by G. E. 
Milller and his school, the measurement of memory remains 
essentially the same in principle to this day. And it was 
Ebbinghaus, too, who obtained the pioneer results in the 
experimental psychology of memory.^ 

The methods which Ebbinghaus introduced for the inves- 
tigation of memory may be made clear by the following con- 
siderations. In the investigation of any memory function, 

^ The reader is referred to the Bibliography at the end of this volume. 



Associative Learning 157 

such as the memorization of any simple material, we must 
fulfil two prime conditions. On the one hand, the external 
and internal conditions of the act of learning must be kept 
as constant as possible throughout, and they must be under 
the control of the experimenter; at the same time, they must 
be so chosen that not only the conditions themselves, but also 
the effect of the learning may be capable of being determined 
quantitatively. On the other hand, the material to be learned 
must present a uniform degree of difficulty throughout its 
whole content. If, for example, we wish to determine what 
is the relative influence exerted upon the learning and reten- 
tion of a poem by number of repetitions and by concentration 
of attention, and particularly to what extent an increased 
concentration of attention may result in decreasing the num- 
ber of repetitions, it is necessary that we make a comparison 
of the processes of acquisition in at least two cases. In the 
first case, we heap up the repetitions and pay no particular 
heed to the intensity of concentration; in the second case, 
we endeavor to limit the repetitions to as small a number as 
possible, striving to compensate the decrease in number of 
repetitions by an increased intensity of concentration. We 
shall see later that the effect upon memory is different in the 
two cases. But if we wish to determine exactly what part 
of the resulting effect upon memory is due to attention and 
what to number of repetitions, it is absolutely essential that 
all of the internal and external conditions of learning, save 
only the two which we have varied dehberately, should have 
remained constant throughout. Or in other words, all other 
factors of learning excepting only these two must remain 
unchanged throughout. For not until these conditions have 
been fulfilled can we say, for instance, that the better reten- 
tion in the case of the more frequent repetitions is to be 

regarded as a product solely of this one changed condition 
13 



158 The Psychology of Learning 

of learning. For this reason, the stanzas of poetry must 
have been equally difficult in the two cases; because if we 
do not fulfil this requirement, it is wholly impossible to deter- 
mine exactly what was the effect of the changed condition 
of learning. If, then, we are to obtain really comparative 
results, it is essential that we should employ material which 
presents a uniform degree of difficulty throughout. The 
internal conditions under which the observer works must also 
remain constant. It is necessary therefore to preserve a 
constancy and uniformity of bodily and mental vigor, of 
psychophysical disposition, of inclination to learn, of emo- 
tional tone, of attention, and of interest in the material. If 
this should prove to be impossible, we must record the fluc- 
tuations and subsequently attempt to evaluate them and to 
utilize them in the interpretation of such variations as may 
have occurred in our results. Variation in internal conditions 
and particularly the variable influence of distractions may 
be excluded by an appropriate arrangement of our experi- 
mental conditions. By means of the latter, we are able also 
to control the external conditions of learning. For this 
reason, experiments should always be made at the same hour 
of the day, in the quiet of the laboratory, and with only the 
experimenter and the observer present. One of the most 
important internal conditions consists in the fact that the 
degree of training or skill in learning the material selected 
should be the same in every observer who takes part in the 
investigation. For this reason, it is customary to devote a 
certain time to preliminary practice before the comparative 
experiments begin, and in this preliminary period to train 
the observer until the number of repetitions required for a 
given task of learning has become constant, from which we 
may infer that he has reached a state of maximum or approxi- 
mately maximum practice. 



Associative Learning 159 

As a result of his many years of experience in experimenta- 
tion, the psychologist is able to fulhl most of these require- 
ments. For instance, a constancy of attention may be 
facilitated either by habituating the observer to the condi- 
tions of the experiment, or by recourse to certain expedients 
in experimental procedure which aid one in obtaining a max- 
imum and uniform concentration of attention. If we arrange 
to have the learning done under adverse circumstances, for 
example, by exposing words and syllables for only an exceed- 
ingly brief period of time, the observer must either concen- 
trate his attention uniformly to its highest pitch in successive 
exposures, or he will completely fail to perform the task 
assigned to him. To be sure, our mental Hfe is subject to 
changing conditions of such extreme complexity that we 
cannot hope in every instance to obtain exactly the same re- 
sults from identical experimental conditions. For instance, 
if after having met all the requirements prescribed above we 
ask the observer to memorize stanzas of poetry on different 
days, and if the stanzas are selected as carefully as may be, 
to insure a uniform degree of difficulty, we shall still succeed 
only in very rare instances in finding that any given observer 
requires exactly the same amount of time and the same 
number of repetitions in his various memorizations. 

This obstacle is overcome by frequently repeating the same 
experiment and by striking an average from the results of 
all the experiments. We repeat each experiment on many 
different days, and take the arithmetical mean of the various 
experimental findings, or one of the other mean values in 
current use. It is well to bear in mind that such an average 
is justified only when the particular cases from which it was 
obtained "are effects of the same system of causes" (Ebbing- 
haus) ; but this identity of cooperating causes is just what is 
provided by our experimental conditions. 



i6o The Psychology of Learning 

Among the external conditions of memory measurement 
the choice of memorial material is of prime importance. 
I. The materials employed in any series of measurements 
must be of equal difficulty throughout. If we compare one 
stanza of a poem with another, we shall always find differ- 
ences in the construction of the sentences, in the diction, in 
the uniformity with which the logical context is distributed 
over the whole stanza, and the like, — variations which con- 
stitute a different degree of difficulty in the memorization of 
each stanza. This inequality is even greater in prose selec- 
tions, because these are still less uniform in their structure. 
Hence, strictly speaking, we should be obliged to perform 
our experiments in memory with an ideal material which is 
free from these irregular variations. 2. The material which 
we employ in the investigation of memory must, however, 
fulfil yet another condition; we must be able to manufac- 
ture it in great quantities because most memory experiments 
extend over weeks and months, and demand a new and 
equally difficult material for each day's experiments, j. The 
material must be capable of accurate quantitative grada- 
tion, because otherwise the memory function would not be 
quantitatively determinable in particular instances. 4. The 
material must be of such a character that the errors made in 
reproducing it may be enumerated, added, compared and 
otherwise submitted to systematic mathematical treatment. 
This requirement also is lacking in most school material, such 
as poems, prose selections, lists of words, etc. And finally, 
5., the material must, so far as possible, be so constituted 
that its elements have not already entered into associations 
with one another, in order that all associations may be formed 
during the course of the experimentation itself. 

It was such considerations as these which led Ebbing- 
haus in 1879 to the conviction that all memory experi- 



Associative Learning i6i 

ments should deal with an artificially constructed material 
which may be built up in accordance with a perfectly definite 
plan. 

A sharp distinction must be drawn between material which 
is a purely artificial product and that which results from the 
artificial transformation of such significant material as is to 
be found in the school-room. As material of the former sort 
Ebbinghaus chose nonsense syllables, which he constructed by 
inserting a vowel or diphthong between a pair of consonants, 
care being taken to avoid similarity with famiHar words of 
one's own or of a famiHar foreign language. Such material is 
illustrated by the following syllables: sef, naz, kug, rix, gan. 
Nonsense syllables such as these seem to provide ideal con- 
ditions for memory experiments for the reason that equally 
long series may be assumed to be equally difficult to learn (in 
experiments, series of twelve syllables are usually employed), 
and that by following the scheme of construction suggested 
by Miiller and Schumann a large supply of these syllables 
may be prepared. G. E. Miiller has composed 2,304 different 
syllables which are suitable for use. In general then we may 
say that the difficulty attaching to a series is measurable in 
terms of its length alone; and that therefore the number of 
syllables in the series expresses the amount of learning that 
is to be done. We shall find later that this statement must 
be quahfied. Then, too, nonsense syllables do not possess 
associations with other words as do the ordinary words of 
the language. Every error made in reproduction may readily 
be expressed quantitatively because of the uniform construc- 
tion of the syllables. Moreover, the syllables may be so 
chosen that difficulty of pronunciation is equally distributed 
over the various series, similar sounds which might aid mem- 
ory in unequal degree being avoided. The syllables have no 
internal bond of union, so that they may be assumed to make 



1 62 ' The Psychology of Learning 

a constant and uniform appeal throughout to attention, 
emotion and interest. 

And yet even this material is defective in certain respects. 
The observer's associations still read meaning into the sylla- 
bles occasionally; and a series in which this takes place is, of 
course, more readily learned. For several reasons, which 
cannot readily be explained, a series of nonsense syllables is 
sometimes found to be more easy or more difficult than usual. 
But we may observe that all these secondary expedients for 
retention, such as the formation of significant associations, 
gradually and invariably retreat to the background as the 
experiment progresses, and that most observers learn in a 
mechanical fashion. This material has only a modicum of 
meaning. Hence it can be used only for the investigation of 
mechanical learning; it is not appropriate for an investiga- 
tion of that type of learning which is aided by meaning. It 
is important, however, to determine the fundamental laws of 
memory for even this simplified type of mechanical learning. 
Indeed when a relatively simple material which can be learned 
mechanically is employed in experiments, the operation of 
the reproduction-tendencies of ideas appears even more dis- 
tinctly than when significant material is employed, because 
the various reproduction-tendencies may cut across one 
another and impede one another in the latter case. We shall 
see, however, that the extension of memory experiments to 
significant material has recently been found to be possible in 
increasing degree. 

Ebbinghaus's ^ procedure with nonsense syllables was as 
follows: Each series was memorized by repeatedly reading 
it aloud, from beginning to end, as a whole, — never in parts. 
Meanwhile he permitted a free alternation between reading 
and reciting from memory, for he experimented upon himself 
^ H. Ebbinghaus, Ueber das Gcd'dchtnis, Leipzig, 1885. 



Associative Learning 163 

alone. He controlled the rapidity of reading and reciting by 
speaking in a tempo of "150 beats to the minute," having 
previously practised this tempo with a metronome or a watch. 
He memorized rhythmically, grouping the syllables by threes 
and by fours and pronouncing the first, fourth, seventh, etc., 
— or the first, fifth, ninth, etc., with a moderate accentuation. 
He continued to learn until he was able to recite the series 
without error, stopping when he felt that he had memorized 
the material. We shall discuss his results presently. 

His initial experiments suffered from numerous defects, 
which he himself recognized in part. The first defect con- 
sisted in the fact that he served both as learner and as experi- 
menter. In consequence of this it was possible for precon- 
ceived opinions to influence his results; and the conduct of 
his experiments was also rendered more difficult. Nor were 
his lists of syllables free from objection. He determined to 
leave the construction of his series to chance; accordingly he 
wrote the syllables upon cards, shuffled the cards and selected 
at random from the pack. It must have happened that sig- 
nificant syllables appeared occasionally, or that successive 
syllables were similar in sound, etc. Then, too, Ebbinghaus 
simply read off the series of syllables which appeared upon 
the cards. This made it possible for his eye and his attention 
to sweep back over the parts which he had already read. 
Now, if the learner is allowed to glance back over his list of 
syllables, it becomes impossible to count the actual number 
of repetitions employed. An accurate enumeration of repe- 
titions is possible only when a purely successive presentation 
is employed, for only then will the recorded number of repe- 
titions represent the actual number of single readings ; G. E. 
Miiller was led by Ebbinghaus's own experiments to improve 
the experimental procedure in many ways. 

During the years 1887 to 1892, Miiller, in collaboration 



164 The Psychology of Learning 

with Schumann, worked out a modified method. These two 
investigators always employed a procedure in which an experi- 
menter performed experiments upon an observer. The experi- 
menter constructed the series of syllables, superintended the 
experiment and recorded the results; the observer was 
required only to learn the syllables and to report his intro- 
spections. Miiller and Schumann also introduced "improved 
and refined series of syllables," or normal series. In order to 
exclude syllables which are difficult to pronounce they made 
use of only sixteen initial consonants, twelve vowels (and 
diphthongs), and twelve final consonants. From these letters 
they constructed 2,304 nonsense syllables; and of these, 
ninety-four were subsequently discarded because of difficulty 
of pronunciation, so that a total of 2,210 syllables was em- 
ployed in the investigation. All distracting factors within 
the series were eliminated, as, for instance, the combination 
of successive syllables into significant words. They also 
aimed ^ to introduce uniform conditions of learning by en- 
deavoring to compel a purely successive reading by means of 
an ingenious device. This consisted in writing the syllables 
with uniform spacing, upon bands of paper, passing the paper 
around a drum and rotating the drum at a uniform rate of 
speed by means of an accurate clock-work device. A screen 
was set up before the drum; and an aperture in the screen, 
at the height of the observer's eye, enabled the syllables to 
be read, one at a time. During the slow rotation of the drum 
the syllables came into view successively; and in consequence 
of this arrangement the observer was prevented from seeing 
several syllables at a time and imprinting them simultan- 
eously. This arrangement is very important. When we 
memorize by reading syllables from a sheet of paper which 

^ The procedure which was followed in constructing the syllables is 
described in Appendix I. at the end of this Volume. 



Associative Learning 165 

lies before us, we never learn in a purely successive or con- 
tinuously progressive manner. The eye sweeps over a great 
part of the material, and the regard hastens on in advance of 
the vocalization, or sweeps back again to what has been read; 
and irregularities in the behavior of the learner are thereby 
introduced. 

Miiller and Schumann also employed rhythmic learning 
consistently throughout, usually making use of trochaic 
rhythm; and finally they obtained a more reliable measure- 
ment of retention, of forgetting, and of the amount of work 
done in learning. Ebbinghaus had, in the main, determined 
only the time spent in the initial learning and in re-learning. 
Now if the reading had been done at an absolutely uniform 
rate, and if the pauses between the several readings had been 
exactly equal, his unit of measurement would have sufficed; 
and the number of repetitions could be computed from the 
time expended in learning. But it is impossible to obtain 
such a uniform procedure on the part of the learner; and it 
is always better, therefore, to take the number of repetitions 
as a measure of learning and retention. Various means of 
measuring memory function may be employed, however; and 
each of them has its own significance. 

The act of learning may be measured either in terms of 
the learning-time, or in terms of the number of repetitions 
which are necessary to produce a first errorless recitation, or 
in terms of the amount of fatigue present in the observer 
after the learning has been completed. As our unit for meas- 
uring retention, we may take either the number of errors in 
reproduction, combined with the time which has elapsed 
before reproduction is begun; or we may determine the saving 
of time and of repetitions on re-learning; or we may deter- 
mine the learner's capacity to specify what syllable follows 
any syllable named by the experimenter. The former method 



1 66 The Psychology of Learning 

is called the Saving Method (Ersparnismethode) , the latter 
the Method of Correct Associates {Trefermethode). Each of 
these methods has a somewhat different significance attaching 
to it. By means of the saving method we are able to show 
that traces of the after-effect of the learning are present in 
memory even when a free reproduction is no longer possible. 
For example, a list of twelve or fourteen nonsense-syllables is 
usually so far forgotten after twenty-four hours that very 
few persons can recall it without error. But if the observer 
is set to re-learn the series we find that his saving of repetitions 
is in most cases fairly large, frequently eighty to ninety per 
cent. This method enables us to demonstrate that the after- 
effect of learning still persists after weeks and months, even 
when free reproduction is no longer possible. The method 
of correct associates has a different object in view. If after 
the lapse of twenty-four hours we name the first, third, fifth, 
or seventh syllable of the series, and have the observer repro- 
duce the even-numbered syllables, — the other member of the 
pair of syllables, in each case, — we are clearly not determin- 
ing whether the series as a whole is still cHnging to his mem- 
ory. This method shows us the stability of the association 
between syllable and syllable. Moreover, the method of 
correct associates furnishes us with a means of determining 
how the concentration of attention was distributed over the 
series during the act of learning. If we employ this method 
after five readings of a series, we discover which syllables are 
already imprinted and which are not. We frequently find 
that the beginning and the end of the series can be correctly 
reproduced before the middle part of the series is learned. 
From this we may conclude that attention is most intensively 
concentrated at the beginning and at the end of the learning, 
while it relaxes at the middle of the series. 

Miiller and Pilzecker subsequently (1892 to 1900) intro- 



Associative Learning 1 67 

duced yet another method of measurement which they call 
the method of time and correct associates. Here they meas- 
ured the time which elapses "between the apprehension of 
the presented syllable and the reproduction of the associated 
syllable," i.e., they employed the method of correct associates, 
and at the same time measured the time required for repro- 
duction. The object of this measurement was to determine 
"whether those associations which have greatest strength, 
and wliich yield the greatest number of correct associates 
require, in general, the shortest reproduction-times." It is 
easy to see that the time which an observer requires for the 
reproduction and the pronunciation of the associated syllable 
must increase when the reproduction falters; and it would 
be of psychological interest to determine whether brevity of 
reproduction-time is an unequivocal criterion of the stabiUty 
of the association between two syllables. 

Mliller and Pilzecker also introduced an improved method 
for presenting the syllable upon whose appearance the observer 
is required to reproduce another syllable. They fastened 
the paper band carrying the syllables around a twelve-sided 
drum. A screen with a small sHt hid the whole drum except- 
ing the syllable which appeared behind the sHt. By means 
of an electro-magnetic de\dce the drum could be rotated 
through thirty degrees to expose a new syllable at the instant 
when a shutter in front of the slit was opened and the syllable 
was exposed to the observer. An electric contact set a chron- 
oscope into motion; and at the first instant of the observer's 
pronunciation of the associated syllable the chronoscope was 
stopped by means of a lip-key. This arrangement enabled 
the experimenter to determine the reproduction-time for the 
pronunciation of the associated syllable. 

The experimental methods which have been described were 
considerably modified for the presentation of significant 



1 68 The Psychology of Learning 

material. Before I describe these modifications, however, let me 
discuss the results of the experiment whose method has just 
been outlined. An experimental investigation, from the very- 
nature of the case, begins with the simplest and most elemen- 
tary relations, A determination of these relations furnishes 
a foundation for the treatment of more complex problems. 
But we begin with the simplest case for the reason that we 
must endeavor to measure the part played by each component 
cause in the complex system of causes of mental functions; 
and also because it is only in the case of simple processes that 
we can adequately observe the causes which are at work. 
Even when we proceed in this fashion, we find that a certain 
factor which is difficult to control interferes in every series 
of experiments, namely, the individual variation of the ob- 
server. Earlier psychologists usually ignored these individual 
differences, treating them as special sorts of deviation from 
normality, or even as "errors." In recent times, however, 
these individual differences of observers have come to be an 
important feature in psychology. They furnish us with a 
means of tracing differences in individual endowment to their 
fundamental psycho-physical conditions; and this brings us 
nearer to the problem of the origin of human individuality. 
Sometimes these differences can be reduced to certain con- 
stantly recurring "types"; and when we shall have succeeded 
in determining these mental types, we shall have paved the 
way for an interpretation of the results of our psychological 
experiments. 

The problem of t3^ical differences is of paramount interest 
for pedagogical practice ; it alone can furnish us with a definite 
basis for the characterization and treatment of pupils. It is 
for this reason that I begin my discussion of investigations of 
memory with a description of the individual differences which 
we find in the memorial function of both adults and children. 



Associative Learnifig 169 

An analysis of these differences which will reveal the most 
elementary and fundamental properties of intellect will at the 
same time furnish a foundation upon which to base all of our 
subsequent discussions. 

I. Memory Types, Learning Types, and Ideational Types 
Anyone who has conducted experiments in memory upon 
even a small number of individuals of approximately the 
same age must have been struck by the great differences of 
memory function of his observers. The fidelity of retention, 
the length of the interval after which a trace of the learned 
material still persists, the rapidity with which forgetting 
begins, the rapidity of learning itself, and the Uke, — all of 
these vary between wide limits in different individuals. In 
the main, however, there are two fundamental differences 
which seem to be the most important practically: the different 
rapidity of learning, and the difference in fideHty and per- 
manence of retention. It is possible that the cause of the 
latter is to be found in the former. Let us, therefore, begin 
with differences in the rate of learning in different individuals. 
These differences are exceedingly great; and they give rise 
to memory types, which are wholly different in their modes 
of operation. Learners may, in general, be classified into two 
groups: rapid learners and slow learners. The rapid learner is 
characterized not merely by his abiHty to reach his goal, — 
errorless recitation, — more rapidly; but his mode of learn- 
ing, the effect of his learning upon retention, his mode of re- 
learning, his span and adaptation of attention, his curve of 
forgetting, — all of these are different from those which one 
finds in the slow learner. In a word, the rapid and the slow 
learner each represents a characteristic mental type which 
may be determined experimentally in its essential attri- 
butes. • 



170 The Psychology of Learning 

When memory experiments are made with nonsense- 
syllables, the rapid learner is, of course, revealed by his ability 
to acquire an errorless reproduction in a shorter time and 
with fewer repetitions. Let us illustrate this phenomenon 
by the citation of numerical results which will also show the 
magnitude of the difference between the two types of learner. 
In one of my experiments, a slow learner, Z., required 56 
repetitions in order to memorize 12 nonsense syllables, while 
a rapid learner of approximately the same age, P., required 
only eighteen repetitions for the memorization of the same 
series. After a month's practice, Z. required 25 repetitions 
for a similar series, while P. required 6 repetitions for this 
similar series. F., a rapid learner, required 26 repetitions at 
the outset, and 8 repetitions after 36 days' practice. W., one 
year older than F., learned this same series with 20 repetitions 
at the beginning, and with 12 repetitions after 36 days' 
practice. In children, these types appear no less distinctly 
and, contrary to expectation, they remain constant even with 
different sorts of material. The typical differences persist 
no matter whether the material to be learned is of a signifi- 
cant or a meaningless sort, although with significant material 
the two types no longer differ so widely, because interest and 
special aptitude for certain materials play a part in learning. 
The individual who learns nonsense-syllables slowly is also 
slow in his acquisition of poems, prose selections, vocabularies, 
dates, etc. G. E. Mliller, to be sure, insists that with poems 
he is able to concentrate his attention much more rapidly than 
with nonsense-syllables, but the very reverse is true of other 
individuals. But these are differences which do not mask 
the learning type. We shall see that there is only one factor 
which is able to conceal nearly all of these differences in learn- 
ing, and that is practice continued through many years. This 
has a levelling effect upon all of the mental functions; and it 



Associative Learning 171 

is able to obliterate almost all differences of connate endow- 
ment in the domain of memory. In order to show that these 
typical differences are present even in children, we may men- 
tion that B. (thirteen years old) learned a stanza of poetry 
with an average of eight repetitions, while M. (same age) 
learned the same stanza with twelve repetitions; and of 
course the learning-time is also considerably shorter for rapid 
than for slow learners. In these determinations of the num- 
ber of repetitions, and of their effect upon the first possible 
reproduction, we see at once another characteristic of the 
rapid learner. He also begins sooner to forget, so that 
we may formulate the rule: He who learns rapidly also 
forgets rapidly.' 'In our experiments it was found that P. 
was unable to reproduce a series of syllables two minutes 
after learning it; hence, as rapid learners usually do, he 
requested that he might be allowed to begin his recitation 
immediately after he had attained the "feehng of certainty." 
The typically rapid learner, then, is usually a rapid forgetter, 
and his manner of reciting during reproduction reveals the 
rapid onset of forgetting, the reproduction being restive and 
in more rapid tempo than the learning. This shows us that 
the rapid learner possesses, in the success of his first correct 
recitation, no guarantee of permanent retention, a fact which 
may constitute a serious danger for children. The whole 
method of memorizing, in the case of a typically rapid learner, 
aims to secure a transitory and temporary retention rather 
than a permanent one. His recitation from memory bears a 
closer resemblance to immediate retention in that it employs 
the after-effect of impressions which have just been received, 
with a view to reproducing by means of these. Immediate 
retention by means of after-effects which have not yet died 
away from consciousness is, however, as we have seen, a 
highly specialized mental phenomenon which must be 



1 72 The Psychology of Learning 

distinguished from lasting retention or genuine reproduction/ 
Immediate retention depends upon other means than mediate 
retention, the impressions having wholly disappeared from 
consciousness in the case of the latter, while the former has 
recourse chiefly to the dying away of the original stimuli. 

The retention of the rapid learner bears a close resemblance 
to that purely immediate retention which is possible only so 
long as the direct after-effect of the sensory impressions of 
the learned material still persists. Hence we find, too, that 
the rapid learner makes use of all conceivable devices in his 
immediate reproduction of the learned material, — cadence, 
rhythm and accentuation employed in presentation, auditory 
after-images of words in their original timbre, more rarely 
their visual images, and the like.^ The state of affairs is 
wholly different in the case of the slow learner. He requires a 
longer time for learning, employs more repetitions, and not 
infrequently expresses a desire to allow the learned material 
to "soak in" for a time. He reproduces with a high degree 
of assurance, and in a tempo which is usually slower than 
that in which he learned; and, even after several minutes, he 
is still able to reproduce with the same assurance as during 
his first recitation. 

Both of these types of learning are characterized by numer- 
ous other features. The individual who learns rapidly and 
forgets rapidly is, as a rule, unable to supply a missing syl- 
lable by reflection; every attempt to do so is attended by a 
consciousness of the utter futihty of the effort. The slow 
learner frequently succeeds in finding a missing syllable after 

^ See pp. 4 iff. of this volume. 

2 Memory experiments have failed to take immediate retention 
sufficiently into account. It appears, however, that certain psychol- 
ogists make allowance for its influence in delaying recitation for a 
time, up to two minutes, after learning. 



Associative Learning 173 

a moment's reflection, and recalls it in definite form. The 
rapid learner retains the first syllable of the series with special 
accuracy; and if it escapes him in the reproduction, the whole 
series is usually lost. The slow learner is sometimes able to 
begin his reproduction at any point in the series, and to recon- 
struct it in a forward or a backward direction. The mode of 
learning also is different in the two cases. The slow learner 
spends a great deal of time upon the mere reading of the 
series; the rapid learner soon begins his attempt to ''recall," 
merely glancing at the syllables in order to test and control 
his continuous attempts to reproduce, wliich run on in advance 
of the syllables read. The attention of the rapid learner is 
more readily distracted by trivial incidents of all sorts, to 
which the slow learner pays not the slightest heed. The 
emotional tone during the learning is different in the two 
t}q3es. The rapid learner is enthusiastic; he learns with a 
feeling of excitation and of pleasure, and with a vivid desire 
to reach his goal rapidly. The slow learner is more indiffer- 
ent, especially at the beginning of the new experiment where 
he may even feel an unpleasurable tenseness and anxiety lest 
hedo not reach his goal without a too great expenditure of 
time. The profit which the slow learner derives from prac- 
tice is, in most cases, relatively much greater than that which 
accrues to the rapid learner. In a long-continued series of 
experiments, Z., mentioned above, required 56 repetitions at 
the outset, but after several months' practice he required only 
19 repetitions; while P., in the same series of experiments, 
reduced his repetitions from 18 to 8. 

It must not be supposed, however, that on account of his 
rapid forgetting the rapid learner is at a disadvantage in 
relearning or refreshing his former impressions. Correspond- 
ing to his rapidity in the learning of new material, is his 
rapidity in the re-learning of old material. He is able to make 

13 



174 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

abundant use of the slightest traces which may have survived 
from the original learning. P. frequently made a greater 
saving of repetitions in re-learning than Z. On the other hand, 
the rapid learner is always found to be at a disadvantage 
when called upon to reproduce freely without re-learning. 
Quite as surprising is the characteristic difference of the two 
types in the reproduction of sensory material which has just 
previously been read or heard. The rapid learner possesses 
a considerably more efficient "immediate retention." In our 
experiments, the largest number of nonsense-syllables which 
could be reproduced correctly after once hearing them was 
eight for P., but only three for Z. A similar difference is 
found in children; a pupil of the rapid type succeeded in 
reproducing six, while a slow learner of about the same age 
recalled only three syllables in immediate reproduction. It 
appears, however, that two sub-types are found among rapid 
learners. There are individual cases of rapid learners who 
are able to retain well. These individuals clearly possess the 
most efficient sort of memory. It is the rapidly learning and 
rapidly forgetting individual who depends most upon imme- 
diate retention, and who at the same time seeks to obtain a 
fleeting and transitory memorial effect. In the rapid learner 
who also retains well, we find a combination of rapid acquisi- 
tion with a will to imprint permanently. 

What constitutes the basis of these differences of memory 
type or learning type? At present, we can say only that the 
chief cause of the difference is to be found in fundamental 
differences of attention. It is chiefly the rapidity of accom- 
modation or central adaptation to the activity in question 
for the moment, or to the material in hand, which gives rise 
to the different effect of learning. The rapid learner possesses 
a capacity to accommodate his attention immediately to the 
peculiar demands of the activity of the moment. Within a 



Associative Learniiig 175 

very brief time he has already reached his maximum degree 
of concentraion; he does not find it necessary to struggle 
with the t>'pical distress of ''beginning," with reluctance, 
with disinclination, with wandering wits, and the like. The 
result of this is that the initial repetitions immediately attain 
their complete or almost complete effect for memory; and 
no part of his work fails to produce a memorial result. The 
individual who adapts himself slowly must, on the contrary, 
expend several repetitions at the outset in attaining a com- 
plete adaptation to the activity and to the material before 
him, and in overcoming distracting ideas and feehngs of 
unpleasantness. He reaches his maximal concentration only 
by a gradual process; and his first few repetitions are of 
Uttle value, in so far as their effect upon retention is 
concerned. 

The obverse of this difference in accommodation of atten- 
tion is to be seen, however, in the fact that the rapid adapter 
soon loses his accommodation again. But no serious damage 
results from this lapse because he very soon regains posses- 
sion of his accommodation. This is especially evident in the 
effect of pauses. Brief pauses, introduced into the act of 
learning, are usually welcomed by both types of learner; 
but they are long avoided by the slow learner because he 
fears that he may lose his adaptation to the activity of mem- 
orizing. The advantage derived from relaxing during a 
pause seems to him to be illusory if he must recoup the loss 
by a subsequent re-adaptation of attention. Is it of advan- 
tage to be able to accommodate the attention rapidly? We 
must answer that both this capacity and its opposite have 
their advantages and their disadvantages. The individual 
who adapts rapidly is able to pass abruptly from one activity 
to another, a feat which is more difficult for the slow adapter. 
On the other hand, th^ latter is able to proceed with undimin- 



1 76 The Psychology of Learning 

ished energy and concentration after brief pauses because his 
adaptation persisted throughout the pauses. 

The adaptation of attention to the activity and to the con- 
tent which engage us for the moment brings with it a phe- 
nomenon which is significant for all mental work; we may 
refer to it as our "adjustment" {Einstellung) to the activity 
of the moment. By this we understand that every long- 
continued activity arouses in us a tendency to persist in the 
same activity. This, of course, makes it more difficult for 
us to pass over to other activities. Our behavior may be 
compared with that of an optical instrument which has been 
adjusted for a particular distance, and therefore images all 
nearer or farther objects indistinctly, or not at all; or with a 
railway txain which is forced along a particular track by means 
of a switching device, — an analogy which was first employed 
by Exner. Attention and will constitute the switching mech- 
anism of mind; but it is especially attention which puts 
forth its greatest energy in the direction in which it has once 
started. What does not lie in that direction may enter the 
field of consciousness, it is true, but it can never reach the 
focus of consciousness. The more our attention becomes 
adjusted to an activity, the stronger is the fixedness of ten- 
dency, the more difficult is it to pass from an initial activity 
to any other, the more does concentration increase, the more 
successfully does the mental operation progress, and the 
greater is the after-effect upon memory. This is the chief 
cause of the difference between rapid and slow learners; but 
there are secondary causes also. The purpose or intention 
with which we enter upon the work of learning has a prime 
significance. The more we intend to obtain not merely a 
transient but a lasting effect, the more is this desired effect 
produced. There is also a significance attaching to the sort 
of means which we employ. The more extensively we make 



Associative Learning 177 

use of secondary means, such as special auditory and visual 
remembrances derived from non-essential circumstances which 
attend the learning, the more transient is the retention. The 
learner's habituation to slow or to rapid work also plays a 
part; we should therefore accustom ourselves to working 
rapidly. And it is possible that there are also fundamental 
individual differences in the rapidity with which memory 
dispositions take shape. Finally, the ideational type of the 
learner is also a significant factor. 

These typical differences in rapidity of learning reveal the 
existence of two readily distinguishable types of mental work 
in general; and these types appear to have their foundation 
in certain elementary properties of attention, which are not 
uniformly distributed throughout the human family. The 
attention which adapts itself slowly to its work is, at the same 
time, an attention which clings tenaciously to its work, shift- 
ing only with difficulty, and offering the most secure guarantee 
for the permanence and fidelity of the content which it ac- 
quires. With this is intimately related yet another funda- 
mental difference in the attention of different individuals, 
which we may call a difference in the concentration and dis- 
tribution of attention. Every-day experience teaches us that 
certain of our fellow-men are more capable of attending to 
several things at once; the attention of these individuals has 
a greater power of distribution. Other individuals resolutely 
avoid attending to many things at any one time, preferring 
to concentrate more intensively upon the few things to which 
they do attend. To this type of attention we ascribe a high 
power of concentration. Concentration and distribution are 
therefore, to a certain extent, mutually exclusive because 
wide distribution of attention is accompanied by but slight 
intensity of concentration upon particular details; but we 
ordinarily find that it is also associated with a breadth of 



lyS The Psychology of Learning 

interest, a high degree of susceptibihty and, since it usually 
goes hand-in-hand with abrupt adaptation, with rapid acqui- 
sition. From this outline it is easy to complete the picture of 
a highly concentrated and narrowly distributed attention. 

These two fundamental characteristics of attention equip 
their possessors for different callings, and constitute the basis 
of different talents and endowments. The broad, inclusive, 
rapidly adapting, and as rapidly shifting attention qualifies 
one for journalism, diplomacy, the medical and the teaching 
professions; it is fundamental to the artistic endowment, to 
the capacity of improvising, to readiness in repartee. Con- 
centrated attention is a necessary condition of specifically 
scientific endowment. 

The opinion of certain psychologists that these two char- 
acteristics necessarily exclude each other is erroneous. Atten- 
tion is capable of being developed in any direction; practice 
increases both its intensity of concentration and its extent or 
compass. Yet it must be granted that we find it easier to 
develop the attention in but a single one of these two direc- 
tions. One must not overlook the fact, however, that even a 
distributed attention can apply itself with a high degree of 
concentration to particular details. An attention which is at 
once distributed and intensive seems to represent the highest 
degree of concentration, if by concentration we mean the 
energy with which attention can be turned upon its object. 
The opposite of concentration in this sense does not consist 
in distribution but in distractibihty. Moreover, concen- 
tration may mean Hmitation; and only when understood in 
this sense is it opposed to distribution. 

These fundamental properties of attention exercise their 
influence upon learning more in the mastering of bulky 
amounts of material than in short series of syllables. This 
may explain how it comes about that in cases of large amounts 



Associative Learnijig 179 

of material the superiority of the rapid learner to the slow 
learner frequently decreases and may wholly disappear. When 
the task is long, the slow adapter gradually gains a greater 
advantage over the rapid adapter because the former usually 
possesses the less extensive but the more intensive concentra- 
tion. Another illustration will show what rOle the adaptation 
of attention plays in the life of the pupil. Burgerstein asked 
a whole class of pupils to memorize stanzas of poetry; and 
the task was continued for a full hour, the time required by 
each pupil for the memorization of each stanza being noted. 
It was found that during the first half-hour the duller pupils 
memorized much more slowly than the brighter pupils; but 
this difference gradually decreased to the vanishing point as 
the work progressed; and all of the pupils learned the later 
stanzas in approximately the same time. This result may per- 
haps be explained by assuming that a slow adaptation goes 
hand-in-hand, in many cases at least, with a lesser degree of 
mental endowment. Indeed, Binet has attempted to show 
that rapidity and degree of adaptation of attention may be 
employed as criteria of intelligence in school-children. But 
on repeating Binet's experiments, Winteler found this result 
to be only partially confirmed. ^ 

A group of variations which have been called Memory- 
types are in many ways closely related with these learning 
types. This unfortunate term^ refers to certain thorough- 
going diversities in the content of the ideas of different indi- 
viduals; and it would therefore be more appropriate to call 
them ideational types. I shall attempt to make clear the 

' See Bibliography at the end of the volume. 

^ Others have referred to them as types of intuition, sensory types 
and even as speech types. I believe that the expression "ideational- 
types" is the only appropriate term to apply to them, because they 
relate primarily to ideation in the narrower sense. 



1 80 The Psychology of Learning 

nature of these ideational-types, and to discuss the question 
of their relation to types of learning. Fundamental differ- 
ences in the content of sense-impressions from which the 
ideas of individuals are built up were first brought to the 
notice of psychologists by the psycho-pathological observa- 
tions of Charcot, and more particularly by the investigations 
of his assistant, Ballet. ^ According to Charcot's view, repro- 
duced ideas are not always derived from the same sense- 
department. In the act of thinking, certain individuals employ 
chiefly the ideas of concrete objects which they have per- 
ceived, while others employ words chiefly, — the thinking of 
the latter group of individuals being referred to as ''internal 
speech." It is found, too, that dififerent individuals recall 
verbal images to consciousness in different forms; one hears 
the auditory images of words, while another has a mental 
revival of the muscular sensation arising from the adjustment 
of his vocal apparatus, or he may actually innervate the vocal 
muscles in his internal speech; and yet another sees before 
him the visual images of written or printed words. Accord- 
ingly we may distinguish an auditory, a motor and a visual 
type of ideation. Of course, combinations of all these vari- 
eties of ideation may occur as "mixed types," or, less accu- 
rately expressed, as "indefinite types " More recent investi- 
gation has made many modifications in the earher conception 
of ideational types, to which we shall turn in the next section. 

Now we are led to suppose that these diverse character- 
istics of ideation give rise to different sorts of learning, and 
that the latter are related to the learning-types which we 
have mentioned. 

Even the apprehension of sensory-impressions, which con- 
stitutes the first step in the act of learning, must be different 

^ J. M. Charcot, Vecons sur les maladies du systeme nerveux. Paris, 
1873. G. Ballet, Le langage int'crieur , Paris, 1888. 



Associative Learning i8i 

in individuals whose modes of ideation are different. The vis- 
uahzer imprints upon his consciousness a picture of the 
printed or written word and of the spatial arrangement of 
its parts. He notes their position by means of his memory 
for location; he remembers the lines as they appeared upon 
the printed page, and he knows approximately how the more 
important or interesting parts, at least, are distributed upon 
the pages. Before his "mind's eye" there arises a picture of 
a poem divided into stanzas and lines, etc. The individual 
who belongs to the auditory or to the motor type immedi- 
ately transforms the visual pictures, obtained from reading, 
into heard or spoken words; and these auditory or motor 
images he substitutes for the visual images of the printed or 
written words. The process of learning or imprinting is even 
more radically different in the various ideational types. In 
the auditory and motor types, the process of imprinting con- 
sists in the formation of series of successive auditory or vocal 
images of spoken words, or series of successive innervations 
of the vocal muscles, which, in turn, are accompanied by 
sensations or images of movements; or he makes a mental 
note of the "melody" of what is spoken to him, and he remem- 
bers the sounds and the rhythmic sequence of the words and 
syllables which he memorizes. And in this melody the va- 
rious sounds then assume their proper auditory and rhythmic 
positions. Now, in the act of reproduction, the auditory or 
motor individual is unable to present the whole series simul- 
taneously to his consciousness; his only alternative is to 
allow the successively learned items to run their course again 
in successive order, in the form of either concrete or verbal 
images. The individual who remembers visually proceeds in 
a wholly different fashion. The syllables or letters which 
are to be remembered, he arranges side by side in the form of 
visual images; and the result of this internal vision, namely 



1 82 The Psychology of Learning 

his visually ideated series of letters, he can see before him 
either simultaneously or in successive sections. In the act 
of reciting he simply directs his mental regard upon the 
series; his retention is simultaneous rather than successive. 
It is exceedingly difficult for an individual of the auditory 
type to recite a memorized series backward, because his 
associations between the terms of the series were formed 
almost wholly in a purely successive order; and successive 
associations always operate more strongly in the direction in 
which they were formed than in the reverse direction. On the 
other hand, the strongly visual individual is distinguished by 
an ability to reproduce his associated groups of letters, etc., 
backward almost as easily as forward. He experiences no 
difficulty in running his internal glance in a backward direc- 
tion over what Hes in the field of his mental vision. 

Unfortunately we possess as yet no investigations which 
have made a special study of the relative fidelity of retention 
by the various ideational types. But from incidental results 
obtained in other investigations of memory we can see clearly 
that visual memory is slower but more sure and reliable.^ 
The individual who learns visually also experiences, as a rule, 
a more vivid feeling of certainty. In experiments with non- 
sense syllables, we very frequently observed the manner in 
which the various observers recall forgotten syllables by a 
process of reflection. Most observers report that the forgot- 
ten vowel or diphthong first floats into view; and in cases 
where forgotten consonants also "occur" to the learner, they 
too, usually make their appearance in visual form. But if 

' According to Pohlmann, this is especially true for nonsense syl- 
lables; and according to Finzi, it is true also for concrete objects. 
The statement seems to me to be self-evident. Compare the investi- 
gations of immediate retention and of observant noting which we have 
already discussed. 



Associative Learning 183 

this does not happen, the feeling of uncertainty still persists. 
This is in accord with Finzi's observation'^ that in experiments 
on apprehending and noting, visual images are less subject 
to falsification than auditory images. It is probable then, 
that visual images are retained more faithfully than any other 
sort of content. My own experiments show that the reten- 
tion of numbers, and consequently mental calculation, is 
accomplished more slowly but much more correctly when the 
digits are ideated also as visual images than when they are 
reproduced only in the form of auditory-motor verbal images. 

From this we must suppose that exceedingly slow learning 
is to be explained from two fundamental differences of dis- 
position and endowment, — from the slow adaptation of the 
individual's attention to the activity upon which he is en- 
gaged, and from the predominance of visual ideation, under 
which we have still to consider all of the secondary factors 
which have been mentioned. 

In how far is it possible to eliminate these differences in 
endowment which constitute the basis of memory function? 
This is an important question for pedagogy but we have as 
yet no decisive or final experiments dealing with the topic. 
Yet in all of our investigations we find that the elementary 
attributes of attention are capable of almost unlimited Im- 
provement in every direction, if only they are submitted to 
an adequate training. Rapidity of adaptation, and the inten- 
sity and compass of concentration may be developed to a high 
degree; and any particular sort of ideating can be acquired 
by training, if there is not a complete dearth of ideational 
elements from the corresponding sense-department in the 
individual's consciousness at the outset. I myself am doml- 
nantly non-visual in my ideation of verbal material. All of 
my learning at school was auditory-motor; I have never 
^ J. Fiiizi, Ibid., p. 377. 



184 The Psychology of Learning 

been able to remember places in books, and the orthographic 
images of foreign words have given me great difficulty in all 
cases where the spelling does not conform with the pronun- 
ciation. In psychological experimentation I have cultivated 
visual ideation to such a degree that I am now able to solve 
arithmetical problems by means of auditory or of visual 
images as I prefer; I can learn a group of letters, numbers or 
syllables, by means of auditory, visual or motor imagery. 
I always find that visual noting and computing is essentially 
slower but more sure; I seldom make a- mistake in visual com- 
puting. 

It was the French psychologists who first called attention 
to the fact that the elimination of differences in memory- 
types by devoting a special training to ill-developed types of 
ideating always brings with it a certain loss in one's connate 
type. Thus, the individual of the auditory type suffers a 
certain loss of auditory imagery when he trains his visual 
ideation. This is just what our every-day experience with 
the one-sided development of capacities would lead us to 
expect. But the loss is only a temporary one; the person 
who submits to training gradually acquires a capacity to 
work with all of the means of ideation which he has practised. 

These considerations indicate that each ideational type 
possesses certain advantages and certain disadvantages. When 
the visualizer learns by means of observation he is condemned 
to work relatively slowly; the auditory-motor individual 
always seems to possess a less reliable but a more rapid mem- 
ory. And although the visual memory is less likely to falsify 
its single ideas, still the visualizer is more prone to blunder 
when he learns whole groups of ideas. In reproducing large 
groups of impressions he is more subject to errors of position, 
although his retention of single impressions, — letters, sylla- 
bles and words, — is better; on the other hand, the individual 



Associative Learning 185 

who belongs to the auditory type is more likely to confuse 
words of similar sound. The auditory-motor individual profits 
from his successive procedure in forming associations; he 
does not so readily confuse the order of the parts of his material 
as the visualizer does. From this it must be inferred that a 
perfect memory must have its foundation in an all-round 
development of ideation. The teacher should note the diver- 
sities of memory which are due to a relative lack of one or 
other sort of ideational content; and he should seek to ehm- 
inate these defects by appropriate training. 

We must not fail to bear in mind, however, that most of 
the experiments which we have described were made with 
adults, twenty to forty years of age, and in psychological 
laboratories. Since the mind of the child, especially in so far 
as memory is concerned, is much more plastic, one would 
expect that if the adult can acquire such a high degree of 
cultivation of memory and of the elementary attributes of 
attention, the schools should be able to attain much greater 
results. And this expectation is fulfilled, according to the 
findings of Radossawljewitsch, who, in an investigation of 
the memory of eleven school-children from seven to thirteen 
years of age, found that the ideational types of children are 
modified by long-continued learning. All of his observers 
gradually approached more and more closely to the auditory 
(probably the auditory-motor) type of memory, because in 
his experiments the learning was done solely by a method of 
reading and sotto voce pronunciation. Radossawljewitsch 
observed this phenomenon in himself also. In my own experi- 
ments with nonsense syllables, I have repeatedly found that 
my ideational type always takes the following form after a 
long period of learning: I retain chiefly in auditory-motor 
fashion, and reinforcement by means of visual images is a 
wholly secondary matter. Anything that has been learned 



1 86 The Psychology of Learning 

verbally, however, is usually retained solely in auditory- 
motor terms, with auditory imagery dominating. ^ Teaching 
should therefore be supplemented by formal training, which 
unfortunately is unknown in the modern curriculum. Gifted 
educators of all ages have demanded purely formal mental 
training. Pestalozzi developed the concentration of his 
younger pupils by having them perform simple manual exer- 
cises during their learning. Froebel's whole system of kinder- 
garten plays is permeated with the idea of giving the child 
formal exercises in order to develop his capacities. The ma- 
terial employed in these exercises is a matter of relative indif- 
ference, in so far as subsequent education is concerned; its 
acquisition is only a secondary purpose of the training. 
Laboratory investigations of the development of the mental 
functions of adults show us what an enormous loss is entailed 
in modern education as a result of its prevailing emphasis 
upon content as the essential aim in teaching. In view of 
the fact that the students in our universities must be taught 
to see correctly and to hear correctly, that they scarcely 
know what their mechanical memory is capable of accom- 
plishing, that accuracy and fidelity of description are not 
developed until they come to our laboratories for experi- 
ments, that eleraentary differences of endowment are levelled 
down so little during the first twenty years of their Hves, — in 
view of all of these facts, it appears that our modern system 
of education fails to fulfil the demands both of science and 
of practical fife. This state of affairs has contributed to 
the success of certain advocates of mnemonics, whose meth- 
ods are guilty of shocking psychological blunders but yield 
abundant renown to their authors. The memory of modern 
man is wholly neglected in so far as its formal aspect is con- 

' P. Radossawljewitsch, Das Bchalten tuid Vergessen bei Kindern 
und Erwachsenen, Leipzig, 1907, 169. 



Associative Learning 187 

cerned; even an improper memory training is better than 
none at all. 

Our generation keenly feels this fundamental need of a 
formal training of our mental capacities by means of appro- 
priate methods. This seems to be the only reason which can 
account for the luxuriant crop of modern Hterature in which 
certain individuals undertake to show their fellow-men "the 
right way to do mental work," to teach them " the art of never 
forgetting" by a system of mnemonics, and to "make men 
strong" by courses of instruction. Our next discussion will 
deal with the psychological development of methods of teach- 
ing which may supply this need, in one direction at least. 

2. More Detailed Description of Ideational Types and Memory 
Types, and their Fundamental Characteristics 
In our preceding discussions, typical differences in the ways 
in which different people "think," — or, more correctly, 
ideate, — and retain, have been brought into relation with 
typical differences in learning. Our knowledge of these 
ideational types, which have only been hastily sketched in 
the preceding section, constitutes at once the basis of a psy- 
chology of memory and of a pedagogy of learning, in the 
broadest sense of -the latter term. Every sort of memory 
process runs its course differently in individuals of different 
mental types; and different methods of learning come into 
being because one or other of the general conditions of learn- 
ing leads more readily to the desired goal, and likewise 
because there are individual ways of learning. Hence before 
we proceed to develop a doctrine of the technique and econ- 
omy of learning, it is appropriate to undertake a more exact 
analysis of those interesting differences of ideating and remem- 
bering which, strangely enough, were not appreciated until 
the modern era of psychology and psychiatry. 



1 88 The Psychology of Learning 

The investigations of these individual differences, like the 
investigation of so many other problems which have been 
raised by modern psychology, have by no means reached 
their final stage as yet; still we already possess a wealth of 
interesting observations and experimental data which give 
us some insight into the complex mechanism which the 
individual employs in his memory work. 

I shall attempt briefly to describe the ideational types 
under the following headings: a. An analysis of rare cases 
of extremely one-sided memorial endowment such as we occa- 
sionally find in noted artists, rapid calculators, chess-players, 
and others of highly developed talents, h. A discussion of 
certain pathological conditions of mental life. c. A descrip- 
tion of the differences between the memory of the child and 
of the adult, d. A discussion of methods of determining 
memory types. 

All persons appear to think ^ in either of two wholly differ- 
ent forms. These forms do not, however, alternate with each 
other in a fortuitous and purposeless fashion; but each comes 
into operation on certain definite occasions and for the reali- 
zation of certain definite ideational purposes. We all think 
either in concrete images of former perceptions of objects or 
processes, or we think in words which we speak to ourselves. 
In the former case, consciousness is dominated by residua, 
after-effects, or traces of former sense-perceptions, and more 
or less original and novel combinations of these. This form 
of ideating is therefore called concrete or objective ideating. 
The ideas which dominate us in this case are subdivided, by 
psychology, into ideas of imagination and ideas of memory. 
They are ideas of memory when they appear to us to be 
subjective copies of objects or processes which we have for- 

I The word "think" will, in what follows, be used as a general term 
to include every sort of ideational activity. 



Associative Learning 189 

merly experienced. In ideas of imagination this trans- 
subjective reference to former impressions is lacking; and in 
the adult, ideas of imagination have not infrequently been 
found to have come into being from numerous combinations, 
cleavages, variations and fusions of former ideas of memory; 
so that they seem to be exceedingly complex structures, in 
which now one, now another, component idea predominates 
in consciousness, in consequence of the cohesion and constel- 
lation of ideas. ^ 

Verbal thinking or thinking in words is wholly different 
from this sort of ideation; and it also takes place under cir- 
cumstances which are different from those under which con- 
crete or objective ideation occurs. Indeed, the two sorts of 
intellectual function are, in a certain sense, mutually exclu- 
sive and antagonistic to each other, as we shall see. We 
think chiefly in concrete or objective terms when we give 
free rein to our imagination, when we have no definite prob- 
lem before us or when the problem is of a purely concrete 
sort, when we go back over our remembrances without attempt- 
ing to recall any particular person or event. On the other 
hand, we think in words in the form of an unspoken, internal 
speech when we deliberately follow a definite train of thought; 
when we reflect upon scientific problems, and especially when 
our real thinking comes into operation in the form of judg- 
ments; when we converse or argue with anyone; when we, 
in any way, put ourselves in the position of a speaker; and 
particularly when we reproduce, in words, a verbal context 
which we have learned. But it seems to be chiefly the con- 
trast between concrete imagination and abstract thought 
which constitutes the contrast between the two forms of 

"^ A more detailed discussion of the distinction between ideas of 
memory and of imagination may be found in Meumann's Intelligenz 
und Wille, Leipzig, 1908. 
14 



190 The Psychology of Learning 

ideation. In many persons, perhaps in all, the two forms of 
thinking are directly opposed to each other. The more con- 
cretely my imagination works, the more do my verbal images 
retreat to the background of consciousness; the more intent 
I am upon following an abstract train of thought, the more 
do I think in terms of internal speech. The two sorts of 
ideation are also opposed in habituation and in inchnation. 
For days and weeks at a time my internal speech predomi- 
nates; and for equally long periods, concrete imaginations 
or persistent remembrances crowd my auditory-motor imagery 
int© the background. It is no wonder, then, that fundamental 
differences of individual endowment should have their founda- 
tion in the opposition between these two sorts of ideating. 
Artists and musicians seldom show an inclination toward 
scientific thinking; and leaders in science are usually indif- 
ferent artists. From the introspective analysis of numerous 
individuals of both groups, one can see clearly that concrete 
ideation is dominant in the artist, while verbal thinking is 
dominant in the scientist. 

The sort of activity which we have designated briefly as 
internal speech or verbal thinking is, in all probability, every- 
where a thinking process in which verbal meanings are faint 
and indistinct, and in which, under certain circumstances, 
they may even be absent from consciousness. The internally 
spoken word is the mental representative of the meaning of 
the word; it is a substitute for a more accurate envisagement 
of verbal meaning. And we shall see that the manner in 
which words are imaged and employed as symbolic repre- 
sentatives of meanings may be wholly different in different 
individuals. 

In both sorts of ideation, in concrete-objective and in verbal 
thinking, wide individual variations occur. These are chiefly 
and primarily due to the fact that the concrete sensory com- 



Associative Learni?ig 191 

ponents of which words and ideas are made up differ radically 
from individual to individual. In the visualizer the parts of 
concrete or verbal images consist wholly or chiefly of memorial 
residues of visual experiences; in the auditory individual, on 
the other hand, the auditory images are dominant; and in 
the motor individual, vestiges of movement sensations or 
actual, if weak, repetitions of former movements constitute 
the essential content of consciousness. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that an individual who possesses chiefly con- 
crete visual imagery does not, for that reason, proceed exclu- 
sively in a \dsual fashion in his verbal thinking, that is, he 
does not think solely in terms of visual images of written or 
printed words. The differences between the ideational types 
are, remarkably enough, of a much more complex sort; for 
instance, the concrete visual type of ideation may co-exist in 
any individual with verbal ideation of another sort, — with 
vocal-motor or with verbal auditory imagery. The asymmet- 
rical development of individual endowment in ideation and in 
retention, which we are accustomed to call ideational type, 
must therefore be discussed both from the point of view of 
concrete ideating and of verbal thinking. 

Individual differences do not present so many remarkable 
features in the former as they do in the latter; and a greater 
pedagogical significance also attaches to individual varia- 
tions of verbal thinking. We shall therefore devote but a 
very brief discussion to the typical differences of concrete- 
objective ideation. 

First of all, it must be noted that the manner in which an 
individual ideates his sensory impressions and his objects of 
perception, in concrete form, is in every instance determined 
by two factors: the character of the impression, and the 
ideational type of the individual. In any given case, there- 
fore, we must always take into account the sort of impressions 



192 The Psychology of Learning 

to which the memory-image owes its origin. The impressions 
which are to be retained in memory may have originated 
from several or from only one sense-department; and the 
ideational type may be a "pure" one, that is, it may be exclu- 
sively auditory, motor or visual. Let us assume that, in a 
particular instance, an individual is called upon to remember 
an impression received through but a single sense-department 
— a color, let us say. If he belongs to the pure visual type, 
his ideational type corresponds to the sort of sensory material 
with which he is to deal; and he will ideate it by the corre- 
sponding or "adequate" means. But when the individual 
who is purely auditory is called upon to ideate colors, he finds 
himself unable to do so by the means which corresponds to 
the stimulus in question because he possesses no visual im- 
agery; he must therefore have recourse to a non-adequate 
means of ideation. He may employ a symbol or "surrogate" 
for the color image; and he may have recourse either to 
verbal ideation, — the verbal image of the name of the color 
being substituted for the concrete image of the color itself, — 
or to verbal ideation combined with an act of judgment, — he 
may remember that he has seen something which is called red or 
he may call to mind the circumstances under which the color 
was seen and these will then enable him to recall the color. 

Representatives of all of the pure types proceed in this 
latter fashion when called upon to ideate sensory material of 
a modahty to which their ideational type does not conform. 
Possessing no concrete imagery of this sort of sensory material, 
they substitute an appropriate name or the consciousness that 
they formerly experienced a similar impression. 

In the great majority of our every-day experiences we are 
not called upon to learn and remember material from but a 
single sense-department. Most objects present stimuli which 
appeal to several or to all of our senses. When engaged in 



Associative Learning 193 

conversation with any one, I have a visual perception of his 
body and his gestures, I hear the sound of his voice, I may 
touch his clothing; and thus I perceive him through the 
medium of three of my senses. In all such cases, the repre- 
sentative of a pure type of imagery may have recourse to 
those images which correspond to his own type; the purely 
auditory individual would remember only the audible speech, 
— clang-tint, inflection, tempo, and rhythm; the pure visual- 
izer, only the visual picture of the speaker and his gestures. 
And those classes of impressions which correspond to the 
individual's type of imagery must then symbolize all of the 
others; and they must constitute for each individual his sole 
but one-sided remembrance of the incident. This is true in 
the case of Dodge, for instance, who is wholly lacking in 
auditory imagery. Dodge's visual memory of the appearance 
and the movements of his fellow-men serves as a substitute 
for a remembrance of their voices. 

Investigation has shown, however, that the great majority 
of people belong not to pure but to mixed or balanced idea- 
tional types. In these cases, we have a comproinise between 
ideational type and sense-modality. When they endeavor 
to remember impressions of a single sense-department which 
is not identical with their ideational type, — for example, 
when an auditory individual whose visual imagery is weak 
is called upon to remember colors, — we observe a phenom- 
enon which is wholly different from that which we observed 
in the case of the pure types. The "mixed type" is made up 
of individuals in whom images of some particular sense- 
department or sense-departments predominate; they work 
most readily with this sort of material, and these images are 
found to be more distinct and complete than any of their 
other sorts of imagery. But they can also make use of the 
less distinct and less readily reproducible sorts of imagery 



194 ^'^^^ Psychology of Learning 

The representative of the mixed type relies chiefly upon 
those images which predominate in his ideation; and he makes 
use of the other sorts only in secondary fashion. Thus, when 
the stimuli themselves are of mixed sorts, he selects the 
sensory elements which correspond with the dominating 
elements in his own imagery. The representative of the mixed 
type, who, for instance, possesses distinct visual imagery but 
indistinct auditory imagery, remembers his fellow-men chiefly 
in terms of visual images; the auditory image of the voice 
ordinarily cooperates to some extent, but only in an indefinite 
and uncertain manner. The procedure is different, however, 
when the stimulus belongs to a sense-department which is 
not dominant in the individual's ideation, and also when he 
is called upon to remember those parts of a composite stim- 
ulus which do not dominate in his imagery. For instance, 
when an individual of the auditory type, who possesses weak 
visual but strong auditory imagery, remembers colors or 
forms, his remembrance contains visual elements but they 
come to consciousness indistinctly]and indefinitely. When he 
has to recall and describe the visual image of another person 
his ideation adapts itself to tliis task also; the visual elements 
of his imagery are now accentuated by his attention, and in 
consequence they are temporarily raised to predominance 
but still they remain relatively indefinite and indistinct. 
Then the attention accentuates these more indefinite elements 
of his imagery, and drives the more definite material tempo- 
rarily into the background. 

From this we see that in concrete ideation the individual 
who possesses a mixed or balanced imagery works, as a rule, 
with those elements which are normally dominant in his 
ideation. It is just that which constitutes the type. But 
because the possessor of mixed imagery has vague images 
from several sense-departments, these come forward as 



Associative Learning 195 

the dominant elements when they correspond with the stimulus 
of the moment or with the problem which has been under- 
taken by the individual. It must be borne in mind, however, 
that the possessor of mixed imagery adopts different proce- 
dures for immediate and for permanent retention. 

In immediate retention he is confronted by the definite 
task of remembering a particular sort of sensory material. 
Let us take the case of an individual who has read a Hst of 
words, or to whom such a Hst has been dictated, with a view 
to having them reproduced immediately in vocal form. The 
mixed type is always able to adapt itself to this task. Even 
the visual individual operates chiefly with his weak auditory 
images when he attempts an immediate recall of words which 
he has heard; at least, I have always found this to be true of 
my observers whose auditory images were not exceedingly 
weak. Here, however, we must always assume the presence 
of an intensive immediate after-effect of the original stimu- 
lation which facilitates this adaptation to the task in hand. 
In recalling auditory words immediately after hearing them, 
the visuahzer may employ auditory images chiefly, but may 
make a secondary use of the visual imagery into which he 
has transformed the auditory material; but in recalling a 
conversation with a friend after a long interval, — that is, in 
a case of genuine ideation, — he has recourse chiefly to visual 
images of expressions employed by his friend during the con- 
versation. The individual who belongs to a pure type, on 
the other hand, endeavors in immediate retention to transform 
into his own favored imagery the sensory impressions which 
he receives. 

It is essential that we bear in mind that most impressions 
from the external world come to us through the visual sense; 
and experiments have shown that most persons belong to the 
mixed type in so far as their concrete imagery is concerned. 



196 The Psychology of Learning 

It is not difficult then to understand why visual elements should 
dominate the concrete imagery of the majority of persons who 
possess a full complement of sense-organs. Most persons 
recall their past experience in terms chiefly of residua of former 
visual impressions. Sensations of pressure, temperature, 
taste, and smell, and even auditory sensations are relatively 
secondary throughout. The majority of mankind, then, 
belong to the visual type in so far as their non-verbal ideation 
is concerned. This shows us, too, why the type usually fails 
to be identical in concrete and in verbal thinking. Most 
people who possess a full complement of sense-organs are 
found to be auditory-motor in their verbal ideation; in the 
majority of individuals, then, we find a combination of visual 
concrete ideation and of auditory-motor verbal ideation. 
Verbal ideation employs both auditory and auditory-motor 
imagery; hence the representative of the mixed type finds 
himself well equipped for verbal ideation. Within these 
various types of ideation and retention we find that individual 
endowment may vary between wide limits. Thus it is found, 
on the one hand, that the ratio of the dominant to the second- 
ary sorts of imagery in a consciousness of the mixed type may 
vary between an upper limit which represents an almost 
complete absence of secondary sorts of imagery and a lower 
limit which represents little more than an equal distribution 
of dominant and secondary sorts of imagery; and on the other 
hand, we find equally wide variations in the permanence and 
fidelity with which imagery is retained in memory. Numer- 
ous individual variations may therefore be observed within 
the chief ideational types; and we find individual variations 
and sub-classes of each of the sub-types, as has recently been 
shown by G. E. Miiller. ^ The extreme case of visual endow- 

' G. E. Miiller, Gedachtnist'dtigkeit und Vorstclhingsverlauf, Leipzig, 
1911. 



Associative Learning 197 

ment is frequently observed in individuals who have devoted 
themselves to the plastic and the graphic arts. Dr. Wigan tells 
of a painter who habitually dismissed his model after half an 
hour's sitting, and then painted, from memory, as though the 
model were still before his eyes. He recalled to consciousness 
a picture of the model sitting upon the chair, varied the pos- 
ture, the expression and the coloring at will, and had the 
visual image as clearly before him as though the model were 
present. Similar incidents are reported of Peter von Laar 
and Henri Regnault. Anselm Feurbach relates in his "Tes- 
tament " that before painting certain of his pictures he planned 
and executed them mentally "to the last brush stroke." ^ The 
visual memory may, again, be chiefly and one-sidedly a form 
memory or a color memory; nor does it always exist in com- 
bination with a highly developed visual perception. In con- 
trast with those individuals who possess a superior endow- 
ment of visual imagery, we find others in our psychological 
laboratories who have had a thorough and well-rounded mental 
training and yet are scarcely able to recall a single color or 
visual form accurately. 

We can do no more than offer conjectures as to the origin 
of these cases of asymmetrical individual endowment, and of 
gradual variability in the dominance of a particular sort of 
imagery. Binet^ beheves that the development of "special 
memories" is due essentially to the prevailing direction of 
the individual's interests and training; but this does not 
accord with the familiar experience that one's interests are 

^ Interesting statements by artists concerning these phenomena are 
compiled in H. Popp's Maleraesthclik, Strassburg, 1902, 32off. Sec 
also Ballet, Die innerliche Sprache (trans.) » 46flf. 

^ A. Binet, Psychologic dcs grands calculatciirs, Paris, 1894. This 
work will frequently be referred to, in what follows, by a simple men- 
tion of the author's name. 



198 The Psychology of Learning 

frequently found to lie in a field for which one has no special 
talent, nor with the fact that professional psychologists have 
frequently striven in vain to overcome a one-sidedness in 
their ideational type. Connate endowment is an essential 
factor here; but how are we to conceive of connate endow- 
ment? Of course, it is easy to say that in the case of the 
visually endowed individual, certain regions, probably in the 
occipital lobe, come into question; and as a matter of fact 
Moebius has shown that mathematical endowment is always 
attended by a marked development of the temporal region, 
from which he is led to locate the mathematical center in 
the inferior convolutions of the anterior region of the frontal 
lobes. But a mere translation of psychological facts in- 
to physiological and anatomical terms contributes nothing 
to the psychological explanation of the asymmetries of 
memory. 

It is more important that we should know whether idea- 
tional types are due to congenital bent and disposition {An- 
lage), or whether they are acquired by habituation and train- 
ing. This question can be answered with some degree of 
certainty from the facts in our possession. It is probable 
that a certain degree of congenital mental defect constitutes 
the basis of every pure type. For this reason, I always regard 
purity of type as a defect in ideation. The predominance of 
one, or of several sorts of imagery in the mixed type, however, 
frequently appears to depend, in part, upon the combined 
influence of endowment and education; in part, upon the 
sheer influences of training and habituation. Otherwise we 
could not explain how, in the training of memory by means 
of material where a particular sort of imagery preponderates, ^ 
the ideational type adapts itself in so short a time (often 
within a few weeks) to this sort of learning. It is undoubtedly 
possible also that there may be such a thing as an ideational 



Associative Learning 199 

disposition which is equally well-adapted for all sorts of sen- 
sory elements. This general, all-round endowment must suf- 
fer modification in consequence of one-sided practice with 
particular sorts of sensory material; and a habituation type 
would then come into existence. 

There are in general four possibilities as to the mode of 
origin of the various types of endowment: i. They may be 
due to congenital bent or disposition, which would then be 
conceived to be the sole determining factor, — the dispositions 
themselves being conceived to be quaHtatively fixed and 
unalterable. Education and training would not transform 
them, but only develop what is latent and pre-determined in 
the disposition. In the case of the ideational type we must 
then conceive the disposition to be a peculiar individual sus- 
ceptibiHty to particular sorts of sensory impressions, — an 
individual faciUty for acquisition and an individual aptitude 
for preservation, — corresponding to the memory disposition. 
2. The types may, indeed, appear to be predisposed by one's 
congenital bent; the bent, however, is capable of being trans- 
formed, but education and training are less effective than the 
disposition itself, j. The ideational type may be due to 
disposition and education, it is true, but the forces of edu- 
cation have a greater influence than the disposition itself. 
4. The disposition may be of no significance; and education, 
in the broadest sense of the term, is the sole determining 
factor. 

I regard the second possibiHty as the most probable, because 
in ideational types we frequently see the influence of the 
disposition asserting itself with extraordinary potency; and 
yet we find a certain influence exerted by educative forces. 
The significance of the disposition is indicated: a. By the 
evident influence of heredity upon ideational type. Not infre- 
quently do we find that a particular type of ideation recurs in 



200 The Psychology of Learnmg 

several successive generations of the same family, a fact 
which can be explained only from heredity. Dodge reports 
that his type is a family inheritance. Lay found three pairs 
of brothers who belonged to the auditory type; the Viennese 
philologist Nussbaumer and his brother possessed "colored 
hearing" (Pfeiffer). The predominance of particular sense- 
memories in families of artists and musicians is well-known. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this is furnished by the family 
of Johann Sebastian Bach, in which musical memory was 
present in conspicuous degree through several generations. 
h. The typical differences between the two sexes likewise 
point to a congenital disposition. We have already men- 
tioned that women are usually more visual than men. Ker- 
chensteiner found that the color-sense of girls is better than 
that of boys, and that the former are more talented in decora- 
tion while the latter excel in the arts which have to do chiefly 
with spatial relations. 

In addition to this we find, as has already been stated, that 
a certain variability of type occurs. We shall refer to this 
later when we deal with the question of the possibility of 
training the types. More striking, however, than the varia- 
tion of type is their relative stability. Pfeiffer on testing the 
ideational types of children of the same school-classes for 
three successive years found a very marked permanence and 
constancy of type. Their variations from year to year are so 
slight that their fixity appears to be the more important phe- 
nomenon. From the tenth to the eleventh years, the "vis- 
uals" were found by Pfeiffer to decrease by 8.7 per cent. ; the 
"auditories " remained approximately constant; the "motors" 
increased by 8.7 per cent. In the following year the "visuals," 
among the same children, increased by 2.4 per cent.; the 
"auditories" decreased by 1.5 per cent.; and the "motors" 
decreased bv .9 per cent. 



Associative Learning 20l 

Before we can understand the nature of these differences 
of ideation we must answer another question : Are the dififer- 
ences traceable more to an original primary strength of sense- 
memory, or to a congenital primary direction of attention 
toward certain sensory contents? 

This problem cannot, of course, be solved by merely point- 
ing out the "circular" course or reciprocal relationship of 
these processes, — by showing that intensive sensory impres- 
sion arouses greater interest and this, in turn, reacts upon 
sense-impressions and intensifies them. The whole of psy- 
chology is permeated by this view, namely, that sense-impres- 
sion, sense-memory and direction of attention are capable of 
reinforcing and intensifying one another. But this does not 
solve the problem as to which is primary. I am of the opinion 
that a typical direction of the attention upon particular 
classes of sensory impressions must be favorable to the per- 
ception and retention of these impressions;^ and I also believe 
that the supra-normal domination of any modality of sense- 
memory may also result in a favoring of that modality by 
attention, and the more so the more one-sided the sense- 
memory is. But in our mental endowment, dominant atten- 
tion and dominant sense-memory may be predisposed inde- 
pendently of each other. I believe, moreover, that individual 
differences in the sensory content of imagery are due primarily 
to the retention and reproduction of this content itself, and 
that they are reinforced in only a secondary fashion by an 
indi\idual direction of attention. Strictly speaking, therefore, 
ideational types must be called association types, because: 
a. Our dominant interest in certain sensory material does not 
always coincide with our dominant sense-memory. Indeed, 
it not infrequently happens that one is deeply interested in a 
sense-department for which one's memory is not especially 
^ CJ. our discussion of Observational Noting, pp. 63ff. 



202 The Psychology of Learning 

well developed, h. The investigation of observational noting 
and more particularly the investigation of testimony show 
that the prevailing direction of attention is determined not 
by sensory contents but by wholly different and more general 
causes, namely, by our practical interests of life, and by our 
theoretical interest in knowing and understanding the exter- 
nal world. It is possible, then, that the dominant sense- 
memory and the dominant direction of attention may be 
discrete and unrelated in our mental constitution. The two 
may go hand-in-hand, but they do not necessarily go hand- 
in-hand. If they do follow parallel paths they will reinforce 
each other; and even if their paths are not parallel this recip- 
rocal or "circular" reinforcement may still take place. But 
it may also happen that the prevailing direction of attention 
is of advantage to the sense-memory toward which one is 
least strongly disposed, c. No matter to what ideational 
type an individual may belong his attention is directed to 
all sorts of sense-impressions in his acts of perception. If 
notwithstanding this fact the extreme representative of any 
ideational type is unable to reproduce certain sorts of sensory- 
impressions, it is clear that attention is only a secondary 
factor in determining the ideational type. Even when atten- 
tion is attracted as intensively as possible to auditory impres- 
sions, individuals like Dodge are still unable to evoke auditory 
imagery. Such designations as "sensory types," "intuition 
types" are therefore misleading. These typical differences 
are not due to differences in the functioning of the senses. 

It should also be pointed out here that all of the traditional 
terms which have been employed to designate these ideational 
types are far from being accurate. Each type should be desig- 
nated not only in terms of the sort of imagery which it pos- 
sesses, but also in terms of those sorts of imagery which it 
lacks. This plan would provide us with much more definite 



Associative Leami^ig 203 

names. We describe color-blinds in terms of the colors which 
they do not see; for instance, we speak of the red-green blind, 
and in so doing we designate him positively as being capable 
of seeing yellow and blue. Similarly, a representative of the 
pure auditory ideational type is a non-visual-motor. A more 
accurate characterization is especially needed in the case of 
the mixed or balanced types. Here it is solely a question of 
determining and designating unequivocally whether a sort of 
sensory element is lacking, or whether it is present in weak 
and indefinite form. Since most persons belong to the mixed 
types, we usually designate these types in terms of their 
dominating sensory elements. Hence, if we ordinarily em- 
ploy a somewhat inaccurate terminology and call a man of 
the mixed type a "visual," that term is usually employed to 
signify only that visual imagery predominates in his con- 
sciousness. He may also be equipped with the other sorts 
of imagery, but may employ these only in a secondary fashion 
and with greater indefiniteness. This has come to be the 
usual meaning of "auditory," "visual," etc., because the 
mixed types occur so frequently. From the point of view of 
general psychology, it is a somewhat arbitrary delimitation 
to designate all of these types of imagery solely in terms of 
diversity of material content. We can distinguish them 
quite as well from the formal point of view of individual 
peculiarity of image-process, or of prevailing form of repro- 
duction. I have elsewhere ^ briefly attempted to broaden the 
concept of ideational type; more detailed discussion of the 
matter here would carry us too far afield. 

In an investigation of ideational types by means of the 

method of reproduction I found that the peculiar type to 

which certain individuals belong is determined by the fact 

that although they can readily ideate imagery of certain 

^E. Meumann, Intelligenz und Wille, Leipzig, 1908, 128. 



204 The Psychology of Learning 

sense-departments, each by itself, they are unable to make 
use of these different sorts of imagery in combination with 
one another in their ideation and learning. For instance, it 
was found that one individual possessed definite visual images 
of objects and auditory images of words; but it was difficult 
for him to employ them both at the same time in an act of 
learning. He relied either upon the retention of visual con- 
crete imagery or of auditory verbal imagery; that is, he 
remembered the appearance of an object or he remembered 
the sound of its name, but never both together. Another 
case was found where an observer possessed a good auditory 
memory of melodies, clangs, timbres of voices and noises; 
he also had a good memory of forms and a fairly good mem- 
ory of colors. But it was difficult for him to combine these 
concrete visual and auditory images. It is probable then, 
that we can distinguish combination types of ideation; and 
here the non-combinability of certain images is the best term 
for the designation of these types. Many defects of endow- 
ment of the third order are probably due to these phenom- 
ena,^ because defects in complex functions, such as are con- 
cerned in the work of the school-room, must owe their origin 
to defects of combination. For instance, defective capacity 
to learn geography may be due either to sub-normal ability 
to deal with concrete visual imagery (maps and the like); 
or when normal visual imagery and normal memory of names 
is present, it may be due to an inability to combine concrete 
visual images with the auditory-motor images of words. 
In another volume^ I have sought to make a complete 

^ Defects of endowment may be of three orders: first order, defects 
in the elementary mental processes; second order, defects of complex 
mental capacity; third order, defects of complex functions. 

^ E. Meumann, Vorlesungen zur Einfuhrung in die experimentelle 
P'ddagogik, Leipzig, 1907, I., 449- 



Associative Learning 205 

schematic classification of the ideational types from the point 
of view of their content. The schema which is appended here 
needs no additional comment: 

1. Types of Concrete Ideation 

A. Pure Types: 

a. Visual. 

b. Auditory 

c. Tactual-Motor — the latter perhaps differing according 

as they have to do with a motor ideation of move- 
ments or of forms. Individuals of this type ideate 
in terms of imitative, empathetic ^ or copying move- 
ments, with or without an actual innervation of 
the muscles. 

In addition to these three, there are perhaps 
types which make use of elements from the gusta- 
tory and olfactory senses, and of organic sensa- 
tions. 

d. Gustatory 

e. Olfactory 

f. Emotional 

B. Mixed Types: Instances of these types have not been 

proven, beyond a doubt, to exist. 

2. Types of Verbal Ideation 
A. Pure Types: 

a. Visual — perhaps two forms: ideating in images of 

^ Empathy (EinfUhlung) is a term which has come to be employed 
in psychology and aesthetics to designate the general tendency to 
project oneself into situations in which one is interested, and to experi- 
ence such sensations as would result from one's active participation 
in such situations. For instance, when we observe or even imagine a 
feat of strength, our bodies become set and our muscles become tense; 
when we see a slender column which supports a heavy capitol, we 
experience an empathetic feeling of the heavy stress which is borne by 
the column. 
15 



2o6 The Psychology of Learnhig 

written or printed words; and, possibly, ideating 
in visual images of writing-movements. 

h. Auditory 

c. Tactual-Motor — ideating in images of vocal move- 
ments; ideating in (kinajsthetic) images of writing 
movements, with or without innervations of move- 
ments. 
B. Mixed Types: not yet clearly shown to exist. 

J. Combinations of Concrete and Verbal Ideational Types 

A. Visual concrete ideation combined with auditory-motor ver- 

bal ideation: This is probably the most common type. 

B. There may be other combinations of i and 2 of the above 

schema: but they are rare, — indeed the existence of 
such cases has not yet been demonstrated beyond a 
doubt. 

4. Negative Combination Types in Concrete and 
Verbal Ideation 

A. Auditory Verbal and Visual Concrete, both well developed, 

but the two incapable of being combined. 

B. Auditory Concrete and Visual Concrete, both well developed, 

but the two incapable of being combined. 

Let me again mention that in the concrete auditory, tac- 
tual, olfactory and gustatory memories a similar one-sidedness 
of development and similar differences of native endowment 
seem to occur. The endowment of the unmusical individual, 
who can not remember a tune and who sings only a few notes 
correctly, ^ and the endowment of a Mozart, who reproduced 
the Miserere frcm memory after hearing it but twice, vary 
between quite as wide limits as the extreme cases of visual 
endowment which we have described. 

Of more importance to pedagogy, however, are the typical 
"^ Such cases have been cited by Stumpf and by Dodge. 



Associative Learning 207 

differences which are found to occur in verbal thinking; and 
these have been more fully investigated by psychology. 
Following the example of Charcot, writers have usually sub- 
divided them into three, or really four, types. The auditory 
individual thinks in heard words ; the visual, in visual images 
of printed or written words; the motor, in images of writing 
movements or in images of former vocal movements which 
themselves are frequently accompanied by slight but actual 
movements of the hps or tongue. Observations bearing upon 
this topic have been made by psychologists these many 
years. Leibnitz called thinking a silent speaking; and 
Hartley distinguished the other types in a work which ap- 
peared in 1749. More detailed investigations of the charac- 
teristics of the various types were first mad^ by Charcot, the 
director of the Salpetriere in Paris, and his pupils, — ^partic- 
ularly Ballet; later contributions were made by Galton, Taine, 
Ribot, Binet, Egger, numerous German psychiatrists, physi- 
cians and psychologists among whom were Kussmaul, Wernicke, 
Storring, Ziehen, Pfeiffer, Segal, Kraepehn and his students. ^ 
To Charcot must be given the credit of having first pointed 
out the fact that the verbal images in which most people 
think are not simple mental processes but that they are com- 
posed of at least four, — more correctly, five — different ele- 
ments: auditory images, visual images, motor images of 
movements of vocalization or of writing, and ideas of meaning. 
Besides the three "pure" t}^es which are characterized by 
an exclusive dominance of some particular sort of imagery in 
the subjectively spoken words, Charcot also recognized the 
"indifferent, or mixed" type. We must assume that in the 
ideation of words all of these types may occur ; and individual 
cases of approximately pure types of verbal imagery of both 
the auditory and the visual sorts have been shown to exist. 
^ See Bibliography at the end of this volume. 



2o8 The Psychology of Learning 

We must also assume that all varieties of the mixed types of 
verbal ideation are possible. The existence of auditory- 
motor, of auditory-motor- visual, and of visual-motor types 
has been demonstrated (Netschajeff) . In most persons, how- 
ever, the auditory-motor ideation of words predominates; 
and, as already remarked, this is probably an adaptation of 
the ideational type to the sort of impressions which most 
frequently occur in the noting of words which are heard in 
the speech of ourselves and others. 

An analysis of these differences is extremely instructive for 
psychology and pedagogy. Let us begin with the pure audi- 
tory type. Individuals who ideate solely in terms of audi- 
tory images are very rare. The average normal person can 
easily observe his ideational type; and among numerous 
persons whom I have requested to make such observations, 
I have found not one who employs heard words exclusively 
in his processes of thinking. Yet it is true that many indi- 
viduals approximate this type, in that mentally heard words 
predominate in their thinking and are accompanied by but 
faint motor images. In the majority of persons there is, in 
all probabihty, an alternation of the sensory elements which 
constitute their internal words. In calm reflection and in 
reading, the heard and the mentally spoken word predominate, 
the appearance of the printed word arousing the reproduc- 
tion of the mentally spoken word. The same state of affairs 
is found in writing; here, too, the image of internally spoken 
and externally seen words play a part. But when one writes, 
the internal words rush along in advance of the act of writing, 
dictating, so to speak, what the hand shall write. Further- 
more, in calm emphatic speaking, the internal word hastening 
on in advance plays the part of a prompter, as Ballet remarks, 
telling us in a soft and oftentimes imperfect whisper what we 
are to say. 



Associative Learning 209 

What determines the auditory type? We are not to sup- 
pose that it is always accompanied by musical endowment. 
As has already been stated, we may find any particular 
ideational type existing in combination with an endowment 
of any other sort of imagery. This is shown by such facts 
as the following. We know, on the one hand, that idiots and 
microcephalous children, who belong to the lowest level of 
intelligence, who can never learn to speak a word, and who 
do not understand the ordinary conversation of persons about 
them, certainly do not possess any internal speech; and yet 
they sometimes have a keen musical apprehension and an 
excellent memory for tones. I have myself observed an idiot 
who led Httle more than an animal existence and who never 
spoke a word; yet I was astonished to find that he listened 
attentively to the playing of a music-box and accompanied 
the melody with rhythmic movements. When the playing 
ceased, he hummed the melody to himself with a fair degree 
of accuracy. Nor is there, in the development of the normal 
child, any coincidence between the development of the tonal 
sense and the acquisition of language. Tracy estabhshed 
the fact that in many children the tonal sense begins to develop 
at the age of six months; one of Stumpf's children knew the 
tonal scale at the age of fourteen months; a son of the com- 
poser Dvorak sang a miHtary march at the age of one year, 
and six months later could sing all of his father's melodies 
when the latter played the accompaniments on the piano. 
We find a corresponding state of affairs in adults. Ballet 
mentions the case of a musician who possessed a remarkably 
good memory for tones but who ideated words more readily 
in visual than in auditory form. On the other hand, many 
persons who have a distinctly auditory ideation of words 
possess no special gift for music. But, of course, a serious 
defect of the tonal sense usually gives rise to a non-auditory 



210 The Psychology of Learning 

ideation of words. These characteristic combinations of idea- 
tional t^pes, in verbal thinking and in non-verbal thinking, 
indicate that our ideation of words is of two wholly different 
sorts, in so far as its relation to audition is concerned. The 
auditory ideation of words is either a product chiefly of mere 
habituation, — in which case it can be overcome by training, — 
or it is due to a congenital lack in capacity to recall non- 
auditory images, — in which case a modification of ideational 
type is possible only to a limited degree. 

In an attempt to reach a clearer understanding of the audi- 
tory ideation of words the question has been raised: How 
does the auditory individual hear his internal words? Cer- 
tain investigators, Egger in particular, have asserted that we 
normally hear the inflection and the rhythm of our own voices 
and that, if this is lacking, genuine internal speech is impos- 
sible. This statement Ballet very properly disputes. We 
really hear our own voices only when we reflect, or when in 
thought we place ourselves in situations where we seem to 
speak. In addition to this, however, all of our remembrances 
of other voices which we have heard also come to conscious- 
ness when we think of another person as speaking, or when 
we think of ourselves as carrying on a discussion with another 
person. Scherer reports that Diderot was an enthusiastic 
debater and that his abstract thinking always took the form 
of an imagined debate with an opponent; and Gal ton has 
introduced the term "histrionic" or "dramatic" to describe 
the ideation of this type of individual. It can scarcely be 
assumed that one's own voice alone is heard in such a case. 
One would expect that the imagery would be constituted 
exclusively by one's own voice only when one's type is vocal- 
motor, rather than auditory because, in that case, the indi- 
vidual is limited to the functioning of his own vocal muscles 
in his ideation of the sounds of words. And, of course, he 



Associative Learning 21 1 

will hear only the sounds which arise from the innervation 
of his own vocal organs. Our propensity to think in terms 
of heard or spoken words may be intensified under certain 
pathological conditions. When the nervous system is over- 
stimulated we frequently find ourselves impelled to repeat 
phrases in an automatic fashion. The reader may remember 
the humorous sketch in which Mark Twain describes the 
contagious effect of a verse which was used in remembering 
the street car fares in an American city. Everybody who 
heard the verse was driven to distraction by it. 

What is the relation between ideational type and mental 
efficiency? A reference to the foregoing discussion of the 
auditory type will indicate the state of affairs which one may 
expect to find in the case of the other types. Every variety 
of motor indi\ddual who thinks in terms of vocal images, — 
and vocal motor images are frequently accompanied by move- 
ment innervations, — is intimately related to the auditory 
type. We have in the literature an excellent introspective 
analysis of two such motor individuals both of whom were 
trained psychologists. iDodge, a pupil of Erdmann, has 
given a detailed description of his own thinking which is 
almost exclusively motor; and Strieker, a Viennese physician, 
has devoted several monographs to the analysis of his own 
internal speech. Dodge has established the fact that his 
thinking may assume the form either of verbal or of concrete 
images. The latter form of ideation occurs, for example, 
when he is planning the construction of a piece of apparatus; 
in such cases he is altogether visual, and his internal speech 
retreats completely into the background, excepting when his 
emotions are vi\idly aroused and when he is about to utter 
an exclamation. When, as he ordinarily does, he thinks in 
verbal terms he pronounces the words mentally but without 
hearing them. His thinking is therefore a motor speech of 



212 The Psychology of Learning 

which he has no auditory image. The sensory elements which 
come to consciousness during the process are images of tactual 
and kinassthetic sensations from the muscles of the lips, 
tongue, mouth and throat, and probably from the thoracic 
muscles which are concerned in breathing. Auditory elements 
may appear but only when the ideation is very definite; and 
even then the auditory images are vague. Dodge has no 
images of writing movements, nor any sort of visual verbal 
imagery. Even in voluntary recall, images of writing move- 
ments can be evoked only with difficulty. This shows that 
Charcot was wrong in including persons who think in terms of 
writing movements and persons who think in terms of vocal 
movements, in the same category; it shows, too, that "motor 
type" is but a general name under which numerous variants 
are to be included. In Dodge's processes of thinking, verbal 
meanings attach to words which are ideated in motor fash- 
ion with weak auditory accompaniments. 

Dodge's introspections are especially valuable because his 
motor-verbal imagery may be traced to a congenital and 
hereditary lack of auditory imagery; it is, therefore, not 
merely a product of habituation. His auditory remembrances 
are "exceedingly scant and indefinite." He says: "I am 
wholly incapable of recalling the successive sounds of a 
musical composition." "I am able to sing mentally a few 
simple melodies, but this singing possesses little besides motor 
content." He is usually unable to ideate the voices of his 
acquaintances; the voice of his father can be recalled only in 
certain phrases, such as "My boy," etc., and only by means 
of the visual images of the appropriate situations. An opera 
which has but recently been heard can be rehearsed mentally, 
but "purely as a pantomime." "The verbal images (of the 
arias) are motor; the voices of the singers are inaudible." 
This one-sidedness of imagery is hereditary in the Dodge 



Associative Learning 213 

family. "My mother and my brother have no more musical 
memory than I have." "None of us sing." In this case, 
then, the lack of internal speech is, at the same time, a lack 
of auditory memory in general. Strieker is even more purely 
motor than Dodge; and Strieker has analyzed his ideational 
type with great care in numerous refined observations. He 
is guilty, however, of two gross errors. In the first place, he 
regards his own peculiar type as being characteristic of man- 
kind in general; and he is of the opinion that nobody pos- 
sesses definite auditory and visual memories of vocal and 
writing movements. Secondly, it is evident from his own 
descriptions that he thinks in terms of tactual and kina^s- 
thetic imagery; yet he asserts that his ideation of words 
contains no sensory elements, but consists exclusively of re- 
vived motor impulses (innervations of vocal movements). 
He summarizes his observations as follows: "My ideas of 
singing are wholly independent of any remembrance of songs 
which I have heard. The state of affairs is similar in the 
case of music to what it is in the case of articulate sounds. 
The auditory impressions which I have experienced are com- 
pletely forgotten; but still something remains in their stead, 
something which I did not obtain from the external world 
but have myself created. My musical ideas, like my verbal 
ideas, I owe to my innervations of movements." 

The other ideational types occur less frequently in verbal 
thinking. Purely visual individuals, an illustration of whom 
will be cited presently, think in terms of verbal images which 
are mentally seen; they read off their words internally, as 
Ballet describes it. Every person who has learned to read 
may have such images; but in most persons they play no 
part in the process of thinking. They make their appearance 
on certain occasions in the mixed types, as for example, when 
such a person recalls a passage in a book or a manuscript. 



214 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

Galton seems to have been the first to establish the existence 
of this type. Charcot, in dealing with a dominantly visual 
patient, found that he thought solely in terms of the visual 
^ images of printed words. Cases of persons who think in 
distinctly visual-verbal terms seem to be found most fre- 
quently among mathematicians and "mathematical prodi- 
gies." 

The nature of these types is very clearly shown by an accu- 
rate investigation of individuals who possess a decided mental 
bent in some particular direction. Fortunate circumstances 
led Binet to make the acquaintance of two noted "calculators " 
who employed processes of wholly different types in their 
mathematical operations. Binet first investigated the Italian, 
Inaudi, whose calculations were made without any partici- 
pation of visual imagery; then the Greek, Diamandi, who 
accompHshed enormous numerical operations almost exclu- 
sively by means of visual imagery. I have had an oppor- 
tunity to make a study, of several hours' duration, of these 
two prodigies. Inaudi placed himself at my disposal in the 
Leipzig laboratory; and Diamandi visited me at my labora- 
tory in Zurich. The results of my tests differ somewhat from 
Binet's in that he, probably under the influence of Charcot, 
concluded that Inaudi was a purely auditory calculator, — 
he called him a "model auditory," — while I found that he 
employs internal speech throughout, both speaking and hear- 
ing the numbers. And Binet regards Diamandi as a pure 
visual, while I found that in him, too, a trace of internal 
speech is present. But my results agree with Binet's in their 
essential features, particularly in the finding that Inaudi is 
wholly lacking in visual images and that Diamandi works 
chiefly by means of visual images. These two mathematical 
prodigies are excelled by Dr. Ruckle, who has been investi- 
gated by G, E. Miiller. Ruckle belongs to a mixed type, 



Associative Learjiing 215 

with predominant visual imagery; according to his own state- 
ments made to me during a brief investigation, Ruckle makes 
extensive use of mnemonic aids and of the mathematical 
relations of numbers. 

The nature of the special memories, whose investigation 
has proved to be difficult for modern psychology, cannot be 
better set forth than by a description of the manner in which 
the memory of a "rapid calculator" functions. In Inaudi's 
case it was possible to determine without psychological inves- 
tigation that he must necessarily do his calculations in a non- 
visual fashion. He was reared as a shepherd, without any 
schooling, and remained ilhterate until the age of fourteen. 
When six years old he began his calculations, after an elder 
brother had taught him to count; and at seven he was able 
to multiply two five-place numbers mentally. He never 
needed to have his numbers or his numerical operations 
written or presented in any other concrete fashion. After 
he had earned a Kvehhood for a time by travelHng about and 
giNdng exhibitions in cafes while his brother played a hand- 
organ, he went to Paris in 1880. There he came under the 
observation of Broca, Charcot and Binet; even at that time 
he was still unable to read or to write. His talents and his 
interests were then of a wholly one-sided sort. The details 
of Inaudi's feats cannot interest us here but the following 
seems to have a psychological significance. His public exhi- 
bition usually consisted in multiplying extremely large num- 
bers, — numbers of sixteen, twenty or twenty-four digits. He 
calculated mentally, while behind him his manager wrote the 
result on a large blackboard. Inaudi did not see the numbers; 
the problem must be given him orally because the sight of the 
figures disturbed him. He did not fear any distraction or 
interruption during the calculation; indeed lest the dem- 
onstration should become tedious to his spectators he even 



2i6 The Psychology of Learning 

introduced interruptions. He would ask one of the audi- 
ence to give the date of his birth, and he would then calculate 
the day of the week upon which the birthday fell, — all of this 
while he was still apparently engaged upon his first and chief 
problem of multiplication. I am convinced, however, that 
he was really not able to carry on two calculations simul- 
taneously. He simply interrupted the first problem at a 
certain point and subsequently took it up again at the point 
where he had left off. But we shall see that this independ- 
ence of interruptions and distractions is a characteristic of 
the auditory-motor type. 

Inaudi's extraordinary memory for numbers is the chief 
feature, however, in which he surpasses the ordinary calcu- 
lator. After an hour's public performance, during which 
approximately three hundred digits were employed, he was 
able to reproduce all of the mathematical operations from 
memory; he was still able to recall them on the following 
day, even when he had not been forewarned or especially 
prepared for the delayed recall. And yet his memory was 
poorly developed in every other direction. When numbers 
were presented to him orally and he was asked to repeat 
them immediately afterwards, he was able to recall forty-two 
correctly, — the limit for other persons does not exceed thirteen; 
but, on the other hand, he could not repeat more than six or 
seven disconnected letters under similar conditions, nor more 
than a very few words of a poem. His memory for musical 
compositions, for geometrical forms, and for colors was 
below the average. 

It is a remarkable fact that Inaudi does not retain large 
groups of numbers mechanically, but by remembering the 
problems in which they occur. This shows that even in this 
unusual development of a memory for numbers, logical reten- 
tion plays a leading role. If we regard forty digits as approx- 



Associative Learfiing 217 

imately the maximum which he is able to retain mechanic- 
ally and reproduce orally, and regard as his extreme limit of 
logical retention the results obtained in a sitting at the Sor- 
bonne where he recalled four hundred digits, we find that 
his memory when reinforced by the meaning of the problem 
is ten-fold more efficient than his mechanical memory. Eb- 
binghaus obtained an identical relation in his investigation 
of the memory of the average individual. Binet's experi- 
ments show that the memories of these two prodigies follow 
the same laws as the memory of the individual of average 
and normal endowment. The sole difference is a difference of 
degree. 

Inaudi remembers numbers by combining them into suc- 
cessive groups. He forms series of successive auditory-motor 
impressions which he brings into association with one another, 
constantly vocalizing throughout. By this means he im- 
prints upon his memory successive groups of spoken names 
of numbers; or, psychologically expressed, he forms successive 
associations of the auditory-verbal images and the vocal- 
motor images of numbers. And in recalling his mathematical 
operations he always has recourse to a successive re-pronounc- 
ing of the imprinted groups. Never does he see large groups 
of numbers simultaneously before him. Multiphcation, there- 
fore, constitutes the basis of all of his calculations because 
multiplication is a genuinely successive operation. It is 
probable that in division, when he deals with large numbers, 
his procedure consists in hitting upon a tentative quotient 
from his wide experience and then in rapidly testing its cor- 
rectness by a process of multiplication. 

The exact process of his retention was not discovered, 
however, until an experimental investigation had been made. 
Binet asked Inaudi to sing a tone continuously during the 
act of calculating, in order, by this device, to introduce an 



21 8 The Psychology of Learning 

auditory-motor distraction. This did not completely destroy 
his ability to calculate, but it doubled the time reciuired for 
the operation. I arranged the following experiment: Inaudi 
was first asked to solve a great number of problems which 
were as nearly as possible of equal difficulty. Each problem 
consisted in raising a two-place number, above forty, to the 
third power. After I had determined from a number of these 
problems what was the average time required for their solu- 
tion, I introduced auditory and motor distractions alternately, 
in the hope of determining exactly what was his mental type. 
I also set several metronomes in motion; but they did not 
disturb him at all. Then, too, he was asked to extend his 
tongue and to hold it between his teeth during the act of 
calculating, — an expedient which eliminated his internal 
speech. This variation increased his time threefold; and it 
was increased still rnore when the tongue was extended from 
the mouth. We applied a registration apparatus to his tongue 
and his larynx and made a graphic record of his vocal move- 
ments. This showed that his calculation was attended 
throughout by uniformly present but faint vocal movements. 
I was not surprised, therefore, to hear him state that he always 
found it impossible to calculate well when he was hoarse. 
Our tests show that he undoubtedly belongs to the domi- 
nantly motor type. Yet from his own statements there seems 
to be no doubt that he also possesses auditory imagery of 
spoken numbers; if he were a purely auditory calculator, 
however, he would be distracted by noises. His employment 
of vocal movements enables him to obviate these distrac- 
tions. 

Diamandi was born in 1880 upon the Greek island of 
Pylaros. He is descended from an educated and well-to-do 
family, and he himself was for a time a corn merchant. In 
describing his method of calculating he states that he sees 



Associative Learni^ig 2ig 

the numbers "as though they were photographed" upon a 
sheet of paper before him, and he reads these visual images. 
There is no doubt that his calculating is done in a wholly 
visual fashion; but his statement that the process is of a 
"photographic" character cannot be accepted without quali- 
fication. In the first place, I was able to discover that he, 
too, was disturbed when his internal speech was inhibited 
during the process of calculating. The disturbance was 
sHght, however, and he was still able to calculate visually 
when he counted the strokes of a metronome while engaged 
upon the solution of a problem. In contrast with Inaudi, 
who refuses to accept any but oral problems and who never 
looks at the blackboard, Diamandi demands that his prob- 
lems be presented in written form. Then he proceeds with 
two interesting and distinctly separate acts; he glances 
rapidly over the written problem, closes his eyes and calls 
up a visual image of the numbers which he saw. Not until 
this visual image comes to consciousness clearly and dis- 
tinctly does he begin his calculation. This shows that the 
images of the numbers are not simply photographed. His 
procedure consists, rather, in first transforming the objec- 
tively seen picture of the numbers into a mental image in 
the form of his own famihar handwriting, and then calcu- 
lating by means of this image. It would be directly contra- 
dictory to the view held by modern psychology regarding 
the reproduction of our sense-impressions if the imaging of 
the digits in the form in which he sees them were a purely 
objective process to which he himself contributes no part. 
Memory never works in a fashion which consists simply in 
retaining retinal images with photographic fidelity; the re- 
membering of visual impressions is possible only because 
apperceptive processes are superadded to purely sensory 
processes. Those data of experience which are not consciously 



220 The Psychology of Learning 

received and brought into relation with our previous store 
of ideas by acts of apperception are not remembered. Repro- 
duction must always come about under the moulding and 
assimilating influence of former ideas. A complete and 
perfect mirroring or reproduction of a complex visual experi- 
ence is of exceedingly rare occurrence; and we can accom- 
plish, or even approximate this feat, only after numerous acts 
of apperception have supplemented one another and have 
tested and corrected our reproduction by comparing it with 
the original experience. Even Diamandi's memory for num- 
bers, although it is dominantly visual in its mode of oper- 
ation, does not "photograph" the digits but requires a series 
of acts of apperception if it is to succeed in retaining and 
reproducing accurate visual images of them. Binet arranged 
the following experiment. Digits were written in inks of 
different colors, and Diamandi was asked to remember both 
the digits and their colors. Now if the visuaHzer's process 
of retention were a "photographic" process he must imprint 
both the digits and the colors in a single act. But this he 
could not do; two operations were necessary. He first 
learned the figures ; and then, in a second reading, he learned 
their colors. Hence we should obtain a wholly erroneous 
conception of the process employed by the visualizer in cal- 
culating if we supposed that he is able to read figures from 
an internal photograph as one may read them from a sheet 
of paper. What he really does is this: In a series of succes- 
sive acts of apperception he transforms the objectively seen 
figures into purely subjective visual images; and if it is not 
expressly demanded of him that he shall remember the details 
of color and of form in the written figures, he will remember 
only their meaning and value. These visual images, how- 
ever, enable him to bring to consciousness only a limited 
number of digits at a time. He then sets about performing 



Associative Learning 221 

his calculations with these relatively few images of simul- 
taneously "seen" groups of digits. 

When we take these facts into consideration we under- 
stand the advantages and the disadvantages of the different 
types of memory. Every difference in efHciency between 
the two calculators must not be referred simply to differences 
in their ideational types because, of course, the mathematical 
talent of the two men may also be different. But if a com- 
parison of their efificiencies should reveal constant and uni- 
form correlations with their memory types, then it would be 
highly probable that the efficiencies are to be regarded as 
products of the respective memory types. 

It was foundj_:fixsLol.all,_tbat in simple calculations Inaudi 
(auditory-motor type) worked much more rapidly than Dia- 
mandi (visual). There was a great difference even in the 
rapidity with which they grasped the problem. The problem 
was presented to Inaudi orally and he set to work immedi- 
ately after hearing it. In the case of Diamandi, however, 
a noticeable time elapsed before he succeeded in obtaining 
a clear visual image of the written problem. Secondly, the 
calculations themselves are much more rapidly accomplished 
by Inaudi than by Diamandi; in view of the latter's superior 
mathematical ability one is compelled to ascribe this differ- 
ence in rapidity to the difference in ideational type. Series 
of auditory-motor names whose meanings are securely asso- 
ciated can be pronounced and reproduced more rapidly than 
their visual images can be evoked. In short, the auditory 
motor calculator is the more rapid; the visual is slower. A 
single series of twenty-five digits is memorized by Diamandi 
in three minutes, by Inaudi in forty-five seconds. But this 
disadvantage has its compensation because the visual mem- 
ory is much superior to the auditory-motor in other regards. 

Even in calculating we are not always concerned with abstract 
16 



222 The Psychology oj Learning 

numbers. It frequently happens that we are called upon to 
deal numerically with concrete magnitudes, as in simple 
and higher geometry, in all operations with equations, in all 
cases where one deals with curves and in numerous applied 
computations. So soon as spatial arrangement comes in for 
consideration, even if it be of the simplest sort, we find that 
the relationship of rapidity between the two types of compu- 
tation is reversed; now the visual calculates much more 
rapidly than the auditory. Binet found that for the mem- 
orization of twenty-five simple numbers Inaudi required 
forty-five seconds, Diamandi three minutes. When asked to 
reproduce the twenty-five numbers in their original order, 
Inaudi required sixty seconds, Diamandi thirty-five seconds; 
for reproduction in reverse order Inaudi required ninety-six 
seconds, Diamandi only thirty-six seconds. In other tests it 
was found that numbers presented in the form of a square 
or of a spiral were readily memorized by Diamandi, who 
was also able to recall them in any order because he imaged 
them visually. Inaudi was almost wholly unable to accom- 
plish either of these tasks; and when he did succeed he did 
so only by means of laborious and complex auxiliary oper- 
ations. From this again it is evident that a memory which 
is to be capable of meeting all of the demands made upon 
it must make use of every sort of imagery, at least it must 
make use of auditory and visual images, that is, words which 
are both mentally seen and heard. Here again Ruckle far 
excelled the other two prodigies because he made use of 
reflective processes, especially in compHcated operations. 
For instance, after twice reading forty-nine numbers arranged 
in seven equal columns Ruckle was able to recite them in 
any desired order, — a feat which neither of the other prod- 
igies could acconr plish. 

For tlie sakeof completeness it may be mentioned here 



Associative Learning 22T, 

that pathological observations have furnished much infor- 
mation regarding ideational types. Investigations of aphasia 
(disorders of speech), alexia (disturbances of ability to read), 
and agraphia (disturbances of ability to write) come in espe- 
cially for consideration here. It is significant that intellectual 
disturbances of these sharply demarcated sorts may occur in 
a consciousness which is otherwise relatively unimpaired. 
They confirm the view that internally spoken words are, 
like audible speech and ordinary writing, a product of com- 
plex functions; that the component processes of which they 
are composed may, in general, be correctly specified by speci- 
fying the ideational types; that in most persons the auditory- 
verbal image and the vocal-verbal image play the leading 
role in verbal thinking; and that these component processes 
of verbal thinking are to some extent mutually dependent, 
although they are to some extent independent of one another. 
The one-sidedness of mental endowment which we have 
described is therefore confirmed by the results of patholog- 
ical investigation. 

Among pathological observations there is a noted case 
which led Charcot to the discovery of ideational types. The 
case is interesting also for the reason that it furnishes an 
illustration of substituted or surrogate images. This patient, 
a teacher, had formerly possessed a very highly developed 
visual imagery, but he had lost it almost completely as the 
result of an illness. When he wished to recall complex visual 
impressions, such as the appearance of familiar persons Or 
places, he found it necessary to have recourse chiefly to audi- 
tory imagery, which now came to consciousness as a substi- 
tute for the missing visual images. This, of course, as one 
might expect, resulted in a general decrease of the patient's 
efficiency of memory. 

These clinical obser-'^ations do not, unfortunately, give us 



224 The Psychology of Learning 

an adequate insight into the extent to which the ideational 
type is changed as a result of such a partial loss of imagery. 
Such an insight is especially desirable because it would 
clear up the question of the modifiability of ideational 
type. Still pathological observations always seem to show 
that other images which formerly served in a subsidiary 
capacity may take the place of the missing imagery. Some- 
thing of a similar nature is found to occur in the normal indi- 
vidual of the mixed type when, in order to adapt himself to 
a particular sort of presentation, he works with a sort of 
imagery which he has but slightly developed. 

During the past few years the pedagogical significance of 
individual types of ideation has been made the subject of 
several important investigations. Before we can apply the 
results of these experiments to the work of the school-room 
we must first determine: i. Whether different types occur 
in children as they do in adults; 2. Whether typical modes 
of ideation are capable of being modified by training; and j. 
What significance these differences of type have in the work 
of memory. 4. It is also essential that we should have reli- 
able and convenient methods for the determination of the 
ideational types of children. 

As for the first question, the investigations of Ziehen, 
Netschajefif, Lobsien, Pfeiffer, Eckhardt, Lay, Pohlmann, and 
others, as well as experiments which I have made upon school- 
children, show that the concrete-objective ideation of the 
child, up to the age of about thirteen or fourteen years, is 
always more particular and visual than that of the adult; 
that is, children of school-age think in terms of concrete 
images of particular objects, persons and occasions which are 
frequently locaHzed spatially and oftentimes temporarily also, 
while adults think chiefly in terms of general verbal ideas. 
Girls make greater use of visual imagery than boys of the 



Associative Learning 225 

same age; and the visual memories of girls are more diversi- 
fied and definite. This characteristic difference between the 
sexes seems also to persist throughout later years, for Cohn's 
investigations of the ideational types of adults show that 
women are more dominantly visual than men. And Wresch- 
ner also shows that women's testimony regarding their visual 
experiences is more abundant and more accurate than that 
of men. ^ Now this seems to indicate that the child's mode 
of ideating is usually concrete- visual; but it does not deter- 
mine whether a dominantly and distinctly visual type of 
ideation exists in childhood. 

We cannot infer from the foregoing that verbal thinking 
must also be more visual in children than in adults. The 
ideational types seem rather to occur with about the same 
relative frequency in adults and in children. 

It is unfortunate that no statistical investigation has ever 
determined, with sufficient comprehensiveness, what is the 
relative distribution of ideational types in children and in 
adults. In the work of Lay and Pfeiffer a beginning has 
been made; and in my own laboratory the ideational types 
of about forty children have been examined. The investi- 
gations of this problem by Pfeiffer at Wiirzburg are instruc- 
tive; but they deal with only about fifteen girls, whose types 
were very carefully examined in each of three successive years. 
Pfeiffer's averages for the three years show that about forty- 
five per cent, of the group were visual, twenty-five per cent. 
were auditory and thirty per cent, were motor, — these data 
referring to concrete objective ideation. Here again the visual 
type predominates. 

As to the second question, — whether the ideational type. 
may be trained or transformed,— I beheve that we must 
answer in the affirmative for we found that in our experi- 
^ See Bibliography at end of this volume. 



226 The Psychology of Learning 

ments the type is frequently changed by the use of a partic- 
ular method of learning which was employed for only a few 
weeks. This particular mode of learning, which consisted in 
reading lists of words sotto voce, had a transforming influence 
upon the type, usually in the direction of intensifying either 
the auditory or the motor elements or both. Thus all of the 
observations which affirm the variability of the types also 
testify to the possibility of modifying them by training. A 
number of such observations were reported in earlier investi- 
gations. Ziehen found a boy who, when words were pre- 
sented orally, always made use of visual images of written 
words because he had been taught to spell by the visual 
method. Pohlmann even found that every sort of training 
develops a special responsiveness to particular modes of pre- 
senting material. Such a specific responsiveness to partic- 
ular sensory impressions, however, presupposes that a specific 
training of sense-memory has taken place. Queyrat reports 
that in ideating the song of Lucrece he has a visual image of 
the printed verse; when he recalls the Marseillaise he has an 
auditory image of its words; and when he remembers a con- 
versation the images of vocal movements predominate. This 
shows us that the dominating sense-elements employed in 
ideating any material correspond to the method employed in 
learning the material. The same phenomenon is seen in 
Baldwin's statement that he ideates the German language in 
vocal-motor and auditory terms because he learned it by 
conversation in Germany, while he ideates French in visual 
and manual motor terms because he learned it in the class- 
room. Pfeiffer found that the influence of our everyday life, 
especially of our vocation, also moulds our ideational type 
by a process of habituation and practice; and Lobsien re- 
ported that the type of concrete ideation varies with age. 
All of this shows that ideational t}^es are plastic and edu- 



Associative Learning 227 

cable; but we do not yet know what are the limits of their 
educability. Our conception of the modifiabihty of idea- 
tional types must conform with our general conception of 
the modifiabihty of natural aptitudes. Every natural apti- 
tude is of a dispositional character. Dispositions can, in 
general, be intensified by training in proportion to their 
original congenital intensity, strong dispositions being more 
easily strengthened by practice than weak ones. The efifect 
of practice, then, is Umited only by weakness of disposition, 
or by complete absence of congenital bent. This accords 
with our experience that the mixed types are more variable 
than the pure types, because, in the former, dispositions 
towards several sense memories are present. PfeifTer found 
that the pure t>^e shows a greater stabihty, but his finding 
is a phenomenon of development rather than of training; and 
I cannot grant that Pfeiffer's alleged pure types are really 
pure. Moreover, the question as to the possibiUty of train- 
ing ideational t}^es will also depend upon their connate 
character. The view which we have here presented affirms 
that they may be trained. Wells ^ has called attention to 
the significant phenomenon that all such questions are inti- 
mately related to the individual educabihty and "practice- 
abihty" of the particular individual; and educabihty and 
" practice-abihty " are for Wells, as they are for Kraepelin, 
fimdamental difi"erences in mankind. 

Let us now examine the methods which have been employed 
for the determination of ideational types. A consideration 
of these methods seems likely to throw still more light upon 
the nature and the pedagogical significance of the types 
themselves. We have not yet discovered a perfectly satis- 
factory method for the rapid and rehable determination of 

* F. L. Wells, The Relation of Practice to Individual Differences, 
Amer. Jour. Psychol., XXIII., 191 2, 75-88, 



228 The Psychology of Learning 

ideational types. The methods which have been in current 
use are ingenious devices rather than accurate and systematic 
methods. The method of distractions and aids combined 
with the reaction-time method gives the most rapid and the 
most reliable results. In this procedure the observer is given 
a number of definite memory tasks of equal difficulty and the 
time required to accompHsh each task is measured. By this 
means we are able to determine the amount of memorial 
work accomplished and the time required for its accompHsh- 
ment. Then aids and distractions are introduced with a view 
to helping and hindering the work of memory; and these 
are so chosen that the means which are employed in the special 
memories and which constitute the observer's type may be 
aided or hindered. In this way we determine whether the 
time required to accompKsh a given amount of memory work 
is decreased or increased, and what is the relative amount 
of decrease or increase in different individuals. For instance, 
an observer is asked to memorize groups of numbers or letters 
or to recite them immediately after he has read them. By 
this means we are able to discover the maximum of numbers 
or letters which he just succeeds in memorizing, and to measure 
the time which he required for their memorization. 

Now we assume that the auditory individual is distracted 
more by the presence of auditory stimuli, the visual by visual 
stimuli, and the motor by the inhibition of his internal speech. 
One would then expect that the possession of a dominantly 
visual type of ideation would be revealed by the fact that 
memorial efficiency is not essentially impaired by an inhibition 
of internal speech ; and that the presence of a motor type would 
be disclosed by the fact that an inhibition of vocal movements 
almost wholly destroys the capacity to memorize. As Segal 
has pointed out, this method can yield unequivocal results 
only when it is supplemented by variations in the mode of 



Associative Learning 229 

presenting the material, and when we take into consideration 
whether the material is mentally reproducible in single or 
manifold fashion. Just as, by this method, we introduce 
distractions, so we may also introduce aids or helps to memo- 
rization. For instance, the visualizer may be identified from 
the fact that his retention is materially aided and strengthened 
by a distinct spatial arrangement of the material which he 
is to reproduce; and this aid is non-effective or even nega- 
tive in the case of the auditory individual because the latter 
must now form successive groups of impressions, and a definite 
spatial arrangement of the items to be remembered may 
hinder his procedure in memorization. The following phe- 
nomena furnish additional means of determining the type to 
which a given individual belongs. The visualizer can readily 
reproduce visual impressions in transposed order; the indi- 
vidual who is dominantly auditory-motor finds that such a 
transposition is a difiicult feat. The visualizer confuses let- 
ters and words which look alike, although they may have 
wholly different sounds; the auditory-motor individual con- 
fuses letters and words which sound alike although they may 
not look alike. The Frenchman who wrote "droit^^ where he 
intended to write ^'trots'' clearly belongs to the auditory type. 
In learning lists of words the visualizer is more likely to note 
the consonants, the auditory individual the vowels. The 
visualizer remembers positions upon the pages of books, the 
auditory-motor does not. The visualizer spells long words 
backwards almost as readily as forwards ; the auditory and the 
motor individuals find this to be a much more difficult task. 
For a more detailed discussion of these methods I must refer 
the reader to the special literature of the topic. ^ 
The foregoing discussions indicate that the memory type 

' See E. IMeumann, Vorhsungcn ziir Einjuhrung in die expcrimcn- 
telle P'ddagogik, II. 



230 The Psychology of Learning 

of the pupil should be taken into account by the teacher. 
I once observed a boy of thirteen who was trying to draw an 
outline map of Greece. Although he had made an accurate 
study of the map, his drawing did not show the characteristic 
outline but only a shapeless form which bore no resemblance 
to the map of Greece. I surmised at once that he belonged 
to the motor type and had him trace the coast-line with his 
finger, at first in sections and then as a whole. He was then 
able to make the drawing accurately and without any difficulty. 
"A study of his ideational type would have been beneficial both 
to him and to his teacher. Binet also has determined that 
certain persons must trace a drawing with the finger if they 
are to remember it. And a certain French painter employs 
this method in teaching his art. "In order to accustom his 
pupils to drawing from memory, he had them follow the out- 
line of the figure with a lead pencil held at some distance 
from the eye; and he thus obliged his pupils to fuse the 
motor remembrance with the visual remembrance" (Ballet). 
While a student in the high school I studied Hebrew; but 
since it was my custom to remember vocabularies by means 
of auditory images I had great difficulty with Hebrew verbs 
because they are all so similar in sound (a long a in the first 
syllable and a short a in the second). It occurred to me to 
attend only to the visual images of the consonants and my 
difficulty disappeared. 

These are only indications of the pedagogical applications 
which may be made of the doctrine of memory types. We shall 
learn more of them in our discussion of methods of learning. ^ 

^ Concerning the significance of ideational types in the general work 
of teaching, see L. Pfeiffer, Op. cit., i2off.; for their significance in 
mathematics, see R. Eckhardt, Visuelle Erinnerungsbilder beim Rech- 
nen, Zeitschrift f. exp. Padagogik,Y., 1907, pp. 1-22; for their signifi- 
cance in language instruction, see L. Pfeiffer, Ueber qualitative Arbeits- 
ty pen, Leipzig, 1908. Pohlmann and Lobsien may also be consulted. 



CHAPTER VI 

ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING {Continued) 

J. Economical Learning 

Economical learning is that sort of learning which attains 
its end in the most appropriate and advantageous fashion. 
The end usually consists in an ability to recite from memory 
and to retain permanently in memory; and the most advan- 
tageous method is the method which employs the least time, 
and which employs the simplest and most appropriate pro- 
cedure. The aim of learning, however, is not always the same, 
as we have already seen. In school-work the act of learning 
aims to secure an abihty to recite the material once from 
memory, and then to retain the "substance" of the acquired 
material either temporarily or permanently. In certain cases 
we endeavor to memorize word-for-word; in other cases our 
sole purpose is to learn the essential content of a coherent 
context or a mass of concrete material without regard to the 
author's wording. The concerns of practical Hfe and the 
affairs of the school-room frequently impel us to learn material 
with a view to remembering it for only a short time. When a 
professor prepares for a lecture, a public speaker for an ad- 
dress, a preacher for a sermon, or an actor for a performance, 
permanent retention is a matter of but sHght importance. 
Hence it is preferable to extend the significance of the term 
"economical learning" to include every sort of learning which 
reaches its goal with a least expenditure of time and of energy 
and by means of associations whose formation conforms with 
sound psychological principles. 

In practical Hfe and in the school-room, significance attaches 

231 



232 The Psychology of Learning 

chiefly to three of the numerous conditions of learning: the 
expenditure of time, the expenditure of energy, and the 
method of forming the associations which are to be effective 
in subsequent reproduction. The amount of time which is 
expended in learning can be measured without difficulty. 
In measuring expenditure of energy we first of all determine 
how many repetitions are necessary to secure a first errorless 
recitation; then we determine the intensity of concentra- 
tion, and finally the degree of fatigue which is produced by 
the act of learning. The effect of the act of learning may be 
measured in various ways; we may determine it from the 
first errorless recitation, or from subsequent recitations made 
after the lapse of variable intervals of time or, when repro- 
duction is no longer possible, we may measure how much 
time or how many repetitions are saved when the same 
material is re-learned after various intervals of time. When 
the method of relearning is employed we may supplement it 
by other methods of measurement, such as the method of 
paired associates which has already been described. Ebbing- 
haus developed a method of prompting, in which the learner 
signals that he is in need of aid and is then supplied with the 
name of the missing word or syllable ; the number of prompt- 
ings is taken as a measure of retention. But this method is 
not to be recommended. 

If we are to obtain an insight into the nature of the methods 
of learning it is indispensable that we should make an inde- 
pendent investigation of every factor or condition wliich has 
to do with the work of memory. And for this reason the 
saving of time, the saving of energy, and other phases of the 
problem of learning has each been made the topic of a special 
investigation. ^ 

^ For a discussion of the meaning of economy in learning see Appen- 
dix II. 



Associative Learning 233 

It will be less difficult to give a clear description of the 
methods of learning and of the means which have been em- 
ployed in investigating them if we first present the successive 
stages through which the development of memory experi • 
mentation has passed. Then we shall add a summary state- 
ment concerning the significance which these experimental 
results possess for the teacher. 

Let us observe a pupil and note how he proceeds when he 
is assigned the task of memorizing a poem, or of learning 
words of a foreign language. Notwithstanding certain differ- 
ences in individual methods of learning, it will be found that 
most pupils commonly adopt the same procedure to the 
extent,* at least, that they break up the prescribed material 
into smaller sections, especially if it be a long task; then 
they learn each of the sections by itself, by a process of repeat- 
ing it over and over again; and finally they connect it all 
together by reading the whole material through from begin- 
ning to end. For instance, the pupil divides a stanza of 
poetry into two or three parts which vary in length with the 
content, the sentence construction, and the length of the 
stanza; and each part is memorized independently. Most 
pupils memorize foreign vocabularies by a process in which 
each word with its equivalent in the mother tongue is learned 
by a series of repetitions of the single pair of words. Seldom 
do we find a pupil who proceeds in any other fashion, for 
instance who reads the whole poem or the whole fist of words 
through from beginning to end and by always reading in this 
fashion attempts to memorize it as a whole. And yet general 
psychological considerations as well as experimental findings 
show that the latter method is the only one which is psycho- 
logically justifiable and that it is by far the more economical. 
That is, the "whole" method requires fewer repetitions and 
usually less time than the "part" method to produce a first 



234 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

errorless recitation; and, what is still more important, the 
"whole" method secures a more accurate reproduction and 
a more lasting retention. From this it would seem to follow 
that pupils should be induced to learn material as a whole 
and never in parts. It is especially true of the pupil whose 
memory is weak and whose reproduction is uncertain and hes- 
itant that a much more faithful reproduction and a more 
enduring remembrance is attained by the "whole" method. 
Since not only in school-children but also in most adults 
the "part" method is the one most frequently employed, 
we must devote a more detailed discussion to the surprising 
experimental result which has just been described. '^ 

In order that the methods of learning may be designated 
as accurately as possible, we shall introduce the following 
terms: The ordinary procedure in which the learner divides 
his material into sections and learns each section by itself 
and then proceeds to learn the whole as a whole, we shall 
call the part-procedure. But when he reads the material 
through from beginning to end during the whole process of 
learning, we shall speak of his method as continuous learning 
or the whole-procedure. 

Even in the earliest systematic investigations of memory 
Ebbinghaus found an indication of the difference between 
these two methods of learning; but Ebbinghaus reported 
only that with material whose parts are of very unequal 
degrees of difficulty the whole-procedure probably requires 

^ From questioning my acquaintances I have found that in certain 
individual instances children and adults have instinctively hit upon 
the use of the '' whole " method in their learning of all sorts of material; 
one of my colleagues reports that he has employed this method since 
childhood. In his monograph on retention and forgetting, Radossawl- 
jewitsch reports that the national singers of Servia learn all of their 
songs and poems by the ''whole" method {Op. cit., p. 93); and I have 
heard that certain primitive peoples know no other method of learning. 



Associative Learning 235 

somewhat more time than the part-procedure. ^ We shall see 
that this is sometimes true of materials whose parts are 
exceedingly non-uniform in their degree of difficulty; but 
this does not prove the falsity of our principle that in general 
the whole-procedure is more economical than the part pro- 
cedure. It was G. E. Miiller who by his experiments upon 
the learning of nonsense syllables first instigated the more 
accurate investigation of this problem; and it was Lottie 
Steffens, a pupil of Miiller's, who although her investigation 
was not wholly complete first showed that under certain 
circumstances it is more advantageous to learn an extensive 
material as a whole. The differences between different 
methods of learning and especially their effects upon perma- 
nent retention have been investigated, in normal individuals, 
by Pentschew, Ebert and Meumann, Ephrussi, Neumann, 
G. E. Miiller, Witasek and others, and in the insane, by H. 
Miiller. == Miss Steffens worked almost exclusively with 
adults, although a nine year old boy and a ten year old girl 
were included among her observers for purposes of compari- 
son. In all of the investigations in my own laboratory we 
experimented with both children and adults, and we adopted 
a strictly comparative procedure. 

Miss Steffens first determined what procedure adults nat- 
urally and normally adopt in learning a poem of nine lines. 
In order to discover how they distributed their repetitions 
over the material, she introduced a most ingenious device. 
Stanzas of poetry were read half-aloud and memorized by 
seven adults; during the progress of the learning the experi- 
menter indicated upon a duplicate sheet what sub-divisions 
the reader made in the stanzas during his process of learning. 
If, for example, the first four lines were read through five 

^ H. Ebbinghaus. Ueber das Ged'dchtnis, Leipzig, 1885, 69. 
^ See Bibliography. 



236 The Psychology of Learnmg 

times at the outset, this fact was recorded by drawing five 
vertical strokes in the margin beside these four Hnes. Hence 
"the length of the strokes indicated the section of the poem 
which was included in each repetition, and the order of the 
strokes indicated the order of the repetitions." Similar 
records were also made for the boy and the girl. J The f ollow- 
/Ihg characteristic features of procedure in learning were dis- 
covered: a. In the process of memorizing poetry every 
learner divided the stanza into parts, h. In memorizing sub- 
sequent parts they all went back occasionally over the parts 
which had already been learned and re-read these once more, 
partly for the purpose of delaying the onset of forgetting, 
and partly for the purpose of linking up the several sections 
which had been learned independently of one another. 
c. Every learner repeated the earlier lines more frequently 
than the later ones ; children wasted many more repetitions of 
the earHer lines than adults, d. The more difficult passages 
and words were memorized by special repetitions, e. The end 
of a section which had been learned by itself, and the begin- 
nings of the succeeding section were linked together by extra 
repetitions. /. Adults showed a general tendency to learn 
by attempting to recite what had been half memorized, mean- 
while looking back occasionally at the original for purposes of 
control; children learned solely by means of reading, g. The 
act of reading was slow in proportion as the material was 
difficult. 

Miss Steffens paid particular attention to individual pecu- 
liarities in learning. Different individuals seem to have wholly 
different habits in their mode of distributing their repe- 
titions over the material. Some read the whole stanza 
through at the outset and do not divide it into sections until 
this has been done; others attempt at the very outset to 
learn a part by itself, etc. The chief difference between the 



Associative Learning 237 

child's method of learning and the adult's consists in the fact 
that the child distributes his repetitions in an exceedingly 
unpractical and uneconomical manner. The child wastes a 
great many repetitions upon the first few lines of the stanza, 
and learns the latter part of the stanza in a very imperfect 
fashion. Such a method of memorization must, of course, 
result in a wholly non-uniform learning of the material. This 
uneconomical distribution of repetitions and certain other 
consequences of the part-procedure give rise to a hesitating 
recitation and to a non-uniform retention. 

What causes have given rise to the customary methods of 
learning? Why do most people learn in a manner which is 
psychologically incorrect and uneconomical? The chief cause 
is probably to be found in the fact that the various parts of 
materials to be learned are not all equally difficult. We first 
of all attempt to learn the more difficult parts separately; and 
in so doing we break the whole into sections. An additional 
reason is to be found in the fact that we are naturally indolent; 
we see the progress of our learning more readily when we learn 
smaller parts by themselves than when we attempt to mem- 
orize the whole at once. Then, too, certain individuals 
deliberately refuse to learn the whole material at once; they 
do not feel that they are equal to such a task. We found 
interesting illustrations of this natural repugnance, some of 
our adults declaring that the whole-procedure is nonsensical, 
but they later discovered to their astonishment how success- 
ful it is. There are other secondary causes which have given 
rise to our customary methods of learning; for instance, Miss 
Steffens expresses the opinion that our learning is not always 
dominated by economical motives but also by aesthetic and 
other motives which are at variance with economical consid- 
erations. Experimental investigation shows us, however, that 

the customary methods of learning are psychologically wrong 
17 



238 The Psychology of Learning 

and unpractical; that the whole-procedure secures a more 
advantageous formation of associations; that it leads to mem- 
orization more rapidly and with fewer repetitions; and that 
it guarantees a more uniform and lasting retention. 

As we have already remarked, Miss Stefifens proved only 
that the whole-procedure leads more rapidly to its goal. This 
was first investigated by means of stanzas of poetry of as 
nearly equal difficulty as possible. Selected stanzas were 
learned by several persons, first by the part-procedure and 
then by the whole-procedure. The differences in time although 
not always large were in favor of the latter method. 

Her averages show that the learning of a verse by the whole- 
procedure required 167 seconds, by the part-procedure 183 
seconds. A similar investigation of the purely mechanical 
learning of nonsense syllables was also made. Here, too, there 
was a slight difference in favor of the whole-procedure. The 
children's results were, on the whole, the same as those of the 
adults. Miss Steffens also attempted to determine whether 
the whole-procedure is also more advantageous when the 
memory material is of large amount. Her results furnish an 
affirmative answer to this question; even when long lists of 
nonsense syllables, — up to twenty syllables in a series, — 
were learned by the two methods, the whole-procedure usually 
led to errorless recitation in less time than the part-procedure. 

Miss Steffens then raised the question: Upon what does 
the advantage of the whole-procedure really depend? A 
group of special experiments, which dealt with this problem, 
showed that the whole-procedure possesses the following 
advantages: a. When poetry or prose is learned in sections, 
a special act of learning must be devoted to the transitions 
from one section to another. The special repetitions expended 
in this fashion are extra; they are not needed when we learn 
by the whole-procedure, b. When we learn by the part- 



Associative Learning 239 

procedure we establish numerous associations which must 
have an injurious effect in our subsequent recitation; in turn- 
ing back from the end of any section to its beginning we 
establish an association between the end and the beginning of 
the same section instead of associating the former with the 
beginning of the following section. These associations are an 
impediment to reproduction; and we must suppress them arti- 
ficially by a special learning of the transitions themselves. 
c. When a material has been learned, not only are associa- 
tions estabHshed between parts which immediately succeed 
one another but parts which are widely removed from one 
another are also linked together by mediate associations; and 
in learning the individual parts of our material we also note 
the positions which they occupy in the whole. These two 
aids to memory, — mediate association and "absolute posi- 
tion," — are reinforced by every complete reading during our 
process of learning the material as a single whole. But when 
we adopt a discontinuous and disjointed method of learning, 
these two advantages are decreased or wholly ehminated 
because the first few lines are now wholly disconnected from 
the succeeding Hues, since each is learned independently, and 
the position of the parts is continuously altered and shifted. 
For instance, at the outset the first few lines of each section 
occupy the initial position; but so soon as the parts are linked 
up in a whole they assume a new position, d. When we learn 
by the whole-procedure, our learning is uniformly distributed 
over all parts of the material; and if the parts of the poem 
are approximately equally difficult, the whole poem is learned 
more uniformly. Hence the method itself guards against our 
devoting too many repetitions to certain parts, and paying 
too little heed to other parts. 

Miss Steffens' investigation was not sufficiently complete 
to furnish a final verdict regarding methods of learning. 



240 The Psychology of Learning 

Beginning with the summer of 1901 we undertook an exten- 
sive series of experiments in the psychological laboratory at 
Zurich. These experiments dealt with the technique and 
economy of learning, their chief purpose being to discover 
the exact meaning of economical learning as discussed at the 
opening of this chapter. Accordingly our investigations 
dealt with three main problems: i. Which method of learn- 
ing leads to faultless recitation from memory in the shortest 
time and with the least number of repetitions? 2. Which 
method of learning secures the best distribution of attention 
over the material, and the best formation of association be- 
tween its parts? 5. Which method gives the most accurate 
reproduction and the most lasting retention? Our investi- 
gation throughout included a comparative study of children 
and adults. In the experiments wliich were devoted to the 
above three questions we employed five school-children, — 
two boys and three girls, eight, ten, eleven, twelve and four- 
teen years of age. The later experiments, particularly those 
of Meumann and Ephrussi, were concerned especially with 
the significance of the different methods of learning for dif- 
ferent sorts of memory material. 

We first took up the ordinary part-procedure and asked 
ourselves the question: Is it more expedient and more eco- 
nomical, in the sense described above, to divide the material 
into few or into many parts? For instance, when four 
stanzas of poetry are to be memorized, the question arises as 
to whether it is more advantageous to learn each of the four 
stanzas by itself or to sub-divide the poem into still smaller 
parts. Our experiments showed that learning by parts 
becomes more and more disadvantageous the more we sub- 
divide the material. And conversely, the more closely part- 
learning approximates to whole-learning, the more rapidly 
and certainly is the task accomplished. Furthermore, we 



Associative Learning 241 

inquired whether the superior advantage of the whole- 
procedure increases with increase in the amount of material 
to be learned. Our experiments showed that in the case of 
adults the advantage of tliis method becomes more evident 
with increasing amounts of material. For instance, if groups 
of 12, 16, 20 and 24 syllables are learned by each of the 
methods the saving in time and in repetitions, and the in- 
creased retention resulting from the employment of the 
whole-procedure are great in proportion as the group is 
large. 

If, now, the learning which is usually done in memorizing 
nonsense syllables is regarded as a purely mechanical memo- 
rization which derives no aid from the meaning of the material, 
and if the memorization of poetry is regarded as significant 
learning, we find ourselves confronted by the question: Is 
the whole-procedure more advantageous in mechanical learn- 
ing or in significant learning? We discovered that the greater 
advantage is derived in the case of significant learning. The 
differences between the two methods of learning are present 
in unmistakable degree only in cases where we learn signifi- 
cant material, but they are here very considerable. For 
instance, one of our observers, KL, learned two stanzas from 
Schiller's "Dido" on each of ten consecutive days; on alter- 
nate days, — first, third, etc., — she employed the part-proce- 
dure, and on intervening days the whole-procedure, — each 
stanza constituting a "part" in the former case. It was 
found that the whole-procedure showed an average saving 
of 14.5 minutes per stanza over the part-procedure. Thus 
even with such a relatively small amount of memory 
material as two stanzas of this poem there was a very consid- 
erable saving of time. Subsequent reproduction showed that 
the stanzas which had been learned as wholes were retained 
in memory with greater tenacity and were recited from mem- 



242 The Psychology of Learning 

ory with greater certainty. The number of repetitions em- 
ployed in the two cases reveals a similar state of affairs. The 
part-procedure required thirty-three repetitions for the mem- 
orization of each pair of stanzas, while the whole-procedure 
required only fourteen repetitions, — less than half the num- 
ber of repetitions for the learning of the same amount of 
material. Moreover, the usual hesitancy in recitation did 
not occur at the beginnings of sections or of stanzas when 
the whole-procedure had been employed. The superior advan- 
tage of this method appeared again when free reproduction 
was no longer possible; the partially forgotten stanza was 
re-learned more rapidly in those cases where it had originally 
been learned as a whole. 

Still another illustration of the difference between the two 
methods of learning material of moderate length may be 
cited. One of our observers, Kel., memorized five eight-line 
stanzas of poetry each day for several days, — employing the 
part-procedure and the whole-procedure alternately. He 
required thirty-two minutes, and forty-five repetitions for the 
memorization of each stanza when the part-procedure was 
employed; he required only twelve repetitions, but approxi- 
mately the same amount of time when he learned the stanzas 
as wholes. This case is particularly instructive because it 
shows that the advantage derived from the use of the whole- 
method consists not so much in a saving of time as Miss Stef- 
fens believes, but chiefly in a saving of repetitions, in a more 
correct formation of associations, and in a more permanent 
retention. It frequently happens that notwithstanding a con- 
siderably lesser number of repetitions, the gain in time from 
the use of the whole-procedure is not great, because most 
persons involuntarily read more slowly and more emphati- 
cally when they employ the whole-method. The difficult 
passages are read with especial slowness in order that they 



Associative Learning 243 

may be imprinted upon memory with maximum concentra- 
tion during every reading. 

The essential advantage of learning by means of the whole- 
procedure does not come to light, however, until we examine 
the mental factors which come into play in the two methods, — 
especially the behavior of attention and the formation of ^ 
associations. If all the parts of the material are of approxi- 
mately equal difficulty, then the circumstances which Miss 
Steffens found to contribute to economical learning must be 
taken into consideration: i. The associations between the 
various parts of the material must be of a more uniform degree 
of stability because the whole-procedure provides that the 
repetitions shall be uniformly distributed over the whole 
material. 2. The associations established by the whole- 
procedure are formed in the direction and only in the direc- 
tion in which they are subsequently to operate in reproduc- 
tion; while the part-procedure estabHshes backward asso- 
ciations between the end and the beginning of the same sec- 
tion. In the former case, reproduction progresses smoothly 
and without hesitation at the points of junction between the 
several sections, j. The association of each section with its 
position in the whole body of material is formed correctly 
from the outset and is reinforced by each successive reading. 
As a result of this the remembrance of position becomes a most 
effective aid in reproduction. 4. In the learning of signifi- 
cant material our apprehension of the meaning and of the 
logical coherence of the material is much more effective in 
the formation of associations when the whole-procedure is 
employed. It is clear that the meaning of the whole is much 
more readily comprehensible and is much more permanently 
present in consciousness when we read the material through 
from beginning to end than when we read each part sepa- 
rately. Even the separate parts are themselves more readily 



244 -^^^^ Psychology of Learning 

understood when they are always interpreted from the whole. 
The advantage which learning derives from an understanding 
of the meaning of the material is so great that the efficiency 
of significant learning is found, under certain circumstances, 
to be ten times as great as the efficiency of mechanical memo- 
rization. When we have recourse to the part-procedure, 
therefore, we eliminate the most potent factor which can 
contribute to learning. 5. The clearer apprehension of the 
coherence of material learned by the whole-procedure gives 
rise to a much more efficient behavior of attention. Since 
the attention is continuously attracted by the meaning of 
the material its tension does not relax so readily and a uniform 
degree of concentration is preserved. In consequence of this, 
automatic and purposeless recitations are not so likely to 
occur; they are, of course, almost wholly ineffective for memo- 
rization. This chiefly explains why fewer repetitions are 
necessary when the whole-procedure is employed; every 
repetition is fully utilized because the concentration of atten- 
tion has been maintained throughout. 

It was the special aim of our investigation to determine 
whether these differences between the two methods of learn- 
ing, which we found to occur in the adult, are present also 
in the child. We discovered, to our surprise, that the differ- 
ences are not duplicated in all of their details. If we are to 
understand this we must bear in mind that the memory of 
children of school-age, up to fourteen years, is a much less 
efficient instrument than that of the studious adult who 
constantly exercises his memorial functions. This is partic- 
ularly true of the mechanical memory of children. The view 
is universally held by students of pedagogy and psychology 
that the mechanical memory of children is superior to that of 
adults, except perhaps in the case of very young children. 
Our experiments have convinced us that this view is erroneous. 



Associative Learning 245 

In comparing the memory of the child with that of the adult 
we must distinguish between two different capacities: the 
capacity to learn and the capacity to remember. The child's 
capacity to learn is inferior to that of the adult; but what 
has once been learned is retained better by cliildren. Yet we 
have evidence which proves that even in young children, under 
the age of five or six years, retention is less permanent than 
in adults. This is to be inferred from observations that cliil- 
dren who become deaf before the age of about six years also 
lose the power of speech and must thereafter be educated as 
deaf mutes; it is also found that children forget their mother- 
tongue when they emigrate to a foreign country while adults 
never forget their native language. 

We do not yet know at what age the child's retention 
becomes superior to that of the adult. Experiments have 
shown, however, that material which has been learned either 
mechanically or significantly is retained better by school- 
children than by adults, and that adults memorize much 
more rapidly than school-children.^ Adults who constantly 
exercise their mental functions are able to learn much more 
rapidly than children. The inferiority of the child's memory 
especially its inferiority in verbal memorization, always aston- 
ished us anew when we compared the efficiency of students 
and instructors with that of school-children. This inferiority 
was indicated in the results of Bolton's investigation of the 
development of memory in children. Bolton pointed out 
that the development of memory depends much more upon 
the age than upon the intelligence of the child. This means 
that his physiological age prescribes a definite limit which 
the memorial efficiency of even the intelhgent child cannot 
transcend, and that older children excel younger children 
simply because they are older. 

' Radossawljewitsch {Op. cit.) has amply demonstrated this fact. 



246 The Psychology of Learning 

This seems to indicate that the adult, — in our investiga- 
tions, the adults varied between twenty and forty-six years 
of age,^ — must possess a capacity to learn which is superior 
to that of the child of fourteen years or less. But is this not 
contradicted by the familiar experience that capacity of 
verbal retention decreases with age, and that children learn 
mechanically more readily than adults? Before I became an 
experimental psychologist I once observed that a long geo- 
metrical demonstration was committed to memory by a child 
because he failed to understand it. I then made an attempt 
to memorize the same demonstration word-for-word and suc- 
ceeded only with the greatest difficulty. Similar observations 
could be cited by every teacher; but they do not prove what 
they are alleged to prove. All of our mental functions owe 
their efficiency to continuous training. The adult has hab- 
ituated himself to learn by meaning alone, and to retain the 
content alone. This habitual procedure forces his mechanical 
learning into the background; but it does not entail a loss 
of his capacity to retain in a mechanical fashion. Hence, 
until he reaches a very advanced age the adult can, by a 
brief training, so restore his neglected mechanical memory as 
to become able to learn more than three or four times as 
rapidly as the average child of even the higher school grades. 
Ebbinghaus found that his own capacity to learn had not 
declined at the age of fifty-two years. This, however, refers 
only to learning, not to retention. By simply re-training 
himself in learning the adult becomes capable of learning 
every sort of material in less time, with fewer repetitions and 
with less fatigue; but he does not retain it so faithfully as 
the child. 

The experimental psychologist has a confirmation of both 
of these phenomena in the quantitative comparative investi- 
gations of the memories of adults and children. The memori- 



Associative Learning 247 

zation of a series of sixteen to twenty-four nonsense-syllables 
is perhaps the best example of mechanical learning which 
can be conceived; in the accomplishment of such a task 
adult learners above the age of twenty years are, after a 
brief practice, considerably superior to children up to the age 
of fourteen years. Lists of twelve syllables fatigue the younger 
child; eight-year-old children are usually unable to learn a 
series of sixteen syllables at a single sitting, even though they 
continue their efforts until they are exhausted. The prac- 
tised adult, on the other hand, learns series of twenty-four 
and more syllables at a single sitting without serious fatigue. 
Then, too, it is not only lack of practice in learning by rote 
which usually impairs the mechanical memory of the adult, 
but rather the direction of his interest which goes out to the 
meaning of what he learns and endeavors to seize upon only 
the particularly important items or upon the aesthetically 
pleasing features of the material. When, therefore, an adult 
is asked to commit to memory a passage of prose, we invari- 
ably find that it is more difficult for him to abandon the 
accustomed direction of attention upon the content and to 
turn his attention to every individual word of the material. 
The fact that with practice the adult very soon becomes 
more efficient than the equally practised child is doubtless 
due to several causes. In the first place, all secondary con- 
ditions of learning, especially the concentration, the intensity 
and the uniformity of attention, are less highly developed in 
the child; then, too, the adult tires less readily, — he has more 
endurance, energy and self-control. And finally, when sig- 
nificant material is presented the adult's more rapid compre- 
hension of its meaning aids him, together with a wealth of 
secondary associations which he is able to attach to the 
words. 
The fact that children excel adults in the retention of sim- 



248 The Psychology of Learning 

ilar material, learned under similar conditions, comes to light 
in experimental investigations, especially in the finding that, 
in re-learning, the saving in repetitions is relatively greater 
than in the case of adults. And this difference in efficiency 
increases with increase of time intervening between learning 
and re-learning; it is also greater for children of seven years 
than for children of thirteen or fourteen years. Thus we find 
the same difference within childhood itself; the younger the 
child (it has been proved up to seven years) the less easily 
does he learn by rote but the more accurately does he retain 
what he has learned. 

This lesser efficiency of the child's memory so far as the 
act of learning is concerned explains the difference in the 
results obtained by different methods of learning. We found, 
namely, that in the child's mechanical learning, the part- 
procedure at first leads more rapidly to the goal than the 
whole-procedure. This is due to the fact that the child finds 
the whole-procedure displeasing and discouraging at first 
because he feels that he is making no progress. It is charac- 
teristic of the mental operations of children, however, that, 
especially in younger children, their emotions and their moods 
are of prime importance in determining the success or failure 
of their work. Disinclination and faint-heartedness, fear of 
having been assigned a task which is beyond their powers,— 
these are usually not overcome in the case of the child, as they 
are in the case of the adult, by an increased effort. The child 
is at the mercy of these debihtating moods; again and again 
we found in our experiments that nothing is so important for 
the mental work of children as the consciousness that they are 
able to accomplish the task assigned. When the child learns 
his material in parts he is aware of his progress from the 
outset; applying himself to small sections he soon masters 
them, one after another, and feels that he will soon be master 



Associative Learning 249 

, of the whole situation. ^ This changes, however, as soon as ' 
- he becomes aware of the advantages of learning the material 
as a single section. With increasing practice even the child \ 
learns more rapidly, with fewer repetitions and with more ) 
accurate retention when he employs the whole-procedure. / 
When significant material is learned, the whole-procedure 
proves to be almost as advantageous for children as for adults, 
as is shown by the following data: Emplo}dng the part- 
procedure, an eight-year-old boy learned a verse of Goethe's 
Erlkonig in seventeen repetitions; in eleven repetitions when 
he employed the whole-procedure. He learned another verse 
of the same poem in fifteen repetitions when it was divided 
into two sections; and immediately afterwards he learned 
the next verse as one section in ten repetitions. Approxi- 
mately this same state of affairs was found with all school- 
children. Subsequent re-learning was easier when the stanzas 
had originally been learned by the whole-procedure. This is 
true also for larger amounts of material so long as they do 
not fatigue the child. We may therefore regard the following 
general result as established: For adults and children it is 
more advantageous and it is psychologically and pedagog- 
ically more appropriate to learn every sort of material as a 
whole than to break it up into parts. 

But what is to be said of the learning of material which | 
does not constitute a coherent whole, such as names, dates, | 
the words of a foreign language, etc.? Experiments which ' 
have been conducted in my laboratory show that with this 
sort of material also it is more advantageous to employ the 
whole-procedure than to learn it in parts. Words of a foreign j 

language, — Italian, Russian, Latin, Bulgarian, — to the num-' 

I 

' For a discussion of these and other inhibitions of the will of the 
child, see Meumann's Vorlesungen zur Einjuhrung in die experimen- 
Idle P'ddagogik, I., 297ff. 



250 The Psychology of Learning 

ber of fifty, were read aloud to observers; in one case, the 
words were learned in the usual manner, each pair being mem- 
orized separately; while in another series of experiments the 
whole series was read through from beginning to end. The 
latter procedure gave the better results and was in every 
way more economical. 

The reason for this advantage is probably to be found 
chiefly in the fact that in learning the series as a whole the 
observer is impelled to distribute his repetitions uniformly 
and abundantly, and to concentrate his attention equably 
throughout. Something which is relatively new is presented 
to the attention at every step; by this means, a non-signifi- 
cant and purely mechanical recitation is avoided, and not a 
single repetition fails to be productive in the acquisition of 
the material. On the other hand, of course, there is here no 
reinforcement of learning by means of a coherence of the whole 
body of material. 

According to investigations made by Neumann, at the insti- 
gation of Martins, upon high school pupils from nine and a 
half to ten and a half years of age, there are certain other 
points of view which must be taken into consideration in 
deciding the relative merits of the different methods of learn- 
ing. This investigator also found that the whole-procedure is 
much more economical than the part-procedure. But the 
advantage of the whole-method is immediately apparent only 
in the case of bright pupils and rapid learners; with dull 
pupils the advantage appears gradually, and only after long 
practice. It turns out, too, that increase of practice benefits 
the whole-procedure more than the part-procedure. Other 
results of Neumann's experiments will be discussed later; let 
us here mention only that he found the superiority of the 
whole-procedure to be evident also in cases where the material 
is to be reproduced not in its original but in a changed order. 



Associative Learning 251 

Do these two methods of learning always remain equally 
advantageous and disadvantageous with every sort of ma- j 
terial? This question was investigated by Ephrussi in an 
extensive series of experiments in G. E. Miiller's laboratory 
at Gottingen. Groups of nonsense-syllables, pairs of Russian- 
German words, combinations of words and numbers, and 
stanzas of poetry were learned by each of the methods. , 
Ephrussi found the surprising result that the part-procedure ^ 1 
gives better results with nonsense-syllables, while the whole- 
procedure is more advantageous with significant materiaL- 
This she explains from the fact that in dealing with nonsense- 
syllables we are obliged to devote a certain amount of effort 
to the task of becoming acquainted with the material itself, 
that is, we must become famihar with the nonsense-syllables 
whereas we are already familiar with the significant words. 
And, she adds, the part-procedure famiharizes us with the 
syllables more rapidly than the whole-procedure because 
individual repetitions in immediate succession can always 
make use of the after-effect of the pre\dous reading of the 
syllables. (Ephrussi refers to this after-effect as a Persever- 
ation.) This finding has no essential pedagogical significance 
because, in the first place, children are not required to learn 
nonsense material, and hence the whole-procedure is better 
for all material learned at school. And secondly, Ephrussi 
did not investigate the general effect upon memory, in par- 
ticular, she omitted to investigate permanent retention; she 
determined only the Trefer, that is, the reproduction of a 
syllable from the clue furnished when the experimenter pre- 
sented the syllable which had been learned with it in a single 
unit of time or rhythm. From this datum alone it is impossible 

' Ephrussi calls the part-procedure the method of learning by accu- 
mulated repetitions. This is not an appropriate term because the 
whole-procedure is also a learning by accumulated repetitions. 



252 The Psychology of Learning 

to draw any reliable conclusion regarding the economy of a 
method of learning. 

However advantageous the whole-procedure may be, it 
must be adapted and modified before it can be employed in 
the work of the school-room because a condition which we 
have assumed throughout the foregoing discussion is seldom 
fulfilled in the work of the school-room, — namely, one rarely 
finds that the material to be learned is equally difficult in all 
of its parts. If a poem or a list of words contains parts which 
are very much more difficult than any of the other parts, the 
method which learns it as a whole compels the learner to 
continue reading the easier parts which have already been 
mastered, for the sake of the more difficult parts which have 
not yet been mastered. This is of course a disadvantage; 
and the method has yet another objection. 

It may be shown experimentally that when a large body of 
material is learned in one piece, — for instance, a poem of 
eight stanzas or a series of sixteen syllables, — the concentra- 
tion of attention is not so uniform throughout as one might 
suppose. The attention rather follows a typical curve of 
varying degrees of concentration showing a maximum inten- 
sity at the beginning and towards the close but relaxing at, 
or shghtly beyond, the middle region. In consequence of 
this, the middle portion of the material is always learned 
most slowly when the whole-pTQcedure is employed; and if 
the learning has not been thorough the middle portion of the 
material is soon forgotten. This typical behavior of attention 
can readily be observed in the learning of nonsense-syllables. 
Ask an observer to learn a series of syllables by the whole- 
procedure; interrupt him as soon as he has read the Hst 
through twice and find out what he has already learned. 
Then have him read the whole series twice more and again 
determine how many and which syllables have been learned. 



Associative Learning 253 

If this experiment is continued until the whole series is com- 
mitted to memory the records obtained at the various stages 
during the progress of learning will show the order in which 
the various members of the series are mastered. It will 
almost invariably be found that the first syllables and the last 
syllables are memorized first, that the intermediate syllables 
are acquired more slowly, and that at a certain point in the 
series, — about the ninth or tenth syllable, — there Hes a min- 
imum degree of concentration, as is shown by the fact that 
these syllables are almost invariably the last to be learned. 
If the series is very long, two minima of concentration usually 
appear. In learning by the part-procedure these minimal 
degrees of concentration do not make their appearance 
because with the beginning of each section of the material 
the attention re\'ives with renewed energy and with a maxi- 
mum of concentration. 

We have attempted to overcome these two objections by 
introducing procedures which have been called the mediating 
procedures. These methods occupy a position intermediate 
between the whole and the part-procedures; and they com- 
bine the advantages of both without possessing the disad- 
vantages of either. One of these mediating procedures stands 
the test with all sorts of memory material. In this procedure, 
the whole body of material is di\^ded into parts, the basis of 
division being the degree of difficulty of content; and the 
parts are marked off by a stroke, or, if convenient, by a blank 
space. In reading the series the learner pauses for a short 
time at the end of each section but he does not then return 
to the beginning of the section; instead he continues to read 
through to the end as in the case of the whole-procedure. 
I. Hence as in the whole-procedure associations are formed 
only in the direction in which they are to operate in subse- 
quent reproduction; and retrogressive associations at the end 
18 



254 T^^^ Psychology of Learning 

of the various sections are avoided. 2. The pauses at the 
end of each section enable the attention to return to its task 
with fresh vigor and with a maximum degree of concentra- 
tion. This procedure can best be illustrated from its applica- 
tion to nonsense-syllables; and the principle may then be 
carried over without change to any other sort of material. A 
series of twelve syllables is written in two sections of six 
syllables each, and between the two sections is a blank space. 
In reading the series the observer always pauses at this 
point but thence continues to the end, never returning to the 
first syllable from the sixth. 

A second mediating procedure can best be employed with 
non-coherent material, such as the vocabulary of a foreign 
language. In this method the reading of the series of words 
progresses continuously until the learner observes that certain 
members of the series prove to be especially difficult. These 
he indicates by a written mark; he devotes a special effort 
to learning them and then returns to the reading of the whole 
series, — continuing until the whole is uniformly memorized. 
This variation of procedure enables us readily to adapt the 
whole-procedure to material which is not uniformly difficult 
throughout its length. Numerous experiments have dem- 
onstrated the superiority of these methods over the ordinary 
whole-procedure. 

Our experiments have shown that the mediating methods 
are capable of very wide application, and that they are exceed- 
ingly advantageous and economical. It must be noted in 
this connection, however, that these two are not the only 
possible modifications and adaptations of the whole-procedure 
to the nature of the material. 

Neumann obtained a somewhat different result in his inves- 
tigation of the learning of a French vocabulary, where the 
whole-method again proved to be the more advantageous. 



Associative Learning 255 

In these experiments Neumann made a special investigation to 
determine which method of learning a German-foreign vocab- 
ulary ensured the most accurate reproduction, — the learner 
being asked to reproduce the pairs of words in an order which 
differed from that in which they had stood upon his printed 
Hst. Here again the whole-method gave better results, but 
that was probably due to the form in which the mediating 
method was employed. Neumann himself advances the 
hypothesis that there are various possible reasons for this 
phenomenon; and he is of the opinion "that the form and 
the content of the material to be learned, and the individuality 
of the learner must determine which method is best in any 
given instance." 

Now it must be observed that all of the investigations of 
learning which we have described were concerned exclusively 
with learning by rote, and with the proper formation of such 
associations as are necessary for verbal memorization. In 
the next section we shall deal with special conditions not 
only of mechanical memorization but also of the learning of 
significant and intelHgible material. It is upon an under- 
standing of these conditions that a real technique of learning 
must be based. 

4. The Conditions and the Technique of Mechanical Learning 

Every act of learning is, in part, mechanical, — even that 
learning in which we derive aid from an understanding of 
the material, or from an apprehension of its logical, ethical and 
aesthetic meanings. This mechanical aspect of learning con- 
sists in a repeated imprinting, during which the will and the 
attention are not directed toward an understanding of the 
material, as such, but toward an acquisition and imprinting 
itself which become the object of our activity while the under- 
standing of the material is subordinated as a means to this end. 



256 The Psychology of Learning 

The more complete the mastery and the more perfect the 
command which we wish to obtain over any memory material, 
or the more easily, certainly and permanently, and the more 
accurately and completely we wish to be able to reproduce it, 
the more must we bring into operation this activity of sheer 
imprinting and its chief means, — the attentive repetition of 
the material. 

Attentive repetition tends more and more to become our 
sole means of learning in proportion as the material offers 
few opportunities for a formation of associations, for an incor- 
poration of the material into larger groups of mental content 
and for a logical and intellectual elaboration of its meaning. 
Attentive repetition becomes a less and less important factor 
in proportion as the material affords more of the above oppor- 
tunities; but it never wholly loses its significance. In learn- 
ing significant material the adult is often disposed to under- 
estimate the importance of this mechanical factor of attentive 
repetition in which the imprinting becomes an end in itself, 
because in the course of his development he has always set 
out to apprehend the concrete ideational content or the 
abstract thought-content of all memory material in order to 
utilize these as means to retention. In so doing he abandons 
the habitual use of mechanical learning; but in all cases 
where he must recall any material in accurate verbal form, 
he finds it impossible to dispense with the use of the mechanical 
factor of learning. Hence with advance in mental develop- 
ment we tend more and more to abandon the fac simile 
mirroring of our experiences; and in place of verbatim repro- 
duction is substituted an independently elaborated and indi- 
viduaHzed copy of our experience. In making this substitu- 
tion, however, we no longer reproduce the original experience 
but only make an approximate copy of it. 

Wessely reports that this phenomenon appeared in the 



Associative Leanmig 257 

different classes of a high school in Berlin. He wished to 
determine whether memory material which had been learned 
in the various departments of the school was still retained in 
memory after long intervals of tim.e, and whether it promised 
to become a permanent possesesion of the pupil. Pupils from 
ten to fifteen years of age were asked to write from memory 
a poem which they had learned about a year before; and from 
the data thus collected Wessely deterirdned the amount re- 
membered. ^ 

In a second experiment, boys of nine to fifteen years of 
age were asked to learn lists containing eight Latin words 
with their German equivalents. The memorial effect of the 
learning was tested immediately afterwards, and also after 
intervals of one day, eight days, and four weeks. The pro- 
cedure employed in testing their reproduction consisted in 
presenting the German words in a changed order, and having 
the pupils recall the corresponding Latin word". 

These investigations showed that retentive capacity in- 
creases, in the first type of experiment, up to twelve years of 
age, in the Latin vocabulary test, up to eleven years, inclusive ; 
and from there onward retention and certainty of reproduc- 
tion decrease. These experiments with high school pupils 
confirm the main results of the investigations of retention 
which have already been reported; after the pupil reaches a 
certain age, however, it is found that accuracy of retention 
decreases with increase of age. The only divergence from our 
results is Wessely's finding that retention increases up to about 
the age of twelve years. Wessely himself is not wiUing to 
ascribe this increase to an increase of formal training in learn- 

' R. Wessely, Zur Methode des Auswendiglernens, Neue Jahrbucher 
fur das klass. Allcrtimi, 1905, 297ff;373ff. Certain of Wessely's con- 
clusions with which the present author does not agree are discussed 
in the latter's Vorlesungen zur EinJ'uhrung in die exp. P'ddagogik. 



258 The Psychology of Learning 

ing, but refers it to the natural growth and development of 
mental capacity. As a matter of fact, two different phenom- 
ena make their appearance in these experiments. The mem- 
ory of some pupils continues to develop for a time; and 
children pass over more and more to the memory type of 
adults, that is, they begin to rely more and more upon appre- 
hending and reproducing by content alone, and abandon the 
accurate, and especially the verbal, memorization of material. 
The mechanical factor of memorization comes into oper- 
ation in more pure form the more meaningless is the material 
to be learned; and hence dates and pairs of synon3ans are 
learned more mechanically, that is, more through the influence 
of mere attentive repetition, than are grammatical rules. 
We find the purest illustration of the type of mechanical 
memorization in the learning of meaningless material; in 
psychological experiments it is illustrated in the memoriza- 
tion of nonsense syllables. Hence the significance of experi- 
ments in learning with nonsense syllables consists in the fact 
that they show us in purest form the conditions of the mechan- 
ical factor in learning. The existence of these conditions is 
here shown either by mere observation of the learner's 
procedure, or in much more exact form, by systematic varia- 
tion of particular factors of learning. When one of these 
factors is varied independently while all of the other factors 
remain unchanged, we are in general justified in ascribing 
any variation in result to the influence of this one changed 
factor; and then we can draw inferences as to the significance 
of this factor itself. For example, in one case we vary only 
the tempo of learning, in another case the rhythm, in a third 
the distribution of repetitions; and we determine how each 
of these changes affects the result of the learning. The infer- 
ence that this variation in result is to be ascribed solely to the 
changed condition is not at once permissable ; and it frequently 



Associative Learning 259 

requires numerous variations of the original experiment to 
clear up the matter and to bring out the casual relation 
distinctly. 

Investigations of this sort, where the particular conditions 
of learning have been varied systematically, have given us 
our chief insight into most of the conditions of mechanical 
learning. I shall present a survey of these conditions as they 
have been revealed by the results of experiments heretofore 
undertaken in this field. 

The conditions under which we learn a material are partly 
determined by external,' objective factors, such as the material 
itself, its amount and its character; they depend, in part, 
upon the subjective factors which together constitute the 
learner's procedure. We may accordingly subdivide the con- 
ditions of learning into external or objective, and internal or 
subjective. The subjective conditions again are concerned 
partly with the general behavior of the learner, his internal 
condition, his attention and the like; partly with the forma- 
tion of associations. In all of our subsequent discussions 
we shall take the experimental learning of nonsense syllables 
as the typical case of mechanical learning. 

Among the external conditions of learning we may men- 
tion, first of all, the tempo of learning, or of speaking or read- 
ing during the process of learning. This carries us over into 
the most universal and fundamental condition of memorial 
work^ because the tempo of learning determines the time 
during which not only the single syllable remains in conscious- 
ness and is imprinted upon consciousness, but also the rapidity 
with which the associations between the several syllables are 
formed. Experiments have shown that the tempo of speech 
during the process of learning exerts a st-rong influence upon 
the rapidity with which we succeed in memorizing. Ebbing- 

^See pp. i5f. 



26o The Psychology of Learning 

haus ^ asserts that according to his own observations the most 
rapid learning is the most advantageous, at least in so far as 
ratio of amount learned to time expended is concerned. 
Ogden, however, did not find a confirmation of this statement; 
his experiments show only that rapid reading secures a better 
survey over the series of syllables. According to Ogden's 
results, the number of repetitions increases so rapidly with 
increased rapidity of learning that rapid learning may become 
disadvantageous. ^ I have found that neither rapid nor slow 
learning is in itself advantageous; but that the matter 
depends chiefly upon adapting the rate of learning or of 
reading or speaking to the degree of familiarity of the material, 
to the progress of memorizing and to the individuaUty of the 
learner. When we set to work upon an unfamiliar material 
it is, of course, disadvantageous to sweep over it with the 
eyes and with the attention in an effort to learn it with 
extreme rapidity; this procedure decreases the memorial 
effect of the first repetitions because in such cases we do not 
become familiar with the material until the third or fourth 
repetition. We waste repetitions in our attempt to obtain 
a correct apprehension of the \isual-auditory impressions and 
to understand the meaning of the material. This is true even 
in the case of meaningless material. In the learning of a 
meaningful text a too rapid rate of reading prevents our com- 
prehending the meaning, as was shown from observations 
which I made in Kraemer's^ experiments. In the case of a 
significant text it is an indispensable condition of economical 
learning that the rate of reading should be adapted to the 

^ H. Ebbinghaus, Psychologic, Leipzig, 1902, (Dritte Aufl.), I., 672. 

^ Cf. the observation by Ephrussi, p. 262 of this volume. 

^ N. Kraemer, Experimcntelle Untcrsuchungen zur Erkenntnis dcs 
Lernprozcsses, Leipzig, 191 2. See also Diirr, in Ebbinghaus' Psychol- 
ogic, Dritte Aufl., I., 674. 



Associative Learning 261 

understanding of the content of the text. When on the 
other hand, we make our first reading as slowly and as atten- 
tively as possible, and then gradually increase the rate of 
reading and of learning we obtain the best results. I per- 
formed the following experiment in the investigation of this 
problem: The revolving drum which carried bands of non- 
sense syllables was provided with a crank so that it could be 
rotated by the learner himself at whatever rate he chose. 
The rapidity with which he rotated it was recorded accu- 
rately, to one-hundred ths of a second, by a graphic method. 
The sole instructions given to the learner were that he should 
rotate the drum in such manner that he might learn most 
conveniently and might feel that he was making the most 
satisfactory progress. Our results show that the drum was 
rotated very slowly at first, much more slowly than in the 
ordinary experiments with syllables; then the rate increased 
with periodic accelerations and retardations until, toward the 
close of the period of learning, the learner chose an exceed- 
ingly rapid rate of reading which permitted only a fugitive 
and superficial glance. This experiment shows that the ra- 
pidity of learning must be adapted to the degree of memorizing 
which has already been acquired, — the appropriate technique 
of learning requiring a slow learning at first, followed by a 
more and more rapid rate. Hence we miss the mark if we 
constantly force the learner to memorize slowly; as we also 
do if we urge him constantly to hasten as Ebbinghaus believed 
that we should do. After memorization has made a certain 
amount of progress, a slow rate of reading becomes more and 
more disadvantageous. Not being sufficiently employed, the 
attention digresses; sensations of strain, impatience and 
aversion make their appearance, and all of these have an 
unfavorable influence upon learning. 

These experiments were subsequently varied in such fashion 



262 The Psychology of Learning 

as to allow the learner to choose his own tempo; and here it 
was found that different learners proceed differently under 
these conditions. Some, apparently those of especially impul- 
sive nature, begin with an exceedingly rapid tempo; then 
they slacken their speed and again accelerate it toward the 
close of the period of learning. 

Rapid learning is not advantageous for permanent reten- 
tion. In general it seems to be true that the more rapidly 
we learn the less permanently do we retain. This appears to 
be confirmed by all the later experiments of G. E. Miiller's 
pupils. Thus Ephrussi found the "paradoxical" result that 
a tempo of reading and learning proves to be economical or 
non-economical of time according as the retention is tested 
by the method of re-learning or by the method of paired 
associates. ^ That is, although we save time by learning rap- 
idly we make fewer "hits," or fewer correct reproductions of 
the immediately following syllable when any given syllable 
is named by the experimenter. This can be explained only on 
the assumption that an acceleration of the rate of learning 
may be of advantage in securing a first correct memorization, 
but it is not advantageous for permanent retention. This 
result of Ephrussi's^ was tested by Jacobs whose method 
consisted in an auditory presentation of nonsense syllables.^ 
The experimenter read the syllables aloud in trochaic rhythm, 
from a revolving drum, while the observer listened with 
closed eyes. Here again, learning was more rapid when 
presentation was more rapid, that is, the total time required 
for the memorization of the series was shortened. Unfor- 

^ Cf. p. 167. 

2 P, Ephrussi, Op. ciL, p. 192. Concerning alleged "economy of 
energy" see Appendix II. 

^ W. Jacobs, Ueber das Lernen mit ausserer Lokalization, Zeits- 
chriftf. Psychologic, XLV., 1907, 43-77; 161-187. 



Associative Learning 263 

tunately, Ephrussi and Jacobs did not determine the effect 
of change in rate of learning upon permanence of retention. 
A survey of all of these experiments gives us the following 
view concerning the significance of the tempo of learning. 
A certain optimal rate of learning leads most rapidly to 
initial memorization; where this is the only aim of learning, 
therefore, the rapid rate is economical. But the rapidity of 
the single readings must not be too great; because if it is, 
the gain in time is more than compensated by an increase in 
the number of repetitions required and by a corresponding 
increase of fatigue. The more rapidly the material is learned, 
the less permanently is it retained; and where permanent 
retention is desired, rapid learning is uneconomical. Real 
economy of procedure always consists in adapting the tempo 
of learning to the individuahty of the learner and to the 
stage which he has momentarily reached in his act of 
learning. 

Another very important external condition of learning has 
to do with the rhythm which the learner employs. AU experi- 
menters testify that it is in the highest degree disadvanta- 
geous to learn without rhythm. Experiments by Miiller and 
Schumann, and by M. K. Smith yielded the result that a 
suppression of rhythmic vocahzation makes it almost impos- 
sible for certain individuals to learn. In continually repeating 
a material, we involuntarily fall into a rhythmic speech, and 
the intentional continuation of this rhythm is advantageous 
in learning. Of special importance here is a definite grouping 
of our impressions, that is, a combining of syllables into visual 
and auditory groups; and experiments have shown that the 
members of such a rhythmic group enter into a particularly 
secure association with one another. Now the question arises: 
Which rhythm or which poetic meter proves to be most favor- 
able for learning? We found that, in general, the dissyllabic 



264 The Psychology of Learning 

verse-foot is the most favorable. It is, moreover, advan- 
tageous to combine the single feet into groups so that, for 
example, a series of twelve syllables is apprehended as two 
groups of six syllables each. Some find it more convenient to 
combine a series of twelve syllables into three groups of four 
syllables each. G. E. Miiller believes that for Germans the 
trochee is, in general, the optimal rhythm; but we have not 
found this to be confirmed in our laboratory. In two investi- 
gations, where the observers included natives of fourteen 
different countries, we determined which rhythm was pre- 
ferred by each observer. We found that rhythms are distrib- 
uted over the different nationalities in the most irregular 
fashion; indeed, the preferred rhythm in many countries 
differs for different provinces. North Germans tend to accen- 
tuate the ultimate syllable. South Germans the initial syllable; 
and each of these habits has an influence upon learning. 
Nagel found that the North Germans and the Scandinavians 
learn with a rising inflection, the South Germans with a 
falling inflection. G. E. Miiller has recently emphasized the 
value of investigating the formation of rhythmic complexes 
and their influence upon learning. From observations made 
by Nagel and Meumann the formation of complexes appears 
to be largely an individual matter, that is, the mode of com- 
bining the elements of a nonsense series in learning seems to 
vary from individual to individual. The significance of these 
complexes for the economy of learning seems to me to consist 
in the fact that their existence indicates that the individual 
learner has discovered the particular rhythmic grouping which 
is most appropriate for him. Moreover, differences in the 
learner's procedure and in the effect of learning come into 
consideration in this manifold variety of possible groupings; 
and while these differences may be of interest in a highly 
specialized psychology of memory they have no direct bearing 



Associative Learning 265 

upon our present discussion whose purpose is of a dominantly 
practical sort. ^ The further question may be raised: Is it 
easier to learn by reading aloud, in an undertone, or silently? 
We found that sotto voce learning gives in general the best 
result. An exception to this, however, is furnished by young 
children, where one finds, remarkably enough, that silent 
reading is most favorable to learning. But this again prob- 
ably varies with the ideational type of the individual; the 
more the learner employs motor imagery, the more advan- 
tageous is his motor speech. Sotto voce speech seems to be 
most advantageous for the auditory-motor tj-pe; reading 
aloud distracts their attention too much. 

Another group of external conditions of learning includes 
the manner in which we imprint the material by repetitions. 
In connection with the repeated reading of materials a first 
question to arise is: Is it advantageous to learn the whole 
material at a single sitting? Or do we gain anything by inter- 
rupting the readings and distributing them over a number of 
sittings? Ebbinghaus found that the distribution of repe- 
titions in learning is an especially important condition for the 
economy of energy. He discovered, namely, that in series of 
syllables where we do not accumulate the repetitions but 
distribute them over a long period of time with intermediate 
pauses we find that a great saving of repetitions results. For 
example, when the repetitions were distributed over three 
days, each series required thirty-eight repetitions, while sixty- 
eight repetitions were necessary when they were all accumu- 
lated at a single sitting. This problem was investigated more 
accurately by Jost;^ we shall select one of his experiments 

'The reader is referred to my criticism of G.E.Miiller in Appendix II. 

^ A. Jost, Die Associationsfestigkeit in ihrer Abhaingigkeit von der 
Verteilung der Wiederholungen, Zeitschr. f. Psychologic, XIV., 1897, 
436-472. 



266 The Psychology of Learning 

to illustrate his plan and method. In one case, he devoted 
thirty repetitions without pause to the learning of a series 
of syllables; in another case, he employed ten repetitions on 
each of three successive days. In both cases he tested ac- 
curacy of retention twenty-four hours after the repetitions had 
been completed. He found that the syllables which had been 
learned with distributed repetitions were retained better than 
those which had been learned with the same number of accu- 
mulated repetitions. Jost also attempted to determine how 
far the distribution of repetitions may be carried without 
giving rise to a deleterious result. He found that when the 
material to be learned is of large mass the most extensive 
distribution is the most advantageous, both as to rapidity of 
learning and permanence of retention. Even when the dis- 
tribution is spread out to such an extent as to make but a 
single repetition per day, the result is better than when the 
repetitions are accumulated into a single sitting, provided, of 
course, that other circumstances do not make such an exten- 
sive distribution disadvantageous. Jost attempts to explain 
this striking phenomenon from his "law of the age of asso- 
ciations." "Older" series of associations, i.e., those series of 
associations which were acquired some time pre\dously, are, 
according to this law, more readily refreshed and reinforced 
than "younger" or more recently acquired associations, or as 
Jost expresses it: "Of two associations which are of equal 
strength but of different ages, the older receives the greater 
intensification from a new repetition." Now when the rep- 
etitions employed in learning a material are spread out over 
a longer period of time, it comes about that we deal more and 
more with relatively old associations, while when the repeti- 
tions are accumulated we are forced to work with relatively 
young associations. Jost's law does not seem to be valid 
for smaller and easier materials, where we find that uninter- 



Associative Learning 26^ 

rupted learning until memorization is reached proves to be 
more advantageous. We need scarcely do more than indicate 
the pedagogical significance of Jost's law. Whenever the 
child is obliged to master a voluminous memorial material he 
should be given instruction and opportunity to learn it in 
easy stages; the memorization should not be forced but the 
repetitions should be distributed as widely as the prescribed 
course of teaching permits. 

We have repeated Jost's experiments, and on the whole 
we have confirmed his findings. One of our observers was 
exceptional, however, in that the distribution which prescribed 
one repetition per day proved to be disadvantageous on 
account of his forgetting between sittings. 

This problem is to be carefully distinguished from another 
of kindred nature. Apart from the question of temporal 
distribution we may ask what significance the number of 
repetitions has for learning, and especially for retention. 
Or what is the effect of an accumulation of repetitions of any 
given material? Let us assume that a material which, so 
far as its amount is concerned, can be learned perfectly well 
at a single sitting is learned until it can be repeated once from 
memory. What now is the effect of additional repetitions? 
Of course one would expect that the material would become 
more firmly fixed in memory and would be better retained. 
But the question arises: i. Is this expectation fulfilled? 
2. Is this increased retention relatively easily attained, or 
only by a great number of extra repetitions? According to 
the experiments of Ebbinghaus the extra repetitions grad- 
ually become less and less effective so that, for instance, a 
disproportionately large number of repetitions must be em- 
ployed in order not only to attain the first recitation from 
memory, but to imprint the material so indelibly upon mem- 
ory that it can be repeated without error at the end of twenty- 



268 The Psychology of Learning 

four hours, or can be retained permanently. This observation 
was, in general, confirmed by Weber and by Knors ; but these 
investigators also show that a process of learning which has 
been continued only to the point where a first recitation from 
memory is just barely possible does not by any means guar- 
antee a complete mastery or a permanent retention. Many 
additional repetitions are still necessary before a lasting reten- 
tion is attained. It is clearly evident that immediate repro- 
duction is a potent factor even in tliis process of "first correct 
recitation."^ 

Certain important rules for the practice of teaching may 
be derived from the foregoing, i. The mere act of learning 
a material until it can barely be reproduced never secures a 
permanent retention in the case of nonsense material of con- 
siderable bulk, even up to ten or twelve syllables; in the case 
of significant material it very seldom secures a permanent 
retention. From this it follows : 2. that for everything which 
is to be retained permanently, a subsequent "freshening" by 
means of additional repetitions is indispensable. It follows, 
too, 3. that we should not be content to regard the ability 
barely to recite it from memory as an indication that a material 
has been memorized. Really permanent retention or complete 
mastery demands many more repetitions for its achievement. 
We see here how important the factor of mechanical learning 
is for genuine memorial function. That which is to become 
an imperishable possession of memory, — not as a part of one's 
systematized body of knowledge, but only as a datum of 
concrete cognition, — can be acquired only at the cost of many 
repetitions. 4. If we wish, at a single sitting, to learn a 

^ J. Weber, Untersuchungen zur Psychologic des Gedachtnisses, 
Zeitschrift f. d. exper. P'ddagogik, VIII., 1908. C. Knors, Experimen- 
telle Untersuchungen uber den Lernprozess, Archiv. f. d. gesamte Psy- 
chologie, XVII., 1910, 297-361. 



a, Associative Learning 269 

material so perfectly that it will be retained permanently we 
must devote an excessive number of repetitions to it; and 
even then the result, so far as permanent retention is con- 
cerned, will remain in doubt. 

Among the external conditions of memory must also be 
mentioned the mode of presenting the material. It is a matter 
of importance whether the learner himself reads the material 
or whether he hears it read. Thus we distinguish between 
learning by means of visual and by means of auditory presen- 
tation. It is of especial interest to pedagogy to determine 
whether either of these is a more profitable procedure than 
the other. 

We have investigated this problem experimentally, and we 
found that learning by means of the visual method is easier, 
both for children and adults, than by the auditory method* 
This is true both for meaningless and meaningful materials. 
This law is limited in its application, however, on account of 
the dependence of learning upon the individual equipment 
of the learner, and particularly upon the ideational type to 
which he belongs. It is to be expected that a person whose 
im.agery is essentially visual will learn better from visual 
presentation, while the representative of the auditory type 
will learn more readily that which he hears. But still we have 
found that even the auditory individual sometimes learns 
better from visual than from auditory presentation. This I 
find to be true of myself. It is due in part to habituation, 
and in part to the fact that more associated elements come 
into play in visual presentation. Our observations must be 
supplemented, first of all, by the results obtained by Pohl- 
mann, who reports that nonsense material is learned better 
from visual presentation, while significant material is learned 
better when heard. But this conclusion is unfortunately inval- 
idated by the fact that Pohlmann did not take the ideational 

19 



270 The Psychology of Learning 

types of his observers sufficiently into account. Then, too, 
it seems natural to suppose that the advantages possessed by 
visual presentation, in the case of nonsense syllables, may be 
due merely to the fact that visual stimuli are apprehended 
more readily than auditory stimuli. If this is true, the phe- 
nomenon does not belong to the domain of memory or learn- 
ing at all and would not occur with materials which are more 
easily perceived and apprehended. 

This phenomenon, however, has no direct bearing upon 
the work of the teacher. One may not infer directly from 
this that in the school-room it would be more advantageous 
to have the pupils employ visual learning exclusively because 
there are many secondary circumstances which would inval- 
idate the rule. Among these is the circumstance that audi- 
tory learning, or the act of learning from the oral instruction 
of the teacher possesses more of the character of common 
and equal work by every member of the class, while in visual 
reading each pupil is left more to himself. The former is 
always a more favorable condition for the work of children. ^ 
Moreover, auditory learning provides an incentive to the 
attention of children; and in using this method of presenta- 
tion the teacher can more readily influence the will and secure 
the active co-operation of his pupils. These secondary effects 
of teaching are probably more significant in auditory than in 
visual learning. If some investigator would clear up this 
matter by experimentation he would render a distinct service 
to psychology. 

It may be assumed to be very probable that certain factors 

^ C/. Pohlmann, 0/>. cz7., pp. i68ff.; also Pentschew, Ueber Oekon- 
omie und Technik des Lernens, Arch.f. d. gesamte Psychologie, I., 1903, 
514. For a discussion of the influence of the class upon the work 
of the individual pupil, see the papers by A. Meyer, F. Schmidt, and 
W. Baade. 



Associative Learning 271 

which appear to be subordinate still serve as aids to memory 
in the act of learning. To this group belongs the locahzation 
of the items in the material which is learned. We know that 
certain indi\dduals tend to note the position upon a page 
where a passage stands. When the child learns words or 
dates he may imprint a visual picture of the page or column 
where they occur. I know a man who memorizes his lectures 
so perfectly from his manuscript that in lecturing he is able 
to follow the original, page for page, in a purely mental 
fashion. This factor of locahzation is an important aid to 
memory. Its significance for the learner is intimately related 
with his memory type. The visualizer employs spatial locali- 
zation much more than do individuals who belong to the 
auditory and the auditory-motor types; he estabhshes definite 
associations between certain items of the memorized material 
and their position upon the page, and he also associates them 
with other visual criteria especially those of a spatial sort. 
Miiller and Schumann found that in learning nonsense sylla- 
bles we note the "absolute position" of particular syllables, 
and that this process is an aid to retention. Miiller and Pil- 
zecker discovered still other sorts of localization which prob- 
ably have greater significance for the auditory-motor learner. 
The position of an item in a memorized group of syllables or 
words may be remembered in three different ways: 7. Locah- 
zation in visual space. This consists in associating the syl- 
lable, word, or group of words with the position where it was 
seen. 2. Locahzation by means of verbal labelhng. The 
syllables are counted during the process of reading, and the 
number or numerical position of particular syllables in the 
series is noted and remembered, j. Locahzation by means of 
modulation of speech. The observer remembers the varia- 
tion of inflection or of melody of speech with which the material 
was heard during the process of learning. This third sort of 



272 The Psychology of Learning 

localization is successfully employed only by individuals of 
the auditory type. 

Walther Jacobs made a detailed investigation of the influ- 
ence of external and internal localizations. Syllables were 
learned by auditory presentation, the observer having before 
him cards upon which were printed as many circles as there 
were syllables in each series. In a first group of experiments, 
the observer looked at these circles while the syllables were 
being read to him, and imagined each syllable to be localized 
in one of the circles. In a second group of experiments, the 
observer listened with closed eyes and attempted to localize 
the syllables in a purely subjective fashion. Jacob's results 
showed that observers differ very greatly in procedure accord- 
ing to their ideational type. Visualizers transform the audi- 
tory syllables into visual images, sometimes so definitely and 
clearly that they are able to describe even the handwriting 
into which they have transformed them; they also localize 
and "mark" the position of syllables in a perfectly definite 
manner. The presence of the schema of circles facilitated 
localization for all learners; but visual learners localize more 
definitely when their eyes are closed than when they see the 
circles. Auditory and auditory-motor learners localize much 
less definitely; and with closed eyes their localizations are 
exceedingly imperfect. A characteristic feature of these 
results consisted in the fact that an increase in the rapidity of 
reading forces the learner to make more and more use of his 
auditory imagery; and this is true even of the visual tj'pe of 
learner. This finding confirms my own view that visual 
ideating is always a slower process than auditory-motor ideat- 
ing. On the whole, the introspections of observers indicate 
that a rapid tempo of presentation increases the rapidity of 
auditory-motor learning; and in the case of the auditory- 
motor type, the more rapid tempos are advantageous for this 



Associative Learning 273 

form of learning. A slow tempo possesses corresponding 
advantages for visual learning.^ 

It is worthy of note that the visualizer probably makes 
greater use than do the other types not only of visual criteria 
but also of criteria derived from spatial localization in general. 

Among the external circumstances which have a direct 
bearing upon learning must be mentioned yet another differ- 
ence in the learner's mode of procedure; and this may be 
designated briefly by the phrases " learning by means of purely 
visual reading" and "learning by hearing oneself read." 
Whenever an adult learns any material by reading it over and 
over again, it may always be observed that only during the 
first few readings is his attitude and behavior similar to that 
of an ordinary reader; so soon as he begins to become familiar 
with the material he takes up the attitude of an auditor and 
listens to his own reading. He attempts to recite the material 
from memory, and he glances back to the text again only when 
his recitation hesitates or halts. Witasek showed by a special 
investigation that these two modes of procedure have wholly 
different effects upon learning.^ Recitation is considerably 
more effective in securing a first perfect memorization than 
is simple reading, — perhaps as a result of the greater amount 
of energy expended, — and the effect is greater when a certain 
amount of memorization has already taken place in conse- 
quence of previous reading before recitation is attempted. 
Katzaroff also found, on repeating Witasek's experiments, 
that when recitation is combined with reading in the act of 

^ C/. Miiller and Pilzecker, Op. cit., p. 221; R. M. Ogden, Archiv f. 
d. gesamte Psychologic, II., 1903, 120; A. Pohlmann, Op. cit., 29; W. 
Jacobs, Zeitschrift f. Psychologic, XLV., 1097, especially 44. 

^ S. Witasek, Ueber Lesen und Rezitieren in ihren Beziehungen 
zum Gedachtnis. Zeitschrift f. Psychologic, XLIV, 1907, i6i£f.; D. 
Katzaroff, Le role de la recitation comma facteur de la memorisation. 
Archives de psychologie, VII., 1908, 225-258. 



274 ^^^^ Psychology of Learning 

learning a more permanent retention results. It is expedient, 
therefore, to employ a combined procedure,— combining a 
number of readings of the material with a number of at- 
tempted recitations, and prompting the learner meanwhile 
whenever he hesitates. Witasek experimented with twelve 
combinations of the two factors which may be presented in 
tabular form, — the number of readings being indicated by 
Roman numerals, and the number of recitations by Arabic: 

VI... o VI... 5 VI... lo VI... 15 

XI... o XI... 5 XI... 10 XI... 15 

XVI... o XVI... 5 XVI... 10 

XXI... o 

Of these twelve possibilities Witasek found that a combina- 
tion of six readings with fifteen recitations is the most eco- 
nomical method so far as saving of time is concerned. 

It is indispensable that these experiments be repeated and 
that their results be confirmed before they are applied in 
pedagogy because the learning of children is distinguished 
from that of adults by the very fact that the former learn 
almost exclusively by a process of reading. Is recitation as 
effective in the case of children as it is in adults? Does the 
same combination of readings and recitations give optimal 
results in the two cases? 

final external condition of learning is a product of the 
quantity and the quality of the material which is to be learned. 
As regards its quality, much depends upon whether it is 
meaningless or significant material; and in case it is signifi- 
cant material, upon whether it is prose or poetry, concrete or 
abstract, narration or description, and the like. Since we 
are considering mechanical learning separately, we shall now 
discuss the influence of amount of material in the learning of 
nonsense syllables. It may be remarked here that the rela- 



Associative Learning 275 

tionship between amount of material and act of learning is 
similar in the case of meaningless and significant materials. 

The fundamental question here is : Does difficulty of learn- 
ing increase proportionately with increase in amount of mate- 
rial? Or does some other relation obtain between these two 
variables? Ebbinghaus formulated the law that difficulty of 
memorization does not increase in direct proportion with 
increase in amount of material, but that larger groups or 
greater masses of material require a disproportionately greater 
number of repetitions. 

I have repeatedly tested the validity of this law, and I find 
that it does not hold. More recent experiments conducted 
by Weber and Knors in my laboratory at Miinster revealed 
the reason for the discrepancy between my earher results and 
those of Ebbinghaus. Weber discovered that the law of 
Ebbinghaus is valid only for unpractised learners. The 
more training one has in memorization, the more does the 
number of repetitions show the very opposite relation; that 
is, the learning of large masses of material demands relatively 
fewer repetitions than the learning of smaller masses of mate- 
rial. This may be illustrated by citations from our data. 
Ebbinghaus found that for the learning of groups containing 
7, 12, 16, 24 and 36 syllables he required the following num- 
ber of repetitions respectively: i, 16.6, 30, 44, 65. Thus the 
number of repetitions increases much more rapidly than the 
number of syllables. I have never obtained such results 
from practised observers; and only with observers who were 
wholly unpractised in the memorizing of nonsense syllables 
did Weber and Knors obtain such a progressive increase in 
number of repetitions. From this it follows that the law of 
Ebbinghaus does not possess universal validity. Our pupils 
are on the whole relatively practised learners; and with 
practised learners we always found a confirmation of the law 



276 The Psychology of Learning 

which I formulated, and which may be illustrated by the 
following data: 

8 syllables were learned with 5.2 repetitions 



12 








10.4 


16 








17 


18 








21.5 


24 








30 


36 








32.5 



In the data reported by Ebbinghaus the leap from 7 to 12 
syllables (i to 16.6 repetitions) is the only one which is 
(approximately) valid. This may be explained from the fact 
that at this point occurs the transition from immediate reten- 
tion to actual learning. And this relation conforms with our 
observations of mental work in general, and with all of the 
findings which have been reported during many years of 
experimental investigation of memory. It would indeed be 
remarkable if an increase in the amount of material to which 
we apply our mental energies did not derive some advantage 
from the general expenditure of energy and the general ad- 
justment of activity which we must devote to the material 
when the increment is not present. In the affairs of every- 
day life a slight amount added to a task does not seem to 
demand so great an expenditure of energy for its accomplish- 
ment as it would if the increment constituted our sole task. 
So too in the process of learning, our adaptation of attention, 
our adjustment to the activity and to the material, our 
mastery of initial disinclination, our steady increase of con- 
centration, our reciprocal reinforcement of associations, and 
the whole group of constellation factors contribute to the 
benefit of the material to be learned, if we only bring them 
into action in the right manner. Or in other words, the 
amount of material to be learned is not so effective in 



Associative Learning 2JJ 

determining how many repetitions must be employed as is 
the coming into play of all of those formal conditions of 
learning. 

At the same time, the slow increase in number of repetitions 
with increase in amount of material reveals the presence of a 
fact of will, and also perhaps of an attitude or adjustment, 
which may be described by the statement that the expendi- 
ture of energy is regulated automatically to conform with the 
magnitude of the achievement which is demanded of the 
learner. It is a matter of every-day observation that our 
task progresses more readily when we make it a part of a 
larger task than when we set about it independently. Our 
awareness of the fact that the task is larger leads us uncon- 
sciously and involuntarily to a keener and more effective 
concentration of our energies. I have found this phenomenon 
to occur in learning, in the work-curve, and even in ergo- 
graphic experiments, so that I am led to suppose that it may 
be a universal law of will. ^ 

Fortunately mind is not organized so uneconomically that, 
as one might infer from the law of Ebbinghaus, our mental 
work increases more rapidly than the results which it accom- 
plishes; but, on the contrary, we find a relative decrease in 
expenditure of energy with increase of mental achievement. 
This principle holds of course only within the limits of the 
indi\iduars working-power or his available psychophysical 
energy. In an investigation of the learning of 20, 24 and 30 
syllables, — with myself as observer and Radossawljewitsch 
and Dannenbaum as controls, — dullness and weariness occa- 
sionally made themselves felt in the longest series, and I was 
then obKged to report that I could no longer succeed in learn- 
ing; but until one approaches the limit beyond which addi- 
tional repetitions make no additional contribution to memorial 
^ Cf. E. Meumann. Hausarbeit tiud ScJiidarheU, Leipzig, 1904. 



278 The Psychology of Learning 

effect, the number of repetitions wholly fails to increase in 
accordance with the Ebbinghaus law of progression. 

These facts have of course an important bearing upon 
pedagogy. They show us that it is not desirable to reduce to 
a minimum the amount which is to be learned at a single 
sitting, as one must infer from the law of Ebbinghaus, but 
that the task assigned for a single period must be as great as 
the capacity of the learner permits. 

A natural transition to the internal conditions of learning 
may be made through a consideration of the question: What 
relation obtains between number of repetitions and concen- 
tration of attention? Most psychologists support the view 
that these two factors are interchangeable with each other. 
They believe that when the learner concentrates his attention 
more intensively and more uniformly, he learns with a lesser 
number of repetitions; and when the learner's concentration 
is neither intensive nor uniform he must make good this defect 
by an increase in the number of his repetitions if he is to 
obtain an equal result from his learning. This law is valid in 
a certain sense; but its range of vaKdity is limited by the fact 
that both attention and repetition have their own peculiar 
effects upon memory. Increased concentration of attention 
secures one result more rapidly, — namely, a first errorless 
recitation; but while a saving in repetitions is thus effected, 
retention is less permanent. Increase in number of repetitions 
on the other hand, has an especially favorable effect upon 
lasting retention. This conclusion is supported by various 
experiments upon memory. We shall return to it in our dis- 
cussion of attention and forgetting. Let us now turli to the 
internal or subjective conditions of learning. 

It is, of course, very important to know and to control these 
subjective conditions, — the whole mental disposition which 
the learner finds to be present during his process of learning. 



Associative Learning 279 

And it would be an ideal state of affairs if throughout our 
experiments and throughout the work of the school-room we 
could keep these subjective conditions as constant and as 
uniform from day to day as we are able to do in the case of 
the objective conditions of our experiments. But this is an 
exceedingly difficult task. It usually lies within the power of 
the experimenter and of the teacher to choose approximately 
uniform external conditions under which a child shall learn; 
but we are seldom able to secure complete control of the 
learner's internal condition. 

A first point which concerns us in learning is the regulation 
of the attention. The attributes of attention which have 
chiefly to do with learning and retention are intensity and 
uniformity of concentration throughout the whole act of 
learning, and particularly persistence of attention throughout. 
Every-day experience teaches us that these three attributes 
have an intimate bearing upon the act of learning. The more 
intensively a person concentrates his attention upon his act 
of learning, the sooner will he succeed, as a rule, in memorizing. 
On the other hand, the attribute of uniformity of attention 
is concerned chiefly in the learning of a large body of material, 
and in associating its various parts with a uniform degree of 
stability. We may distinguish between an individual and a 
general unevenness or lack of uniformity of attention. Gen- 
eral lack of uniformity is due to the nature of the attentive 
process itself, to the material upon which attention is con- 
centrated, and in part, to the method of learning. We know 
from general observation that the duration or persistence of 
attentive concentration varies from individual to individual. 
There are individuals whose attention functions in a typically 
regular and uniform fashion; others however possess a typi- 
cally fluctuating attention which alternates between states of 
concentration and relaxation. 



28o The Psychology of Learning 

General concentration depends upon the nature of the 
attentive process. The nature of attention is such that it 
cannot function uniformly, and psychology recognizes the 
existence of normal fluctuations of attention. These fluctua- 
tions, whose alternations may be of long or of short duration, 
make themselves felt, of course, in our learning.* 

Then too an irregularity in the distribution of attention is 
due to the nature of the material. When material interests us 
or when it has meaning for us it claims the attention in greater 
or lesser degree. Irregularity of attention is even more inti- 
mately related to the method of learning which we adopt. 
It may be said that each method has its own typical distribu- 
tion of attention, or more accurately, its typical irregularity 
of distribution of attention. We have already seen that 
when we learn by means of the whole-procedure we find a 
typical irregularity of attention to manifest itself in the fact 
that the middle region of the series of syllables is invariably 
learned with a lesser intensity of concentration. At the 
beginning of the series attention enters upon its task with a 
relatively high degree of intensity, and toward the close a 
second impulsion of attention makes itself felt; but at the 
middle region a lesser degree of concentration occurs. When 
the part-procedure is employed a different distribution of 
attention takes place. Here it strikes out anew with each 
new section of the material; but it also dies down more 
rapidly because when this method is employed the same short 
section is repeated over and over again in immediate succes- 
sion. This is the reason why the mediating methods are 
much more effective for learning. The latter methods pro- 
vide for the associations being established in proper serial 

^ The physiological causes of fluctuation of attention are discussed 
by Zoneff and Meumann, Ueber den Ausdruck der Gemiitsbewegungen 
in Atem und Puis, Philos. Studien, XVIII., 1901, 44ff. 



Associative Learning 281 

order; and they also make it possible for attention to recover 
for a moment at the stopping-places within the group of 
material, and then to proceed with renewed energy at the 
beginning of the next section without being dulled or blunted 
as it advances through the series. 

The endurance or persistence of attention must be regarded 
as another subjective condition of learning. The opposite 
condition shows itself in the exhaustion of attention. Kraepelin 
was the first to point out that individuals differ widely in this 
regard, some possessing an attention which is readily fatigued 
while the attention of others is characterized by endurance. 
One need scarcely remark that it is a matter of great impor- 
tance for the teacher to be able to determine whether a child 
possesses an enduring or an easily exhausted attention. This 
factor must be taken into account not only in the manage- 
ment but also in the evaluation of pupils. 

Adaptation is another subjective condition of learning 
which may be explained from the attributes of attention. 
By adaptation we understand the accommodation of atten- 
tion to the activity of the moment. We have already seen 
that individuals differ widely in their rapidity of adaptation. 
Certain persons are typically rapid, and others are typically 
slow to adapt; and to this variation is chiefly due the differ- 
ence between the rapid and the slow learner. 

Another subjective condition of learning, and one which 
has been too little heeded, is the affective state which is 
present during the act of learning. The emotional condition 
in which we find ourselves during the performance of a mental 
task is of profound importance for the accomplishment of 
the task. In general, it may be said that an emotion of pleas- 
antness facihtates the function of memory, and that unpleas- 
antness has a very detrimental effect upon memory. We are 
all familiar wnth the experience that when during a state of 



282 The Psychology of Learning 

extreme unpleasantness we have to learn something, it usu- 
ally requires a great effort to overcome the unpleasantness; 
while a moderate cheerfulness or a calm but pleasurable 
mood is favorable to efficiency in all mental work. This rule 
however, is not universally valid. All emotions exert an 
influence upon the work of memory; and all impair it if they 
exceed a moderate degree. Experiments have shown that a 
certain equable mood is especially advantageous for learning. 
vVhat this statement means can best be described by com- 
paring an unpractised with a thoroughly practised learner. 
The unpractised learner is usually subject, at the outset, to 
^^ell-marked fluctuations of emotion. He may feel a certain 
oleasure in the experiment, perhaps however an uneasiness 
due to the unfamiliarity of the material and to other external 
:ircumstances. This fluctuation of emotion is particularly 
deleterious to the act of learning. With progressive practice 
the learner gradually discovers the mood which is propitious 
to the work in hand; and it seems probable that this is in- 
timately related to the relative degree of intensity with which 
the desire to learn must be present. If this relative degree of 
desire is present, the most favorable condition for learning, 
or otherwise expressed, the state of equable emotion or of 
emotional equilibrium is attained. 

Another group of subjective conditions of learning may be 
designated by the word "tension." The advent of tensions 
in the muscular system is a concomitant of concentrated 
attention. Almost everybody who strains his attention to 
keen concentration may note that he also contracts muscles 
at different parts of his body; and these contractions come to 
consciousness as sensations of strain. The distribution of 
muscular contractions and sensations of tension is wholly 
different in different individuals, and is to a certain extent a 
matter of habit. Certain persons observe them in the mus- 



Associative Learning 283 

cular apparatus of the sense-organs, especially in the eyes and 
the visual muscles; others in the toes or in the muscles of the 
legs; in certain instances, the muscles of the neck are con- 
tracted, the teeth are set and the fists are clenched during 
keen concentration. Now these tensions always make their 
appearance when we are engaged in learning, and they accom- 
pany our every act of learning. How important they are may 
be seen when we compare the unpractised and the practised 
observer in a memory experiment. The untrained learner 
ordinarily employs too much motor strain at first. Such an 
excessive expenditure of tension impairs the function of mem- 
ory; and, in consequence, the beginner is obliged to expend 
many more repetitions in learning a material than the trained 
observer. During the course of the experiment, however, a 
feeling of the proper amount of tension is usually acquired 
by the learner; and then ensues that equable condition which 
is most favorable for memorial efficiency. 

It seems probable that the phenomenon of impulse of will, 
which Kraepelin investigated, is related with these tensions. 
We spur and impel the will from within whenever during the 
course of a long act of learning we detect that the attention 
is flagging or that the desired memorial result is not being 
attained. These impulsions probably have both an intel- 
lectual and a motor aspect. The intellectual aspect consists 
in the accomplishment of our task and the realization of the 
voluntary resolve by whose aid we hold ourselves to the task. 
The motor aspect consists in the arousing of tensions from 
the groups of voluntary muscles; and this dual phenomenon 
brings it about that transient relaxations of attention are 
eliminated. 

A further feature which belongs to the subjective conditions 
of learning has to do with the disposition of the learner. This 
simply means our general physical and mental condition. 



284 The Psychology of Learning 

When the disposition is favorable, the work of memory pro- 
gresses more efficiently than when an unfavorable disposition 
is present. A general rule of method may be derived from 
this because, since investigation shows us that the learner's 
psychophysical disposition exerts a very strong influence upon 
the process of learning, the teacher must take this fact into 
consideration. It is impossible to obtain as satisfactory results 
from an ill-disposed child as from the same child when in a 
normal condition. Moreover, it is to be noticed that certain 
children have abnormally great fluctuations of disposition; 
these demand a different treatment in a case of long-continued 
memory work than children who are perfectly sound and 
normal. ^ 

Yet another group of internal conditions is designated by 
the term practice. This term has a two-fold meaning in the 
German language. We use it to designate the process of 
training, and also to designate the result of training. It would 
be better to substitute for the latter some other term, such as 
skill. The amount of practice or skill which an observer 
possesses exerts an exceedingly great influence upon the result 
which is attained in his memory experiments and in his learn- 
ing in general. For this reason the experimenter arranges that 
a so-called maximum degree of practice shall be attained by 
his learners in the preHminary stage of his investigation. 
Maximum practice represents the point beyond which further 
progress is not, or is scarcely, attainable. The practised 
learner proceeds more economically under all conditions of 
learning than the unpractised observer. As we have already 
seen, the former employs no superfluous tensions; he has a 
more equable mood, more intensive and more regular concen- 
tration, requires fewer repetitions, etc. Now experimental 

^ A. Fuchs, Dispositionsschwankungen bei normalen mid schwach- 
sinnigen Kindern, Gutersloh, 1904. 



Associative Learning 285 

investigations have yielded the exceedingly important result 
that learning is to an extraordinary degree subject to training. 
This phenomenon however is so significant that we shall 
devote a special discussion to it. ' 

Habituation, as a condition of learning, is intimately related 
to practice. Habituation also consists of a group of subjective 
conditions which must be taken into account in the investi- 
gation of memory. Every observer passes through a stage 
in which he is not habituated to memory experiments, not 
only as regards the objective conditions under which they 
are conducted but also with respect to subjective procedure, 
to material to be learned, and to the peculiar demands which 
are made upon him during the experiment. So long as this 
period of strangeness and unfamiliarity continues, experiments 
cannot be conducted properly ; hence it is customary to intro- 
duce a number of preliminary experiments. The emotional 
state and the tensions which we have already mentioned 
belong among the factors of habituation; but neither of them 
is wholly dependent upon habituation. 

Another group of subjective conditions may be referred to 
as the influence exerted by the ideational type upon the act 
of learning. The ideational type to which an individual 
belongs exerts an influence upon the result of his mental 
work. Thus, for instance, in the experiments which we ordi- 
narily regard as fundamental to the whole psychology of mem- 
ory, — in the learning of nonsense syllables, — auditory-motor 
ideation is, on the whole, the most advantageous endowment; 
and, indeed, an especially favorable condition is found to be 
present when the auditory-motor type is to some extent com- 
bined with the visual type. This is due to the fact that 
nonsense syllables may be memorized by reading and pronounc- 
ing them sotto voce. Here we have, on the one hand, a func- 

' See the concluding section of this book. 
20 



286 The Psychology of Learning 

tioning of the motor processes of speech with the concomitant 
sensations of movement, as well as a functioning of the audi- 
tory and the visual images of the syllables. On the other hand, 
the purely visual type is at a disadvantage in this sort of 
learning because the syllables are seen for but an instant, and 
moreover the visualizer possesses no vocalization or auditory 
imagery to reinforce his memory. One finds a similar state of 
affairs in a great part of the work of the school-room. Chil- 
dren are required to remember a great many things which 
they learn through hearing alone; and here again the auditory- 
motor type excels. Hence the ideational type must be taken 
into account, above all else, in deciding upon the method of 
presenting material which is to be learned because when the 
mode of presentation conforms with the learner's type he 
learns more readily. Jacobs found that when material is 
presented in auditory fashion the visual observer transforms it 
into visual images wherever the experimental conditions give 
occasion for his doing so; and this visual transformation is 
done with such definiteness by certain observers that they see 
the letters before them in a particular form of handwriting. 
Jacobs^ also reports, — and this is confirmed by every-day 
observation, — that the visualizer receives more aid from 
spatial localizations; he notes the "absolute position" of 
syllables in the series, of words in the list, of sentences upon 
the page, etc. The auditory-motor individual, on the other 
hand, notes the position of particular items by labelling them 
with their consecutive numbers, by observing their position 
in the "speech melody," and in the vocal rhythms. Most 
learners seem then to localize the various parts of their mem- 
ory material but they do so by wholly different means accord- 
ing to the ideational type to which they belong. Consequently 
Miiller and Pilzecker distinguish three sorts of localizations: 
"■ W. Jacobs. Op. cit., 5off. 



Associative Learning 28"/ 

Localizations in visual space; auditory-motor enumerations; 
and vocal modulations.'' 

A final subjective condition has to do with the influence of 
the task or of the will upon the act of learning. Whenever 
we set to work upon memory material, a definite task or 
problem hovers before our minds; for instance, we are con- 
scious of the fact that we are to learn a certain number of 
syllables or verses of poetry as rapidly as possible, in such 
fashion as to be able to recite them from memory and to remem- 
ber them as long as possible. The manner in which we ideate 
the problem or task is a matter of great importance in learn- 
ing. It may even be shown that the efficiency of the learning 
is determined by the sort of problem which we set up before 
ourselves. For example, in experiments upon memory it is 
necessary that the observer should know during the act of 
learning whether he is subsequently to be tested by the 
method of re-learning or by the method of paired associates; 
and if our experimental procedure includes both methods, we 
very soon find that the observer inquires: Which method are 
you going to employ in testing this memorization? When 
this question is answered he regulates his whole procedure in 
accordance with the form of test which is subsequently to be 
applied. If he knows that the method of paired associates is 
going to be employed, he involuntarily adopts a procedure 
which makes the association between each pair of syllables as 
closely knit as possible, and prepares himself relatively little 
for a free recitation of the whole series of syllables. When, 
however, he knows in advance that he is going to be tested 
by the saving method he pays almost no heed at all to the 
individual associations but devotes himself to learning to 
recite the whole list. Yet another illustration: When the 
observer knows that the only thing which is to be determined 
^ Cf. the discussion in the foregoing pages. 



288 The Psychology of Learning 

is the rapidity with which he can learn to recite the whole 
list once from memory, he adopts a wholly different procedure 
from that which he follows when he knows that his permanent 
retention also will be tested. In the former case, he learns 
only for the momentary effect; in the latter case, he aims to 
have his learning result in a lasting retention. And if we should 
deliberately assign the task of learning only for a single reci- 
tation from memory but should subsequently test his perma- 
nent retention, we would find that he actually retains the 
material much less permanently. In general, then, we may 
formulate the rule that the consciousness of the task should 
correspond as closely as possible with the nature of the achieve- 
ment which we shall subsequently demand; if the assigned 
problem does not conform to the achievement which we test, 
the efficiency of the learning will invariably be impaired. 

Everything which we have discussed from the point of view 
of the conditions of mechanical learning may also be regarded 
as having to do with the general conditions of all learning 
because all learning has a mechanical aspect. When signifi- 
cant material is learned, however, a number of additional 
factors come into operation. The importance of the mechan- 
ical factor of repetition is somewhat lessened in logical mem- 
orization; but none of the conditions of learning which have 
been mentioned lose their importance even in the learning of 
significant material. In discussing these conditions, therefore, 
we have discussed universal conditions of all learning. 

At this point we may present a summarized statement con- 
cerning technically correct and economical learning. We 
learn most economically, so far as time and energy are con- 
cerned, when we are familiar with all of the foregoing 
subjective and objective conditions of learning; when we 
control these conditions in ourselves, and when, if it is possible 
to vary the conditions, we adapt them to the purpose for which 



Associative Learning 289 

the act of learning has been undertaken. That individual 
possesses a technique of learning who understands these con- 
ditions, controls them in his own learning, and is able to 
adapt them to the purpose for which he learns. 

We shall now complete our description of the conditions of 
learning by adding a discussion of the learning of significant 
material; here the mechanical factor of attentively repeating 
the words recedes into the back-ground, and the factor of 
content or meaning comes into prominence. 



CHAPTER VII 

ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING (Continued) 

5. The Learning of Significant Materials 
It is universally recognized that the learning of significant 
material progresses more easily, leads sooner to memorization, 
and results in a more permanent retention than the mechan- 
ical learning of unrelated data, such as isolated letters, num- 
bers or names, nonsense-syllables, and the like. Quite as 
wide-spread, however, as this beUef are certain fundamental 
errors concerning the relation of meaningful or "rational" 
memorization to mechanical memorization. Investigations in 
this field of psychological pedagogy have paid but little heed 
as yet to that type of memorization which is assisted or rein- 
forced by meaning. This dearth of experimentation is easily 
explained if we but bear in mind the extraordinary variety of 
possibiHties which must be taken into account by the inves- 
tigator in this field of research ; the work of Ebert and Meu- 
mann and the more recent work of Kraemer, however, have 
thrown a certain amount of light upon the learning of logically 
coherent material. In the domain of significant learning we 
find that not only do all of the conditions of mechanical 
memorization co-operate but that the act of learning is now 
further complicated by the manifold variety of possibiKties 
which arise as a result of the nature of the material to be 
learned, and of its action upon the learner himself. In signifi- 
cant learning, the quality and the quantity of the material 
must again be taken into account. As regards quantity, the 
rules which we have laid down in connection with nonsense- 
syllables are also vahd here, that is, the practised learner also 

290 



Associative Learning 2gi 

learns significant material with relatively few repetitions 
even when the material is of large bulk, and the unpractised 
learner requires an excessive number of repetitions for the 
learning of significant as well as of non-significant material. 

If we next consider the influence exerted by the quality of 
the significant material, we again find that it is a matter of 
importance whether the material is made up of relatively 
incoherent elements as synonyms, or dates, or whether it 
forms a significantly coherent whole. In the latter case, again, 
conditions differ according as we deal with prose, or with 
poetry where rhythm and rh^me have a facilitating effect. 
In relation not only to the age but also to the individuali-ty 
of the learner, much depends upon whether the material is of 
relatively abstract character, — here the apprehension of log- 
ical coherence plays a leading role, — whether it is concrete 
and descriptive or whether it is historical and narrative. 
^ The nature of the material exerts an influence upon learning 
in the following manner : It is very much easier to remember 
a coherent body of material than to remember a group of 
incoherent data. For the latter sort of material the limit of 
retention in our most highly practised learners was found to 
be not more than thirteen letters, tliirteen numbers, seven to 
nine nonsense-syllables, ten isolated words, twenty words of a 
poem, twenty-four words of (philosophical) prose. ^ This 
brings to light the important fact that learning is not a mere 
matter of the number of elements but of the number of inde- 
pendent memorial units. For example, our ten words con- 
tained about fifty or sixty letters ; they were not remembered 
as so many letters, however, but only in \irtue of their 
memory value as word-units. Here is expressed the universal 
nature of memory: The only things which we remember are 

^ Ebert und Meumann, Uebungsph'dnomene im Bercichc des Gcddcht- 
nisses. 



292 The Psychology of Learning 

wholes; and particular things are remembered only as parts 
of unitary wholes. An observer once reported that he remem- 
bered a series of syllables by making them into an auditory 
whole, "a sort of melody." Memory is a synthetising activity 
which combines elements to form wholes; and data are "asso- 
ciated" when they become parts of a whole for consciousness. 

/^he nature of the content which is to be learned must also 
be taken into consideration. The content may be relatively 
concrete or relatively abstract in character; and in the former 
case it may deal with a concrete description, or with a narra- 
tive in which temporal relations are concerned. For these 
reasons it may make its appeal more strongly to the concrete 
ideation or to the logical function of the learner. Again, it 
may derive its data from different domains of sensation; and 
in its logical aspect it may be more or less abstract in charac- 
ter. Its logical coherence may be clear and readily compre- 
hensible, or it may be obscure and complicated. The gram- 
matical structure and the length of the sentences may be 
favorable or unfavorable for learning. And there comes in a 
wholly new factor, — the relation between the content and the 
form of expression; indeed the words themselves sometimes 
obtain a special sensory significance in virtue of their relation 
to the content,— the sound of the words may be more or less 
appropriate to the objects designated. Alliteration, asso- 
nance, rhyme, rhythm and meter, the variety and richness 
of the diction, all of these play a part in memory. 

This enormous variety of factors which contribute to the 
learning of coherent material raises a host of interesting prob- 
lems. Only a few of these problems have as yet received 
attention from the investigator; but the following phenomena 
have been observed. First of all, the existence of thorough- 
going differences between individual learners has come to 
light. These may be called types of rational memorization. 



Associative Learning 293 

The materials employed by Ebert and Meumann were 
stanzas from Schiller's Zerstorung von Orleans and selected 
passages from a German translation of Locke's Essay con- 
cerning Human Understanding. Kraemer employed materials 
of various sorts: selections from Locke, and from Hume's 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, passages from 
Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas (narrative prose); from Man's 
Pompei, Schmeil's Lehrhiich der Zoologie and Hertwig's 
Physiology (descriptive prose). The learners were asked to 
describe their mode of procedure; and these introspective 
reports were supplemented by objective determinations. 

Ebert and Meumann's investigation revealed the following 
typical differences in method of learning: one observer {Mn.) 
learned exclusively from the meaning and the logical coherence 
of the material. He remembered tlie words of the poem and 
the prose selections only in so far as they expressed the mean- 
ing and the coherence of the content. The learning of the 
prose, wliich was chiefly of an abstract character, was char- 
acterized by the fact that attention was directed more 
exclusively to the meaning and the grammatical connection 
of the sentences than in the learning of the poetry; while in 
the poem the most concrete en\dsagement possible of the 
events, actions, persons, and places served the memory as a 
starting-point for the work of imprinting the words. The 
retention of the words was facilitated more by their concrete 
content than by their abstract relations. At times, Schiller's 
poetic diction led the learner to attend to the sounds of the 
words, to the rhythm, and to the lengths of measures, words 
and sentences. Still these sensory elements always served 
merely as secondary aids to memory. 

The procedure of some of the other observers was wholly 
different. In their cases, the verbal and grammatical elements 
of the text played the leading role in imprinting even in the 



294 ^^^ Psychology of Learning 

act of significant learning. They attended chiefly to the 
visual elements, — the length of the words, sentences and parts 
of sentences, to their position in the line, in the stanza or in 
the paragraph, and to the sentence construction; or to the 
auditory elements, — the sounds of the words, the inflection 
and the rhythm of their own voices, especially to the relative 
strength of accentuation, to rhythm and rhyme, to the recur- 
rence of the same letters or sounds at the beginning of words, 
to unusual words which are not current in common diction, 
and the like; or to sounds which are difficult to pronounce, 
and to the succession of vocal innervations. On the other 
hand, in these observers the sense and significance of what 
they learned played only the role of an auxiliary to the sense- 
memory. This shows us that even in learning significant 
material, one person remembers chiefly by means of sensory 
elements, another chiefly by the meaning of the content. In 
the latter case the sensory elements, whether auditory-motor 
or visual, are only occasionally summoned as aids when the 
learner finds that a certain word will not take hold and cling; 
or the sensory elements may occasionally force themselves 
into the focus of consciousness in virtue of their unusual or 
striking character. 
\ A second difTerence between individuals results from the 
fact that the meaning of what is learned is envisaged chiefly 
in concrete images by some observers, while by others the 
imprinting is accomplished in terms either of the logical 
coherence or the grammatical structure of the sentences, or, 
in certain cases, in terms of temporal coherence. A third 
typical difference consists here again in the fact that certain 
observers set out to learn the total body of material as a 
whole, imprinting the single sentences or lines of verse as 
parts of the stanza, and the stanzas as parts of the whole 
connected poem; the attention of these observers is directed 



Associative Learning 295 

to the total context. In opposition to this procedure, other 
learners link together, piece by piece, the various lines, sen- 
tences and stanzas, and the parts are thus connected up into 
a whole. The attention of the former type of observer is a 
total attention; that of the latter functions in a series of 
discrete acts, each directed to a single detail. The one atten- 
tion is analytic; it proceeds to analyze what has first been 
grasped as a whole. The other is synthetic; it constructs a 
whole from a number of parts. 

We find here a recurrence of the fijcating and the fluctuating 
types of attention. The observer who possesses a fluctuating 
attention reaches out in advance of his reading, and reaches 
back as well, not only with his internal but also with his 
external regard ; the fixating type reads and learns, in a strictly 
successive fashion, whatever appears before his progressively 
advancing regard. One is tempted to speak of yet a fourth 
typical difference; but it seems doubtful to me whether this 
type is to be placed upon a level of fundamental significance 
with the foregoing. In all psychological experiments, includ- 
ing, of course, memory experiments, it is observed that cer- 
tain learners tend to employ all possible secondary associa- 
tions of their own devising, while others wholly refrain from 
using these devices and confine themselves to what is given 
them. In some cases, the former devise mnemonic aids which 
connect the parts of the material with one another; in other 
cases, they make reinforcing movements or they construct pe- 
culiar spatial schemata into which they arrange what is to be 
remembered, and the like. The most of these secondary aids 
disappear, however, during the course of progressive experimen- 
tation, and the learning is confined more and more to the text 
which is furnished. These auxiliary means appear, therefore, 
to be a matter of habituation ; they do not seem to imply the 
existence of essential differences in the organization of memory. 



296 The Psychology of Learning 

Kraemer was able to establish these typical differences in 
learning more securely because he prescribed a variety of 
conditions under which the act of learning was to be per- 
formed. In one case the learners were instructed to attend 
only to the meaning; in another case their attention was 
directed, so far as possible, to the verbal and sensory elements 
of the material; and in a third case they were to attend to 
both form and meaning. Kraemer also employed the method 
of interrupted reading; here the act of learning was broken 
in upon after a certain number of readings and the amount 
which had been learned up to that point was determined. 
His results show that the direction of attention to meaning 
proved to be the most advantageous procedure throughout. 
For adults, then, a thorough understanding of the content 
and particularly a complete knowledge of the logical connec- 
tion of the sentences constitute not only the most important 
but the indispensable factor of all learning and remembering. 
When the learner rehes upon the sensory details of forms of 
expression his learning is, in most instances, attained only 
after a great many readings of the text; and even then he 
does not usually understand its meaning. And even those 
individuals, whose act of learning seems to be based chiefly 
upon the words of the text, employ the words only as a sec- 
ondary aid for the attainment of logical memorization. All 
three investigators, — Ebert, Meumann and Kraemer, — have 
made the important observation that the act of learning a 
material of any considerable extent starts out from certain 
"corner-stones" of retention; and the procedure consists in 
first laying these "corner-stones" securely and then support- 
ing the rest of the learned material upon them. These may 
also be regarded as crystalHzation-points around which the 
whole chain of associations is formed. In the case of the type 
which learns exclusively from meaning, these supports are the 



Associative Learning 2()'j 

centers upon which the whole logical context hinges; for the 
other type of learner, striking words or phrases, verbal antith- 
eses or repetitions also constitute starting-points of retention. 
Apart from these individual variations, however, our inves- 
tigations of significant learning have yielded a number of 
results which are pedagogically important. 

1. In the case of coherent and meaningful materials the 
chief memorial support consists in the apprehension of the 
meaning and the logical context; and as a matter of fact, the 
process of learning takes its start from the dominant thoughts 
of the text. These are learned first of all; and the rest of 
the content, which the learner himself regards as subsidiary, 
is wholly ignored at the outset. The natural pedagogical 
inference is that the memorial acquisition of all meaningful 
material can best be facilitated by clearly explaining to the 
pupil the context and coherence of thought of the whole 
material. 

2. In order to accomplish this it is necessary a. that the 
learner should grasp the leading thoughts, and h. that he 
should pay particular attention to those parts of the text 
upon which the essential progress of the thought or the devel- 
opment of the argument is based. The subsidiary parts of 
the text may then be learned with relative ease because they 
enter into union with the dominant thoughts. 

J. Besides these points which are (objectively) significant 
for the progress of the thought, it is chiefly those parts of 
the text, which are (subjectively) most readily understood 
by the learner, whose mastery constitutes the starting-point 
of the act of learning. It is important, therefore, that in 
teaching, these parts should be discovered and that attention 
should first be concentrated upon them. 

4. In the act of learning, a special significance attaches to 
the as.sociations which are already present in the mind of the 



298 The Psychology of Learning 

learner, — his habitual combinations of words, his habitual 
trains of thought, and his habitual modes of expressing his 
thoughts. These are grasped first of all; and these are most 
correctly reproduced. It is natural, then, for the teacher to 
infer that the new elements in the material to be learned will 
attach themselves with relative facility to what is already 
known, and that the weak learner should begin with the famil- 
iar parts of the material. 

Those trains of thought and contexts of words, which al- 
though in themselves unfamiliar are yet similar to trains and 
contexts which are familiar, act in much the same way as 
familiar and customary associations. From this it may be 
inferred that if a new material contains memorial supports 
which are similar to former contexts of thought, they consti- 
tute the best starting-point for the act of learning; and the 
novel and unfamiliar parts of the content should be brought 
into relation with them. 

5. The factors which we have briefly designated the chief 
supports of the process of learning are of three sorts: 

a. When the memory material is a description of tangible 
objects or of concrete situations, or the like, the chief support 
of learning consists in the learner's act of envisaging their 
parts or properties as concretely as he can. In doing so, how- 
ever, he must guard against superfluity of concrete envisage- 
ment; he must confine himself strictly to the content which is 
expressed in the text because the superfluous portrayal of 
objects by an act of imagination inhibits the function of 
memory. Concrete aids may contribute in a secondary fash- 
ion if they are employed to embody the abstract parts of the 
content; but this is an advantage only in cases where the 
individual endo^vment of the learner lacks auxiliary imagery of 
a concrete sort for the direct apprehension of the abstract 
thoughts. 



Associative Lcarni^ig 299 

h. Wlien the memory material is narrative in character, its 
temporal relations constitute its most effective memorial fac- 
tor; and these temporal relations must be definitely and 
accurately presented to the consciousness of the learner. Sev- 
eral sorts of temporal relations come into consideration here: 
the simultaneity or the succession of events; their duration; 
their recurrence; their rhythmic succession, when periodically 
recurring events are dealt with. 

c. To these must be added the logical elements, among 
which the thought of cause plays an especially prominent 
part when the content is of the nature of a proof or an explan- 
ation. 

Besides these chief supports of memory a great many 
secondary supports contribute to the process of learning. 
The following may be mentioned as secondary aids which 
owe their origin to the meaning of the text: • 

I. The most important of these secondary supports is the 
structure of the sentences. Its effect consists in the fact that: 
a. Simplicity of grammatical structure facifitates, while 
complexity of grammatical structure hinders the act of learn- 
ing, h. Uniformity of sentence structure is an exceedingly 
valuable aid to memory, irregularity of sentence structure 
gives rise to an intensely inhibitory effect, c. Subordinate 
clauses are relatively well remembered when they are not too 
numerous or too difficult to understand; subordinate clauses 
wliich contain digressions or additions that seem to be super- 
fluous or subsidiary interfere with the act of learning, d. The 
recurrence of identical introductory words or phrases, — in 
part — in part, now — now, and the like, — proves to be advan- 
tageous to learning, e. The length of the sentences is an 
important factor. Sentences of moderate length which can 
be apprehended at a single reading are most readily remem- 
bered; successions of short sentences are difficult to remember 



300 The Psychology of Lear7iing 

as are also very long sentences. /. The rhythm of prose 
facilitates learning. The more smooth the rhythmic flow of 
the sentence, the more easily can its content be remembered, 
and vice versa. The effect of rhythm is greater, the more we 
attend to the wording of the text. g. Particularly striking 
words attract the attention and are for that reason remem- 
bered better. Such words may sometimes have an inhibiting 
effect at first; they attract the attention, and in the subse- 
quent course of the process of learning they aid retention. On 
the other hand, if similar but not identical words recur fre- 
quently in the text, they interfere with the act of learning. 
h. Certain visual elements such as unusual handwriting, 
unusual syllabification, and the like, are of advantage only 
to the visual type of learner, i. All characteristics and pecul- 
iarities of the text which occasion external or internal locali- 
zation, such as the noting of a striking passage in the line 
or on the page, constitute secondary supports of the act of 
learning. 

2. We may also mention certain chief factors which con- 
stitute hindrances, and which are a product of the meaningful 
and grammatical elements of the text. Like the chief supports 
they are partly objective, partly subjective in their nature; 
that is, they are due in part to the nature of the material, and 
in part to the mental constitution of the learner. 

Among the hindrances may be mentioned the following: 
a. Frequent recurrence of similar or synonymous expressions; 
this, however, does not prove to be equally disadvantageous for 
all learners because certain individuals are disturbed in an 
extraordinary degree by the frequent recurrence of synon- 
ymous words, while this factor is much less disturbing to other 
learners, b. Successions of many short sentences which are 
not grammatically connected with one another, c. The other 
extreme, immoderate length of sentences, is also disadvan- 



Associative Learning 301 

tageous. d. Interpolated words, especially adverbs referring 
to place and to time, have a disadvantageous effect; indeed, 
they may furnish a very great obstacle if they interfere with 
the learner's obtaining a distinct perception of the connec- 
tions between the parts of the text. All additions which appear 
to be secondary or superfluous as compared with the leading 
thoughts also tend to hinder the process of learning, e. The 
form of expression and the customary combination of words 
and phrases have a disadvantageous effect when a familiar 
thought is expressed in an unusual fashion in the text. The 
ordinary form of expression persists stubbornly in forcing 
itself upon the learner and can only be suppressed with diffi- 
culty by dint of learning the form of expression which appears 
in the text. This phenomenon is more prominent in cases 
where the material is learned by concentrating one's attention 
upon the meaning. /. There are certain other factors which 
may have an exceedingly disadvantageous effect, such as 
fatigue, unpleasantness, repugnance and the like. 

These aids and hindrances of the act of learning take their 
origin chiefly from the meaning of the material which is 
learned; but there are also specific disturbances and obstacles 
which are due to the wording of the material. These are par- 
ticularly effective when the attention of the learner is directed 
to the wording or to spoken material. Yet it is, in general, 
true that but few universal rules can be formulated for acts of 
learning which consist in verbal acquisition; certain general 
phenomena may be established, however, which relate to this 
sort of verbal learning. Their formulation will enable the 
reader to recognize the general nature of this type of learning 
which has recourse to the forms of expression contained in 
the text. 

I. The memorization of the wording of a text is invariably 

the most disadvantageous procedure for the adult. It can 
21 



302 The Psychology of Leanimg 

be relatively advantageous only when the learner possesses a 
distinctly verbal type of memory and when, therefore, his 
learning does not differ materially from meaningful learning. 
But even in individuals of dominantly verbal memory, an act 
of learning which proceeds by merely noting the words is 
always somewhat more disadvantageous than a learning which 
relies upon meaning. 

2. When the wording of the text is learned apart from its 
meaning, the former may be completely memorized without 
the latter being apprehended in its context. And since this is 
true even of adults, how much more must it be true of children? 
The following important pedagogical inference may be drawn: 
Even a complete and perfect memorization of the wording of 
a text does not constitute a guarantee that the meaning has 
been grasped. Indeed, it happens even in the case of adults 
that the wording of the material may have been learned by 
rote, and yet the learner may have no knowledge whatever of 
the meaning of what he has learned. 

3. The verbal memorization of a material which has thus 
been learned from the wording of the original enables one more 
readily to apprehend the meaning of the material when one's 
attention is subsequently directed to the latter. From this 
we may derive the pedagogical inference, — although it is not 
wholly innocuous, — that in certain instances where we have 
to do with pupils who possess a normal verbal memory but a 
sub-normal understanding, we may first have them learn the 
text by rote in a verbal fashion, and then have them proceed 
to acquire an understanding of its meaning, because the 
memorial mastery of the text facilitates the apprehension of 
its meaning. But we must bear in mind here that a special 
work still remains to be done which should never be omitted, 
namely, the acquisition of the meaning of the text which has 
already been learned by rote. This pedagogical rule is the 



Associative Learning 303 

more worthy of note because in our experiments we observe 
that even the adult sometimes resorts instinctively to this de- 
vice, learning by rote certain passages of the text which are 
especially difficult to understand and then employing his 
memorial mastery of the words as a means of acquiring the 
meaning of the context. 

4. The meaningless learning of words always results in the 
remembering of parts but not the whole of the text. 

5. The most important aids for the learning of spoken 
material and verbal expressions as such are attention to 
rhythm, attention to the sounds of the words, and the whole 
group of factors which have to do with the grammatical 
structure of sentences. The most important obstacles to 
verbal learning result from the fact that customary associa- 
tions of words and customary forms of expression force them- 
selves in upon the learner and prevent the unusual forms of 
expression which are employed in the novel text from coming 
into action. The other hindrances result from the foregoing 
group of obstructions which depend upon the structure of 
the sentence. 

One of the most important results of our recent investiga- 
tions of the process of learning is the discovery of the extra- 
ordinary influence which the different intentions or attitudes 
{Einstellungen) of the learner exert upon his whole memorial 
process and upon his memorial result. It may be shown that 
there is a highly differentiated attitude of learning, and that 
memorial results are determined in a highly differentiated 
fashion by the attitudes or intentions of learners. 

In the learning of significant texts three attitudes are pos- 
sible: I. An adjustment to the meaning as such; 2. to the 
words as such; and j. to the meaning and the words together. 
Most individuals usually learn in a more or less random 
fashion in so far as this three-fold possibility is concerned; 



304 The Psychology of Learning 

their attitude assumes now one, now another of these three 
forms. Kraemer's results show, however, that the adjust- 
ment is very significant for the effect of learning, and that 
with rare exceptions adjustment to meaning is most appropri- 
ate, being even more advantageous than adjustment to mean- 
ing and words together. Adjustment to words alone is least 
advantageous, that is, most adults can best learn a significant 
material from its meaning, i.e., by basing their process of 
learning upon an apprehension of the context of thought. 
But, remarkably enough, even adults differ widely in this 
regard, for we sometimes find students who learn a text 
almost as readily from its wording as from its meaning, and 
in some cases even more readily. During the act of learning, 
these individuals attend almost exclusively to the wording as 
such. But here again one finds individual variations, because 
in certain learners it proves to be a matter of prime importance 
whether they attend to meaning alone or to wording and 
meaning together, while in other learners this variation in 
adjustment of attention makes no difference. There are 
individuals, then, who learn most effectively when their atten- 
tion is wholly one-sided and particular, — when they set out 
to acquire meaning alone, or wording alone, but not to acquire 
both together; and there are other individuals in whom it 
appears to make but little difference whether these different 
intentions are pursued separately or not, although, of course, 
this is not a matter of complete indifference in any individual. 
From these experiments we deduce the following general 
rules of memory: i. It is always disadvantageous to dis- 
tribute the attention over both form and content in the learn- 
ing of meaningful material. 2. The distribution of attention 
gives rise to an extravagant expenditure of energy and to a 
purposeless act of learning because the learner attends to 
now one, now another phase of the jnaterlal; and i|i, njpst 



Associative Learning 305 

individuals an increasing mood of unpleasantness results from 
this increased work of memory, j. The mode of distributing 
the attention depends upon the memory t}^e of the learner. 
If he is more verbal he may almost wholly dispense with 
meaning, while the more concrete or logical type must neces- 
sarily attend chiefly to meaning as such. 

The memorial effect, the amount remembered and repro- 
duced, depends upon the adjustment or attitude of the learner. 
The more his intention is directed upon the meaning, the more 
is a correct reproduction of the meaning attained; the more 
he intends to learn the wording as such, the more are the 
words alone mastered. And it is a significant fact that the 
words are more correctly reproduced, — and probably more 
permanently remembered as well, — if they are learned not by 
means of a divided attention but by means of either one of 
these two adjustments of attention alone; that is, this superior 
memorial result is attained not only in the case where the 
learner attends to the wording as such, but also in the case 
where he learns the wording from its meaning and imprints 
the words as bearers of meaning or as the vehicles of a partic- 
ular train of thought. 

Similar observations have been made in investigations 
where nonsense syllables were employed as material for mem- 
ory. In these experiments, retention may be tested either 
by the method of free reproduction or by the method of paired 
associates. Now it has been observed that when the learner 
undertakes his task with the intention of learning for the 
paired-associates test he can sometimes succeed in recalling 
all of the associates for which he is asked while he is wholly 
unable to recite the complete series. And conversely when it 
was his intention to learn the series for the recitation test, 
he may be unable to recall each syllable when he hears its 
predecessor in the series although his recitation of the series 



3o6 The Psychology of Learning 

is fluent and free from error. This phenomenon shows that 
a specific intention in the act of learning has a specific effect 
upon the result. 

It is pedagogically important that the pupil should know 
of the influence which his intentions exert upon the results of 
his acts of learning, because misdirection of his attention 
could be avoided and the formation of improper habits in 
learning could be obviated. It frequently happens that in 
the learning of a vocabulary the pupil directs his intention 
lipon the spatial localization of particular words, and he 
learns their positions in order that he may, by this means, 
remember them better. This association may, in certain 
instances, be an invaluable aid to memory; but in this case 
it proves to be an obstacle to the ready employment of the 
words in his subsequent study of the language because they 
have been learned not as words but as groups which stand 
at a particular place upon the page. 

Every distribution of the learner's intention and every im- 
proper adjustment of his attention is to be regarded as an un- 
desirable by-product which tends to diminish or to impair 
the chief product of the act of learning. 

But notwithstanding the existence of these types of learn- 
ing there are certain characteristics which are common to all 
learners. It is always found, for instance, that the learning 
of meaningful material is far superior to the mechanical learn- 
ing of discrete items. There is, however, a lack of agreement 
in the statements of the various authors who have endeavored 
to make a quantitative comparison of the effects of these two 
sorts of learning. The learning of meaningful material varies 
with the degree of difficulty of its content; and it is therefore 
impossible to compare logical with mechanical learning except- 
ing in an inaccurate and merely approximate fashion. Eb- 
binghaus found that stanzas from Don Juan could be repro- 



Associative Learning 307 

duced without error on the fourth day after learning, while 
approximately the same amount of meaningless material had 
been so far forgotten that thirty-one repetitions were required 
in the act of re-learning them on the sixth day. From other 
experiments of Ebbinghaus and of Binet, the learning of a 
meaningful text of moderate length seems to demand only 
one-tenth of the time required for mechanical learning. In 
Binet and Henri's ' investigation of the retention of words and 
sentences by school children, it was found that an average of 
twenty-five times as many words were retained when signifi- 
cant sentences were presented as when disconnected words 
were employed. 

As regards methods of learning, our experiments showed 
that for significant material the whole-procedure {Cf. p. 233) 
or one of the mediating methods {Cf. p. 253) is by far the best. 
Indeed the whole-procedure does not manifest its complete 
superiority over the part-procedure in all of its forms until 
we come to deal with significant material. The distribution 
of attention, the uniform regularity of concentration is most 
advantageous when the whole-method and the mediating 
methods are applied to significant material. 

A question which is of especial importance in the pedagog- 
ical application of investigations of significant learning is this : 
How do significant and mechanical learning act in combina- 
tion with each other? Modern school-practice very properly 
insists that all memorization and retention should be pre- 
ceded by as thorough an interpretation of the material as is 
possible, and that a complete understanding of the meaning 
of the content should constitute the basis of all memorizing. 
"Rational learning" is therefore to be preferred over every 
sort of "mechanical learning." From this, however, the con- 

' A. Binet et V. Henri, La memorie des mots et la m 'moire des 
phrases, Ann'ee psychol. I., 1895. 



3o8 The Psychology of Learning 

viction seems to have arisen in many quarters that there 
exists a purely logical memorization from which every mechan- 
ical element of mere repetition is lacking, and that this purely 
rational memorization is the ideal type of learning for which 
to strive in school-children. If this view of learning were 
taken seriously, a complete confusion of memory and a uni- 
versal fragmentariness of retention would necessarily result. 
Psychological investigation shows us that in all memory 
material which is to be reproduced with accuracy, and which 
is to become the permanent possession of mind, a mere initial 
apprehension of the content does not suffice; but that in all 
learning which is to leave lasting traces upon consciousness 
the mechanical element of sheer repetition must play a part. 
Indeed it is found that mere repetition has exactly the same 
importance for significant as for mechanical memorizing even 
though the number of repetitions is less in the former case. 
Repetition, repeated imprinting, reading, speaking, reciting, 
all of these play a characteristic and independent role besides 
that played by the energy of attention and by an apprehen- 
sion of the meaning. In investigations of permanent reten- 
tion we discovered that when a learner found himself unable 
to concentrate upon his re-learning on account of unfavorable 
psychophysical disposition, and therefore worked with dimin- 
ished attention, he sometimes endeavored to compensate 
the unfavorable bodily or mental condition by an excessive 
accumulation of repetitions. It invariably happened, in such 
cases, that more enduring traces remained in consciousness 
and that the material was remembered longer. 

We found a somewhat similar phenomenon in a compara- 
tive investigation of the influence of rhythm upon learning. 
It turned out that a poetic meter had a particularly inciting 
effect upon the observer; he learned with heightened 
attention and in more pleasant mood, and by these means 



Associative Learning 309 

effected a saving of repetitions. But when permanent reten- 
tion was tested, we found that the series were not retained 
so well as series with unfavorable rhythm which had been 
learned with apparently the same degree of thoroughness, but 
by dint of a greater number of repetitions. Experiments 
dealing with immediate retention show even more clearly the 
necessity of mechanical memorization. In the determination 
of the limit of immediate retention of significant passages, the 
retention of the last sentence which can just be reproduced 
without error is in no particular different from the retention 
of a group of meaningless elements. A very few minutes 
after he has written it down he finds himself unable to repro- 
duce it completely and correctly. Everything which is to be 
remembered permanently must be acquired and secured by 
means of repeated memorizations. And if a text is to be 
memorized word-for-word, the repeated memorization must 
contain a purely mechanical element,— namely, the sheer 
association of the visual-auditory-motor elements of the heard 
and spoken words. No one is able to acquire a verbatim remem- 
brance of a poem of six stanzas by simply obtaining a clear 
understanding of the ideas and thoughts contained in it, or 
by simply imprinting these ideas and thoughts in their con- 
secutive order because, in the first place, there is no unequiv- 
ocal relationship of association between any chain of ideas and 
any series of verbal expressions, in consequence of which the 
words might be discovered from ones knowing the ideas; and, 
in the second place, all of the ideas of the poem are themselves 
conditioned by the choice of words. Our memory must there- 
fore devote a certain amount of energy to the mechanical 
imprinting of the verbal material itself if verbal memoriza- 
tion and retention are to ensue. This mechanical element 
may recede far into the back-ground of consciousness, as it 
really does in the case of that learning-type which directs its 



3IO The Psychology of Learning 

attention to the meaning and makes use of the non-signifi- 
cant elements of the word in a more secondary fashion; 
nevertheless the mechanical element is invariably present. A 
more important condition which forces us to memorize in a 
mechanical fashion has been found in the fact that we are 
obliged to make our reproduction in vocal form, and that we 
learn by means of a process of speaking. From this has been 
drawn the erroneous inference that the motor associations of 
the act of speaking constitute a group of mechanical associa- 
tions which are fundamental and indispensable to the act of 
learning. But this can be true of only the motor type of 
learner. In the visual and auditory types, the visual and 
auditory elements of words may become so securely associated 
that vocal movements are automatically reinstated in the 
act of reproduction in virtue of the perfectly facile association- 
paths of the visual-verbal and auditory-verbal centres in the 
cortex. 

If then the factor of repetition and at the same time the 
mechanical association of concrete verbal images play a part 
in all verbal memorization, then learning by means of repe- 
tition must not be under-estimated or neglected by the teacher. 
A lasting permanence and an accurate verbal reproduction of 
what has been learned is acquired by the child only through 
the agency of genuine memorization. 

These statements must, however, not be misunderstood. 
They do not mean that a clear grasping of the meaning and a 
constant attention to the logical connection of what is learned 
are merely secondary matters; nor do they mean that the 
sensory and mechanical elements constitute the essence of 
learning. If this were true how would it be possible to explain 
the extraordinary superiority of significant learning over 
mechanical learning? On the contrary, the mechanical ac- 
quisition of sensory and motor elements in verbal learning. 



Associative Learning 311 

and the manifold repetition of the material must be subordi- 
nated to the apprehension of meaning whenever possible. 
But on the one hand, mechanical learning must undertake the 
task of securing and making fast the material which is atten- 
tively grasped and understood, while, on the other hand, it 
alone can give fluency to the reproduction of the verbal 
material. 

Now, since it is so much easier to learn significant material 
than to learn incoherent items, the question arises: Does this 
fact not justify the systems of mnemonics which are in current 
use? These, as is well known, endeavor to facilitate the 
remembering of numbers, names, and other disconnceted 
data by introjecting an artificial coherence. For instance, 
letters are substituted for the dates of accession of the German 
emperors. As a rule, only consonants are employed primarily 
but vowels are interpolated in order to build up significant 
words from the consonants. A sentence is formed from several 
words of this sort; the sentence is relatively easy to remem- 
ber, nor is it difficult to re-construct the dates from the words 
in the sentence. By means of this and similar devices which 
always depend upon the introduction of artificial ideas of an 
intermediary and auxiliary sort, mnemonics teaches one to 
remember every conceivable sort of material, — numbers, 
names, foreign vocabularies, grammatical rules, and the like. 
The mnemonic principle in itself is not inconsistent with 
psychology. If one finds it easier to remember discrete and 
disconnected data by bringing them into artificial association 
with one another, no psychological blunder is made so long 
as the principle is not abused. But all of the directions which 
have been published for the construction of mnemonic aids 
employ a jumbled medley of the most heterogeneous aids to 
memory which cannot fail to confuse one by their unsystem- 
atic arrangement. At one time, they rely upon similarities 



312 The Psychology of Learning 

of sound; at another, upon logical relations, — which are 
usually falsely stated; at another, they have recourse to 
memory of locality; at another, they bring in a complicated 
substitution of other letters or numbers, and the like. 

Apart from this, however, the whole mnemonic principle is 
as uneconomical as it possibly could be. It is at variance 
with the natural tendency of memory to retain only what is 
absolutely necessary;^ and at the same time, it burdens the 
learner with a cumbrous mass of auxiliary ideas all of which 
must gradually be weeded out again if a fluent and reliable 
reproduction of an experience is ever to take place. Those, 
therefore, who at first make enthusiastic use of mnemonic 
devices usually abandon the system ultimately because no one 
will permanently bear this burden of purely auxiliary ideas. 
This criticism may be expressed in quantitative terms. Any- 
one who masters a foreign language must learn a vocabulary 
of approximately four thousand words. If now he introduces 
three auxiliary ideas, on the average, between the word of 
his mother tongue and the word of the foreign language his 
memory must carry an extra burden of twelve thousand 
words. But there are other psychological principles, such as 
the effect of mediate and immediate associations, which 
reveal the disadvantages of systems of mnemonics. The con- 
tinuous use of mnemonics in teaching must be distinguished 
from an occasional employment of particular mnemonic de- 
vices by means of which one can sometimes make it easier 
for pupils to remember a date, the meaning of a word, or the 
like. There is, of course, no objection, psychological or prac- 
tical, which can be urged against such an occasional use of 
memorial aids. And if, as is supposed by certain psychol- 
ogists, it should turn out that there is a special mnemonic 
type of memory, we should, of course, place no obstacle in the 
' See pages 315^. 



Associative Learning 313 

path of pupils who endeavor to remember everything by means 
of secondary associations, because that may be their normal 
and t>^ical mode of remembering. But to base the whole 
formal education of memory upon a mnemonic foundation 
would be decidedly objectionable for reasons already cited. 
The technique and economy of learning by logical apprehen- 
sion or learning by means of understanding or the rational 
combination of ideas has not yet been included in our discus- 
sion. The psychological investigation of this sort of memory 
work, however, is still in such a backward condition that we 
must be content with the references which have already been 
made to it. ^ 

6. Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Learning, Stages 
of Learning; Retention and Forgetting. 

The effect of learning is usually conceived to consist in a 
''retention" of what has been learned; but since the existence 
of retention can be revealed only by an act of reproduction, 
we may estimate the effect of learning in terms of reproduc- 
tion. As a matter of fact, however, the first effect of learning 
comes to light in the act of learning itself, in that previous 
repetitions affect subsequent repetitions in a definite fashion, 
and the process of imprinting passes through several clearly 
distinguishable stages. 

Before we consider these stages, it should be noted that in 
the investigation of memory we ordinarily employ the effects 
of learning as a means of designating the attributes of mem- 
ory. We make a distinction between memories which acquire 
their material with ease or with difficulty, and between mem- 
ories which reproduce their content with ease or with difficulty. 
We speak of a faithful memory, designating by this term the 
accuracy with which the original impressions are retained and 
^ See pages 29oflf. 



314 The Psychology of Learning 

reproduced; of an extensive memory, referring to the num- 
ber and variety of items which are retained; of a tenacious 
memory, referring to the length of time during which impres- 
sions can still be reproduced with a certain degree of vivacity 
and completeness. 

Let us first of all consider the effect of learning in the act of 
learning itself. We know that learning passes through several 
stages. The first stage may be called that of the adaptation 
and orientation of the learner. The first few readings of a 
material, — or it may be the very first reading, — serve to 
adapt the learner to the activity of learning and to the material 
in hand; by this means he becomes oriented to the material 
which is presented to him. When nonsense syllables are pre- 
sented, he usually discovers at this early stage which rhythm 
of learning is most suitable, and he becomes familiar with 
the auditory and visual impressions of the syllables. ^ This is 
followed by a second stage, — that of passively receptive 
learning. The learner now imprints the essential material 
upon his mind by reading, hearing or speaking, meanwhile 
assuming an essentially receptive attitude. This is followed 
by a third stage where the material is tentatively recited, 
checked, and controlled by the learner. As a rule the observer 
reveals the advent of this stage by his external behavior; 
he looks away from the text and anticipates the forthcoming 
parts of the material. This stage is usually manifested, in the 
case of nonsense syllables, by an involuntary acceleration of 
the tempo of speech. The fourth stage is characterized by a 
^ C/. the introspections of observers in the papers of Ebert and 
Meumann, Pentschew and Radossawljewitsch; see also M. K. Smith, 
Rythmus und Arbeit, Philos. Studien, XVI., 1900., 6iflf. G. E. Muller, 
Gedlichtnistatigkcit und Vorslcllungsvcrlanf, Leipzig, 191 1; and espe- 
cially Franz Nagel, Experimentelle Untersuchungen iiber Grundfragen 
der Assoziationslehre, Archiv f. d. gesamte Psychologic, XXIIL, 191 2, 
156-253. 



Associative Learning 315 

final fixing and strengthening of the uncertain parts whose 
difficulty the learner discovered in his tentative recitation, 
and by a genuine associating or synthetizing in consequence 
of which the learner now begins to feel that he is able to repro- 
duce the material from memory. ^ The emotional state of the 
learner also experiences marked changes during these four 
stages of learning. The first stage is usually attended by 
unpleasantness and tension or by alternating emotional states 
and, in proportion as the subsequent stages arouse a conscious- 
ness of progress and success, a pleasant mood ensues. 

The act of learning also has its definite effect in retention 
and forgetting. Before we can make this clear we must bear 
in mind that the purpose of learning is not always the same. 
In one case, we may endeavor to obtain a permanent imprint- 
ing, in another case, only a single reproduction. Now, it is 
most desirable that memory should not retain everything 
which it receives; and it is no less desirable that everything 
which is to be remembered permanently and accurately 
should be memorized in the real sense of the term. Non- 
psychologists have frequently been heard to complain that 
memory oftentimes fails us, and that we frequently find our- 
selves unable to give an account of our everyday surroundings 
when we endeavor to remember them. I have frequently 
convinced myself that this is true. I made systematic en- 
quiries of a number of students as to whether they could 
describe the wall-paper of the rooms in which they studied; 
whether they could describe the dishes which they used every 
day at table; how many steps they ascended daily in the 
university stairways; whether they could name the buildings 

' Special experiments devoted to this topic indicate that this syn- 
thesis is not a purely associative act; but this is a psychological 
question whose discussion would carry us too far from our present 
subject. 



\ 



316 The Psychology of Learning 

which they passed every day; whether they could describe or 
sketch the most striking church spires of the city; whether 
they could sketch the outline of mountain-peaks which they 
have seen often and attentively; whether the four upon their 
watch dials is indicated by four I's or by a IV, and the like. 
To all questions of this sort one obtains exceedingly uncertain 
or even erroneous answers. Remembrances of everyday 
experiences are frequently so uncertain that the student 
becomes vexed and wishes to discontinue the experiment. 
These and similar observations prove that memory fails to 
retain many impressions that come to us countless times 
during our lives. They prove further that it is not the mere 
repetition of impressions as such which constitutes imprint- 
ing, and makes it possible for us to reproduce, especially to 
reproduce freely; on the contrary we find that, as a rule, we' 
remember only what we have apprehended attentively and 
with the intention of remembering it. However necessary 
then the factor of repetition may be for retention, it seems to 
render a subsequent free reproduction possible only when it 
constituted an intentional acquisition by consciousness. We 
must not reproach memory because everything which it did 
not acquire by intentional and repeated acts has been allowed to 
lapse or is not freely reproducible. Consciousness would indeed 
have an exceedingly heavy burden to carry if the countless 
trivialities which we daily experience were all so deeply 
imprinted that they were "retained" and acquired a tendency 
to be reproduced. The limited compass of consciousness 
forbids our being occupied with many ideas at any one time. 
The struggle of ideas for possession of the narrow field of 
consciousness would be immeasureably increased if memory 
were not limited to the relatively narrow domain of those 
impressions which were intentionally noted. There is yet 
another characteristic of memory which sustains us in the 



Associative Learning 317 

presence of this alleged- defect of practical life. This is the 
familiar phenomenon that it is easier to recognize than to 
reproduce. Countless things are recognized when we perceive 
them again although we could not have called up a free 
memory-image of them in the meantime. For practical pur- 
poses it is sufl&cient that we should recognize the things which 
we know; it is by no means always essential that we should 
be able to reproduce a free idea of them. 

In the interests of psychology and of pedagogy, the accu- 
rate investigation of retention and forgetting has frequently 
been attempted. It is particularly important that we should 
know how rapidly impressions, which have once been received, 
disappear from consciousness again; in what manner forget- 
ting is dependent upon sort of impression, upon our apprehen- 
sion and imprinting of it, upon the individual characteristic 
of the learner, upon an occasional renewal or refreshing, eti 
These latter determinations would furnish us with rehab) 
data which, in turn, would constitute a basis for the system 
atic introduction of repetition into the courses of study i 
the school-room. 

When we approach this question experimentally we must 
bear in mind the different functions of retention which have 
been described in the foregoing discussions. Memory is char- 
acterized by two wholly different sorts of retention, — imme- 
diate and lasting retention. We may also designate them as 
primary memory, and secondary or mediate or genuine mem- 
ory. ^ It is instructive to compare the effects of retention and 
forgetting in each of these memory functions. Such a com- 
parison discloses the extraordinary superiority of permanent 
retention over immediate retention. Immediate retention dies 
down in consciousness very rapidly, and the more so, the more 
nearly the number of impressions to be retained approximates 
22 ' CJ- PP- 4off. 



3 1 8 The Psychology of Learning 

the limit of our power of retention. For instance, if we read 
aloud to an observer as many letters as he is just able to repro- 
duce immediately thereafter, his power to reproduce them 
will frequently be found to have disappeared entirely within 
a few seconds, provided no new imprinting of the material 
has taken place in the meantime. 

Immediate retention is easily improved by formal training. 
Unpractised adults are ordinarily incapable of immediately 
reproducing more than eight or ten letters at the most, but 
practised observers can reproduce twelve or fourteen. Signifi- 
cant texts are correctly reproduced, immediately after pre- 
sentation, to a much larger extent. The effect of practice in 
immediate retention is not very great; but it must be noted 
that the addition of only a few items may make the task much 
more difficult. The limit of achievement of immediate reten- 
tion may here be illustrated by citations from our numerical 
results; but of course it depends upon the observer's practice, 
upon the sort of material chosen, and upon other conditions 
as well. When letters or digits were employed, one of our 
observers succeeded in reproducing thirteen to fourteen cor- 
rectly; with nonsense syllables, eight to nine; words, twelve; 
stanzas of poetry, twenty-four words; prose selections, thirty- 
six words. The child's limit in this function of memory is 
considerably less than the average limit for adults. This is 
apparent from the experiments which dealt with the numeri- 
cal determinations of the compass of immediate attention. 

The limit of immediate retention in school-children has 
been determined by several investigators; and similar methods 
have been employed in all of these experiments.^ Bolton 

^ T. L. Bolton, The Growth of Memory in School-children, Amer. 
Jour. Psychol., IV., 1892, 362-380; B. Bourdon, Influence de I'age sur 
la memoire immediate, Revue philos., XXXVII., 1894, 148-167; A. 
Binet et V. Henri, La memoire des mots, Annee psychol., I., 1895, 



Associative Learnifig 319 

and Jacobs employed auditory presentation; they read short 
lists of monosyllabic numbers which were written by the 
children immediately after hearing each list. Binet and 
Henri read seven series, each containing seven disconnected 
words, and had the children write down what they remem- 
bered. They tested three hundred and eighty children, from 
eight to thirteen years of age. Then they read significant 
sentences, which likewise were written down immediately 
from memory by the children. The same general method was 
also employed by the later investigators. I have improved 
upon it in the following manner: In my systematic investiga- 
tion of the compass of immediate retention the children were 
first given three, then four, then five words, continuing up to 
eight; the words were read aloud to the children who were 
required to write all that they could remember immediately 
afterwards. This modification adapts the experimental pro- 
cedure to the age of the child. Binet and Henri used a list of 
seven words for eight-year-old children. This number is too 



1-23; La memoire des phrases, Ibid., 24-59; J- Jacobs, Experiments 
on Prehension, Mind, O.S. XII., 1887, 75-79; E.Meumann, Vorlesimgen 
zur Einfuhrung in die experimentelle Pddagogik, Leipzig, 1907. I. Schuy- 
ten's experiments are reported in the Bulletins de V Acadcmie Royale de 
Belgique, 1905, and in the Paedologisch Jaarbock from 1900 on. See 
also M. Lobsien, Das Gedachtnis fiir bildlich dargestellte Dinge, usw. 
Beitr'dge zur Psychologie der Aussage, II., 1905; Bernstein und Bog- 
danoff, Experimente iiber das Verhalten der Merkfahigkeit bei Schul- 
kindern. Ibid., II., 1905, ii5ff.; Ebert und Meumann, Grundfragen der 
Psychologie der U ehungsph'dnomene im Bereiche des Ged'dchtnisses, 
Leipzig, 1904; Decroly et Degand, Experiences de memoire visuelle 
verbale, etc., Annce psychol., XIII., 1907; W. H. Winch, Immediate 
Memory in School Children, British Jour, of Psychol. I., II., 1904-6; 
Louise Ellison, The Acquisition of Technical Skill, Pedagogical Semi- 
nary, XVI., 1909. See also the Reports of the Board of Education 
of the Chicago Public Schools, containing reports of experiments by 
Smedley, Cooley, Macmillan and others, Chicago, i899ff. 



320 The Psychology of Learning 

great; it readily confuses the child. Schuyten dictated lists 
each containing eight two-place numbers; and here again 
written records Vv^ere made by the children. 

These experiments show, first of all, that immediate reten- 
tion throughout all of the classes of the pubhc school is less 
efficient than in adults. Furthermore, immediate retention 
develops very slowly, and has not reached its maximum 
capacity at the age of thirteen or fourteen years, the age at 
which the child leaves the public school. The pupil of the 
high school is better off in this particular. The most important 
part of his mental training comes during those years when 
memory has approximately reached its greatest efficiency. 
Comparative data for children and adults, which I have ob- 
tained from observers up to the age of forty-six years, show 
that up to the age of thirteen years the development of 
immediate retention is very slow; from thirteen to about 
sixteen there is a more rapid development. At the age of 
twenty-two to twenty-five the adult student reaches the limit 
of his capacity of immediate retention; from there onward 
the capacity remains stationary in most persons. Bourdon 
found a sHght growth of immediate retention between the 
ages of fourteen and twenty years, when tested with mean- 
ingless or relatively discrete material. 

Bolton reports that the development of immediate reten- 
tion does not run parallel with the development of intelli- 
gence but with increase of age; that is, older children have, on 
the average, a better memory than younger children, and 
increase of age is the chief factor in the development of mem- 
ory. My investigations show that in the majority of cases 
intelligent children are also equipped with better memories; 
this does not, however, constitute a parallelism in the develop- 
mental progress of the two functions in question. The inves- 
tigations of the Societe de psychologic de Vcnjant in Paris also 



Associative Learning 321 

show that intelligent children have on the average a more 
efficient immediate memory. ^ 

The children investigated by Binet and Henri retained, on 
the average, 4.7 and the adults 5.7, of the seven words dic- 
tated to them. This result is clearly too low for adults. 
Children of eight to nine years retained an average of 4.6 
words; ten to eleven years, 4.9; eleven to twelve years, 4.8; 
twelve to tliirteen years, 4.9. According to my experiments, 
the memory capacity of eight-year-old children is less than 
these data indicate; they retained an average of four words, 
while children of thirteen to fourteen years retained an aver- 
age of 5.6 words. A comparison of some of the extreme 
findings is more instructive. Among the seven-year-old chil- 
dren I found a great many who never succeeded in retaining 
more than three words and two nonsense syllables, while a 
great many of the fourteen-year-old children reproduced 
eight words correctly. The best observers among my prac- 
tised adults retained as many as twelve words, and in correlate 
experiments sometimes succeeded in retaining fourteen dis- 
crete letters. 

Decroly and Degand extended the investigation of imme- 
diate reproduction to children, five to ten years old, in a 
kindergarten school in Brussels. The results of these experi- 
ments show that simpler impressions are by no means better 
retained but that facihty and fidelity of immediate reproduc- 
tion increase in proportion as the material is more famihar 
to the child; they also show that in children, as in adults, 
sentences which express unitary concrete thoughts are more 
readily attended to and remembered than isolated words 
and much more readily than syllables and letters. Small 
cards upon which letters, words or sentences were written in 
red ink were shown to the children who were allowed to look 
^ See the bulletins of this Society, published by Alcan, Paris. 



322 The Psychology of Learning 

at them for thirty seconds. The sentences were remembered 
better than the words or the letters. In a second series of 
experiments nine letters were shown to normal and abnormal 
children who were then asked to select these letters from a 
group of twenty-six; similar experiments were made with 
geometrical figures and pictures. In these recognition-tests of 
immediate memory, pictures were remembered better than 
letters or geometrical figures; and it was also found that words 
contained in sentences are remembered better than isolated 
words. 

In an investigation of the immediate retention of visual 
and auditory \vords, Winch undertook to solve the following 
problems: Can "pure memory," — or memory of data which 
are associated only in time and space, — be improved by 
practice? Does "pure" memory improve with increase of 
age and of mental proficiency? In a first series of experi- 
ments, twelve consonants written in three columns were 
presented for a period of thirty-five seconds to children from 
eight to fourteen and a half years of age. In one case, written 
reproductions were made immediately, in another case, after 
an interval of twenty-five seconds. Although the temporal 
interval was brief it is remarkable that Winch found no dif- 
ference between the results of immediate and delayed repro- 
duction. Repeated tests showed that this fundamental func- 
tion of memory manifests a distinct and regular improvement 
as the result of practice. Winch also found that memory im- 
proves with increase of age and general proficiency, and that 
a definite relation obtains between memorial excellence and 
intellectual proficiency. In a second series of experiments, 
Winch tested the immediate auditory memory of thirty-six 
girls. These girls represented the average ages and the aver- 
age degrees of intelligence of the second to the seventh classes, 
inclusive. Twelve consonants were read aloud to these pupils, 



Associative Learning 323 

with pauses after the fourth and the eighth consonants; each 
consonant was read twice, twenty-five seconds being devoted 
to the two readings. The consonants were then reproduced 
in writing, and after one minute and thirty-five seconds the 
next experiment began. Notwithstanding every precaution, 
the pupils sometimes formed significant words from the con- 
sonants, for instance, sir from sr, and Ted from td, but only 
by six of the thirty-six pupils. All ten of the tests were made 
on the same day of the week and at the same hour of the fore- 
noon. Winch reports that immediate retention shows a 
distinct and fairly uniform improvement as the result of prac- 
tice; that school proficiency and efficiency of "pure" mem- 
ory usually go hand in hand; and that when the comparison 
is limited to children of the same age and school-class, the 
same correlation holds although it is less conspicuously present. 
The experiments of Smedley and Cooley dealt only with 
the immediate reproduction of numbers, but they attempted 
to analyse retention into its component processes and to trace 
the development of auditory, visual, vocal-motor and manual- 
motor memories of numbers, independently; the visual and 
auditory acuity of the pupils was also tested. Smedley pre- 
sented ten series of four to eight numbers to pupils between 
the ages of seven and sixteen years. Four modes of presen- 
tation were employed, — the numbers being seen; seen and 
heard; seen, heard and pronounced; seen, heard and written 
by the pupil. Two objections may be raised against this 
procedure. The sort of memorial function employed by the 
pupil is not necessarily identical with the sort of stimulus 
presented by the teacher; and the author himself states that 
some of the pupils found it impossible to repress their vocal 
innervations during the auditory tests. Moreover the idea- 
tional type plays such a prominent part in immediate reten- 
tion that no matter what may be the mode of presentation of 



324 The Psychology of Learning 

a verbal material which is reproducible in more than one 
modality, many indi\'iduals transform the presented material 
into their own typical modality; for instance, the auditory 
individual attempts to remember by means of auditory images 
when verbal material is presented to him visually. For this 
reason such experiments do not warrant any inference as to 
the development of the several memories unless each sense- 
memory is compelled to function independently, and unless 
the observers are classified into ideational types by means of 
a special investigation. The former condition can be only 
approximately fulfilled and the latter can not be fulfilled in 
the class-experiment. As to the practical application of the 
results of these experiments it must also be borne in mind 
that the most favorable condition for retention is not provided 
when the mode of presentation is made as many-sided as 
possible (auditory-visual- vocal-mo tor), but only when the 
mode of apprehension is relatively circumscribed and when it 
conforms to the ideational t}^e of the learner. This comes 
to light in the Chicago experiments where numbers which 
were seen and heard by the pupil were sometimes remembered 
better than numbers which were seen, heard and written. 
My own observations show that this phenomenon is due to 
the fact that, in the absence of special practice, it is more 
economical to employ our customary modes of learning; and 
that these modes are a product in part of congenital type and 
in part of habit. So soon as a memorial means which does not 
correspond to the congenital or the acquired factor comes into 
play, a part of the energy which should be devoted to attentive 
apprehension is expended in the act of learning the unaccus- 
tomed material which does not conform to the learner's typical 
modality. And that is just what happens in the case of most 
pupils when they are asked to write their memorial material, 
because they are not accustomed to learn words by writing 



Associative Learning 325 

them since the manual-motor type of memory is rarely 
found. 

It is not to be assumed then that the results of these 
experiments nullify the law wliich was empirically established 
by Muensterberg and Bigham, — namely, that we remember 
well in proportion as we have recourse to many associative 
aids, — because this law, of course, presupposes that the several 
associative aids are equally facile and familiar to us. On the 
contrary, we are impelled by general psychological consider- 
ations to assume that practice in the use of the several 
memorial aids must demonstrate that the law is valid 
throughout the whole range of memorial functioning. 

If we assume that those modes of presentation where Smed- 
ley employed no unaccustomed memorial means are to be 
regarded as constituting normal cases of immediate retention, 
then it follows from his experiments that the average capacity 
of immediate retention increases by a considerable amount 
and in fairly constant progression up to the fourteenth year. 
In agreement with the findings of other investigators, its 
capacity almost doubles between the seventh and the four- 
teenth year, thence it improves more slowly but continues to 
improve up to the nineteenth year. Here again we see that 
development still continues after the last year in the public 
school, — a phenomenon which we see duplicated in all of the 
other higher mental functions. 

Lobsien has recently investigated the development of audi- 
tory memory by testing the immediate reproduction of ten 
meaningless combinations of syllables. His material, however, 
was much too difficult; and material should not be presented 
solely in groups of ten elements if accurate results are to be 
obtained. Moreover, his investigation dealt with an inter- 
mediate function between immediate retention and genuine 
learning because the series were each presented five times. 



326 The Psychology of Learning 

He tested 2,788 boys and girls between the ages of seven and 
fifteen. He found that the average number of syllables re- 
tained was 2.33, about a quarter of the maximum capacity 
that was possible. The capacity of immediate retention of 
this meaningless verbal material increases progressively; but 
the unreliability of phonetically accurate reproduction also 
shows a considerable increase with increase of age. The 
improvement is not regular, but fluctuates periodically both 
as regards amount and fidelity of retention; and the perio- 
dicity differs in the two sexes. A striking lapse in efficiency 
is found at about the tenth year. 

Now it must be borne in mind that this capacity of immedi- 
ate retention, which proves to be so ill-developed, must be 
made use of at every moment by the child at school. When- 
ever the teacher asks him a question the child must "imme- 
diately retain " a sentence. Here, then, we have a psycholog- 
ical basis for the familiar rule that questions must be put to 
children in brief form. In all auditory instruction and oral 
response, in dictation, in mental arithmetic, and particularly 
in drawing, immediate retention plays an important role. In 
the act of drawing, the child must glance at the original or 
the model, and when he glances back to his drawing-board 
the immediate retention of what he has just seen comes into 
play. 

In psychological experiments we endeavor to determine 
not only the compass of immediate retention, but also to dis- 
cover what methods are employed by different individuals in 
their acts of immediate retention. Here again are revealed 
certain typical differences in procedure, which come to light 
not only in the behavior of attention but also in the means 
by which the primary impressions are remembered. The 
chief differences in types of immediate retention may be made 
clear by a description of two of my observers, whom I shall 



Associative Learning 327 

call D. and F. The diversity in the procedure of these two 
observers was revealed in the sort of errors which they made 
in the immediate reproduction of letters and numbers. F.'s 
errors were usually misplacements, — he transposed letters or 
digits from their original order; wliile Z).'s were usually 
phonetic errors, — he substituted letters of somewhat similar 
sound for the letters dictated to him. In visual presentation, 
D. was aided by the letters being printed closely together, but 
this feature had no significance for F. In a series of experi- 
ments where the tongue was held securely between the upper 
and lower teeth F. made more errors than Z),,— the former 
being conscious of a strong impulse to withdraw the tongue 
while D. was not aware of any such tendency. 

These facts show us that D. remembers chiefly in terms of 
auditory images of words, F. by means of vocal movements, 
ideated or executed. That, however, does not, by any means, 
constitute the essential difference between their modes of pro- 
cedure; this consists rather in the different behavior of their 
attention. D. himself gave the following description: ''While 
the experimenter is dictating I do not direct my attention to 
the individual letters, nor do I fixate my internal regard at 
all upon the series of words which I hear; but I turn my 
attention aside in order to receive the whole uniformly into 
the neutral and unconcentrated field of consciousness. Imme- 
diately after the dictation is finished, I have a very faint 
auditory image of the whole series. This soon clears up, and 
I write the whole series as rapidly as possible as though it were 
'all in one piece.' " F. describes the behavior of his attention 
as being directly opposed to this: "I attend to each individual 
letter; and during the later process of writing them down I 
arrange the single items of the series one to another, assign- 
ing each to its place." 

If now we express these introspections in more general 



328 The Psychology of Learning 

terms, we find that the two observers have wholly different 
behaviors of attention. F.'s attention functions in a discrete 
fashion; it turns to the particular letters, words, etc., in a 
series of successive acts, and the observer himself must com- 
bine these individual impressions into a series. The group or 
the whole is here built up from the individual items. On the 
other hand, Z).'s attention is directed toward the whole; his 
is a sort of total attention. Consequently what his memory 
retains is the series; and the single items are remembered 
solely by means of the series and as parts of it. For this 
reason D. turns aside his attention or the focus of his con- 
sciousness while he is listening to the dictation of the series 
in order that he may not heed the several elements discretely 
and in isolation from one another, but may rather obtain a 
general impression of them as a series. The full work of atten- 
tion does not begin until, with the completion of the dictation, 
the whole is before him. Now it is especially important that 
a definite and intimate internal relation should be found 
between the means employed by the memories of these two 
individuals and the modes of behavior of their attention. Or 
shall we regard it as an accidental circumstance that F., who 
is more motor, should be the one who manifests the discrete 
type of attention? It is probably his motor method of re- 
taining, that is, the necessity of accompanying every single 
letter with a special vocal innervation, which directs his 
attention to the items of the series; while, on the other hand, 
it is more advantageous for D., who belongs to the auditory 
type, first to permit the individual items of his series of audi- 
tory images to fuse into a whole in order that he may then be 
able to reproduce the latter. 

Now it may be shown that this difference in attitude and 
behavior of attention makes its appearance not only in learn- 
ing but also in other and wholly diverse sorts of mental activ- 



Associative Learning 329 

ity. In the experimental analysis of the act of reading, for 
example, we find that a wholly analogous difference comes to 
light in the reading processes of different individuals; some 
readers sharply fixate the particular parts of the word, while 
others invariably direct their attention to as large a group of 
words as possible, — to a "reading-field." In reading, then, 
the attention of one individual proceeds in a filiating fashion, 
that of another proceeds in a fluctuating fashion. I have no 
hesitation in asserting that this variation is to be regarded as 
a fundamental difference in the attention of different indi- 
viduals, and that it is to be set on a par with those differences 
in concentration and distribution of attention which have 
been accepted by modern psychology. ^ 

The foregoing results are, to some extent, supplemented by 
Binet and Henri's investigation of the retention of sentences 
by school-children. A comparison of these with our Zurich 
investigations of immediate retention in adults furnishes the 
pedagogically important result that, in this regard also, the 
memory of the child of school-age is considerably less efficient 
than that of the adult. 

A summary of the investigations of immediate retention 
yields the following conclusions which are of interest to 
pedagogy: i. The behavior of attention and the means 
employed in retention show typical variations from individual 
to individual, — hence the conditions which are most favorable 
to retention must also be subject to individual variation. 
The auditory type finds auditory presentation to be most 
advantageous; the visualizer finds visual presentation to be 
most favorable. For the auditory type, the directing of the 
attention to the whole body of material and a certain divert- 

' I have repeatedly observed this difference in children and adults; 
Mrs. Diirr has found it in children, and Albien in pupils from nine 
to eighteen years of age. 



330 The Psychology of Learning ■> 

ing of attention is a profitable procedure; the motor learner 
finds it best to fix his attention sharply upon particular 
details. 2. Errors made in immediate reproduction can be 
understood only in relation to type of ideation and of atten- 
tion. J. The memory of the child is much less efficient in 
immediate retention than that of the adult. 4. Individual 
differences in aptitude for immediate retention are very great 
both in children and in adults. Bright children retain twice 
as much as dull children of the same age. 

All of these relations which we have determined for imme- 
diate reproduction have also been established for permanent 
retention. It is found, however, that so soon as we come to 
deal with permanent retention we are confronted by wholly 
new problems, such as: What influence does re-learning 
exert upon the process of forgetting? And this is an important 
question for pedagogy. 

Ebbinghaus again is the experimenter to whom we owe the 
first accurate investigation of permanent retention and re- 
learning. He memorized many series of nonsense syllables, — 
each series containing thirteen syllables, and as a rule eight 
of these series were learned in succession. Each series was 
learned until he could just recite it from memory without 
error. After definite intervals of time, — twenty minutes, one 
hour, nine hours, one day, two days, six days, and thirty-one 
days, — each series was re-learned. The results of such a 
procedure must show the progressive course of the process of 
forgetting, first during succeeding hours of the day upon 
which the syllables were learned, and then through the ensuing 
days and weeks. It is unfortunate that Ebbinghaus usually 
recorded simply the time expended or the time saved in re- 
learning after the lapse of the interval, and employed these 
determinations as the measure of the amount of forgetting 
which had taken place up to that point. It would have been 



Associative Learning 331 

more correct to determine not only the time but also the 
number of repetitions, and, so far as possible, the accuracy of 
reproduction. The chief results of these experiments were as 
follows: Forgetting proceeds rapidly at first, then gradually 
more and more slowly. Even within an hour after the cessa- 
tion of the learning "more than a half of the work done at the 
beginning must be done over again," before the series can 
again be reproduced correctly. At the end of about nine 
hours the loss amounted to approximately two-thirds of the 
work done at the outset. From this point onward, forgetting 
proceeds more slowly. After twenty-four hours about one- 
third of what was learned is still present in memory; after 
six days, one quarter; and after one month, fully one-fifth 
is still present. This gradually retarding progress indicates 
that complete forgetting would, theoretically, not ensue until 
after an infinity of time had elapsed. From this behavior of 
memory Ebbinghaus derives the following general principle: 
Forgetting progresses not in direct proportion to the time 
elapsed but in proportion to the logarithm of the time. 

Ebbinghaus's determination of the curve of forgetting has 
not been confirmed in the numerous investigations which 
have been carried on in my laboratory. A considerable devi- 
ation from the finding of Ebbinghaus was invariably found in 
the experiments of M. K. Smith, Magneff, Pentschew, and, 
in particular of Radossawljewitsch, who repeated the experi- 
ments of Ebbinghaus with twenty-seven observers. In the 
first place, it is certain that the results of Ebbinghaus show 
forgetting to proceed much too rapidly at the outset. When 
the act of learning has been continued to the point where one 
finds it possible to recite the material once or twice from 
memory, the amount of forgetting which occurs for a time 
thereafter is almost directly proportional to the length of the 
elapsed interval. Not until some little time afterwards does 



332 The Psychology of Learnhig 

a more rapid progress of forgetting appear; and this again is 
always followed by a rate of progress which gradually becomes 
slower and slower. Another striking divergence comes to 
light in connection with Ebbinghaus's finding that more has 
been forgotten after an interval of twenty-four hours than 
after eight hours, for instance, when the syllables were learned 
in the morning and the re-learning took place in the afternoon 
of the same day, eight hours later. We found that all 
observers remember more after twenty-four hours than they 
do after eight hours. It is probable that two factors contrib- 
ute to bring about this state of affairs: A general mental 
fatigue makes its appearance during the day, rendering reten- 
tion more difficult; and associations continue to gain in 
strength throughout the first twenty-four hours. This is the 
phenomenon of latent after-practice which may be shown by 
other means to exist. The progressive advance of forgetting 
as found by Radossawljewitsch is compared with that found 
by Ebbinghaus in the table ^ on opposite page. 

The results reported by Ebbinghaus seem improbable in 
the light of every-day experience. What an unreliable instru- 
ment memory would be if it forgot as rapidly as Ebbinghaus 
believes! If to-day we are to succeed in reciting a body of 
material which we learned yesterday, we must do over again 
more than half of the work which we devoted to its initial 
memorization ! 

It seems desirable to bring forward additional evidence 
bearing upon this first point concerning retention and for- 
getting. We can obtain a direct measurement of the process 
of forgetting by determining the effect of re-learning upon 
retention and forgetting. And this determination may be 
made by discovering how the number of repetitions required 
for re-learning any material are distributed over successive 
' Radossawljewitsch, Op. ciL, p. 83. 



Associative Leai-ni7ig 



2>32> 





Number of 
Experiments 
Performed by 


Length of Interval 
Between Learning 
atid Re-learning 


Per Cent. Forgotten 


Difference 




Rados- 

sawljfw- 

itsch 


Ebbing- 
haiis 


Radossa'ui- 
jewilsch 


Ebbinghaus 


of Rados- 
sawljewitsch 


I 

2 

3 

4 

5 
6 

7 
8 

9 

lO 

II 


24 
24 

24 
24 

47 
26 
20 

13 

8 

18 

12 


12 

16 

12 

26 
26 
26 

45 


5 minutes 

20 " (Ebbing- 

haus, 19) 

60 " (Ebbing- 

haus, 63) 

480 " (Ebbing- 

haus, 525) 

1 day 

2 days 

6 " 

T ^ " 
14 

21 " 

30 " 
120 " 


II.4 

29-3 
52.6 

32.2 
39-1 
50-7 
59-0 
62.0 
79.8 
97.2 


41.8 

55-8 
64.2 

66.3 
72.2 
74.6 

78.9 


-30-4 
-26.5 

-II.6 

-34-1 
-33-1 
-13-9 

•9 


Total 240 


163 











days, — the material being learned or re-learned in each case 
until we know it by heart. This method was first employed 
by Ebbinghaus, who found that the number of repetitions 
required for learning the same material on consecutive days 
decreases in logarithmic progression. Thus, for instance, if 
21.5 repetitions are necessary for the memorization of 24 
nonsense syllables on the first day, the numbers of repetitions 
required on the following days are 10, 5, 3, and i. The 
existence of such a state of affairs, however, seems to be 
very problematic because the first re-learning, on the second 
day, is much more effective than Ebbinghaus reports it to 
be. Our own determinations for consecutive days were (for 
24 syllables) 21.6, 4, i and .7. From this it follows that the 

23 



334 The Psychology of Learning 

first repetition is the prime factor in retention, and that 
subsequent repetitions serve only to intensify its effect. 
Pedagogical rules for the technique of learning may be de- 
rived from all of these facts; but particular heed should be 
paid to the stages of learning. The pupil who is made familiar 
with these stages will be more hkely to guard against immature 
and imperfect learning, and hence will be spared a great deal 
of relatively useless work. In the class-room, material should 
always be thoroughly re-learned as soon as possible after its 
initial acquisition because this procedure will be found to aid 
retention in a most effective manner. 

Ebbinghaus reports other findings which are of value to 
pedagogy. At each sitting he memorized six stanzas of 
Byron's Don Juan, and a series containing twelve, twenty-four 
or thirty-six nonsense syllables ; and on the following day, at 
the same hour, he re-learned the same materials. In these 
experiments the difference between the number of repetitions 
required for learning and for re-learning, that is, the "saving" 
in repetitions, was taken as a measure of the amount retained. 
The results were as follows : i. As to the influence of length 
of series, it was found that the longer series were more indel- 
ibly imprinted, — that is, they were retained better; indeed, 
the groups of thirty-six syllables were imprinted almost twice 
as thoroughly as the groups of twelve syllables. Significant 
material was remembered very much better than meaningless 
material. The stanzas of poetry were re-learned on the second 
day with less than half as many repetitions as the shortest 
series of nonsense syllables required; and notwithstanding 
this, the memorial stability of the former was so great that 
no more repetitions were required for their refreshing on the 
next day than for the series of twenty-four syllables, i.e., 
about one-half of the original number of repetitions. 2. As 
to the influence of re-learning, the results revealed the remark- 



Associative Learning 335 

able fact that the number of repetitions which the longest 
series of syllables required on re-learning decreased more 
rapidly than the corresponding number of repetitions for the 
shortest series; so that ultimately, upon a certain day, the 
longest and the shortest series were re-learned wdth the same 
number of repetitions. 

Ebbinghaus employed but a single method of learning; and 
he wholly failed to determine which procedure in learning 
gives the most accurate and permanent retention. We have 
already mentioned the influence of procedure upon retention 
and forgetting. We need only repeat that material which 
has been learned in parts is more readily forgotten, and 
what has been learned as a single whole is remembered much 
longer. If, for example, an observer remembers thirty per 
cent, of a poem which he learned three months ago by the 
whole-procedure, he would be found to have forgotten almost 
the whole of it during the same interval if he had learned it 
by the part-procedure. Indeed, it sometimes happened, it is 
true, that stanzas which had been learned by the whole-pro- 
cedure required more repetitions on re-learning than stanzas 
learned by the part-procedure; but, even in those cases, the 
former stanzas were remembered essentially better than the 
latter. Hence the whole-method again proves to be more 
advantageous in so far as retention for longer periods of 
time is concerned. 

7. The Education of Memory in the Schools 
The foregoing descriptions have disclosed a picture of mem- 
ory function which is wholly different from that which psy- 
chology was accustomed to sketch in its non-experimental 
days. According to the older psychology, all remembering 
and reproducing depend simply upon laws of association ; and 
no clear distinction was made between laws of association and 



336 The Psychology of Learning 

laws of reproduction. Instead of these laws of association 
we now have an analysis of the particular and the general 
conditions of memorization and reproduction in their extra- 
ordinary fullness and complexity. We have obtained an 
insight into the fundamental differences of learning-types, and 
into certain of the more essential of the general conditions of 
learning. The question will now arise: To what degree, and 
in what manner are the learning types capable of being sys- 
tematically turned to account in learning, of being improved 
and developed, or of being levelled down and made identical 
with one another? We must also inquire to what extent and 
by what means memory, in general, is capable of being 
trained and improved. And finally it may be mentioned once 
more that the profound importance of formal memory train- 
ing has been established in every memorial investigation where 
the training of memory as such was attempted. May it not 
be demanded, then, that the schools shall incorporate the 
formal training of memory into their curriculum? 

A first demand which our psychological investigations lead 
us to make upon the schools is of a general sort: Memoriza- 
tion should not be a matter of accidental success as it has been 
in the past; nor should it be given over to the blundering efforts 
and the unsystematic groping of the child. It should not 
entail the waste of time and of energy which necessarily 
results from a desultory and fortuitous procedure. The teacher 
must raise it to a higher plane; and this he can do by directing 
his pupils in their process of learning and by adapting their 
activity to conform with the results obtained from investi- 
gations of the conditions of economical learning. 

How can this be brought about? It may be accomplished 
in the following ways. Children should be instructed by the 
teacher in the proper use of their means of remembering and 
modes of reproducing, the instruction of course being made 



Associative Learning 337 

more and more complete and thorough as the children become 
older. They should be systematically trained by practical 
memory exercises. The material employed in this training 
should be related as closely as possible with the material 
ordinarily learned in the school-room; its quahty and its 
quantity should be graded to adapt it to the age and the 
capacity of the pupils. The formal purpose, — the training and 
development of memory itself, — and the material purpose, — 
the mental acquisition of the subject-matter, — should receive 
equal emphasis throughout. 

As regards the theoretical instruction of the child in the 
use of his memory, this may include the following points: 
I. Pupils may have their attention called to the various 
means of memorizing through whose use the highest efficiency 
of memory is attained ; and again the instruction may include 
either the particular means of memorizing, which are pecuHar 
to particular persons, or the general means which are common 
to all individuals. This demand, of course, presupposes that 
the teacher himself has a mastery of the methods by means of 
which the memory-type of the child may be determined. A 
few minutes at the beginning of the first school-period should 
suffice for an examination of the memory types of certain 
children in the class ; the tests could be made in the presence 
of other children, who would thus come to an understanding 
of the experiments which are to be made upon them later. 
In this manner a large class can be investigated within a few 
weeks. Where it is not feasible to make individual tests, the 
whole class may be investigated at once by means of one of 
the mass-methods, although mass-methods are always less 
reliable than individual tests. For instance, the pupils may 
be asked to record all of the visual, auditory, and motor ideas 
which occur to them in a given period of time, say five minutes ; 
or the teacher may determine which children remember data 



338 The Psychology of Learning 

best from auditory presentation, and which find visual pres- 
entation the most favorable; or the pupils may be asked to 
report the first idea which occurs to them when a word is 
pronounced in their presence. In the latter case, one may 
gradually confine their choice of reproduced words within 
narrower and narrower limits; by this means, and by an 
appropriate selection of stimulus-words, the child's dominating 
imagery may readily be determined. The time required for 
the learning of a given material may be measured, and notice- 
able fluctuations of attention may be recorded. It is a simple 
matter to determine the compass of immediate retention for 
all the members of the class. 

When we have determined the ideational type to which a 
child belongs, and have also determined his type of attention, 
it is then desirable to bring the essential features of his method 
of learning to the notice of the child himself, and to show 
him the advantages and the disadvantages of his procedure. 
My own observations show that these determinations and 
demonstrations are interesting both to the teacher and to the 
pupil. Through acquiring an insight into the mechanism of 
memory, children are led to take pleasure in the formal act 
of learning; while the teacher is enabled to ascertain the 
causes of success and failure in the memory work of his pupils, 
to acquire skill in diagnosing memorial weakness and memorial 
strength in particular pupils, and to develop an ability to 
direct his pupils to a proper and effective employment of 
means which may be made to contribute to memory. He 
sees that the attention of one pupil adapts itself with difficulty 
to the material and to the act of learning, while that of another 
adapts itself readily and securely; that one child is inclined 
to remember chiefly in terms of sensory elements while an- 
other tends to employ non-sensory elements; and that the 
former child's procedure consists chiefly in calling up material 



Associative Learning 339 

concretely before his mind, while the latter relies upon his 
power to apprehend the logical coherence of the material. 
He sees, too, that the attention of one is attracted by the 
whole, — the parts being remembered by means of the whole, — 
while that of another is directed to particular details; that 
in the latter case, the act of learning consists in apprehending 
the details as isolated items and then combining them into a 
whole; that the attention of one is characterized by its inten- 
sity of concentration and by the fact that it progresses by 
means of a series of acts of fixating, while that of another is 
diffuse and fluctuating, and vacillates between forward and 
backward movements during the process of establishing its 
associations; that in one pupil the emphasis in the mechan- 
ical aspect of learning is upon the auditory word elements, in 
another pupil upon the visual or the motor, or any combina- 
tion of the three; that certain pupils make extensive use of 
secondary clues such as memorial locaHzations. Speaking 
generally, the teacher who proceeds in this investigative fash- 
ion ascertains that the whole activity of learning is constituted 
differently according to the fundamental characteristics of the 
individual's memory, and that every individual must first 
learn how best to make use of his own peculiar means to 
remembering. 

Here is a problem in memory training regarding whose 
solution psychologists are far from being in agreement. In 
consequence of general psychological considerations and of 
the results of certain experiments, psychologists have held 
that pupils should be instructed to employ as many memorial 
factors as possible, or, in other words, to learn by means of 
all of the senses and by means of the content or meaning of 
the material as well. Other authors are of the opinion that 
it is better for each individual to work with the factors which 
conform with his own endowment or type, — the auditory 



340 The Psychology of Learning 

learner with auditory images, etc. An investigation by 
Bigham^ seems to support the former view. Bigham deter- 
mined whether an observer makes more errors in the imme- 
diate reproduction of numbers and colors when he retains the 
impressions by auditory imagery alone, by visual imagery 
alone, or by both of these means in combination. Numbers 
and colors were learned by simply seeing them in one case, by 
simply hearing their names in another case, and in a third 
case by the two modes of presentation together. His results 
show that visual memory acting alone retains better than 
auditory memory alone; and that when the two memories 
co-operate, the number of errors is considerably less than 
when either memory operates alone. Thus when the names of 
ten colors were presented, an average of 7.6 were remembered; 
when the colors themselves were seen 8.2 were remembered; 
when they were seen and their names were heard at the same 
time 9.5 were remembered. This result also seems to be 
supported by theoretical considerations. Indeed, one may 
say that the more associative connections a content of con- 
sciousness enters into, the more aids are present for its reten- 
tion and reproduction. 

But Bigham's experiment is too crude to furnish any proof; 
and against the general consideration it may be urged that 
the number of associative connections is by no means the sole 
determinant of retention. Retention is rather a matter of 
stability and strength of associative bonds. In investigations 
of immediate and permanent retention I have found that 
unpractised observers retain better when they employ only 
the sort or sorts of imagery which correspond to their idea- 
tional type than when they are asked to make use of all pos- 
sible sorts of imagery. For example, in the case of the unprac- 
tised auditory individual the request that he shall attend also 
"^ J. Bigham, Memory, Psychol. Rev., I., 1894, 453-461. 



Associative Learning 341 

to the visual images of the letters, numbers, syllables and 
words may produce such a decrease of memorial efficiency 
that he retains very much fewer data than when he directs 
his attention only to the auditory imagery with which he is 
conversant. The explanation of this is to be found in the. 
fact that the unusual direction of his attention to the visual 
images weakens the association of the auditory images with- 
out furnishing any compensatory strengthening of association 
by means of visual images. This is in accord with our experi- 
ence that a beginner sometimes requires a ridiculously great 
number of repetitions (sixty, seventy or more) for the learn- 
ing of a series of twelve meaningless syllables, while on the 
following day he may succeed in learning an equally long Hst 
of new syllables with one-half or one-third as many repeti- 
tions. In such cases, it is always possible to show that the 
beginner must first discover his learning type, and that in 
his first few sittings he vacillates between different modes of 
learning. None but practised observers can learn to make 
use of means of memorizing with which they are not naturally 
conversant. 

From this it seems to follow that memory exercises for 
children must at first be adapted to their peculiar mental 
types, and that children should first acquire an ability to 
make exclusive use of their connate memorial endowment. 
Not until they have attained an increased degree of memorial 
efficiency will it be possible for them to make a transition to 
the gradual process of rounding out their one-sided memorial 
endowment. 

A second important point in instructing children in their 
process of learning would consist in teaching them that in 
learning significant material an understanding of the subject- 
matter must be made to co-operate with the indispensable 
mechanical aspect of all memorization, and also in directing 



342 The Psychology of Learning 

them as to how this co-operation is to be brought about. A 
complete understanding of the content should constitute the 
starting-point of all learning, ^ because otherwise it is impos- 
sible to avoid the danger that a tedious mechanical memoriza- 
tion of an uncomprehended text may be substituted for a 
rational acquisition of it, and, — what is psychologically more 
important, — in that case the valuable memorial aids which 
inhere in the understanding of the content are not employed 
to the best advantage in the act of learning. In addition to 
this, however, the attention of the child must be especially 
directed to the sensory vehicle by means of which the subject- 
matter is conveyed to his consciousness. As early as possible 
the child should be given instruction in rhythm and rhyme, 
correct pronounciation, the length of words and sentences, 
and whatever other features correspond to his ideational type. 
In so doing we may show, at least to the more intelligent 
child, that the choice of words is not an arbitrary or accidental 
matter in so far as their purely sensory character is concerned. 
This marks the first step toward guiding the mechanical fac- 
tor of memorizing in the proper direction. The second step 
in the same direction consists in showing him the necessity of 
vigorous repetition with constant concentration of attention 
upon the subject-matter and upon the mechanical and sensory 
elements. 

Meanwhile it is exceedingly important that the child should 
receive a hint as to the difference between aimless, ineffective 
repetition and that sort of repetition in which attention and 
memory receive the full benefit of every single reading. This 
can be done by showing him the differences between the 
various methods of learning. I have discovered that the whole- 
procedure is advantageous not only in the laboratory, for 
teachers of my acquaintance have also submitted it to a 
' See pages 2975. 



Associative Learning 343 

thorough test in their schools. Let the children see how wholly 
different is their concentration of attention when they learn 
by means of the whole-method or by one of the mediating 
methods, and when, in employing the part-method as they 
ordinarily do, they waste an extravagant number of repeti- 
tions on the first few lines of a stanza of poetry and neglect 
the other lines. My own experience shows me the necessity 
of using the child himself as an illustration in demonstrating 
how the various methods differ in their effects upon retention 
and reproduction; it encourages the child to adopt a partic- 
ular method in his learning, and it also contributes to his 
enjoyment of the act of learning. It is scarcely necessary to 
add that all of these instructions may be given without 
burdening the child with psychological terminology. 

The fundamental characteristics of his attention may also 
be pointed out to the child. If he is led to see that his atten- 
tion is slow to adapt itself to its task, this may spur him on to 
overcome his defect. And the practical precepts which follow 
from Kraemer's investigation may also be included here, espe- 
cially those wliich concern the adjustment and direction of at- 
tention upon the results to be attained in the act of learning. ^ 

Practical exercises in appropriate memorial work may go 
hand in hand with theoretical instruction. Let the child first 
be taught that all memory work should begin with a correct 
apprehension of the content which is to be remembered, and 
that the accuracy and care of this initial apprehension, the 
sensory perception and the motor reproduction of the verbal 
material as well as the concrete-logical understanding of the 
material to be remembered are fundamental conditions of 
memorial acquisition. 

The precautions which are to be observed in order to secure 
a compliance with this rule are different in the mechanical 
^ See pages 293 fif. 



344 T'he Psychology of Learning 

learning of unrelated data and in significant learning. In 
mechanical learning, — for instance, in learning words of a 
foreign language, — the auditory, motor, and visual elements 
of the words must be apprehended as accurately as possible 
in purely sensory fashion before the learning begins; and 
during the first few readings the rapidity of speaking and of 
learning is slackened to such a degree that an accurate sensory 
apprehension may become possible. In the learning of sig- 
nificant material, the complete penetration or ''soaking in" 
of the content, in its concrete and logical relations, constitutes 
the analogous pre-condition of memorial work. The accuracy, 
rapidity and range of the apprehending attention can be im- 
pi ea by practice; and this improvement contributes indi- 
rectly to the work of imprinting upon memory. To what 
degree one's rapidity in apprehending visual words can be 
improved by practice may be seen from experiments in tachis- 
toscopic reading. The tachistoscope is essentially a faUing 
screen which may be made to drop with variable rapidity, and 
to expose a word for an instant at some point in its course. 
By means of this instrument, one may determine the shortest 
exposure- time during which words may still be read. If a 
great many persons are trained in the rapid apprehension of 
words, it may sometimes be determined that their reading- 
time is generally reduced by seven-fold to eight-fold, so that 
most observers ultimately read a word with an exposure- 
time of three to four one-thousandths of a second. The 
rapidity of apprehension of content can likewise be increased 
by practice. But the more rapidly and accurately the visual- 
auditory impressions and the content or meaning of the 
material are grasped, the more rapidly does the single reading 
become effective for memory; while the individual who appre- 
hends inaccurately and slowly devotes more readings to the 
mere process of completing his apprehension. 



1 



Associative Learnifig 345 

Still more important is it to give practical instruction in 
the concentration of attention for the act of learning itself. 
A certain education of attention for the act of learning is 
necessary if memorization is to attain its highest efficiency. 
Investigation shows that this end can be accomplished by 
regulating the rapidity of reading and in general by following 
the precept: Learn slowly and accurately at first, then grad- 
ually increase the rapidity of reading and learning. Psycho- 
logical investigations have furnished us with valuable obser- 
vations regarding the best means of attaining a uniform and 
intensive degree of concentration of attention. We frequently 
make perception and reading more difficult by artificial means 
in order to obtain a higher degree of concentration. T. 5, 
when nonsense-syllables are being read from a revolving 
drum,^ the rotation is sometimes increased to a very rapid 
rate, and the observer is obliged to read with a maximum 
concentration of attention or the syllables will disappear from 
view before he has apprehended them. The attention of the 
child may be trained in similar fashion, by obhging him to 
read through a sht which moves at a definite rate of speed 
across the list of words or other non-coherent memory mate- 
rial. We find, too, that when distractions of attention, such 
as noises, are introduced into the experiment, these oftentimes 
give rise to no distracting effect but to an increase in the 
efficiency of attention and memory. In these cases the dis- 
traction is more than compensated by an increased concen- 
tration of attention. The presence of his class-mates in the 
school-room constitutes a natural "distraction" which in- 
creases the efficiency of the child's attention; class-learning 
may, then, be one of the most effective means of attaining a 
higher degree of attentive concentration upon the part of the 
pupil. Investigations have recently been undertaken which 

^ Cf. p. 164. 



346 The Psychology of Learning 

aimed to compare the class-work with the isolated, individual 
work of the child; and in almost every instance, the class- 
work was found to be superior. These investigations also 
show that the energy expended in protecting attention from 
distracting stimuli is greater in class-work than in solo work. ^ 
The sort of directions which the teacher gives to pupils exerts 
an influence upon the intensity of attention. The same task 
is attacked by the pupil in wholly different fashion according 
as the teacher instructs him to do it slowly and well, to do it 
rapidly and well, or to do it as rapidly as he can. We have 
already discussed the form in which instructions for memory 
work must be expressed. From the nature of these practical 
instructions for memorial exercises it also follows that the 
exercises must be done under the control of the teacher, and 
for the same reason they must be done as class-work. A 
comparative study of work which is done individually and as 
class-work shows in general that the more the pupil studies in 
class, the more efficient does he become in concentrating upon 
his learning; and, on the other hand, if home-work is done 
under distracting influences it frequently has a deleterious 
effect upon the concentration of pupils who are prone to dis- 
traction. 

As to the arranging of memory exercises, the results of 
school experiments show that the first hour of the day should 
be chosen for those exercises in which the formal purpose of 
memory development is most emphasized, because in the 
first place, school-children possess the greatest amount of 
psycho-physical energy during the first and second hours, 
and they are then still free from the influence of fatigue; 
and in the second place, their memorial efficiency fluctuates 
between wide limits at different hours of the day. 

^ Cf. the references to A. Mayer, F. Schmidt, and K. Roller, in the 
Bibliography. 



Associative Learning 2>'\7 

Immediate retention, no less than permanent retention, 
should receive systematic training in school. If the adult can 
almost double his immediate retention by practice, we may 
expect an even greater improvement of this capacity in the 
child. Dictation and every other form of school activity 
which appeals to immediate retention may be used as a means 
for the systematic training of this function. For example, 
lists of words may be read aloud by the teacher up to the limit 
of immediate retention, before the real memorization of the 
list begins. 

8. The Actual Memorial Efficiency of School Children Com- 
pared with the Results of Experimental Investigations 
We have offered certain suggestions for the systematic 
development of memory in the school-room. If now we con- 
sider the memorial efficiency of the child as it actually exists, 
we find that the investigations of school-children of different 
ages reveal an unsatisfactory state of affairs. It has already 
been mentioned that Miss Steffens, working at the instigation 
of G. E. Miiller, was the first to make a detailed investigation 
of the natural methods of learning employed by school- 
children. She found that children learn in a much more uneco- 
nomical way than adults, and particularly that they learn 
with an exceedingly injudicious distribution of repetitions. 
Her experiments also showed that the amount remembered 
and the compass of immediate retention, as well as the fidelity 
and accuracy of remembrance are much greater in adults than 
in school-children of any age, even when purely mechanical 
learning is concerned. In Pentschew's investigation in the 
Zurich laboratory it was found that school-children at the age 
of nine years never succeeded in remembering more than four- 
teen nonsense-syllables which had been learned in a purely 
mechanical fashion and as a whole series; it was observed. 



348 The Psychology of Learning 

too, that they soon become very much fatigued. Adults, 
however, learned Hsts which were at least twice as long, with- 
out fatigue, although the material did not conform to their 
usual mode of memorizing; and practised adults were able 
to memorize twenty-four, thirty-six or even more syllables at 
a single sitting. In class-experiments conducted by A. Mayer 
in Wiirzburg, certain pupils required from eighty to one hun- 
dred repetitions for the memorization of ten syllables; two 
of my most highly practised observers learned this number of 
syllables with an average of three to four repetitions. 

A somewhat similar state of affairs is found in immediate 
retention. As already described,^ my own experiments in 
immediate reproduction showed that children of ten to twelve 
years retain an average of about four letters, and that children 
of thirteen to fourteen years retain an average of five to six 
letters and not quite so many syllables, while our practised 
adults retain as many as thirteen to fourteen letters and 
approximately the same number of words. This clearly 
shows that the memory of school-children is much less efficient 
than is to be expected. Experiments by German, American 
and French teachers have shown that the improvement in 
memory with increase of age is slight. The memory of chil- 
dren seems to improve but little after they have reached the 
mean school-age. This fact has been confirmed by nearly all 
investigators, but the differences were not always so slight as 
Binet and Henri found them to be. Indeed, Bourdon found 
even a worse state of affairs, so far as increase of memory in 
children is concerned, than appears from the data which we 
have quoted. Bourdon tested the memories of one hundred 
pupils between the ages of eight and twenty in the high schools 
of Paris. According to his results, memory improves slowly 
from eight to fourteen years; from fourteen to twenty years 

^C/. p. 321. 



Associative Learning 349 

it remains wholly unchanged or improves in scarcely percep- 
tible degree. 

How is it possible that the child's memory develops so little 
during all his years at school, notwithstanding the fact that 
it is exercised and trained every day and every hour? General 
psychological considerations and experimental investigations 
lead one to suppose that the child's memory is much more 
plastic and impressionable than the over-burdened memory of 
the adult. The fact that, notwithstanding its possibilities of 
development, memorial efficiency improves so little during 
school-age forces one to form an exceedingly unfavorable 
opinion of school methods of memorization, in so far as their 
value as formal training is concerned. As a matter of fact 
the child's learning does not improve his memory; there 
seems to be but a single factor which contributes to a develop- 
ment of his memory and that is his own increasing age. And 
this slight improvement in memorial function he does not 
owe to the school. His learning at school is organized and 
conducted from a purely material or non-formal point of view; 
and in consequence of this, his memory is demoralized and 
becomes a mere matter of accident. Yet in spite of this, it 
improves somewhat as a result of his natural development. 

The serious complaints against the current learning of the 
schools, which is regulated in accordance with no psychological 
laws,* are based chiefly upon the fact that school-children who 
have been subjected to formal memory training in our labor- 
atories have frequently shown a ten-fold increase of memorial 
efficiency; the fidelity of their retention, although not increas- 
ing by nearly so much, is likewise essentially improved; and 
their accuracy of reproduction also increases. The empirical 
determination of the child's lesser capacity to learn must not, 
however, be employed simply as a justification for heaping 

reproaches upon the schools. The chief weakness of these 
24 



350 The Psychology of Learning 

charges lies in their assumption that the child has, as a matter 
of fact, a much more plastic and impressionable memory 
than the adult. This assumption, couched in this general 
form, is too indefinite; and although a psychologist has 
recently asserted that, strictly speaking, the memory of the 
child decreases steadily in impressionability with advancing 
age, and that the child's whole gain is a gain in concentration 
of attention, one can readily cite experimental evidence to 
show that the pupil's capacity to learn increases steadily with 
his years. ^ Yet the fact remains that notwithstanding all his 
learning at school he shows but little improvement; and the 
question arises as to what inference is to be drawn from this 
circumstance. 

My inference is, first of all, that it is absolutely necessary 
to introduce into the schools a formal training of memory 
such as we have suggested. According to our experimental 
investigations, it must be possible to increase the memorial 
efhciency of school-children by three or four-fold, by giving 
them systematic instruction based upon sound psychological 
principles, and by training them in retention as such. Are 
we, then, to resort to purely formal memory exercises? And 
are we to drill pupils in the most efficient methods of learning 
by means of material which is itself valueless? This question 
I should answer in the negative; or at least I should say that 
purely formal exercises are to be employed only occasionally 
and secondarily, as for instance, when it becomes necessary 
to train an especially inattentive learner by private treatment 
outside school-hours. Meaningless material with accurately 
controlled methods of learning would serve well for this pur- 
pose. But there are two important reasons for not introduc- 
ing purely formal memory exercises, a practical and a psy- 

^ J. J. van Biervliet, Esquisse d'une education de la memoire. 
Revue de philos. III., 1903. 



Associative Learning 351 

chological reason. The practical reason is this : Specific formal 
mental training cannot be added to the over-loaded curriculum 
of the public school. There simply is not time for it, because 
what may justly be demanded for memory may with equal 
justice be demanded for other mental capacities; and if we 
introduce formal mental training why not also exercises in 
apprehension, judgment, speaking, etc.? In short, we would 
return to the atrocious speech-drill of Pestalozzi, or to the 
monstrous words of the orthographical training of the Phil- 
anthropinists. 

As a matter of fact Biervliet has recently arrived at this 
conclusion, apparently without a knowledge of the failure of 
the older pedagogy in this direction.^ But there are also 
psychological objections. Purely formal memory exercises 
with meaningless material must necessarily train the child's 
mechanico-meaningless method of learning; and he would 
never discover the correct use of the most important factor 
of memory, — the proper reinforcement by the meaning of the 
material. This latter procedure can be learned only by means 
of material which has meaning and value for consciousness. 
This, however, is not tantamount to saying that valuable 
formal training of memory and a systematic improvement of 
methods of learning cannot be combined with the material 
already contained in the school curriculum. Only to this 
extent would I be in favor of a formal mental training. The 
materials which are already prescribed by the curricula of the 
schools must be learned in such fashion as will contribute as 
much as possible to a formal training of memory ; and the act 
of learning must be performed in a manner which is psycho- 
logically sound. I have already endeavored to offer sugges- 
tions as to how this may be done; children must, above all 

' Thus Biervliet recommends exercises in the pronunciation of such 
words as lololilalulilo and lalabarakalamana. Op. (it, p. 506. 



352 The Psychology of Learning 

else, be instructed in the proper use of their memorial equip- 
ment and in the acquisition of a technique and an economy 
of learning which is psychologically and practically justified. 
A complete organization of such exercises can be attained 
only by a systematic co-operation of psychological observa- 
tion and pedagogical practice. 

Another psychological objection to the demand for formal 
mental exercises in the schools has recently been advanced; 
but it does not seem to me to be vaHd. In an interesting study 
of memorization Netschajeff ^ has urged the following consid- 
eration against this demand. ''Experimental psychology has 

shown that different sorts of memory are 

to be distinguished from one another. Is it possible for train- 
ing to exert a beneficent influence upon all of the memorial 
functions of a given person? For instance, can a composer 
who endeavors to strengthen his auditory memory by rehears- 
ing various melodies hope that his visual memory will also be 
improved by this means? Experimental investigations do not 
justify us in answering this question in the affirmative. We 
know only that practice in remembering certain impressions 
strengthens our capacity to remember this one sort of impres- 
sion alone." Then the author adds that it might sometimes 
appear "as though the training of a particular sort of memory 
also strengthens other forms of memory;" it is probable, 
however, that this is not due to a training of the general 
memorial function but to the fact that the practised learner 
has acquired certain "schematic devices," clues, knacks, and 
a more advantageous general behavior in consequence of which 
his general learning is now improved. In short, Netschajeff 
claims that there is no general memorial function, but only a 
group of special memories; that for this reason no general 
formal training of memory is possible, but that we can train 
^ A. Netschajeff, Ucbcr Memoricren, Berlin, 1902, 20. 



Associative Learning 353 

only a certain special memory, — memory for tones, or colors, 
or names, or nmnbers, etc. From this he infers that the devel- 
opment of memory at school can proceed only in such fashion 
that the child acquires "certain rational schematic methods" 
of memorizing. 

In the foregoing, we have demanded two things instead of 
one, namely: The introduction into our schools not only of 
general memory exercises, but also of methods of learning 
which are psychologically sound. In the first place, Netscha- 
jeff appears to overlook the fact that even if a general improve- 
ment of memory is due solely to the learner's acquisition of a 
more advantageous procedure in learning, still the school may 
derive profit from memory exercises because it is a matter of 
indifiference to the teacher whether the general concomitant 
training of other sorts of memory is due to one cause or to 
another, — to the presence of a general memorial function 
which is improved and strengthened by practice, or to an 
improvement in certain general factors of another sort such 
as attention, interest in learning, or the practical procedure or 
behavior of the learner. Even in the formal discipline of a 
special memory these more general factors which are indi- 
rectly advantageous to retention are improved. The student 
of pedagogy is interested only in determining whether, as a 
matter of fact, a general training of memory is possible; the 
psychological basis upon which it rests concerns him only 
indirectly as a practical man. 

Ebert and Meumann have made an experimental investi- 
gation of just this very question, as to whether there is such a 
thing as a general memory training; and their experimental 
findings were unequivocal and positive. The following exper- 
iment was carried through with six observers. First, in a series 
of preHminary experiments the existing state of the observer's 
memory was determined, i.e., a cross-section was made 



354 The Psychology of Learnmg 

through all of his special memories. They first of all tested 
immediate retention by determining the compass of retention 
of numbers, letters, words, nonsense syllables, stanzas of 
poetry, and selections of prose. Then they tested permanent 
retention in the genuine learning of nonsense syllables, poetry 
and prose; and finally a special investigation of visual mem- 
ory was made. After the chief sorts of memory in unprac- 
tised individuals had thus been determined quantitatively, 
the drill experiments began. Only a single type of memory was 
trained, — the mechanical memorization of nonsense syllables, 
— and the training was continued through thirty-six consec- 
utive days. At the end of this period, they again made a 
cross-section through all of the varieties of memory present 
in the individual in order to discover whether these other 
memories had profited from the training. Then they again 
trained certain of the observers for eighteen, others for thirty- 
six days, in the mechanical retention of nonsense syllables; 
and then once more a quantitative determination of the special 
memories was made. 

Now these experiments show that all of the sorts of memories 
were considerably improved by mere drill in the learning of 
nonsense syllables. Even a function which is so different 
from genuine memorization as the immediate retention of 
non-significant impressions had been considerably strength- 
ened. Purely visual memory had been improved by the learn- 
ing of nonsense syllables, as had also the learning of abstract 
prose selections, — a function which is utterly different from 
the practised function; and the memorizing of poetry had 
also been improved.^ This, to be sure, establishes only the 
fact that there is such a thing as a general memorial training, 
and that our whole memory is improved when we train it 

^ Ebert und Meumann, Uebungsph'dnomene im Bereiche des Geddcht- 
nisscs, Leipzig, 1904. 



Associative Learning 355 

with any sort of material. It does not, however, determine to 
what cause this fact is due, whether to an improvement of 
certain general mental factors such as attention, which may 
be of indirect advantage in all learning; or to the existence 
of a general internal relationship among all of the special 
memories, in virtue of which every training of one memory 
brings with it a concomitant training of all other memories; 
or to the existence of a general memorial function. I have 
been engaged for some time upon additional experiments 
which aim to settle this question which is so important for 
psychology. 

Coover and Angell ^ have recently investigated this problem 
anew. In experiments which dealt with related mental 
functions, they found that the effects of practice may be 
shown to be transferred from a trained to a non-trained 
function. For instance, one's discrimination of brightnesses 
is improved by a training in the discrimination of pitches; 
and training in certain complex reactions is transferred to 
other reactions. These authors refer the phenomenon of 
transfer to an improvement in certain co-operating factors, 
such as habituation, a more economical adaptation of atten- 
tion to the stimuli, and an increased concentration or a capac- 
ity to ignore distracting influences and accessory circumstances 
during the act of observing. This seems to me to leave the 
main problem still unsettled ; but so far as pedagogical prac- 
tice is concerned, Coover and Angell's investigation estab- 
lishes the existence of a transfer of training, — a result which 
has a purely practical significance. Winch ^ went a step 
farther in his investigation of transfer of training in school- 

' Coover and Angell, General Practice Effect of Special Exercise, 
Amcr. Jour, of Psychol., XVIII., 1907, 328-340. 

^ W. H. Winch, The Transfer of Improvement in Memory in School- 
children. Brit. Jour, of Psychol., II., 190S, 284-293. 



356 The Psychology of Leanmig 

children. In his first series of experiments, — with girls whose 
average age was thirteen years, — he showed not only that 
practice in the learning of poetry transfers to the learning of 
history, but that the transfer is present in high degree in the 
majority of pupils. In a second series of experiments, memory 
for geography was considerably improved by practice in the 
learning of poetry. Winch's chief result is thus expressed: 
"Training which is acquired through the memorizing of one 
sort of subject-matter may be transferred to the memorizing 
of other sorts of subject-matter whose nature is certainly 
diverse from the first." In these cases the investigation dealt 
with the existence of transfer in verbal memorization. And 
the question arises as to whether "rote memory, "or the 
mechanical remembrance of verbal material, transfers to "sub- 
stance memory, " or the remembrance of significant material. 
Winch answers this question in the affirmative. Boys and 
girls, ten to twelve years of age, improved their memory of 
the essential content of a significant text by mechanically 
learning verbal materials ; not only did practice in mechanical 
learning improve "substance memory" but the amount of 
improvement was sometimes greater in the latter (unprac- 
tised) case than in the former (practised) case. This investi- 
gation proves that the transfer of memory training occurs in 
children as well as in adults. 

The student of pedagogy, however, is primarily interested 
only in the fact that such a general training of memory is 
possible. And in consequence of this fact he may make, on 
behalf of the schools, a renewed demand for memory exer- 
cises which shall aim to improve memory itself, and which 
shall, in that sense, constitute a formal training of memory. 
Let us point out once more that this does not mean a de- 
mand that for purposes of memorial training the schools 
shall resort to the use of material which is itself valueless, 



Assocuitivc Learning 357 

such as nonsense syllables; it only means a demand that 
in learning the materials which are now prescribed by the 
school curriculum memory may, and indeed must, receive a 
specific training. 

We may now finally report a group of experiments which 
deal with the degree to which memory may be improved by 
training. There are two points to be taken into consideration 
here. In the first place, it may be asked where, after all, is 
the limit of general improvement of capacity. In how far 
can memory, in general, be improved? Then, in the interests 
of pedagogy, we may enquire how far is it possible to level 
down or to ehminate individual peculiarities of memory. 
Light is thrown upon both of these problems by our investi- 
gations of practice. As to improvement of memory, we can 
only say that it has no limit,^at least, a given memory 
function may be developed to a maximum degree by practice. 
For example, the maximum efficiency in the learning of a 
series of syllables of a given number is reached when the series 
is learned in a single reading. As a matter of fact, two of 
my observers very frequently succeeded in learning a twelve- 
syllable series with three readings, and sometimes even with 
two readings. I do not doubt that it would have required 
but a shghtly longer continuation of our practice experiments 
to enable these observers to learn a twelve-syllable series with 
but a single reading. Now one of these observers, Ba.^ 
required forty-nine repetitions for the learning of a series of 
twelve syllables at the beginning of our course of training; and 
the other, F., required fourteen repetitions. The complete 
efifect of training upon the memory of the adult can best be 
understood from the following summary. The numbers of 
repetitions required for learning ten nonsense syllables were 
as follows (see next page) : 



358 The Psychology of Learning 

Repetitions required at Repetitions required at 

Observers the beginning of the end of the 

the experiments experiments 
{For the learning of ten nonsense syllables) 

Ba. 28 3 

F. 23 2 

Br. 25 4 

M. 31 4 

{For the learning of sixteen nonsense syllables) 
Ba. 31 5 

P- 19 5 

Br. 23 8 

M. ZA 3 

It is also characteristic that the progress of memorial train- 
ing is not so evident in the learning of significant material as 
in purely mechanical learning. In the case of significant 
material the mechanization of learning is not always present 
in equal degree; and it is the mechanization of learning which 
seems to be the factor which profits most from continued 
practice. The following data were obtained in the learning 
of prose: 

Repetitions required Repetitions required 
without practice with practice 

Ba. 36 14 

Br. 26 II 

F. 17 5 

S. 38 10 

On the other hand, the training of visual memory which 
certain of our observers acquired from the learning of nonsense 
syllables produced an extraordinary degree of improvement 



Associative Learning 359 

in the memorizing of visual impressions. The visual impres- 
sions, twelve in number, were all geometrical forms which were 
varied in regular order during the course of the investigation. 
The results of these experiments were as follows: 



Observers 


Repetitions before 


Repetitions after 




training 


training 


Ba. 


25 


7 


Br. 


26 


6 


F. 


24 


7 


S. 


43 


6 



There can be no doubt that so great an amount of trans- 
ferred training cannot be explained from a mere acquisition 
of mechanical devices which aid in memorizing; we are com- 
pelled to assume that a concomitant training of related func- 
tions of memory took place. 

It is especially to be noted that three older observers took 
part in all of these experiments, one of whom was thirty-six, 
another forty, and the third fifty-four years of age. And 
although the effect of practice was very considerable in the 
case of these three observers, still it did not even approximate 
the amount which appears in the results of the students. At 
about the age of forty years then, it seems probable that a 
retrogression of memory occurs even under conditions of 
maximum practice. If we examine our whole group of experi- 
ments, which included observers ranging from seven to fifty- 
four years of age, in order to determine at what age the 
greatest memory efficiency can be attained by an approxi- 
mately equal amount of practice, we shall find that the period 
lying between twenty and twenty-five years is the optimal 
age of memorial efficiency. In any discussion of the possi- 
bility of eliminating individual differences of memory, and of 
making all memories conform to a common type we must 



360 The Psychology of Learning 

distinguish between real defects of memory and such cases of 
one-sidedness of ideational type as are due solely to a predom- 
inance of certain sense-elements in an individual's stock of 
imagery. The case of Dodge may be cited to illustrate a 
defect in auditory imagery. When auditory imagery and the 
memory of tones are lacking to such a degree as in Dodge's 
case, it seems probable that practice, no matter how long- 
continued, would not produce any marked result. So great 
a degree of lack of development of a particular sort of imagery 
occurs but seldom however. In all of the individuals whom 
I have investigated the sensory qualities of all modalities 
were to some degree represented by imagery, although a 
marked predominance of some particular sense-modahty could 
be observed in certain cases. In all such cases, it seems to be 
possible to make the equipment symmetrical and well-rounded 
by a process of training. 

It is natural, however, to institute a comparison between 
the brilHant success which has attended the systematic train- 
ing of memory in laboratory experiments and the dismal fail- 
ure of the schools in the training of this function. It might 
be supposed that the slight improvement in the formal func- 
tion of memory during the school-years could not be explained 
solely from the fact that children learn by means of unprac- 
tical and imperfect methods, because experience teaches us 
that a bodily or mental function improves even when its 
training has not been done in accordance with the most appro- 
priate methods. This consideration indicates that there may 
be a deeper reason for all improvement which results from 
training. I have repeatedly observed in my laboratory 
experiments that every improvement in mental or bodily 
skill which results from practice is, in the last analysis, a 
phenomenon of will. We profit from continued practice only 
in proportion as we incite the will to progress and arouse an 



Associative Learning 361 

intention to improve. The mere repetition of an act, even 
though it be repeated daily, is by no means sufficient to bring 
about an improvement in the execution of the act; one may 
even fall into a mechanical routine during which no improve- 
ment appears even though the acti\'ity be repeated hundreds 
of times. 

So long as the observer in a psychological experiment does 
not suspect that he is able to improve in a mental capacity, 
improvement is sure to be lacking; but so soon as we arouse 
his intention to perfect the activity which is being practised 
the improvement itself ensues. This statement is confirmed 
by the result of an interesting experimental observation. 
Radossawljewitsch '^ began a series of experiments in my 
laboratory with an observer who had not yet fully mastered 
the German language. He had failed to understand the object 
to be attained in the learning of the nonsense syllables; and 
the repetitions continued to be non-effective until he under- 
stood his instructions. The will to memorize was now aroused ; 
and now, for the first time, the repetitions became effective. 

This phenomenon, which was thus revealed to me by inci- 
dental observations in the laboratory has been made the sub- 

' Radossawljewitsch describes the incident as follows: "G. vol- 
unteered to serve as an observer in my investigation. Before the 
experiments began I showed him the apparatus and demonstrated 
the method. At that time he knew but little German, and did not 
fully understand my description; but he sat down before the apparatus 
and began to read aloud a series of eight syllables. He read it twenty, 
thirty, forty, even forty-six times without announcing to me that he 
had committed it to memory, as he had been requested to do in my 
instructions. I had begun to fear that the experiment would not be 
a success, and after the forty-sixth repetition I stopped the apparatus 
and asked him whether he could recite the series. 'What! Am I to 
learn the series by heart? ' was his response. He still required six more 
repetitions; but he reached his goal without difficulty." CJ. Rados- 
sawljewitsch, Op. cit., 127. 



362 The Psychology of Learning 

ject of a special investigation by Judd.^ Judd arranged an 
experiment in which a number of observers, whose hands 
were obscured from view behind a screen, drew oblique hues 
from a copy which lay before them. They did not see their 
hands, nor did they know with what degree of accuracy they 
accompHshed their task; and in consequence, their practice 
was non-effective. From Judd's statements it seems to me 
to follow that the will to form a habit or to improve by prac- 
tice demands, above all else, the controlling influence of a 
consciousness of improvement, and indeed for a two-fold 
reason, — i. in order to have a standard by reference to which 
the individual may determine the amount of his improve- 
ment; and 2. in order to guide the practice qualitatively in 
the right direction. Judd shows that if this control is lacking, 
a falsely directed and inappropriate habit may be formed 
which is difficult subsequently to eradicate. 

Thus an intellectual and a volitional factor co-operate when 
we improve by practice. Intellect furnishes the standard, 
shows the quality of the defect which is to be overcome, and 
prescribes the direction in which improvement must take 
place. These constitute the content of the idea of success or 
improvement which directs the whole process. The volitional 
factor appears to consist in the energy, the intensity and the 
persistence with which this idea of improvement is fixated and 
with which practice is repeated under its influence. 

All of this information is of prime importance for pedagogy. 
It shows us that i. the arousal of the will to improve is of 
fundamental significance in all mental and bodily improve- 
ment, and 2. that this will cannot be a mere "empty" 

' C. H. Judd, Practice without Knowledge of Results, Psychol. 
Rev. Mon. Supp., VII., 1905, 185-198; see 'also C. H. Judd, Practice 
and its Effects in the Perception of Illusions, Psychol. Rev., IX., 
1902, 27-39. 



Associative Learning 363 

volition; it must be gauged by fixed standards and it must be 
under the constant control of the end. In our every-day 
affairs we have similar experiences. Whoever has learned an. 
athletic game is familiar with the phenomenon that he soon 
reaches a certain stage of skill or efficiency where his progress 
seems to cease, but that his skill and efficiency both improve 
again when he compares himself with others who have made 
greater progress in the same game. By this means the will to 
improve is aroused; and now the efficiency itself improves. 
This constitutes the basis for the significance of standards in 
all human efficiency and development; the pace-maker im- 
proves the efficiency of the bicychst or at least holds it up to 
its maximum. A similar phenomenon is observed throughout 
the whole mental domain. A single original genius who sets 
up new standards for the art and the science of his genera- 
tion and estabhshes a higher "record" of ability and scholar- 
ship can raise the efficiency of hundreds of lesser geniuses of 
his generation. The art of a country or of a people is often- 
times found to be raised to a higher level by coming into 
contact with people of superior culture or of superior artistic 
achievement. The higher standard, with which the artist 
compares himself, itself gives rise to a higher art. This may 
perhaps explain why the art of the miniature painters, the 
frescoes of the Byzantine and Roman periods, the grotesque 
smile of Gothic sculpture, as well as the jejune poetry of an 
Opitz should have met with admiration in their generation; 
neither the artist nor the layman of that time knew the possi- 
bilities of art. 

Returning from this digression to the development of mem- 
ory in school-children, we now discover the real reason why 
the development is so slight in spite of their daily exercises in 
learning. The will of the child is not directed toward an 
increase of formal memorial efficiency itself, but is directed in 



364 The Psychology of Learning 

one-sided fashion toward an acquisition of certain definite 
data. This explains why, notwithstanding his daily training 
in memory and in immediate reproduction, the child's progress 
in these two functions appears to be conditioned solely by his 
increase in age, and is entirely disproportionate to the actual 
use which is meanwhile being made of his memory. In our 
laboratory experiments, on the other hand, the intention to 
improve one's memory is awakened from the first moment 
onward, the real experiments having been prefaced by pre- 
liminary exercises in which the observer practised until max- 
imum efficiency was attained. Thus it comes about that 
even school-children, when they take part in laboratory experi- 
ments, soon show a considerable improvement in memorial 
ability. And this again indicates the necessity of school 
exercises in learning, in which besides the material end,— the 
acquisition of data, — the formal proficiency of memory itself 
shall be sought. 



APPENDIX I 

THE CONSTRUCTION OF SERIES OF NONSENSE SYLLABLES 

The method of constructing series of nonsense-syllables was 
systematized by Miiller and Schumann. They had found 
that when syllables are arranged in random order, as in the 
experiments of Ebbinghaus, the different series present unequal 
degrees of difficulty. And they stated that this lack of uni- 
formity is due to the fact that a series of syllables is more 
easily memorized: " i. When it contains alliterations, that is, 
when adjacent syllables begin with the same consonant; 
2. when consecutive syllables rhyme; j. when consecutive 
syllables or the initial syllables of consecutive rhythmic groups 
contain the same vowel or diphthong; 4. when the initial 
consonant of the first syllable and the final consonant of the 
second syllable of a rhythmic group of two syllables are 
identical, or when the final consonant of a syllable and the 
initial consonant of the succeeding syllable are identical; 
5. when two or more syllables make a word (Berlin) or a 
phrase (send us). On the other hand, learning is hindered 
by a frequent recurrence of diphthongs or of consonants which 
are difficult to pronounce, such as sch and z. When two 
syllables belonging to the same series are similar, — for instance, 
if two of their letters are identical, — the learning of the series 
may be rendered more easy, although, if the similarity causes 
confusion, the series is rendered more difficult." 

"In order to make the various series of syllables as nearly 

uniform and as comparable with one another as possible" 

Miiller and Schumann employed only 'normal series' of 

twelve syllables, which had been constructed in accordance 

25 365 



366 Appendix I 

with a special method. "Each of the seventeen initial con- 
sonants, b, d, f, g, h, j, k, 1, m, n, p, r, s, t, w, z, sch, was 
written upon a small card. These cards were shuffled and put 
into a box where they could not be seen by the experimenter. 
Cards containing the vowels and diphthongs, a, e, i, o, u, ae, 
oe, ue, au, ei, eu, were put into a second box; and cards con- 
taining the twelve final consonants, f, k, 1, m, n, p, r, s, t, z, 
sch, were put into a third box. In the constructing of a 
'normal series,' three cards bearing an initial consonant, a 
vowel, and a final consonant were taken at random from the 
three boxes, and the letters upon these three cards were com- 
bined to form the first syllable. The letters upon the cards 
next selected made up the second syllable, etc. Letters which 
had been used for the making of a syllable were, of course, 
not returned to their respective boxes until the construction 
of that series had been completed. By this means we fulfilled 
the condition that all of the initial and final consonants of a 
series should be different. One of the vowels or diphthongs 
had to be used twice in each series since we had only eleven 
of these letters at our disposal. But the two syllables which 
contained the same vowel were always separated from each 
other by at least two other syllables. Soon after the beginning 
of our investigation we made a distinction between aa and a, 
long a and short a, in order to increase the number of our 
vowels and diphthongs to twelve. 

"This procedure in the constructing of our syllables en- 
abled us to prevent the recurrence of alliteration, rhyme, and 
assonance as well as to obviate the frequent repetition, within 
any series, of diphthongs and of consonants which were diffi- 
cult to pronounce. But we had still to arrange for the exclu- 
sion of the conditions which we mentioned under 4 and 5. 
This was accompHshed in the following way: In adding any 
new syllable to those that had already been constructed, the 



Appendix I 367 

experimenter always took the precaution to observe whether 
either of these objectionable features was being introduced. 
If it was, the new syllable was inserted at the next appropriate 
place which could be found for it, — usually at a place nearer 
the end of the series; only when this was not possible was it 
given a place nearer the beginning. 

At the outset Miiller and Schumann entered the syllables 
in a ' syllable-book ' where they were arranged in alphabetical 
order, in order to check off those syllables which had already 
been employed. It is essential that one avoid a second use 
of the same syllable, at least within the interval of time during 
which they might seem familiar to the learner. They subse- 
quently adopted the plan of recording the syllables in a table 
instead of in the book, a procedure which made it more easy 
to check them off. The table contained sixteen vertical columns 
for the sixteen initial consonants which may be employed and 
twelve horizontal rows for the vowels and diphthongs. 

"When a syllable had been constructed in the manner 
described by withdrawing an initial consonant, a vowel or 
diphthong and a final consonant from the boxes, if the syllable 
was such as could be used, its final consonant was entered in 
that square of the table which fell in the horizontal row corre- 
sponding to the initial consonants of the syllables and in the 
vertical column corresponding to the vowels or diphthongs of 
the syllables. And at the same time we added to the tabular 
record the serial number of the day on which the syllable was 
to be used. In deciding whether or not any syllable might 
be presented at any given time, the experimenter need only 
glance at the column where its final consonant was entered to 
assure himself as to whether and on what day it had already 
been presented. If it had been employed within the last ten 
days, another syllable was chosen." Certain syllables were 
excluded because they seemed to be particularly difficult to 



368 Appendix II 

pronounce, for instance, zaesch, zaech, zoesch, schaach, 
schaech, schaesch, schisch, etc. The result was that a total 
of 22 lo syllables could be used. Miiller and Schumann also 
lay especial emphasis upon the fact that the composition of 
the series of syllables is wholly withdrawn from the control of 
the experimenter; that is, it becomes a wholly impersonal and 
automatic matter. 

APPENDIX II 

THE MEANING OF ECONOMY OF TIME AND ENERGY IN 
LEARNING 

The meaning of economy and technique of learning is not 
so simple as might be supposed; and one finds it difficult to 
clear up their meanings for the following reasons: These 
terms are usually employed to mean the saving of time and 
energy which results from the use of a particular method of 
learning for the attainment of a particular goal or a particular 
result as compared with the use of another method. The sav- 
ing which is effected by employing any one method is always 
measured in relation to other methods, and always in relation 
to some particular memorial effect or goal of learning. 

We must first explain what is meant by saving time and 
energy, and what is the relation between the two; and then 
we shall describe the different memorial effects or goals of 
learning which one may attain or attempt to attain in relative 
independence of one another. For instance, if it should be 
found that one method has the effect of leading rapidly to a 
first recitation from memory but does not have the effect of 
securing permanent retention, while another method leads 
less rapidly to a first errorless recitation but secures a more 
permanent retention, the former method appears to be more 



Appendix II 369 

economical for the attainment of a first errorless recitation but 
uneconomical in so far as permanent retention is concerned. 
It is evident then that one can determine whether a given 
method is economical or uneconomical only by determining 
how much time and energy are expended in attaining a par- 
ticular memorial effect, and then comparing this measurement 
with measurements made from other methods which seek to 
attain the same result by other means. 

For this reason no determination of the economy of a method 
can ever possess universal validity; one can do no more than 
reach a decision which holds for the momentary purpose which 
the learner has in view. Certain measurements of economy 
of time and energy which have been made by G. E. Miiller 
and his students (Steffens, Ephrussi) are to be evaluated in 
the Ught of this fact. 

Since economy of learning depends upon the purpose or 
result which is momentarily desired, it is especially important 
to have a clear understanding of the extraordinary variety of 
memorial effects which may be attained by means of obser- 
vational noting, or learning in the narrower sense. Certain 
chief varieties of memorial effect which come in for considera- 
tion here must be differentiated: i. From the point of view 
of the interval which elapses between acquisition and repro- 
duction we must distinguish between imxTiediate retention, 
transitory retention and permanent retention. '^ 2. From the 
point of view of material effect we must distinguish between 
completeness and fidelity of remembering, and the retention 
of different sorts of materials, — such as sensations, spatial and 
temporal relations, objects, processes, meaningless and mean- 
ingful materials, poetry, prose, etc. j. From the point of 
view of formal memorial effect we must distinguish between 
the acquisition of elements and the formation of associations 

' Sec pp. 34ff. 



370 Appendix II 

between elements, — for instance, associations between pairs 
or between groups of elements, uniform associations of all the 
members of the series, analytical and synthetical retention, — 
types of retention which are illustrated when the learner 
knows in advance that he will be tested by means of the 
TrefermdJiode or by the Ersparnismethode, — together with 
purely anterogressive and purely retrogressive associations, 
and uniformly secure associations of all the elements of a group 
of materials with one another; and finally the amount of 
material must also be taken into consideration. 4. From the 
point of view of reproduction we must distinguish between 
rapidity, certainty, fidehty, and completeness of reproduction. 

The determination of the economy of a method of learning 
may possibly be brought into relation with each of these 
partial points of view. Any procedure in learning may be 
more economical than any other from each partial point of 
view. 

When we consider the manifold variety of memorial effects, 
and when we further take into consideration the fact that 
each of these memorial effects may be the specific purpose for 
which an act of learning is undertaken, we see how recklessly 
decisions regarding economy of time and energy have often- 
times been reached in the school of G. E. Miiller. Both Miss 
Steffens and Miss Ephrussi fail to appreciate that such deci- 
sions must be purely relative matters; it is wholly impossible 
to reach any general conclusion regarding the economy of a 
method by an exclusive use of the TrefermetJiode which has 
been so extensively employed by Mtiller's students. The 
determination of the number of correct associates decides 
nothing excepting the general question as to whether or not 
such a procedure is useful for the attainment of the wholly 
special effect of estabhshing pairs of associations, and the 
special question as to what is their degree of stability. 



Appendix II 371 

In addition to these variations which are due to variations 
in the purpose of our act of learning, differences in economy of 
time and energy must also be taken into consideration; and 
the question arises as to how economy of time and of energy 
can be measured. Several difficulties are involved here. 

One might be tempted to suppose that economy of time is 
distinct from economy of energy because one speaks of an 
economy of time when one refers to a saving in the amount 
of time which is expended upon an act of learning, and one 
speaks of an economy of energy in cases where a saving of 
energy is effected. Nor can there be any question that one 
can always measure the sa\'ing of time readily and unequivo- 
cally from a comparison of learning-times. It is more difficult 
to measure one's saving of energy, and to make clear its rela- 
tion to one's saving of time. The gain in time may represent 
a saving in energy because the procedure which leads to the 
goal in the shortest time is also most economical of energy, 
pro\ided that equal demands were made upon the learner's 
energy, per unit of time, by each of the procedures. But on 
the other hand, the saving of time may be effected at the cost 
of an increased expenditure of energy; the intensity of the 
learner's work may now be so great that a greater amount of 
energy is expended than would be demanded by another pro- 
cedure where the learner works longer but less intensively. 

The fact that one procedure requires a greater expenditure 
of time than another for the attainment of an equal memorial 
result gives rise to a similar duahty of relationship; the 
increased expenditure of time may entail a saving of energy 
or a loss of energy. When one procedure demands more time 
than another for the attainment of the same goal, the increased 
expenditure of time and the increased duration of the learner's 
work may give rise to a mode of working which is of such 
slight intensity and which entails such a slight expenditure 



372 Appe7idix II 

of energy that the total expenditure of energy is less during 
the slower procedure than during the faster procedure. But 
when the slower procedure involves a greater intensity of 
work it demands, of course, a greater expenditure of energy. 
In the economy of energy, however, we are concerned not 
only with the intensity of work as such but also with the advent 
of fatigue, because we always endeavor to give rise to as little 
fatigue as possible. If now the amount of fatigue may be 
regarded as an index of the amount of time and of the intensity 
of work devoted to the task, then the amount of fatigue may 
be regarded as a measure of the amount of energy expended. 
Unfortunately this is not the case; the phenomenon of fatigue 
complicates still further the problem of determining economy 
of energy because the degree of fatigue present in an individual 
varies not with the absolute amount of his work but with the 
ratio between demand and supply of certain materials in his 
organism. This relation may be subject, at different times in 
the same individual, to the influence of wholly different 
causes than time and intensity of work, — for instance, emo- 
tional condition, especially prevailing unpleasantness, previous 
fatigue, and the like. 

The amount of fatigue which is present after an act of 
learning need not therefore be a simple index of the time and 
the intensity of the work expended, but it may be a product 
of secondary causes. Hence if we are to be able to measure 
the amount of energy which is devoted to an act of learning 
we must discover a direct means of measuring intensity of 
work. This measure may perhaps be found in the different 
number of repetitions employed by the learner in acts of 
learning which are of equal length. If he devotes now more, 
now fewer repetitions to the attainment of a given memorial 
effect, learning-time and amount of material being constant, 
then in the former case he must have worked more intensively 



Appendix II 373 

and he must have devoted more energy to the task. That the 
increased number of repetitions is nothing more than a merely 
temporal factor is more apparent than real, for every increase 
in the number of repetitions in a given unit of time means 
that an increased amount of energy is expended. Repetition 
is, in the nature of the case, a temporal factor; it means a 
reduplication of mental work,— that is, an increased expendi- 
ture of energy. This is due to the fact that an increase in the 
number of repetitions necessitates a corresponding increase in 
the activity of speaking, including its motor, sensory and 
intellectual components. Hence one may say that so long as 
one cannot directly measure intensity of psycho-physical work, 
the measure of economy of energy is to be found in the increased 
number of repetitions and in the degree of fatigue which they 
produce. The latter is the less rehable of these two criteria 
because fatigue not only depends upon the amount of work 
which is necessitated by the method of learning itself but is 
also influenced by numerous contributing causes which may 
exist independently and vary independently of the particular 
method of learning. 

Our discussion may be summarized in the statement that 
that method of learning is most economical which secures a 
particular memorial effect or attains a particular memorial 
purpose in the shortest time, with the least number of repeti- 
tions and with the minimum degree of fatigue; and this 
method may be regarded as the most economical only with 
reference to this memorial effect and this memorial purpose. 
Of these three determinations, the learning-time measures the 
economy of time; while the economy of energy is measured by 
the number of repetitions and, in less precise form, by the 
amount of fatigue. No other accurate means of measurement 
is at our disposal. It may be that the measurement of atten- 
tion, — especially the measurement of the inhibiting effect of 



374 Appendix III 

attention, — will some day furnish us with a direct means of 
measuring intensity of work. In his psycho-dynamics, Leh- 
mann attempts to take the intensity of work into account in 
measuring the economy of working. But his discussion is not 
based upon empirical findings, and we can not here discuss 
these purely hypothetical considerations. The reader is re- 
ferred to a recent criticism of Lehmann's position. ^ 



APPENDIX III 

ADDENDA FROM THE MOST RECENT LITERATURE 

In an investigation of the memory of mental defectives 
Gregor^ distinguishes between a'' normal" and a "successive" 
type of learner. In the act of memorizing a series of nonsense 
syllables, the former learns the initial and the final syllables 
of the series before the middle region of the series is acquired ; 
the latter learns the initial syllable of the series first, and then 
progresses through the series mastering each successive syllable 
in consecutive order. I have never found that the latter 
represents a constant type of learner, although I have some- 
times observed that certain learners vary between the two 
procedures. Hellmut Miiller^ reports that his mental defec- 
tives almost invariably proceeded in the "normal" fashion in 
the learning of nonsense syllables. This author also found 
that the part-procedure was the more advantageous method 
of learning in the case of mental defectives, — a lesser resistance 

^ H. Miiller, Zur Oekonomie des Lernens bei geistesschwachen Per- 
sonen, Sommer's Klinik f. psych, u. ncrv. Krankheiten, VI., 1911, 121- 
157; see 135 and elsewhere. 

^ M. Gregor, Beitrage zur Psychopathologie des Gedachtnisses. 
Monatsschr. f. Psychiat. u. Neurol., XXV., 1909, 218-255; 339-386. 

^ H. MuUer, Loc. cit. 



Appendix III 375 

to f-atigue apparently being an essential characteristic of their 
learning. 

G. E. Miiller^ has remarked that "there is a tendency to 
estimate the value of investigations of the economy of learning 
in terms of the applicability of their results to the affairs of 
practical life, and especially to the affairs of the school-room." 
And he adds that "this is a very narrow point of view"; 
investigations of this sort are, in the opinion of Professor 
Miiller, significant for psychologists chiefly on account of their 
heuristic value. I know of no psychologist or educator who 
has evaluated these investigations from a purely practical 
point of view; and both the form and the content of this 
random polemic seem to be wholly unwarranted. Professor 
Miiller appears to have confused two radically different issues 
here. That the pedagogical and practical significance of in- 
vestigations of the economy of learning should be emphasized 
in a treatise which is written for a pedagogical purpose is 
one matter; that the practical point of view should be made 
the sole criterion in estimating the general psychological value 
of such investigations is a wholly different matter. When a 
critic fails to appreciate the fact that the standards by which 
a book is to be judged depend upon the purpose for which the 
book was written, it is the critic, not the author, who lays 
himself open to the charge of "lack of breadth." I have re- 
frained from discussing certain details of Professor Miiller 's 
monograph for the reason that they do not seem to me to 
be of service in pedagogy; and many of his polemical criti- 
cisms have not been considered in this third edition because I 
can not accept the views regarding "precision" in psycho- 
logical experimentation upon which his criticisms are based. 

' G. E. Miiller, Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistatigkeit und dcs Vorstell- 
ungsverlaujs, (Zeitschr. f. Psychol., Erganzungsband V.) Leipzig, 191 1, 
I., 402. 



2,^6 Appendix III 

I shall illustrate these views by a single example from which 
the reader may judge how this polemic is, in my opinion, to 
be regarded. 

In Dr. M. K. Smith's investigation of the most advanta- 
geous rhythm, to which frequent reference has been made in 
the foregoing pages, the act of learning under the influence 
of each particular rhythm was in each instance continued for 
four days, after having been preceded by prehminary experi- 
ments for a period of five days. Professor Mliller finds that 
this investigation was ''inexact," "not only because the number 
of experiments was not sufficiently great but chiefly because 
the influence of practice was not sufficiently taken into 
account." This is a characteristically Miillerian criticism. 
There was an absence of "great numbers of experiments" 
which according to Professor Miiller's idea of precision con- 
stitutes the salvation of all experimental psychology. Every 
psychologist, however, who possesses a modicum of experience 
in experimentation must grant that with increasing practice 
the differences in the effects of the different rhythms upon the 
act of learning become less and less, and with maximum 
practice they wholly disappear. And everyone who does not 
cherish Professor Miiller's idea of precision knows that these 
differences are most clearly present with moderate degrees of 
practice. During the progress of Dr. Smith's experiments I 
investigated the influence of different forms of rhyme upon 
the act of learning. The results of all of my observers showed 
that the different effect of different sorts of rhyme upon the 
act of learning came to light only during the initial stage of 
practice; after a certain amount of practice every observer 
obtained the same learning-effect from each of the sorts of 
rhyme which we employed, — i.e., practice had eliminated the 
differences. Over and above this. Dr. Smith found confirma- 
tion in the experimental result that our most highly practised 



Appendix III Zll 

learners found no difference between the effects of trochaic 
and iambic rhythms. In my own case, no difference in effect 
of learning with trochaic and iambic rhythms is found because 
practice has eliminated any differences which may have been 
present at the outset; even the trisyllabic rhythms produce 
no noticeable difference in the effect of learning. Hence the 
point at issue is not so much a "lack of precision" on the part 
of Dr. Smith as it is a tendency on the part of Professor 
Miiller to judge **in accordance with schema F." 



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Winch, W. H., The Transfer of Improvement in Memory in School- 
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CHAPTERS IL, III. and IV. FUNCTIONS OF MEMORY; THE 
ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONAL NOTING; THE EX- 
PERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF OBSERVATIONAL 
NOTING 

Alexander-Schafer, G., Zur Frage der Beeinflussung des Gedachtnisses 
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384 Bibliography 

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INDEX OF AUTHORS 



Albien, 329. 

Angell, sec Coovcr and Angell. 

Aristotle, 13. 

Baade, 120, 128, 130, 270. 

Bach, 200. 

Baldwin, 82, 226. 

Ballet, 180, 197, 207, 208, 209, 210, 

213, 230. 
Bernstein, 108, in, 116, 117. 
Bernstein and Bogdanoff, 108, 116, 

117,319- 
van Biervliet, 350, 351. 
Bigham, 340. 
Binet, 88, 89, 179, 197, 207, 213, 214, 

215, 217, 220, 222, 230, 307, 348. 
Binet and Henri, 82, 88, 136, 142, 

143, 144, 307, 318, 321, 329, 348. 
Bleuler, 18. 

Bogdanoff, 108, 116, 117. 
Boldt, 104, 108, 112, 119. 
Bolton, 245, 318, 320. 
Borst, 120, 128, 130. 
Bourdon, 318, 348. 
Breukink, 128, 129, 130. 
Broca, 215. 
Brodmann, 108. 
Burgerstein, 179. 

Charcot, 180, 207, 212, 213, 214, 215. 
Cohn, 225. 
Cooley, 319, 323. 
Coover and Angell, 355. 

Decroly and Degand, 319, 321. 

Diderot, 210. 

Diehl, III. 

Dodge, 193, 200, 202, 206, 211, 212, 

213, 360. 
Dlirr, 261. 
Diirr-Borst. 107. 
Dvorak, 209. 

Ebbinghaus, 33, 141 156, 159, 160, 
162, 163, 165, 217, 232, 234, 236, 



38s 



246, 260, 261, 26s, 267, 27s, 
276, 277, 278, 306, 307, 330, 

331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 365- 
Ebert and Meumann, 143, 235, 290, 

291, 293, 296, 314, 319, 353, 354. 
Eckhardt, 224, 230. 
Egger, 207, 210. 
Ellison, 319. 
Ephrussi, 235, 240, 251, 260, 262, 

263,370. 
Exner, 176. 

Feuerbach, 197. 

Finzi, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 

loi, 104, 182, 183, 184. 
Forel, 3. 
Freud, 18. 
Froebel, 186. 
Fuchs, 284. 

Galton, 156, 207, 210, 213. 
Goldstein, 104, 108, in, 112, 113, 

114, 115. 
Gregor, 374. 
Gross, 99. 

Haeckel, 3. 
Hartley, 207. 
Hawkins, 154. 
Heidenhain, 82. 
Hensen, 3. 
Hering, 3. 
Hoffding, 31. 
Hume, 13. 

Jacobs, 262, 263, 272, 286, 319. 

Jastrow, 89. 

Jost, 265, 266, 285. 

Judd, 362. 

Jung, 18. 

Katzaroff, 273. 

Kerchensteiner, 200. 

Knors 268, 275. 

Kraemer, 260, 273, 290, 296, 304, 343. 



386 



Index of Authors 



Kraepelin, 6, 87, 89, 93, 207, 227, 

281, 283. 
Kramer, loi, 102. 
Kraus, loi. 
Kronfeld, 18. 
Kussmaul, 207. 

von Laar, 197. 

Lay, 154, 200, 224, 225. 

Lehmann, 374. 

Leibnitz, 207. 

Lewin, 82. 

Lipmann, 120, 128, 130, 138. 

Lobsien, 107, 108, 224, 226, 230, 

319. 325- 
Locke, 13. 

Mach, 3. 

Macmillan, 319. 

Magneff, 331. 

Martius, 250. 

Mayer, 346, 348. 

Meumann, 83, 96, 97, 108, 120, 126, 
143, 147, 189, 203, 204, 229, 240, 
249, 257, 264, 277, 319. 347, 377- 
{See also Ebert and Meumann.) 

Meyer, 270. 

Moebius, 198. 

Mozart, 206. 

MiiUer, G. E., 23, 153, iS6, 161, 163, 
170, 196, 214, 23s, 251, 262, 
263, 264, 265, 314, 347. 369, 

375,376,377- , . ^^ ^ 

MuUer and Pilzecker, 146, 166, 167, 

271, 273, 286. 
Miiller and Schumann, 161, 164, 

165, 263, 271, 365, 366, 367, 368, 

370- 
MiiUer, H., 235, 374- 
Muensterberg and Bigham, 97, 154, 

325- 

Nagel, 264, 314- 

Netschajeff, 48, loS, 119, 131, 208, 

224,352,353- 
Neumann, 235, 250, 254, 255. 
Nussbaumer, 200. 

Ogden, 260, 273. 
Oppenheimer, 107, 120, 128. 

Paulhan, 88. 

Pentschew, 235, 270, 314, 331, 347- 

Pestalozzi, 186, 351. 



Pfeiffer, 200, 207, 224, 225, 226, 

227, 230. 
Philippe, 93. 
Pohlmann, 141, 142, 144, i4S> ^Si. 

152, 153, 154, 15s, 182, 224, 226, 

230, 269, 270, 273. 
Popp, 197. 

Queyrat, 226. 

Radossawljewitsch, 32, 185, 186, 
234, 245, 314, 332, 333, 361- 

Ranschburg, 9, 102, 103, 104, 108, 
no, III, 114, 115, 120, 131. 

Regnault, 197. 

Reinhold, loi. 

Ribot, 207. 

Riklin, 18. 

Rodenwaldt, 8, 107, 108, 119, 123, 
124, 125, 136. 

Roller, 346. 

Romer, 131. 

Scherer, 210. 

Schmidt, 270, 346. 

Schneider, loi. 

Schorbler, 108, 120, 126. 

Schuyten, 319. 

Segal, 97, 150, 207, 228. 

Semon, 3. 

Sharp, 88. 

Shaw, 82. 

Smedley, 319, 323, 325. 

Smith, M. K., 263, 314, 33i, 376, 377- 

Steffens, 235, 237, 238, 239, 243, 

347,368,370. 
Stern, 99, 106, 107, 119, 120, 121, 

123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 133, 

136, 137, 138, 145- 
Stbrring, 207. 
Strieker, 211, 213. 
Stumpf, 206, 209. 

Taine, 207. 
Titchener, 87, 88, 92. 
van der Torren, 130. 
Tracy, 209. 
Twain, 211. 

Vogt, 89, 90, 91,92. 

Warren, 82. 
Weber, 26S, 275. 



Index of Authors 387 

Wells, 227. Wolfe, 80. 

Wernicke, 207. Wolfskehl, loi. 

Wesseley, 256, 257. Wreschner, 107, 119, 124, 225. 

Wigan, 197. Wundt, 98, 156. 

Winch, 319, 322, 323, 355, 356. 

Winteler, 179. Ziehen, 156, 207, 224, 226. 

Witasek, 235, 273, 274. Zonefi and Meumann, 280. 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



Abnormalities and defects, 90, 101, 
103, 112, 113, 180, 198, 204, 206, 
209,212,223,374. 

accuracy of observation, i32f. 

accumulated vs. distributed repeti- 
tions, 258, 265f. 

additional repetitions, 267f. 

adjustment of attention, 57f., 71, 
8s,i74ff. 

adjustment in learning, 303, 305, 
306, 328. 

advantages of whole-procedure, 238f., 
24ifif., 248ff., 307, 335, 375. 

age and memorial capacity, ii7ff., 
245ff-, 257f., 320, 325, 347, 348. 
(See also Children vs. adults.) 

advantages of mediating procedures, 

age and memorial training, 359. 

age of associations, 266. 

agraphia, 223. 

aids in rational learning, 298f. 

aims in learning, 36-39, 231, 288, 

368-371. 
alexia, 223. 
amount of material, 147, 2745., 

29of., 334. 
anatomical basis of memory, 2fif., 

iiff. 
aphasia, 223. 
artistic endowment, 178, 190, 197, 

200. 
assimilation, gS., 52ff., 76, 132, 133, 

135, 2i9f., 256. 
association and attention, i6f., 44, 

157, 278. 
association and emotion, i6ff. 
association psychology, i3f. 
association t>'pes, 210. 
associative learning, 35, 36ff., 139!?. 
attention, i6f., 44, 50, 52, 62fi[., 66ff., 

7of., 8iff., 86ff., 104, no, 115, 

137, 153. 166, I74ff., 194, 201, 

203, 279. 
attitude in learning, 3035., 328. 



auditory imagery, 96, 183, 191, 1931!., 

204, 207, 209, 212, 218, 223, 226, 

230. 
auditory-motor ideation, 183, 185, 

196, 208, 217, 221, 223, 229, 265, 

271. 
auditory type, 8off., 191, 193, 194, 

200, 203, 2o8f., 269, 313. 
Aufgabe, 287. 
automatization, 26. 

Behavior of attention, no, 139, 
141, 159, 166, 170, i74ff., i77f., 
240, 243, 252f., 254, 261, 276, 
279, 32 7flf. 

Children vs. adults, 48, 66, 119, 122, 

125, 185, 224f., 236fiF., 244fif., 

257f-, 265, 3_i8ff., 347, 349f., 359. 
capacity of immediate retention, 

I4iff., 
causes of tj^pical variations, i74f., 

I9if., i97ff. 
classification of ideational types, 

i8o£f., 196, 2045. 
classification of memories, 34ff., 46ff. 
combination types of ideation, 204, 

206, 210. 
compass of memory, i4iff., 146, 319. 
compass of immediate retention, 44. 
concrete ideation, 180, i88ff., 194, 

196, 204, 205, 210, 211, 224 
concrete thinking, See concrete 

ideation, 
conditions of association, i4fT. 
conditions of observation, sgS., 695. 
connate endowment, 171, 198, 200. 
curve of forgetting, 83, 85, 93, 95f., 

loif., 107, 146, 173. 
cross-examination, 106, 1232. 

Defects of ideation, 204. 
definition of memory, i. 
development of memory. See Children 
vs. adults. 



389 



390 



Index of Subjects 



Diamandi, 214, 2i8£f., 221. 
differences between immediate and 

permanent retention, 40-45, ii3f., 

115 131, 141, 174, 195- 
disadvantages of part-procedure, 233, 

238-244. 
disadvantages of whole-procedure, 

252, 
distributed vs. acctunulated repeti- 
tions, 258, 265f. 
dispositions, 2ff., iiff., 2-jS.. 
dispositional psychology, 32f. 
distractions, 44, 87!!., Qoff., 98, 114, 

215, 216, 218. 
distraction method, 2i7f., 228. 
■irDodge, 193, 200, ^o2, 206, 211, 212, 

213, 360. 
dramatic type, 210. 

Economical learning, 23iff., 240, 324. 
effect of amount of material, 2742., 

334- 
effect of additional repetitions, 267f. 
effect of attempted recitation, 273f. 
effect of attention, 278, 279, 308, 

341,343- 
effect of emotion, 28if. 
effect of habituation, 285. 
effect of ideational type, 285. 
effect of mode of presentation, 269, 

323,325,340. 
effect of practice, 284, 376. 
effect of will, 283, 287, 303, 315, 

361, 3622. 
efficiency of the various types, 97, 98f., 

152, i82ff., 192, 211, 22if., 230, 

28sf., 329f. 
empathy, 204. 
emotion, i6ff., 173. 
emotion and learning, in, 248f., 

28if., 315. 
emotional memory, 46. 
errors in observation, logf., 118, 119, 

128,135. 
errors in testimony, 8, 11 7-138. 
external conditions of observation, 

excessive repetitions, 267ff. 

' Factors which contribute to for- 
getting, 8iff., 146. 
factors which contribute to observa- 
tion, 104. 
factors which determine ideational 



types, 152, 1973., 201, 202, 208, 

210. 
falsifications of memory, 8. 
familiarity, i. 
fatigue, 22, i46f., 165, 247, 277, 322, 

332,346, 372, 374, 375- 
fidelity of memory, 80, 94f., g6f., 

98, 99, 102, 105, ii6f., ii8f., 121, 

T-2,5, 182, 321, 347, 370. 
fluctuations of attention, 8if. 
forgetting, 3if., Biff., 95f., i46f., 

315^-, 33off. ~ ^ 

formal training of memory, 186, 313, 

337, 341, 343, 347, 3Soff- 
frcisteigende ideas, 22ff., 26. 

Ganzmethode, See Whole-procedure, 
general memory, 6f., 34, 352, 353. 
goal-idea, soff., s6f., 6off., 65, 69, 85, 

90, 104, 105, I2lff., I32ff. 

Habituation, 177, 210, 269, 285. 
hindrances in rational learning, 30of. 
histrionic type, 210. 

Ideational procedure, 193. 
ideational types, 152, I79ff., i87ff., 

i97ff., 20iff., 210, 223. 
ideational type and mental efl&ciency, 

211, 221, 230. 
ideational type and mode of presen- 
tation, I44f., i49f. 
imagination and memory, 8ff., 136, 

i8Sf. 
immediate after-effect of imprinting, 

41, 43, loi, 104, 115, 172, 195. 
immediate reproduction, 4off., 105, 

ii2ff., 115, 140, 145, i7if., 174, 

195, 2i6f., 221, 222, 309, 3i7f., 
• 320, 321, 323, 348. 
\/ Inaudi, 214, 2i5ff., 219, 221. 

individual differences in immediate 

reproduction, 326. 
individual differences in learning, 105, 

i68ff., 177. 
individual differences in memory, 

48, i79ff., 313- 
individual differences in observation, 

loi, 102, 113. 
influence of mode of presentation, 

97f., i43f., I47f-, 151-155, I92f., 

226, 269. 
inheritance of ideational endowment, 

iggi., 2i2f. 



Index of Subjects 



391 



inquiring observation, 5sff., 67ff. 
intention, 37, 39, 51, 74, 141, 168, 

176, 303^-. 306, 361. 
interest, 19, 106, i2eff., I34ff., i97f., 

201, 202. 
internal speech, 180, 189, 190, 208, 

210, 211, 219, 223, 228. {See also 

Vocal-motor type, and Histrionic 

type.) 
internal conditions of observation, 

58, 6off., 69f. 
involuntary observation, ssff., 69ff. 
iteration of ideas, 25. 

Jost's law, 266f. 

judgment and memory, 9. {See also 
Assimilation.) 

Law of totality, 31. 
laws of association, I3ff., 26, 27. 
laws of reproduction, isff., igff., 26fl. 
localization, 181, 222, 229, 239, 243, 

27if., 286, 306. 
logical memory, 39, 216. 

Manual-motor memory, 226, 230. 
materials for memorial investigation, 

198, 2i4fE. 
mathematical endowment, 198, 2i4ff. 
mathematical prodigies, 2i4fE. 
meaning, I24f., I39f., 143, i45f., 

190, 207, 212, 243f., 260, 296f., 

341, 343- . , 

meaning of economy in learning, 

23iff., 368. 
mechanical learning, 238, 241, 246, 

248, 25sff., 258, 290, 303, 307f., 309f ., 

341, 358. 
mechanical memory, 244. {See also 

Mechanical learning.) 
mediating procedures, 253f., 343. 
memorial assimilation, 8f. 
memorial dispositions, 27fE. 
memorial terminology, 2ff., iiff., 26f. 
memorial training, sf., loi, 322, 

335ff-, 349ff. 
memory and attention, 83f. 
memory and imagination, 8ff., 136, 

i88f. 
memory and intelligence, 119, 320, 

322f. 

memory and understanding, 34, 35, 
38ff., 137, i39f., 143, 146. {Seealso 
Rational learning.) 



memory for abstract ideas, 46, 48; 
for colors, 8, 82, 112, 124, 125, 134, 
137, 216, 340; for concrete objects, 
46, 48, 112, 124, 126; for emotions, 
340; for geometrical figures, 82, 
116, 216, 322; for letters, 322; for 
numbers, 46, 48, 109, 112, 153, 
216; for persons, 122, 133; for 
pictures, 112, 119, 322; for quanti- 
tative relations, 37; for spatial 
extents, 82; for temporal and spatial 
relations, 46, 48, 49, 124, 125; 
for tones, 46, 48, 8off.; for voli- 
tional processes, 46f.; for words, 
46, 153. 340. 

memory span, i4iff., 146, 347.' 

memory types, i79fT., 313. 

method of aids, 229, 232. 

method of correct associates, io2f., 
i65fif., 251, 37of. 

method of distractions, 218, 228. 

methods of investigating memorial 
problems, 79f., 95, 98, io2f., 106, 
108, i4if., i49f., i55ff., 232, 23s, 

330, 353, 365- . 
methods of learning, 233. 
mixed types, 180, i93f., 195, 205ff., 

2i3f., 224, 227. 
mnemonic devices, i86f., 215, 3iiff. 
modes of presentation, i42ff., i47ff., 

151, 155, i9if., 226, 228f., 269f., 

323ff., 340. 
modern concept of association, 15, 

27, 29. 
modifiability of ideational type, 227. 
motor associations, 47. 
motor imagery, 183, 189, 213, 265. 

{See also Internal speech. Verbal 

thinking, and Histrionic type.) 
motor memory, 47. 
motor type, i8iff., 200, 203, 211, 

212, 218, 310. 
music, 206, 209, 212, 213. 
musical endowment, 178, 190, 200, 

209. 

Natural method of learning, 233, 

235, 237. 
nature and nurture in ideational 

endowment, igSfT. 
nature of the idea, 9fiF. 

Objective and subjective tjpes, 13 2f. 
observational learning, 3, 49-138. 



392 



Index of Subjects 



organic memory, 3. 
over-learning, 26^i. 

Part-procedure, 233ff., 335, 343. 
passively expectant observation, ssff., 

Sgff., 72f. 
pathological cases, 18, 48, loi, I03f., 

inf., 131, 188, 209,211, 223f., 374. 
permanent retention, 4off., 105, ii3f., 

115,195,317,330- 
perseveration, 231!., 251. 
persistence of ideas, 25. 
pertinacity of attention, 87, 90. 
practice, 5, i7of., 173, 227, 246, 247, 

250, 275, 284f., 291, 347, 348, 

359, 376, 377- 

preparation for observation, 56, 67ff., 
71, 72f., 132. 

presentation, See Modes of pre- 
sentation. 

procedure in ideation, 193. 

procedure in learning, See Part- 
procedure, Whole-procedure, Medi- 
ating procedures, and Stages in 
learning. 

progress of forgetting. See Curve of 
forgetting. 

prompting method, 229, 232. 

psychical dispositions, 5. 

psycho-dynamics, 374. 

psycho-pathology, 5, 180, 223. {See 
also Pathological cases.) 

pure types, 192, i93f., 195, 205, 
207, 227. 

purpose, See Intention. 

Rapid learners and slow learners, 

i69ff., 183, 250, 313, 345. 
rational learning, 34, 35, 38f., 137, 

I39ff., 24if., 249, 260, 290-313, 

334, 358. 
recitation, 236, 273f. 
recognition, 317. 
recognition method, 79, 82, 112, 

ii6f., 322. 
reliability of memory, 94f., 96f., 

98, 99, 102, ii6f., 121, 130, 133, 

326. 
repetitive learning, 256. 
reproduction method, 79. 
reproduction tendencies, i9£f., 84. 
Ruckle, 214, 222. 
rhythm in learning, 165, 181, 263f., 

292, 308, 376, 377- 



Saving method, 166. 

scientific endowment, 178, 190, 200. 

selective function of attention, 5of., 

52, 64. 
sense-memory, 46, 79-86. 
sentence structure, 299. 
sex differences, 154, 200, 2 24f. 
similarity and dissimilarity, 95, 1092., 

simultaneous and successive pre- 
sentation, 154, i64f. 
slow learners and rapid learners, 

i69ff., 183, 313, 345. 
specific effect of attention, 44, 157, 

278. 
specific effect of repetition, 44, 157, 

256, 278, 308, 310, 316. 
spontaneous description, 106, 121, 

i23f., 125. 
stability of association, 167. 
stability of ideational type, 200, 225. 
stages in learning, 251, 296, 3i4f. 
stages in observation, siff., 122. 
subjective and objective types, i32f. 
subjective assurance, 99f. 
suggestive questioning, 106, 136. 
superior excellence of logical memory, 

39f., 143, 222, 29of. 
surrogate imagery, 192, 193. 
symbolic imagery, 19 2f. 
synthetic activity of memory, 9, 

3off., 292, 

Teihnethode, See Part-procedure, 
tempo of learning, 145, 172, 259, 

26lff., 272f. 

temporal factors of association, 16. 
temporary retention, 4off., 45. 
testimony, 35, 106-138, 202. 
training in observation, 68ff., 73f., 

100, 102, 125, I27ff., 186. 

training of memory, 5f., loi, i86,35off. 
training of type, i83ff., i97f., 2255., 

transfer of memorial training, 7,3523. 
transformations of ideas, lo-i 2. 
Trejfermdhode, See Method of paired 

associates, 
tj^pe, and mode of presentation, 226, 

228i. 

types of association, 201. {See also 

Mnemonic type.) 
types of attention, 2795., 295, 339, 

343- 



Index of Subjects 



393 



types of ideation, 169-186. 
types of learning, 144, 1655., i69ff., 
180, 236f., 293ff., 304, 306, 336, 

341. 
types of observation, 13 2f. 
types of memory, 1692., lygff., 313. 



Unusual cases of ideation, if 

198, 210, 2Ilff., 2I4fE. 



197, 



Variable behavior of attention, 166. 
variability of type, 200, 226. 
varieties of attention, 4off . 
varieties of observation, ssff., 6of., 102. 
verbal ideation, 145, 180, i88ff., 

196, 210, 213, 224. 
verbal imagery, 189, igof., 205, 207, 

208, 212. 



verbal thinking. See Verbal ideation, 
view-points of observation, 52f., 

65f., IDS, i2if., 123, 126, 134. 
visual imagery, 96, 98, 99, 183, 185, 

194, 19s, 197, 203, 204, 207, 214, 

219, 224ff., 230, 233. 
visual type, i8iff., 191, i95f., 197, 

200, 203, 213, 2i9f., 221, 229, 

260, 27if., 310. 
vocalization, i54f., 161, 217, 218, 

226,_ 23s, _263f[., 285, 310, 373. 
vocal-motor imagery, 191, 207, 210, 

223, 226. 
volitional memory, 46f. 

Whole-procedure, 2336?., 335, 3/13. 
will, 64f., 66, 74f., 115, 139, 283, 
287, 36ifE. 



(1) 



